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This thesis examines the intellectual history of male friendship through its articulation in 
non-Shakespearean early modern drama; and considers how dramatic texts engage with the 
classical ideals of male friendship.  Cicero’s De amicitia provided the theoretical model 
for perfect friendship for the early modern period; and this thesis argues for the further 
relevance of early modern translations of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, and in 
particular, Seneca’s De beneficiis, both of which open up meanings of different 
formulations and practices of friendship. This thesis, then, analyses how dramatists 
contributed to the discourse of male friendship through representations that expanded the 
bounds of amity beyond the paradigmatic ‘one soul in two bodies’, into different 
conceptions of friendship both ideal and otherwise. Through a consideration of selected 
dramatic works in their early modern cultural contexts, this thesis adds to our 
understanding of how amicable relations between men were arranged, performed, read and 
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 In John Harington’s 1562 translation of Marcus Tullius Cicero’s De amicitia he reiterates 
Cicero’s understanding of the integral nature of friendship to a man’s life saying, ‘neither 
water, nor fier ne aire, as they say, do we more places use then this frendship’.1  
Harington’s ‘preface to the reader’ suggests that he, too, recognised the necessity of 
friendship at the time that he translated it.  He writes that in Cicero’s text he ‘sawe’ the 
‘civyle use of friendship’.2 And he was not alone. At a time when rank and status not only 
mattered, but helped to forge male bonds that drove personal and professional success, the 
development and preservation of amicable relations was more than a worthy endeavour, it 
was, in fact, crucial.  Friendship’s attainment could, like success in other intimate 
relationships, namely marriage and parenthood, confer honour and reputation. Early 
modern humanist thinkers not only recognised this, but also understood that private 
friendship had public resonance.  As such, just as didactic manuals were printed to advise 
men on raising their children and to guide them in conducting their other domestic 
responsibilities admirably, a proliferation of literature was made available to assist men in 
the successful cultivation and maintenance of one of the more instrumental relationships 
necessary for his success:  male friendship.   
      Humanist writers looked to guide the ethical practice of friendship beginning in 
grammar school through appeals to classical wisdom, particularly Cicero’s work.  The 
hope was that each young man might realise what Harington claimed that he found in De 
amicitia, ‘a glasse to dycerne my freends in, and a civile rule to leade my life by’.3  
                                                          
1 The Booke of Freendship of Marcus Tullie Cicero trans. by John Harington (London: Thomas Berthelette, 
1562), sig. B8r ; For its later corollary see Marcus Tullius Cicero, De Amicitia in Cicero, De Senectute, De 
Amicitia, De Divinatione, trans. by William Armistead Falconer, The Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts:  1927-2001 (2001), pp. 103-211, ( iv 14-16, p. 133).   
2 Booke of Freendship, Harington, sig. A3r. 
3 Booke of Freendship, Harington, sig. A3r. 
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     The influence of Cicero’s De amicitia on the discourse of early modern friendship 
cannot be denied.  The work was available in Latin and five vernacular translation editions 
between 1481 and 1577.  Its ideas were widely disseminated.  Lorna Hutson observes the 
pervasive presence of Cicero’s principles in ‘all genres of literature’ in the sixteenth-
century.4  But she is right to wonder to what extent the prevalence of the work’s principles 
in the discourse can be ‘read’ as correlating to a ‘belief’ by men that their friendships 
should comply to the Ciceronean model, especially given the work’s own explicit appeals 
to friendship’s usefulness.5  Thomas Newton’s translation of De amicitia claims that ‘love 
is confirmed by benefites received’, as well as goodwill and acquaintance.6  And although 
this idea is somewhat muted to the overall call for virtue in friendship in Cicero’s text, it is 
there nonetheless.7  Further, Harington’s own application of the term ‘use’ in his preface, 
still carried with it at the time an instrumental meaning: ‘the act of employing a thing for 
any (especially a profitable) purpose’.8  The association between benefit, friendship and 
goodwill however, received full expression in Seneca’s De beneficiis. This too, was 
available in translation in the period, and its ideas also had extra-textual life. Even so, the 
contributions to the discourse of friendship by De beneficiis, and Aristotle’s Nicomachean 
Ethics, which expands friendship beyond the Ciceronean ideal’s exclusivity, have been 
largely subordinated by the critical attention given to Cicero’s work, even though Aristotle 
and Seneca had important things to say about friendship.   
     While contemporary literary critics do credit Aristotle for his contributions to ideas on 
friendship in the period, it is to a lesser extent than Cicero.  In part, this may be because 
                                                          
4 Lorna Hutson, The Usurer’s Daugther:  Male Friendship and Fictions of Women in Sixteenth Century 
England (London and New York:  Routledge, 1994), p. 62. 
5 Hutson points up that the text ‘never pretends to sever friendship from instrumentality’, p. 62. 
6 Marcus Tullius Cicero, The Booke of Freendeshipe in Fouure Seuerall Treatises of M. Tullius Cicero trans. 
by Thomas Newton (London:  Thomas Marshe, 1577), sig. B6r. Hereafter: Booke of Freendeshipe, Newton. 
7 ‘The Newton translation reads ‘frendshyp cannot be where vertue is not’, sig. B1v. 
8 ‘Use’ Oxford English Dictionary, def. 1a. (in use around the time of Harington’s translation in 1440, 1558). 
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Aristotle acknowledges as friendships those amicable relations that do not reflect the ideal 
of ‘one soul in two bodies’.  The same may be said for Seneca’s work, which is mainly 
mistakenly regarded only as a treatise on the politics of exchange. Both works however, 
have similar ethical grounding as De amicitia.  It is just that their emphases, focus and 
intents differ.  The Ethics is an inquiry into eudaimonia, and De beneficiis outlines the 
ethical practice of giving and receiving, positing friendship as a social act.  Coppélia Kahn 
recognised the general importance of De beneficiis, describing it as ‘the most influential 
treatise of the Renaissance on gift-giving per se’.9  But it is also useful to acknowledge the 
work’s contribution to ideas on the conventions of friendship.   
     In his 1986 article ‘Timon of Athens and the Three Graces: Shakespeare's Senecan 
Study’ John Wallace observed that Seneca’s De beneficiis had been ‘much neglected by 
recent scholarship’.10  He remarked that at the time the work’s ‘influence over sixteenth- 
and seventeenth-century English thought’ had ‘yet to be fully explored’.11  Even though 
Wallace’s study focused on exchange and benefit in Shakespeare’s work  rather than a 
consideration of amity, he sheds important light on the ideas discussed in Seneca’s text and 
demonstrates how a reading of the work can help foster further understanding of 
representations of ‘friendly affection’ and generosity.12  Despite Wallace’s submission that 
there was work to be done, there has yet to be a focused study on the representation of 
friendship in early modern drama that considers the import of ideas on the conventions of 
giving and receiving from Seneca’s work.  Historian David Wootton called De beneficiis 
                                                          
9 Coppélia Kahn ‘“Magic of Bounty”: Timon of Athens, Jacobean Patronage, and Maternal Power’, 
Shakespeare Quarterly, 38.1 (Spring, 987), pp. 34-57, (p. 49).  It is also interesting that De beneficiis has not 
received as much attention or consideration as Marcel Mauss’ The Gift, a work that David Wootton rightly 
notes ‘whose subject matter is identical with that of Seneca, though strangely, Seneca is never mentioned’, in 
David Wootton ‘Francis Bacon:  Your Flexible Friend’ in The World of the Favourite ed. by JH Elliott and 
WB Brockliss (London and New Haven:  Yale University Press, 1999), pp.184-204, (p. 186). 
10 John M. Wallace ‘Timon of Athens and the Three Graces: Shakespeare's Senecan Study’ Modern 
Philology, 83. 4 (May, 1986), pp. 349-363 (p. 350). 
11 Wallace, p. 350. 
12 Wallace, p. 352. 
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to critical attention in his important 1999 study, ‘Francis Bacon:  Your Flexible Friend’.  
Here he recognised Seneca’s work as one of three classical texts that were ‘prolonged 
mediations on friendship’.13  Nevertheless, despite the fact that early modern translations 
of the work invoke friendship and the work posits benefit and giving as the beginning of 
friendship, De beneficiis remains largely overlooked for what it may add to an 
understanding of the conventions of early modern friendship.   
     While this is curious, in that two of the work’s translators had (albeit different) ties to 
the London commercial theatre community, it is not surprising, in light of Arthur 
Golding’s description of the work in the dedicatory epistle as the ‘why, how, when, too 
what ende, and on whom’ of benefitting, as well as ‘what reward is too bee looked for in 
the doing of it, and what frute it yeeldeth again’.14 The description seems antithetical to the 
virtuous friendship model promoted in Cicero’s De amicitia. G.W. Peterman has remarked 
that modern readers may find that Seneca’s ideas ‘smack of bribery’.15  But as Peterman 
cautions, one must be mindful of ‘the cultural chasms between twentieth and first century 
social conventions’;16 a chasm that was not all that wide between first century Rome and 
early modern England, as they shared a similar understanding of the integral relationship 
between friendship and benefit. This is an understanding that Harington himself highlights 
in his translation of Cicero’s work when he considers friendship’s ‘use’.17  In his work on 
Saint Paul’s descriptions of his relationship with Philippians, Peterman relates that Paul 
uses ‘terms common in commercial transactions’ and observes that ‘the transactional 
                                                          
13 David Wootton, ‘Francis Bacon:  Your Flexible Friend’ in The World of the Favourite ed. by JH Elliott 
and WB Brockliss (London and New Haven:  Yale University Press, 1999), pp.184-204, (p. 186). The other 
two he named were Cicero’s De amicitia and Plutarch’s ‘How to Tell a Flatterer from a Friend’. 
14 Lucius Annaeus Seneca, The Woorke of the Excellent Philosopher Lucius Annaeus Seneca Concerning 
Benefyting That Is Too Say the Dooing, Receyving, and Requyting of Good Turnes trans. by Arthur Golding 
(London : By [John Kingston for] John Day, 1578), sig.*2r. (The pagination begins A1 with the text itself), 
sig. 2r;* is the way the page is paginated. Hereafter  the reference will read De beneficiis, Golding. 
15 G.W. Peterman, Paul’s Gift from Philippi (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 1997), fn. 53 p. 68. 
16 Peterman, fn. 53 p. 68. 
17 Book of Freendship, Harington, sig. A3r. 
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character of Greco-Roman social reciprocity is very much like buying and selling’.18 As 
such, we might not be surprised by the forthright assertions of the benefits of giving and 
receiving that inform De beneficiis, a work written at a similar time, between ACE 56 and 
62.19  We should certainly not dismiss the work’s importance because it appears on the 
surface to suggest the building of strictly instrumental relationships devoid of affection; for 
De beneficiis is much more than a first century version of How to Win Friends and 
Influence People; its philosophical underpinning is strongly rooted in Seneca’s ideas on 
friendship, including the generally held classical view that equality is requisite for true 
friendship. 20   
     There have been many scholars who have made important contributions to the work on 
friendship in the early modern period.  Several historians who have furthered an 
understanding of certain aspects of early modern amity include Alan Bray, Mervyn James, 
Alexandra Shepard, Blair Worden and David Wootton. This current study benefits from 
their insights.  The most recent contribution is ‘Friendship and Sociability’ by Keith 
Thomas in The Ends of Life (2009).  Thomas’ work points up the continued interest that 
the subject of early modern friendship engenders. The seminal work on male friendship in 
drama is Laurens Mills’ 1937 study One Soul in Bodies Twain.  Mills surveyed over eighty 
plays that consider friendship as a theme.21  The work devotes a chapter to a review of 
classical ideas and catalogues dramatists’ engagement with friendship themes, tracing the 
evolution of the topoi of friendship in its various permutations through Shakespeare and 
Stuart drama. It provides a useful thematic and friendship plot survey, but given the scope 
                                                          
18 Peterman, p. 64. 
19 Peterman, p. 52. Date held for the Philippians (ACE 60-62), fn. 6 p. 52. 
20 How to Win Friends and Influence People is a  much reprinted 1936 best-seller by Dale Carnegie on how 
to establish friendly relations with others in order to achieve your goals; ‘The greatest friendship we can 
intend to any man is to make him equal with ourselves’ in Seneca, De beneficiis trans. by Thomas Lodge, 
rpt.  of 1612 edn. by Israel Gollancz (London:  J.M. Dent, 1899), pp. 49-50. 
21 See Laurens J. Mills, One Soul in Bodies Twain:  Friendship in Tudor Literature and Stuart Drama 
(Bloomington:  Principia, 1937), passim. 
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of the project there are limited in-depth readings. There was an almost fifty year gap 
between Mills’ study and further substantive consideration of male friendship in early 
modern drama.  This extended gap was filled in part by work that subordinated classical 
thinking to post-Foucaldian sexuality, through a significant focus on male homoerotics.22  
The call for papers for 17 September 2009 London Renaissance Seminar on ‘Amity in 
Early Modern Literature and Culture’ highlighted the need to redress this imbalance and 
pointed up the research possibilities available in the study of male friendship in the early 
modern period:    
 In recent years, discussions about early modern human relationships have been 
 dominated by the topic of sexuality and eroticism, with the result that non-erotic 
 relationships have been reductively misunderstood within this theoretical approach. 
 This has meant that the complexity, diversity and importance of non-erotic 
 relationships have not been given due scholarly attention.23 
     Four recent studies have refocused attention on classical and humanist-inspired ideas on 
male friendship and considered them, to differing extents, in relation to representation in 
early modern drama.  Lorna Hutson’s work in The Usurer’s Daughter: Male Friendship 
and Fictions of Women in Sixteenth Century England (1994) considers how the 
‘economies’ of the humanist ideology of male friendship influenced the representation of 
women, and offers a new reading of The Comedy of Errors and The Taming of the Shrew 
                                                          
22 See for instance the work by Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, Between Men: English Literature and Male 
Homosocial Desire  ((New York: Columbia University Press, 1985);  Love, Sex, Intimacy and Friendship 
Between Men, 1550-1800 ed. by Katherine O’Donnell and Michael O’Rourke (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2003); Queering the Renaissance ed. by Jonathan Goldberg  (Durham : Duke University Press, 
1994) and Alan Sinfield, Shakespeare, Authority, Sexuality:  Unfinished Business in Cultural Materialism 
(London and New York:  Routledge, 2006). 
23 Call for papers ‘Amity in Early Modern Literature and Culture’ at the University of Portsmouth, via email 
June 2009 from Bronwen Price and Paraic Finnerty at <http:earlymodern-lit.blogspot.com/2009>. 
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in this context.24 Lisa Jardine examines companionate marriage and male friendship and 
considers how familiar letters were constructed as acts of friendship in Reading 
Shakespeare Historically (1996).25  Laurie Shannon considers friendship discourses and 
the politics of likeness and explores mignonnerie as friendship in Sovereign Amity: 
Figures of Friendship in Shakespearean Contexts (2002).26 Tom MacFaul’s Male 
Friendship in Shakespeare and His Contemporaries (2007) explores the ‘fictions of 
connection’ informed by humanist ideas on friendship that stressed ‘equality and 
permanence’ and deprived the self.27  Overall, however, the works of Shakespeare 
continue to receive the most significant scholarly attention.  
     This thesis has two main objectives.  The first is to consider how an understanding of 
the ideas on friendship and giving in De beneficiis and the more inclusive formulations of 
friendship outlined in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics can help to open up meanings of 
friendship in early modern drama and contribute to a broader definition of, and depiction 
of friendship beyond the Ciceronean model of ‘a most perfect agreement of willes, desires 
& opinions’.28  This work will analyse how Aristotle’s ideas on conceptions and 
formulations of philia from the Ethics and Seneca’s ideas on the conventions of giving, 
receiving and benefit from De beneficiis figure in dramatic representation and early 
modern practice of friendship.  This will be done by analysing what the works have to say 
about these aspects of friendship and exploring the extent to which these ideas became a 
                                                          
24 Hutson, pp. 52-90, 188-223. Only pertinent highlights of this text and the works of other scholars are 
referred to here.  
25 Lisa Jardine, Reading Shakespeare Historically (London and New York:  Routledge, 1996). 
26 Laurie Shannon, Sovereign Amity:  Figures of Friendship in Shakespearean Contexts (Chicago and 
London:  University of Chicago Press, 2002). 
27 Tom MacFaul, Male Friendship in Shakespeare and his Contemporaries (Cambridge:  Cambridge 
University Press, 2007), pp. 1-2. 
28The Booke of Freendshippe, Newton, sig. A7r; see also sigs. B1r-B1v. 
The word ‘meanings’ seems most apt here in that it accounts for understanding across the spectrum of 
friendship’s possibilities.  The term is coined by Alexandra Shepard in her book Meanings of Manhood in 
Early Modern England (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).  
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part of the discourse of friendship in the period. This will involve a consideration of the 
influence of Aristotelian and Senecan thought beginning in the thirteenth century. The 
second aim of this thesis is to analyse the innovative ways in which dramatic works that 
have been heretofore less-attended to, that is, those that lie outside the Shakespearean 
canon, engaged with classical ideas on friendship from Aristotle, Cicero, Seneca, and to a 
much lesser extent, Epicurus, Plutarch and Lucian. The hope is that this work will provide 
further understanding of how amicable relations between men were arranged, performed, 
read and understood in the early modern period. The idea is not to map classical or 
contemporary texts to specific works of drama, as this would be problematic and 
speculative at best.  Rather, the purpose is to consider the resonance of ideas on friendship 
represented on the academic, commercial, and private stages in order to more fully 
understand the range of views that were a part of the discourse of friendship.   
     The argument for drama’s relevance as a contributory voice in the discourse of male 
friendship follows Michael Hattaway’s suggestion that dramatic texts may be viewed as 
evidence ‘in history’ through which we might gain further insights into a time, offering ‘a 
record, highly mediated, of the period’s perceptions of itself, sometimes of an event or 
series of events—even if this is only a performance or a series of performances’.29  When 
attempting to gain an understanding of male friendship in the period, drama may be 
considered as important to ‘read’, as the other evidence considered in this thesis.  This 
approach acknowledges the limitations of trying to read drama as evidence of a shared 
cultural view, however, it recognises the value of dramatic representation in helping to 
uncover some of the ways that classical ideas on friendship were affirmed, challenged, 
interrogated, and understood.   
                                                          
29 Michael Hattaway, ‘Drama and Society’ in The Cambridge Companion to English Renaissance Drama 
(Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 93-130 (p. 96). 
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     The scope of this study is purposely limited. It examines eleven plays by nine 
dramatists in order to undertake an in-depth analysis. The plays chosen for inclusion have 
been heretofore less well-represented in the critical literature. They have received little, if 
any, attention for contributing to an understanding of male friendship. They include Titus 
et Gesippus by John Foxe (1544), The Excellent Comedie of Two the Moste Faithfullest 
Freendes, Damon and Pithias by Richard Edwards (1565), Endymion by John Lyly 
(1588), the anonymous Arden of Faversham (1591) and Timon (1602-3), A Woman Killed 
with Kindness (1603) and The Rape of Lucrece by Thomas Heywood (1608), the 
anonymous The Faithful Friends (1614),  The English Traveller by Thomas Heywood (c. 
1624),  The Tragedy of Orestes by Thomas Goffe (1633) and The Lady’s Trial by John 
Ford (1638).30  These plays will be considered through extended case studies that analyse 
their interrogation of a particular conception or formulation of friendship.  Although in no 
way quantitative, this examination hopes to contribute to the growing body of scholarship 
that considers representation of friendship in drama beyond the Shakespearean canon, as 
some of Tom MacFaul’s most recent work has done. This study acknowledges a debt to 
the work of Lorna Hutson, whose point about reading ‘belief’ in the Ciceronean model is 
at the heart of this inquiry, and to David Wootton, whose attention to ideas in De beneficiis 
also informs this work. 
     For this endeavour all evidence provides insights. As such, early modern contextual 
examples of friendship will also be considered thematically to help understand the cultural 
resonance of formulations and enactments of friendship beyond the Ciceronean model.  
This is not to insist that art necessarily imitates life, but to help add further dimension to 
                                                          
30 Robert Stretter discusses  Edwards’ Damon and Pythias in ‘Cicero on Stage: Damon and Pithias and the 
Fate of Classical Friendship in English Renaissance Drama’, Texas Studies in Literature and Language, 47.4 
Winter (2005), 345-365; Ros King reviews Edwards’ work in her introduction to an edition of his works but 
the focus is not on friendship in The Works of Richard Edwards:  Politics, Poetry and Performance in 
Sixteenth Century England ed. by Ros King (Manchester: MUP, 2001), pp. 108-184. 
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our understanding of the cultural influences that may have helped to shape the way that 
ideas on friendship entered the discourse.  Just as the pulpits served as a source for the 
mediation and dissemination of ideas, so too did the theatre.  The potential of that reach 
was broad, if Andrew Gurr’s observation is correct that ‘on average’ there were ‘as many 
as a million visits to the playhouse a year.’31 With this in mind, examining how dramatists 
mediated ideas and participated in the dialogue of friendship can help to further our 
understanding of the discourse of early modern friendship. 
     Situating the study in its early modern historical context can assist in evaluating how 
classical ideas were mediated through translation and redaction, as well as through 
contemporary practice; practice that may also have pointed up problems with ‘translating’ 
theory into action. This requires a broad approach which will consider historical, 
philosophical, and religious evidence. As a study of ideas, contemporary voices in the 
discourse of friendship are considered including works by  Francis Bacon, William 
Baldwin, Richard Braithwaite, William Cecil (Lord Burghley), Erasmus and Michel de 
Montaigne. Other evidence will include early modern vernacular translations of classical 
texts, collections of adages, commemorative inscriptions, Court of Chivalry proceedings, 
early modern essays, extant letters, humanist didactic literature, obsequies, printed 
sermons, and works by early church theologians.  Because context is important, sixteenth 
and seventeenth-century editions of classical texts are used. Later editions are employed as 
points of comparison or for purposes of explication only. The value of this approach will 
become visible beginning in Chapter 1 when the early modern construct of male friendship 
                                                          
31 Andrew Gurr, The Shakespearean Stage 1574-1642, 3rd edn (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 
2001), p. 212. 
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is explored through consideration, in part, of contemporary translations for their distinctly 
contextual feel and understanding.32   
     The emphasis is on male friendship, as gentlemen were the target audience for 
friendship advice. This is not meant to dismiss the significance of female friendship or the 
importance of the scholarship of Barbara Harris, Valerie Traub, and Merry Wiesner, whose 
works have contributed greatly to our understanding of its consequence. Further, because 
of the attention paid by critics to the homoerotics of male friendship, such representations 
are excluded from this study.  As such, although Chapter 5 briefly considers Plato’s 
Phaedrus, the Lysis is not examined.  As Charles H. Kahn observes, the Lysis ‘is staged as 
a conversation on friendship set within the frame of an erotic courtship’, 33  as such, it is 
not within the scope of this thesis, especially in light of the fact that erotic love and 
friendship, according to David Konstan, ‘were understood normally to be incompatible 
relationships’ in classical Greece because the former eliminates the symmetry required of 
friendship.34   
     Because this study considers the historical context the term ‘early modern’ has been 
employed. The question over the exact bounds of the early modern period remains 
unresolved.  As Keith Thomas most recently observed, ‘early modern times are variously 
said to have started at different dates between 1300 and 1560 and to have ended at sundry 
points between 1660 and 1800’.35  For these purposes, the examination of drama begins 
with John Foxe’s Titus et Gesippus (1544) and ends with John Ford’s The Lady’s Trial 
(1638).  Primary source evidence expands this view beginning with John Tiptoft, the Earl 
                                                          
32 Lorna Hutson provides a cogent explanation of the value of this approach in The Usurer’s Daughter, ix. 
33 Charles H. Kahn, Plato and the Socratic Dialogue: The Philosophical Use of a Literary Form (Cambridge:  
Cambridge University Press, 1997, rpt. 1998), p. 265. 
34 David Konstan, Friendship in the Classical World (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 1997), 
pp.38-39. 
35 Keith Thomas, The Ends of Life: Roads to Fulfilment in Early Modern England (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2009), p. 4. 
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of Worcester’s translation of De amicitia in 1481 and ending with the results of Katharine 
W. Swett’s study of the friendship circle of Sir Richard Wynn of Gwydir, Caemarfonshire 
(1634-1674) in "The Account between Us": Honor, Reciprocity and Companionship in 
Male Friendship in the Later Seventeenth Century’.36  
     The thesis consists of five chapters. Chapter 1 explores the early modern construct of 
friendship through a review of the vernacular translations of Aristotle, Cicero and Seneca 
and traces the influence of Aristotle and particularly, Seneca, from the early church 
through the early modern period. Chapter 2 considers how academic dramatists writing 
about perfect friendship pairs represented the classical ideal.  Chapter 3 traces the 
dissolution and use of the ideal through dramatic construction of a friend whose raison 
d’être is the practice of asymmetrical friendship. Chapter 4 evaluates benefit and 
performance in friendships of utility.  Chapter 5 reviews how marriage challenges the 
dynamics of male friendship and considers how the shared parlance and similar 
codification of friendship and marriage obscured relational boundaries.  
     In Thomas Lodge’s unpublished pamphlet Honest Excuses, A Reply to Stephen 
Gosson’s Schoole of Abuse in Defence of Poetry, Musick, and Stage Plays Lodge 
acknowledges a link between the theatre and classical thought.37  He deems Seneca ‘the 
father of philosophers’ and invokes an idea of Aristotle’s remarking that it was ‘first 
pronounced by no smal birde even Aristotle himself’.38  Lodge, the dramatist who would 
go on to translate the complete works of Seneca in 1614, demonstrates an appreciation and 
                                                          
36 Katharine W. Swett, “The Account between Us”: Honor, Reciprocity and Companionship in Male 
Friendship in the Later Seventeenth Century’ Albion: A Quarterly Journal Concerned with British Studies, 
3.1 (Spring, 1999), pp. 1-30. 
37 Lodge’s biographer, Edward Andrews Tenney relates that the publication of Honest Excuses, attempted in 
1579 , was ‘forbidden’ by the licensors. Lodge indicates that some ‘private unperfect’ copies did get printed. 
See Edward Andrews Tenney, Thomas Lodge (Ithaca and New York: Cornell University Press, 1935), pp. 
78-79. 
38 Thomas Lodge, Honest Excuses, A Reply to Stephen Gosson's Schoole of Abuse in Defence of Poetry, 
Musick, and Stage Plays in Elizabethan & Jacobean Pamphlets ed by George Saintsbury (London:  Percival, 
1892), pp. 3, 15. 
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understanding of Aristotle’s Poetics and its grounding in ethical thought, commenting, 
‘But (of truth) I must confes with Aristotle (it), that men are greatly delighted with 
imitation, and that it were good to bring those things on stage, that were altogether tending 
to vertue’.39 To what extent did Lodge’s fellow dramatists comply with this call to 
represent virtue when they engaged with the Ciceronean model of the ideal and figured 
male friendship on the early modern stage? 
 
                                                          




Constructing Early Modern Friendship 
In the preface to the reader in the 1574 verse adaptation of Boccaccio’s Titus and 
Gesippus, Edward Jeninges metrically recounts the difficulty with which writers 
approached the task of defining friendship, and the wealth of classical wisdom from which 
they had to draw:   
   I am not able of freindshyp to showe  
   A true definycyon in every thinge,  
   Though all a whole yere my wyt I bestowe  
   In such like sentences still wrytinge,  
   With manie auncient Hystoryes searchynge  
   Whearin I shulde fynde such stoore to indyte  
   That in a large booke I scarce coulde them write.1 
 
Despite some of the similar ideas that philosophers shared about friendship, Jeninges’ 
commentary relates the difficulty in defining friendship in the context of such a vast array 
of thought on the subject.  And Jeninges’ work is but one example of the multitude of 
musings on the topic.  Contemporary tracts and translations of classical and Christian 
treatises on friendship published during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in England 
demonstrate a resurgence in consideration of the notion of friendship.2  But entries for 
‘friendship’ and ‘friend’ in the Oxford English Dictionary indicate that even before 
William Caxton published Fables of Aesop in 1484, the terms were well-established in the 
lexicon. Between 1000 and 1535 friendship had a varied range of designations, including: 
                                                 
1 The Notable Hystory of Two Faithfull Lovers Named Alfagus anb [sic] Archelaus (Whearein is declared the 
true fygure of amytie and freyndshy.) trans. by Edwarde Jeninges (London:  Thomas Colwell, 1574), sig A3v. 
2 Lorraine Smith Pangle, Aristotle and the Philosophy of Friendship (Cambridge:  Cambridge University 
Press, 2003), p. 2. 
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a condition, an alliance, a sentiment, a close personal relationship, something performed 
(as an ‘act’, a ‘favour’ or ‘friendly aid’), as well as a being, simply, a friend.3   
     Early modern men did not have the benefit of the Oxford English Dictionary however, 
to help them understand friendship, or to explain the actions and obligations necessary to 
earn the title of ‘friend’.  What they did have were their experiences and an abundance of 
voices from past and present contributing to a burgeoning discourse that was at times 
disparate, at others, collective. These voices not only contributed to an understanding of 
what early modern friendship was supposed to be, but also codified methods to cultivate 
and maintain it.  The views on friendship at the time formed what can best be described as 
a continuum, with the shining ideal of perfect friendship at one end and its dystopic 
extreme, false friendship’s betrayal, at the other.  In between these two views emerged a 
more politic definition of the term, with friendship a designation for relationships of ‘credit 
and patronage’, as well as a reflection of the realities of court life, especially in the late 
Elizabethan and early Jacobean periods, and particularly the factious 1590s where 
friendship became linked to self-interest and benefit.4  This more pragmatic connotation 
encouraged unequal amicable relations where friendship rested on one’s ‘ability and 
disposition to help another by his influence in high quarters’.5   
     The term ‘friend’ had multiple contemporary uses. It was used as a greeting, and 
employed to engender a certain feeling of concord.  These uses are exemplified in William 
Heminge’s ‘Prologue’ to The Jewes Tragedy (1628-1630) where he addresses his audience 
as ‘friends’, and ‘judicious’ ones at that.6  The term could also designate ‘a lover or 
                                                 
3 ‘Friendship’ in The Oxford English Dictionary, def.1a-c to 3; ‘friends’, 1c. 
4 For friendship as patronage and credit see Alexandra Shepard, Meanings of Manhood in Early Modern 
England (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 122-123. 
5 OED, def. 5c) 
6 The dating of the play comes from Carol A. Morley ‘General Introduction’ in The Plays and Poems of 
William Heminge ed. by Carol A. Morley (Madison: Farleigh Dickinson University Press, 2006), pp. 17-31, 
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paramour of either sex’, a definition that could prove problematic to friendship and 
marriage, as will be examined in Chapter 5.  The contributing voices in the discourse that 
addressed this range of connotations came from a variety of secular and Christian sources 
including:  early modern translations of classical philosophy, the Bible, popular print 
narratives, epigrams and anthologies.  Ideas about friendship were circulated in grammar 
schools, universities and Inns of Court.  They were disseminated from the bench at the 
High Court of Chivalry and from Reformation pulpits.  They were symbolically 
represented in funerals and commemorative monuments and in dramatic works on the 
early modern English stage.  The boundaries between the disciplines that spoke of 
friendship were frequently blurred, owing much to reliance on a shared classical tradition.  
This idea is realised in Thomas Crewe’s translation of Gabriel Meurier’s The Nosegay of 
Morall Philosophie (1580).  Here he considers Christian responsibility, as well as man’s 
eudaimonia, through references to Aristotle, Cicero, Plato and Plutarch pondering, 
‘wherein consisteth the accomplishing of mans felicity?’ and concluding, ‘in getting of 
friends, and doying [sic] good to others’.7  In his assertion of the compatibility of amity 
with caritas Crewe acknowledges what Augustine, other church fathers, and Christian 
humanists recognised long before him when it came to friendship:  that there was much to 
learn from the wisdom of the ancients, and incorporating their views would not necessarily 
compromise Christian ideology. 
     This chapter begins the study of the intellectual history of male friendship and its 
articulation in early modern English drama through an examination of how classical ideas 
entered and contributed to the discourse, and by a consideration of available vernacular 
                                                                                                                                                   
(20); ‘Prologus’, The Jewes Tragedy in The Plays and Poems of William Heminge ed. by Carol A. Morley 
(Madison: Farleigh Dickinson University Press, 2006), pp.104-224 (p. 104). 
7 Gabriel Meurier, The Nosegay of Morall Philosophie, translated by Thomas Crewe (London: by Thomas 
Dawson, 1580), sigs. A1r, C9r. 
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translations and contemporary mediations in popular works.  It reviews the shared mining 
of, and negotiation with ideas of friendship from Aristotle, Cicero and Seneca by the early 
Church, humanists, translators and contemporary writers.  The core classical ideas on 
friendship that entered the discourse from early modern translations and redactive 
mediations will be highlighted, and later chapters will draw on this context in dramatic 
representation. Further, this chapter will call attention to the particular influence of 
Senecan moral philosophy, suggesting the usefulness of reading De beneficiis as a text on 
the conventions of friendship and demonstrating its value to the study. 
     Section I of this chapter briefly examines some general issues related to the translation 
of classical texts.  Section II examines the influential early modern vernacular translations 
and translators of key texts by Aristotle and Cicero, and underscores how some of the 
ideas were shaped.  Section III traces the influence and appreciation of Senecan moral 
philosophy and Stoic thought from the early Church through the seventeenth-century.  It 
also begins a discussion of the Stoic virtue of constancy, which will continue throughout 
subsequent chapters in relation to different representations of friendship on the early 
modern stage.  Section IV makes the case for the usefulness of reading Seneca’s De 
beneficiis as a work on friendship, considering its ideas and early modern translations.  
Section V looks at contemporary mediations and redactions of classical ideas on friendship 
in contemporary humanist works, philosophical compilations and miscellanies.  The final 
section considers the importance of friendship not only as a private, but also as a public 
good, and how that recognition became an important part of the discourse, fuelling the 
overall concern and rigorous inquiry into its achievement and maintenance.   
     The authors and texts considered here are not exhaustive, but are chosen for their 
prominence at the time and for their usefulness to the overall consideration of dramatic 
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representation in subsequent chapters, where some additional works will also be invoked 
to highlight particular points.  The overall aim of this chapter is to arrive at a picture of 
how friendship was ‘constructed’ through the use of classical friendship theory, so as to 
provide a framework within which to interrogate early modern dramatic treatment of its 
distinctive, prominent features. 
 
I.  Issues of Vernacular Translation of Classical Texts 
Before reviewing the key, available vernacular translations of moral philosophy related to 
friendship, a brief discussion of issues affecting how classical ideas were translated and 
came into the discourse is warranted.  Extant works reveal problems related to authority, 
comprehensiveness and overall quality.  The work of Elizabeth Eisenstein, Charles Nauert 
and Knud Sorenson speaks generally to these issues.  Nauert notes the availability of many 
classical texts by 1500 in Italy through hand copying of translations into Latin, but points 
out the resultant steady ‘corruption’ of classical manuscripts through  unintended 
replication of  errors.8  He credits printing with not only establishing a ‘standardised frame 
of reference’ but also with helping to ‘stabilize’ texts, ‘even if the text used for the 
printer’s copy was far from perfect’.9   
     To be sure, vernacular translations were often several times removed from their French, 
Latin or Greek counterparts.  The extent to which this was the case could depend on the 
translator and the cultural demands exerted, for example censorship, and the overall 
context in which they were writing.  Elizabeth Eisenstein’s work underscores this idea.  
She points out that the ‘written or printed’ Renaissance book was ‘a culturally hybrid 
                                                 
8 Charles Garfield Nauert, Humanism and the Culture of Renaissance (Cambridge:  Cambridge University 
Press, 1995), p. 53. 
9 Nauert, p. 53. 
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product’.10  For instance, she relates that Erasmus ‘was celebrated for redoing St. Jerome’ 
(emphasis mine), at a time when ‘a humanist who was engaged in copying one of Livy’s 
books’ was ‘in a sense’ actually ‘engaged in “writing” one of Livy’s books’.11  Knud 
Sorenson takes a similar view, explaining that translators working from Latin to English 
were innovators, ‘transferring new senses from the Latin contexts’.12  He notes that ‘most 
Elizabethan translations, and all the best of them, are stylistically as much Elizabethan as 
they are classical’.13 According to Sorensen, ‘Most sixteenth and seventeenth-century 
translators were not scholars’, although he excludes Arthur Golding, who translated Ovid’s 
Metamorphoses and Seneca’s De beneficiis, and Philemon Holland, translator of 
Plutarch’s Moralia, from this grouping.14  
     While it is possible to see how translators may intentionally shape a text, the work of 
Sorenson and Nauert also highlights the potential for unintentional new renderings. 
Translators with less solid knowledge of the French, Latin or Greek from which the work 
was derived may have produced less authoritative translations. For example, it would be 
important to consider how John Harington’s hasty education in French while in the Tower 
might have affected his translation of De amicitia (1550) from French.15 Harington makes 
clear that his translation needed and received emendation.  In his dedicatory epistle to the 
Duchess of Suffolk, he says that the work was reviewed by the ‘knowen wel lerned to be 
                                                 
10 Elizabeth L. Eisenstein, The Printing Press as an Agent of Change:  Communications and Cultural 
Transformations in Early-Modern Europe (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 1979; rpt. 1997), p. 
204.  
11 Eisenstein, pp. 188-189, 191. 
12 Knud Sorenson, Thomas Lodge’s Translation of Seneca’s De Beneficiis Compared with Arthur Golding’s 
Version : A Textual Analysis with Special Reference to Latinisms (Oslo: Gyldenhal, 1960), p. 17. 
13Sorenson, p. 21. 
14 Sorenson, pp. 31-32. 
15 Explanation of learning French and translation in the Tower by John Harington, ‘Preface’ in Marcus 
Tullius Cicero, The Booke of Freendeship of Marcus Tullie Cicero trans. by John Harington (London: 
Thomas Berthelette, 1562) , sig. A2v. The preface is paginated separately, A1r-A8r..  The text also begins 
again with A1. 
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corrected’ and when ‘perfected’ emerged with ‘a newe spirite and life’.16  It is plausible 
that Harington’s editor may have been the learned humanist Sir Thomas Smith, writer of 
De republica Anglorum (1565), who was well versed in Latin and Greek, became the 
Ambassador to France in 1562 and was imprisoned in the Tower at the same time as 
Harington.17  Whomever it was, Harington’s preface suggests that the text was 
considerably altered, but does not accept full responsibility for the need to change the 
‘sence’ of his translation, attributing it in part to the fact that the French translation that he 
worked from ‘was somewhat darkened.’18  Whether this means that his ‘lerned’ editor also 
engaged with the French, or merely tidied up the style of his translation is unknown, but 
what emerges is a text perhaps yet another hand removed from its original.  Although 
Harington was well aware of some of the problems with his translation, Sorenson notes 
that translators were ‘frequently unconscious’ of straying from ‘current usage’.19  But even 
a small misinterpretation of just one word can significantly affect meaning. This is notable 
in Thomas Lodge’s translation of Seneca’s De beneficiis where he translates ‘sincere’ for 
‘sincerus’, the latter of which, according to Sorenson, ‘must be taken to mean “morally 
corrupted,”’20 thus conveying a completely different sense.  One can see how such a 
distinction might be of great significance in terms of understanding ideas, especially in 
relation to moral ethics and friendship.   
     Even so, the extent to which it is possible to attribute changes to individuals is 
problematic, unless one traces a work’s copying and printing history up to and including 
the translation under question. For instance, Harington does not mention the name of the 
                                                 
16 The Booke of Freendeship, Harington, sigs. A3v-A4r. 
17 The biography of Smith is from Ian Archer in Oxford Dictionary of National Biography. The suggestion 
that Smith could have provided editorial advice is my own.  
18 The Booke of Freendeship, Harington, sig. A4r. 
19 Sorenson, p. 17. 
20 Sorenson, p. 17. 
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‘learned’ man who revised his translation; therefore it is impossible to ascribe particular 
readings to either.  For the purposes of this thesis, however, assigning intent is not the 
focus.  The emphasis rests on the ideas themselves, and on the form in which they entered 
the robust discourse of friendship.   
    
II. Early Modern Translations of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics and Cicero’s De 
Amicitia  
This section examines some of the issues at play in relation to the translation of the work 
of Aristotle and Cicero on friendship, the Nicomachean Ethics and De amicitia 
respectively.  It considers how circumstances of their production and textual emphases and 
omissions may have shaped the way in which classical ideas on friendship were 
disseminated and understood. Although Aristotle’s work pre-dated Cicero, De amicitia 
will be examined first, as its vernacular printing predates that of Aristotle’s Ethics.   
     The Roman statesman and orator, Marcus Tullis Cicero (106-43 BCE) wrote his 
Laelius De amicitia c. BCE 44 as a testament to his lifelong friendship with Atticus.21 The 
work is described as being influenced by earlier works on friendship from the Greek 
school, namely, Plato's Lysis, Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics and Xenophon's 
Memorabilia.22 It is considered one of the most influential contributors to the discourse of 
early modern friendship because of the central place it occupied in the humanist school 
curricula where it served as a  repository for moral wisdom, as well as what Laurie 
                                                 
21 Horst Hutter, Politics as Friendship: The Origins of Classical Notions of Politics in the Theory and 
Practice of Friendship (Ontario: Wilfrid Laurier Press, 1978), p. 133. 
22 William Armistead Falconer, ‘Introduction’ in Marcus Tullius Cicero, De Amicitia in Cicero, De 
Senectute, De Amicitia, De Divinatione, trans. by William Armistead Falconer, The Loeb Classical Library 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts:  1927-2001; 2001), pp. 103-211 (p. 106). 
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Shannon notes was ‘a gateway text in Latin learning’.23  Shannon underscores the text’s 
dual use for moral and grammatical instruction.24   T. W. Baldwin’s work has 
demonstrated the text’s centrality to the Elizabethan grammar school system.25  School 
records as early as 1560 show that Cicero’s views on friendship were imparted through 
this work to young men in their formative years from Rivington to Tidewell in 
Derbyshire.26    
     De amicitia remained an important source of ideas on friendship throughout the 
Elizabethan and pre-Civil War Stuart period.  The work has received considerable 
attention for its contributions to an early modern understanding of amity, and with good 
reason, as it marks an early beginning of a rigorous intellectual inquiry into friendship 
which continued in the early sixteenth-century through works by Erasmus, Thomas More 
and Thomas Elyot.  There were several key classical texts made available in vernacular 
translations during the early modern period, but Cicero’s De amicitia is generally heralded 
as the key friendship text.  As such, it is invoked with relative frequency when readings of 
dramatic works on friendship are considered, for as Lorna Hutson relates, its principles 
pervade all types of sixteenth-century literature.27   
     The 1574 verse by Edward Jeninges that opened this chapter whimsically suggests that 
one book could not contain all of the possibilities for friendship.  Nearly one hundred years 
earlier, this proved no obstacle to humanist John Tiptoft, Earl of Worcester, who 
recognised Cicero’s De amicitia as just that one text and made a translation that became 
                                                 
23 Laurie Shannon Sovereign Amity:  Figures of Friendship in Shakespearean Contexts Chicago and London:  
University of Chicago Press, 2002), pp. 26-27. 
24 Shannon, pp. 26-27. 
25 T.W. Baldwin, William Shakspere’s Small Latine and Lesse Greek, 2 vols (Urbana:  University of Illinois 
Press, 1944), I, p. 433. 
26 T.W. Baldwin, I, pp. 345, 347 for Bishop Pilkington’s Rivington, and pp. 430-433 for Tidewell. 
27 Lorna Hutson, The Usurer’s Daughter:  Male Friendship and Fictions of Women in Sixteenth- Century 
England (London and New York:  Routledge, 1996), p.62. 
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available in 1481 (reprinted 1530).  This translation, which receives a thorough 
examination by Laurie Shannon in Sovereign Amity, was followed in 1550 by John 
Harington’s The Booke of Freendeship of Marcus Tullie Cicero.28  This text, and a later 
translation by Thomas Newton, will serve as the focus of this review. 
     Harington (1517-1582) was a courtier under Henry VIII and entered the service of Sir 
Thomas Seymour. While the latter relationship was instrumental in his rise to a 
parliamentary seat, it was also what led to his first imprisonment in the Tower.  This is 
where he learned French and made his translation from the French version available to 
him, as previously discussed.  Jason Scott-Warren notes at this early date ‘Harington 
stands out as a vigorous champion of the vernacular.’29  And indeed he was. Harington 
indicates in his preface that in his ‘enterprise’ he ‘used the playne and common speache' in 
the hope of making Cicero’s thought accessible to ‘the unlatined’ (or perhaps those who 
could not speak French, as he himself had access to a French translation).30  Further, he 
says that the work was meant to ‘bee enterpreted rather by freends, as a treatise of 
frendship, then by lerned clerkes in an argument of translation’.31 Through his work, 
Cicero’s ideas on friendship now had the potential for an even wider audience. 
     Harington’s interest in friendship perhaps took on a new significance after the ‘great 
and sundrie miseries’ that befell him, through which he found ‘some holow hertes, and a 
few feithfull freendes’.32  Without Harington’s translation before it was emended by his 
unnamed editor(s), and without information about the French translation from which he 
was working, it is impossible to know to what extent the text was informed by his or his 
                                                 
28 The work had a 1562 edition with the same publisher, Thomas Berthelette, and this will be used in this 
study. 
29  Biography of Harington all from Jason Scott-Warren, in The Oxford Dictionary of National Biography.  
30 The Booke of Freendeship, Harington, sig. A3v. Harington does not entitle this a dedicatory epistle.  The 
later pages refer to it as ‘the preface to the reader’ even though it appeals directly to the Duchess of Suffolk 
on A2r. Here it will be referred to as ‘preface’. 
31 Harington, ‘Preface’, The Booke of Freendeship, sig. A3v. 
32 Harington, The Booke of Freendeship, sig. A2r. 
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editor’s personal experiences, religious beliefs or rather, those of the French translator.  
This would be interesting to understand, for the translation reads less like a recounting of a 
philosophical dialogue about friendship between Gaius Laelius and his sons-in-law Gaius 
Fannius and Quintus Mucius Scaevola, and more like a Christian didactic work.  It is a 
syncretised work of religious theology and classical philosophy of the kind one would not 
expect, or find, in later twentieth-century translations, such as the Loeb editions (1923-
2001).  But Harington’s preface evidences a conflation of the two, declaring:  
 
for an assured freende is the medicine of life:  suche a one shall thei obtayne, that 
reverently honoure the lorde; He that honoureth the lorde dooeth stablishe and 
make sure this friendship forever as another hym selfe shall his frende bee to 
hym.33  
  
Here the friend retains the classical designation of ‘another self’ but it is made clear that 
that ‘self’ should be a Christian.  To assume this perspective in a classical translation was 
not unusual.  Robert Miola relates that ‘some prefatory material, notes, and commentary 
aggressively managed reading, directly and indirectly conforming classical texts to 
Christian revelation’.34  But equally important is the way in which Harington’s preface 
underscores the ease with which Christian morality was able to accommodate certain 
classical ethics, and how translators would reconcile the latter to do so.   
     Harington’s translation defines ‘amitee’ in the following terms:   
 
                                                 
33 The Booke of Freendeship, Harington, sig. A6r. 
34 Robert Miola ‘‘Reading the Classics’ in A Companion to Shakespeare ed. by David Scott Kastan (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1999), pp. 172-185 (p. 175). 
24 
 
no thinge els but a perfecte agremente with good wyll and true love in al kind of 
good thinges and godlie.  And I knowe not whether any better thyng hath bene 
geven of GOD unto men, wysedom excepted, then this same freendship.35  
 
 Here the gift of friendship bestowed on man by the pagan gods becomes the providence of 
the Christian God.  The love in friendship is defined within a moral framework as unity in 
things ‘good’ and Godly.  The next vernacular translation fifteen years later, by Thomas 
Newton (1577) defines friendship twice.  In the first instance there is no attribution of 
friendship to a supreme being.  Here, Laelius’ definition of the ‘whole summe of 
Frendshippe’ is represented as consisting of ‘a most perfect agreement of willes, desires, & 
opinions’.36 The later Loeb edition (2001), working from nine manuscripts from the ninth 
to the twelfth-centuries, reads similarly to Newton’s, asserting that ‘the whole essence of 
friendship’ lies in ‘the most complete agreement in policy, in pursuits and in opinions’.37  
But Newton refines this definition later in the work, reiterating Harington’s view: ‘For 
friendshippe is nothinge elles but a perfecte agreemente with goodwil and hearty love in al 
matters, both divine and humaine’.38 Newton’s work also posits friendship as a gift from 
God, similar to Harington’s.  Both translations assert a view of perfect friendship that 
makes requisite the sharing of not merely ‘one soul in two bodies’ as classical friendship 
suggests, but rather, a Christian soul ‘in two bodies’.39 As Newton was a Church of 
England clergyman, this may not be a surprising addition to his translation.  But as an 
editor and translator of note, with at least twenty books and translations including several 
of Cicero’s and the only English translation of Seneca’s dramatic works in print at the 
                                                 
35 The Booke of Freendeship , Harington, sigs. B6r - B7v. 
36 Marcus Tullius Cicero, The Booke of Freendeshipe in Fouure Seuerall Treatises of M. Tullius Cicero 
trans. by Thomas Newton (London:  Thomas Marshe, 1577), sig. A7r. 
37 Marcus Tullius Cicero, De Amicitia in Cicero, De Senectute, De Amicitia, De Divinatione, trans. by 
William Armistead Falconer, The Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, Massachusetts:  1927-2001 
(2001),(pp. 103-211),  ( iv 14-16, p. 125).   
38 The Booke of Freendeshipe, Newton, sigs. B1r- B1v. 
39 The Booke of Freendeshipe, Newton, B1r- B1v. 
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time, it is interesting to further consider to what extent his religious beliefs informed his 
translation of De amicitia.40  
     His Christian consciousness is indeed felt in other instances in the work.  In the section 
delineating lesser types of friendship, Newton retains Cicero’s subordination of these to 
perfect friendship, but characterises them in unmistakably dark tones.41  Rather than the 
less disapproving designations of ‘ordinary and commonplace’ (or similar permutations) 
found in early and late twentieth-century translations (Loeb 1927-2001), he chooses the 
more censorious ‘vulgare or meane’, firmly dislocating the other types of friendship from 
the ideal.42  He further promotes the negative sense of friendships of utility, by affirming 
that: ‘Frendship prowles not after profit’, rather than the twentieth-century, less 
contemptuous, ‘It is not the case, therefore that friendship attends upon advantage’.43  
Newton’s translation evokes an image of useful friendship as a medieval vice character, 
similar to Voltore, Corbaccio and Corvino in Ben Jonson’s Volpone, men who are in 
search of pure profit, not affection in friendship.   
     Another example of this in the work helps to show not only how a translation can be 
subtly inscribed by one’s own morality, but also perhaps one’s cultural context.  In a 
section which discusses ‘howe farre Love ought to stretche in Freendshippe’, Newton 
labels Gaius Blossius’ reply, that he would do what his friend Tiberius requested even if it 
meant burning the city, as a ‘villanous saying’, and deems his actions in wrongdoing 
‘trayterous attemptes’, while the earlier pre-Elizabethan Harington translation does not 
qualify the attempt adjectivally at all, and deems Gaius’ reply that he would do what his 
                                                 
40 Gordon Braden, ‘Thomas Newton’ in DNB. 
41 In fact, Cicero does not recognise these other relationships as friendship. 
42The Booke of Freendeshipe , Newton, sig. B2v; Cicero, De Amicitia, Loeb, vi. 22, p. 133.  
43 The Booke of Freendeshipe , Newton sig. C7v; Cicero, De Amicitia , Loeb, xiv. 50, p. 163. 
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friend asked as merely a ‘shamefull’ ‘sayinge’.44 But Harington in 1562 is writing before:  
the imprisonment (1569) and execution of Mary (1587), the papal Bull excommunicating 
Elizabeth (1570), and threats from plots by the Nevilles and Percys (1569) and Thomas 
Howard, Duke of Norfolk, the latter culminating in his execution in 1574.45  While the 
background of Harington’s writing was the Lady Jane Grey controversy, his work might 
not register the same intensity regarding sedition as Newton’s, as his was exempt from the 
acute pressure of Catholic threats against the Queen.  Such threats were contemporary to 
Newton, as were concerns over representation of such ideas.  Newton’s translation was 
made at the same time that professional theatre was gaining its footing in London and 
concerns about its potential to incite ‘disorder’ were growing.46  Further, while a scholarly 
exercise in translation of a classical text may have been considered less problematic (or 
potentially subversive), Janet Clare’s work on censorship reminds us that the beginning of 
state control of the presses was under the early Tudors.47  This context may have provided 
a frame of reference for Newton’s adjectival choices that intensify the sense of high 
treason.  It may also help explain why the work is emphatic that friendship has it limits and 
that the public good outweighs perceived duties of fidelity in friendship. 
     It is easy to see how a work on friendship which encourages its promotion and lauds its 
benefits on a public and personal level might have its use in Newton’s England.  In the text 
its necessity is palpably felt in the imagining of a world devoid of friendship:  ‘Now if you 
take out of the world the knot of friendship, certes, neyther shall any house be able to stand 
                                                 
44 The Booke of Freendeshipe , Newton, sigs. B9v-C2r; The Booke of Freendeship, Harington, sig. D2v. 
45 For a discussion of the Catholic threats see Newton Key and Robert Bucholz, Sources and Debates in 
English History, 1485-1714 (Malden, Massachusetts:  Wiley-Blackwell, 2004), p. 77. 
46 Although Janet Clare explains that it was during Elizabeth’s later years that ‘bureaucratic regulation of the 
stage’ took place. See Janet Clare, Art Made Tongue-tied by Authority: Elizabethan and Jacobean Dramatic 
Censorship (Manchester:  Manchester University Press, 1990), pp. 8-9. 
47 Clare, p. 16. 
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ne City to endure, no, nor yet any tillage to continue’.48  With this in mind, the work 
outlines the specific characteristics of ‘true and perfect’ friendship.  Friendship is between 
good men.49  It promotes and is grounded in virtue.50  A friend offers counsel and 
comfort.51  Similar to Pylades, whose willingness to die for Orestes ‘affirmed’ his 
friendship; a true friend remains steadfast in fortune and adversity.52   And there is again 
the iteration of the idea dating back to Pythagoras of all-encompassing closeness in faithful 
friendship where the friend becomes a ‘pattern’ of one’s ‘owne selfe’.53   
     Despite the forwarding of the benefits of true friendship, however, there is the caveat 
that it is rare, as are the type of men who would prove to be such friends; as Newton’s 
translation notes ‘there is  greate scarcity’ of ‘sure, steadfast and constante’ men.54  There 
is a significant emphasis here on faithfulness in terms of Stoic constancy, with the 
steadfast friend likened to ‘a God [sic]’.55  One and one-half quires are dedicated to this 
idea, noticeably in a section offering advice about the selection of friends (like the above), 
with ‘constant, & stable’ ‘stablenes & constancie’ and ‘stable’ reiterated.56  If the friend is 
a pattern of one’s self and a true friend is constant, it follows that one must cultivate such 
virtue in oneself if he is to have a friend.  Thus the reciprocal nature of friendship is 
implicitly enforced.  But there is another insistence here, and that is that ‘a sure Frend is 
tryed in Adversitye’, not only in the figurative sense, but quite literally, ‘as men use to 
assaye their horses’, as it is ‘a harde matter’ to ‘judge’ a friend’s constancy ‘without 
                                                 
48 The Booke of Freendeshipe, Newton, sig. B3r. 
49 The Booke of Freendeshipe, Newton, sig. A8r. 
50 The Booke of Freendeshipe, Newton, sigs. B1v, B5v, C2r, C4v, C5v. 
51 The Booke of Freendeshipe, Newton, sigs. C4v, D2r. 
52 The Booke of Freendeshipe, Newton, sigs. B3v, C8r, D4v. 
53 The Booke of Freendeshipe, Newton, sig. B3r. 
54 The Booke of Freendeshipe, Newton, sigs. B1v, D3v--D4r. 
55The Booke of Freendeshipe,  Newton, sig. D4v.  
56 The Booke of Freendeshipe, Newton, sigs. D3v, D4v-D5r.  
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tryall’.57  This idea becomes a significant part of the discourse, especially as it relates to 
constancy.  It emerges with frequency in compilations and literary works.58  There is also a 
warning about flattery, which is denounced in the work, but the caveats in no way detract 
from the sense that friendship is a noble and worthy endeavour.59  Overall, the work 
remains true to its Roman roots as a celebration of the friendship that Laelius shared with 
his deceased friend, Scipio.  The healing power of friendship recollected is palpably felt in 
the penultimate part of the Newton translation.60   
     The final words ‘exhorting’ men to value virtue and friendship above all else, provide a 
gentle reminder of their inextricable link, despite the divisive political world of the Roman 
Republic where friendships of utility flourished,  De amicitia was composed, and Cicero 
was eventually betrayed by a false friend.61  It was a world not unlike Tudor and Stuart 
England when the work was translated and made available to a new audience.  Perhaps the 
hope was that the work would foster a ‘commonly shared belief’ in the value of friendship 
so that they would shape their useful friendships with these duties in mind, as Horst Hutter 
notes that the Romans had done before them.62   
      The Greek philosopher Aristotle (384-322 BCE) contributed to the early modern 
discourse on friendship primarily through translations of his Nicomachean Ethics. The first 
complete translation of his Ethics into Latin was in 1260 by Robert Grosseteste.  The work 
received much attention in the thirteenth century through commentary by Albert Magus in 
                                                 
57 The Booke of Freendeshipe, Newton, sigs. D3v, D4v. 
58 Most notably in the popular Euphues: The Anatomy of Wit in the phrase: ‘trial shall prove trust’ in John 
Lyly, Euphues:  The Anatomy of Wit and Euphues and His England ed. by Leah Scragg (Manchester and 
New York:  Manchester University Press, 2003), p. 46. 
59 The Booke of Freendeshipe, Newton, sigs.E6v-E8r. 
60 The Booke of Freendeshipe, Newton, sig. F4r. 
61 For a discussion of friendships of utility during the time of Cicero and its relation to the writing of De 
amicitia see Hutter, p. 133-135. 
62 Hutter, p. 136. 
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1250, and his student Thomas Aquinas in 1266.63  The earliest vernacular edition in 
England was John Wilkinson’s 1547 translation.  Its source is the thirteenth century Italian 
translation of Brunetto Latini.  Christiana Fordyce explains that Latini was a rhetorician of 
note, who was inspired by Aristotle and Cicero and sought to educate the growing 
mercantile class in the rhetoric of utilitas: ‘an art that could preserve good name, assure 
gain, make alliances and fortify individual will into common want’.64  Fordyce holds that 
Latini’s translations were informed by ‘this idea of utile’.65  It is important to note at this 
point that Latini’s work was itself a translation of an Arabic abridged version by 
Hermannus Alemannus.66  Therefore, Wilkinson’s translation into English came to his 
early modern readers third hand, its thought compressed and possibly influenced by 
Latini’s concern for utilitas.  While this helps to demonstrate the importance of using 
contemporary editions to understand the shape that ideas on friendship took as they entered 
the discourse, it also raises the question, given Latini’s views, how might he have engaged 
with Aristotle’s inquiry into friendship that ascribes a lesser status to useful amity?  
Without an examination of that translation this question remains unanswered, but the 
Wilkinson translation highlights the problem with working from abridged versions in 
general. 
      There is little known about John Wilkinson.  In the preface to his translation he refers 
to himself as the ‘humble and obediente servaunte’ of Edward earl of Derby (1509–
                                                 
63 Joel Kaye, Economy and Nature in the Fourteenth Century: Money, Market Exchange, and the Emergence 
of Scientific Thought (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 56; for current scholarship on 
dating of the Grosseteste translation and Aquinas' exegesis see fn.3. 
64 Cristiana Fordyce, ‘The Pro-Ligaro: Volgaizzamento as a Means of Profit’ in The Politics of Translation in 
the Middle Ages and the Renaissance Ottawa:  University of Ottawa Press, 2001), pp. 107-120 (pp. 107, 
109). 
65 Fordyce, p. 109. 




1572).67  The sections on friendship in the work, generally books 8 and 9, comprising 
fifty-five pages in modern editions, is reduced to six and one-half quires in the Wilkinson.  
The abridgement and redaction is significant insofar as it reveals the ideas that w
emphasised in relation to friendship. And as will be considered, because of the complex 
nature of the Ethics this can open the text to misinterpretation in places. The inquiry into 
friendship in the work begins by establishing an association between friendship and virtue, 
but with a notable addition which figures it in Christian terms.  Friendship is not a gift 
from God, as is posited in Newton’s Cicero, but it is something God himself embodies:  
‘Amitee is one of the vertues of almightie God’.
ere 
                                                
68  This elevates amity to something nearly 
unachievable, outside the realm of possibility for earthly men.  Further, it affords it a status 
suggestive of one of the cardinal virtues:  Prudence, Justice, Fortitude, and Temperance. 
The view taken here, in essence, is that ‘God is friendship’.  This is a perspective assumed 
in the work of twelfth-century Cistercian abbot Aelred of Rievaulx in his Christian 
humanist work, Spiritual Friendship (c.1147).69 As discussed at the outset of this chapter, 
classical ethics had long been recognised, and used, to inform Christian moral thought, and 
Aelred’s and Wilkinson’s texts speak to this idea.   
     The Wilkinson text transformed the classical model of friendship that other 
contemporary works offered for emulation from that of Damon and Pythias or Orestes and 
Pylades, to that of God and man.  It does so, in part, through the inclusion of a chapter that 
 
67John Wilkinson, ‘Preface’ in The Ethiques of Aristotle, that is to saye, preceptes of good behauoute [sic] 
and perfighte honestie, trans. by John Wilkinson (London:  Richard Grafton, 1547), sig. A2r. 
68 Ethiques, Wilkinson, sig H3r. 
69 Aelred of Rievaulx, Spiritual Friendship trans. by Mary Eugenia Laker (Kalamazoo:  Cistercian, 1977), 
1.69, p. 65, for the relational model of friendship with God, see 3.87, p. 114; Douglass Roby dates the work’s 
beginning around the time that Aelred became abbot at Rievaulx. In Douglass Roby, ‘Introduction’ in Aelred 




has no correlative in the 1998 Oxford edition:  ‘The love that a man hath with God’. 70  In 
this section the work argues that the love of God, not the friend, or the self (which is 
central to the ethic of amity according to Aristotle) ought to be above all others.  It reads:  
‘the love of God oughte to bee preferred before the love of father. For the benefits that a 
man receiveth of God: be more greate and noble’.71  This idea challenges the paradigm of 
perfect classical friendship understood in the period through other classical texts and the 
aforementioned perfect friendship pairs by implicitly holding up the nobility of God’s 
sacrifice as the model from which friendship is to be judged.  This of course would be a 
view that readers might be familiar with through biblical teaching, but incorporating it in a 
translation of a work by a pre-Christian philosopher is striking.72  Importantly, this 
Christian framework for understanding friendship stresses the benefit received from God 
as the motivating factor for preferring his friendship above all others. This contradicts 
Aristotle’s view of perfection in friendship, where the friend is an ‘other self’, as it 
establishes a superior-inferior relationship; for man is not on equal footing with God (even 
if he is made in God’s image), as the story of Adam and Eve confirms.  Further, this model 
engenders a sense that indebtedness and reward are the basis for friendship, in sharp 
contrast to principles of ideal friendship.73  The suggestion in Wilkinson is not that love 
and virtue compels this philia, but rather, that it is driven by the need for man to 
reciprocate God’s beneficence. While Aristotelian philosophy recognises the role of 
reciprocity in perfect friendship, the additional chapter in Wilkinson registers a more 
useful, obligatory sense of the ideal generally absent from modern translations. 
                                                 
70 For comparison see Aristotle: The Nicomachean Ethics, trans. by David Ross, rev. by J.L. Ackrill and J.O. 
Urmson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1925; repr. 1980, 1998), pp. 211-214. 
71 Ethiques, Wilkinson, sigs. H7v-H8r; See also Ross, Ackrill and Urrmson, pp. 211-214. 
72 Even so, biblical teaching held up David and Jonathan as examples of perfect friendship. 
73 For instance, Smith Pangle, pp. 38, 153, 169. 
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     The emphasis in Wilkinson’s translation forwards a hierarchy that ensures that earthly 
friendships are not esteemed above the phila between God and man.  The degree of ‘amite’ 
differs depending on the nature of one’s relationship, and is specifically outlined: ‘The 
amite of kyndred, frendes, neighbours and straungers, is more and lesse accordyng to the 
diversitie of causes by that whiche one beareth good will unto another’.74 The problem 
here of course is that employing the term ‘amity’ to define relationships with even 
strangers dilutes perfect friendship’s lofty ideal of  ‘one soul in two bodies’, something 
which is important to Aristotle’s conception of perfect friendship (despite the practical 
acknowledgement and discussion of friendships of utility and delectation).75  The inclusive 
‘amity’ and Christian sensibility that permeates the discussion renders friendship less akin 
to classical amicitia and rather, nearly indistinguishable from caritas.76  And while it 
nevertheless remains a virtuous exercise, the sense of classical friendship is muted in an 
overall implicit call for brotherly love based on Christ’s charge to the disciples that he 
reminds, ‘you have I called frendes’ in John 15, telling them: ‘that ye love together, as I 
have loved you’.77  But this conception of friendship as caritas and the extension of the 
definition of friendship to include everyone removes discernment and choice, and effects 
quality, three essential aspects of classical friendship theory asserted in De amicitia and in 
Aristotle’s Ethics.  Further, it contradicts the ideas recounted in later translations of 
Aristotle that ‘one cannot be a friend to many people’ and that true friendship is one with 
origins in familiarity and ‘the good’.78  But herein lies a problem, as Wilkinson also 
includes the classical idea of the exclusivity of friendship, thereby muddying the waters, 
                                                 
74 Ethiques, Wilkinson, sig. H8r. 
75 For instance see Nicomachean Ethics, Ross, Ackrill, Urmson, pp. 209-210. Ethiques , Wilkinson, sig. J4r. 
76 David Konstan explains that the noun philia is ‘commonly rendered as friendship’ but that it actually has a 
more inclusive definition including love (from the verb philein) and solidarity in Friendship in the Classical 
World (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 9. 
77 The Bible in Englishe (London:  Richarde Harrison, 1562), G4v. There are no verse numbers given in this 
work. 
78 In Nicomachean Ethics, Ross, Ackrill, Urmson, pp. 193, 196, 201. 
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saying ‘There can be but one verteous frend. As a man can have but one lover that he 
loveth intirely.’79 This exclusivity is where the Wilkinson translation departs from its view 
of friendship as caritas.  
     Amity in the Wilkinson translation is weighted heavily in terms of responsibility to 
others, and is demonstrated through acts that are seen as a way to preserve friendship.  In 
this way, the work not only outlines the duties of friendship, but emphasises, the duty for 
friendship, as compelled by Christian dogma.  That said, Aristotle’s inquiry into friendship 
does consider goodwill and different types of friendship between unequals, outlining 
‘proportional affection’80 and the Wilkinson translation follows similarly:  
 
 The greater man to geve unto the lessee winnyng, & the lesse ought to geve unto 
 the greater honor and reverence. And this ought to bee accordyng to the deservyng 
 of them both: In these waies is conserved frendeship.81   
 
One can see how the idea of ‘gevyng and receivyng naturally from hand to hande’ and the 
notion that this safeguards friendship might be troublesome to an understanding of 
friendship, even if it is explained that it is ‘a good thyng it is to do good to other [sic] 
without any hope of gaynes’.82  But Aristotle does see the bestowal of benefits as ‘an 
active exercise of friendship’.83  Conversely however, if  ‘love is the pryce of vertue and 
thankes of benefites received’84 then philia is neither an end nor good in itself, which is 
part of ‘the deeper strain of friendship’, but rather, the means, what one must offer to 
achieve virtue and the reward of friendship.  This is contradicted later in the work by the 
                                                 
79 Ethiques, Wilkinson, sig J8r. 
80 For a discussion of this idea see Smith Pangle, pp. 57-64. 
81 Ethiques, Wilkinson, sigs. J1v-J2r. 
82 Ethiques, Wilkinson, sigs. J1r-J1v.   
83 Smith Pangle, p. 142. 
84 Ethiques, Wilkinson, sig. J1v. 
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insistence that a friend should be loved ‘for the very love of vertue’,85 for here virtue is an 
end in itself.  If the Wilkinson translation was meant as an instructive work for readers or 
students, which the subtitle suggests it was—The Ethiques of Aristotle, that is to saye, 
preceptes of good behauoute [sic] and perfighte honestie 86—then it is possible to see how 
there could be some confusion in practical application of some of the ideas discussed thus 
far.  As a dialectical inquiry into eudaimonia,87which was the objective of Aristotle’s 
work, this proves less problematic.   
     The significance of Aristotle’s Ethics (and ethics) to moral thought in the early modern 
period is pointed up by the translators’ note to the 1611 King James Bible.  Amidst 
mentions of Erasmus and Saints Ambrose, Augustine and Jerome, the unnamed translator 
asserts, ‘The Judgement of Aristotle is worthy and well knowen’, although he goes on to 
lament its popularity as a subject for translation:  
 
 How many bookes of profane learning have bene gone over againe and againe, by 
 the same translators, by others? Of one and the same booke of Aristotles Ethikes, 
 there are extant not so few as sixe or seven severall translations.88   
 
One of those who went ‘over’ the Ethics was Thomas Aquinas, his exegesis on the work is 
said to have had ‘the widest ranging and lasting influence’.89 Aristotle’s thought on 
morality and friendship influenced Aquinas’ own views, and further suggests the 
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86 Ethiques, Wilkinson, title page. 
87 Rosalind Hursthouse observes that this is ‘usually translated as happiness or flourishing, in Hursthouse, 
“Virtue Ethics”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2009 Edition). Hereafter:  SEP; Ross 
explains that eudaimonia ‘is usually translated as happiness’ in ‘Introduction’ in Nicomachean Ethics, Ross, 
Ackrill, Urmson, vi. 
88 The Holy Bible by his Majesties Speciall Co[m]mandement, n. trans. (London:  Robert Barker, 1611), sig. 
A6v. 
89 Jill Kraye, ‘The Tripartitie Division of Moral Philosophy in The Cambridge History of Renaissance 
Philosophy ed. by Charles B. Scmitt and Quentin Skinner (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 1990), 




complementary natures of classical and Christian ethics.90  The issue of the classical 
‘Supreme Being’ proved no problem to Christian mediation, as Jill Kraye’s work on 
Renaissance ethics finds that pagan gods ‘were often transformed’ into the Christian 
God.91  Wilkinson’s translation of the Ethics offers an example of this accommodation, as 
well as an instance of a continued syncretic approach to friendship ethics beyond Aquinas.  
Importantly, however, it is presented in the guise of a translation of Aristotle. 
     The apparent consonance between Christian theology and classical morality helps to 
shed light on the Christian perspective taken in Wilkinson’s work.  It may also, along with 
the abridgement of the original, help to explain the translation’s oversimplification of the 
idea of self-love’s relationship to friendship, a concept that continues to give rise to 
scholarly debate.92  Wilkinson’s translation asserts, ‘There bee men that love themself to 
much, and that is called a filthy love’ and declares that a ‘manne ought to love his friend, 
for in loving him he loveth himself’.93  While twentieth-century scholars disagree over 
whether Aristotle is suggesting ‘friendship is based on self-love’ or whether he is merely 
considering ‘whether it makes sense to speak of love for oneself in the way it obviously 
makes sense to speak of loving another,’94 for Wilkinson this poses no problem.  He 
identifies two key precepts to be derived from Aristotle’s complex inquiry into ‘the nature 
of the end or ends at which man ought to aim’:95  You should not love yourself too much, 
and you should show love to your friends, both of which subordinates self by putting 
                                                 
90 See Servais-Theodore Pinckaers trans. by Mary Noble, ‘The Source of the Ethics of St Thomas Aquinas’ 
in The Ethics of Aquinas ed. by Stephen Pope (Georgetown:  Georgetown University Press, 2002), pp. 17 -
29, (p. 20); See also Stephen Pope, ‘Overview of the Ethics of Aquinas’ in The Ethics of Aquinas ed. by 
Stephen Pope (Georgetown:  Georgetown University Press, 2002), pp. 30-53 (p. 30). 
91 Jill Kraye, ‘Renaissance Ethics’ in A History of Western Ethics ed. by Lawrence C. and Charlotte B. 
Becker (London:   Routledge, 2003), pp. 61-78 (p. 66). 
92 For instance, see Kraye, ‘Tripartite’, p. 327; Konstan, p. 77; Smith Pangle, 169-182. 
93 Ethiques, Wilkinson, sigs. J6v, J7 r. 
94 Kraye, ‘Tripartite’, p. 327. 
95 This is how David Ross describes Aristotle’s efforts in ‘Introduction’ in Nicomachean Ethics, Ross, 
Ackrill, Urmson, vi. 
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others first.96  This truncated version of a rather complicated idea corresponds nicely to the 
Christian imperative to love one’s neighbour as oneself, so long as your love of self was 
‘proper’, which in Augustinian terms meant the love was ‘morally neutral’ as opposed to 
the ‘reprehensible’ kind ‘which produced selfish behaviour’.97  It is interesting that a 
discussion of the significance of self-love is virtually eliminated from the Wilkinson 
translation, especially in light of the fact that Aristotle closely associates ‘the higher form 
of self-love’ with virtue, as Lorraine Smith Pangle explains, ‘obeying and gratifying one’s 
true self means doing what one should, choosing virtue’.98  Curiously, however, the view 
on self-love in Wilkinson, assigning it egocentric status in relation to friendship, prefigures 
Kierkegaard who also condemns self-love and finds love and friendship exacerbating it 
because love for the ‘other I’ is really just love for oneself.99  Wilkinson leans in this 
direction especially in his focus on caritas, what Kierkegaard sees as superior because it is 
love of ‘the first-thou’, one’s neighbour, rather than the ‘other I’, oneself.100  
     But Wilkinson’s text does not abandon the idea of friendship altogether, (as 
Kierkegaard’s will do).  Rather, it reflects on the capacity of friendship to provide ‘helpe 
and counsail’, support in ‘adversitee and prosperitee’, and guidance along the path towards 
virtue ‘so that menne maie become the better one by another’.101  What emerges overall is 
the sense of friendship’s benefit and obligations.  Wilkinson’s translation serves less as a 
                                                 
96 For friendship’s basis on self-love see Nicomachean Ethics, Ross, Ackrill, Urmson, where a section is 
devoted to self-love and friendship: ‘Internal Nature of Friendship:  Friendship is based on self-love’ 1165b - 
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Century (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 58-59. 
98 Smith Pangle, p. 171. 
99 Seren Kierkegaard, ‘You Shall Love Your Neighbour’ From Works of Love trans. by Howard and Edna 
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101 Ethiques, Wilkinson, sig. J8r. 
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theoretical model of friendship, or celebration of ‘one soul in two bodies’, which early 
modern readers might find in works such as Michel de Montaigne’s ‘De l’amité,’ and more 
of a framework for establishing harmony in society through self-denial and helping each 
other to achieve success, especially through declarations such as:  ‘it is a natural thyng to 
man to live citezenly, and a necessary thyng to  manne to accomplishe his busines of 
necessitee by his neighbores and frendes, which cannot bee doen by hymself’.102   
     The benefits of a more inclusive idea of amity, posited as concord, are prominent and 
explicitly outlined in Willkinson’s Ethiques, as well as in Newton’s De amicitia.  
Harington indicates that he was prompted to make his translation of De amicitia by 
reading it in French in the Tower and being struck by the ‘civyle use’ of friendship, which 
made him think the work was ‘mete for moe’.103  Making the ‘fruits’104 of friendship 
manifest through the work of Aristotle and Cicero might help to convince readers that its 
cultivation and practice was a worthy endeavour, especially if they could be convinced of 
Aristotle’s lofty claims of its public usefulness in an uncertain world:  ‘frendshippe 
destroyeth al strife, and euery discorde that may be’, and  ‘yf every man wer frendly to 
other, Justice shuld not nede’.105   
 
III. The Influence of Senecan Moral Philosophy and Stoic Thought   
Lucius Annaeus Seneca (c. 4 BCE-65 CE) was a Cordoban-born, Roman statesman, 
philosopher, and dramatist.  He was well-known in the sixteenth-century for his corpus of 
revenge tragedy from which dramatists drew inspiration, but also for his Stoic moral 
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105 Ethiques, Wilkinson, sig. H3v . 
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philosophy which helped to prompt the English Neo-Stoic movement. Janet Clare has 
pointed up the ‘wave of academic and aristocratic Senecanism’ that flourished in ‘the mid 
sixteenth-century’.106  Servais-Theodore Pinckaers relates that even though Thomas 
Aquinas, working in the thirteenth century, considered Aristotle ‘the philosopher’ and 
drew on his work, Aquinas also ‘exploits’ Cicero and Seneca to shape his ‘project of 
constructing a morality of virtues’.107   
     A fourteenth-century manuscript miscellany also helps to support the idea of the 
influence of Seneca’s moral ethics.  This compilation further attests to the comfortable 
coexistence of pagan and Christian thought, but most notably to Seneca’s centrality to it.  
The volume, said to have been compiled for Roger of Waltham, a clerk to the Bishop of 
Durham, contains devotional texts by Church fathers, scientific writings by Aristotle, and 
moral and liberal arts treatises which draw largely from Seneca (pp. 99-274).108  This 
volume, indeed, is not unusual for its inclusion of Seneca; Alcuin Blamires asserts that 
‘Seneca’s ethics were endlessly cannibalised in medieval compilations’.109  
     The manuscript is described as ‘well used’, with ‘margins annotated by a number of 
hands’, but it is the two pictures by the Master of Taymouth Hours that are most 
striking.110  In the first, Seneca is portrayed as sharing his wisdom with an eager ‘disciple’ 
(fig. 1). In the second, Plato, Seneca and Aristotle are ‘presented’ as Beryl Smalley 
suggests, ‘according to the medieval iconography of the Blessed Trinity (i.e. the Father, 
                                                 
106 Janet Clare, ‘Elizabethan and Jacobean Revenge Tragedy’, In Our Time, BBC Radio 4, hosted by Melvyn 
Bragg, 18 June 2009. 
107 Pinckaers, p. 20. 
108 Julie Gardham ,‘Manuscript Compilation:  Devotional & Philosophical Writings’ Online at The 
University of Glasgow Library Special Collections < http://special.lib.gla.ac.uk /exhibns 
/month/june2008.html> [accessed 25 June 2009]; Manuscript: London: c. 1325-1335 Sp Coll MS Hunter 231 
(U.3.4). Photos reprinted with the kind permission of The University of Glasgow Library Special 
Collections; They are described as paginated on vellum and not foliated. 
109 Alcuin Blamires, Chaucer, Ethics, and Gender (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 2006), p.10. 
110 Beryl Smalley description in Julie Gardham, ‘Manuscript Compilation’. 
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the Son and the Holy Spirit)’ (fig. 2).111  Seneca’s centrality here may be a reflection of 
what has been the subject of later scholarly debate:  his influence on St. Paul’s thought.  
Marcia L. Colish explains that Jerome indirectly helped to promulgate the now widely 
discounted 'myth' that Seneca corresponded with St. Paul and that this may have 
contributed to Seneca's esteem in the late medieval period.112  It is clear that there was a 
keen appreciation of Seneca’s moral ethics by the Church fathers and later theologians. 
The oldest manuscript of De beneficiis dates to the eighth-century and his Epistulae 
morales had not only what Colish notes was ‘the richest manuscript tradition’ but also, the 
‘most extensive influence’.113 According to Colish, Seneca’s popularity in the middle ages 
was greater than in the late classical period.114    
   
 
 





                                                 
111 Beryl Smalley description in Julie Gardham, ‘Manuscript Compilation’. 
112 Marcia L. Colish, The Stoic Tradition from Antiquity to the Early Middle Ages: Stoicism in Christian 
Latin Thought Through the Sixth Century , vol 2 of The Stoic Tradition from Antiquity to the Early Middle 
Ages (Leiden:  BRILL, 1985), p. 91; See also Arnaldo Momigliano,  On Pagans, Jews, and Christians ( 
Middletown:   Wesleyan University Press, 1987), p. 204; Terence Paige notes the distinct dissimilarities 
between Paul and Seneca’s thought, but asks, ‘why does he [Paul] so frequently use language that appears 
Stoic?’ 
112 Terrence Paige,’Stoicism, ἐλευθ-ερία and Community at Corinth’ in Christianity at Corinth: The Quest 
for the Pauline Church ed. by Edward Adams and David G. Horell (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 
2004), pp. 207-218 (p. 209). 
113Colish, pp. 17-18. 
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     Smalley’s thoughts on the iconography of the drawings are interesting, even if 
Aristotle, Seneca and Plato were not thought of as competitors for the hearts and minds of 
the Church.  At the very least, the anachronistic clothing of the philosophers in garb 
similar to that of the early Church theologians depicted as beneficently offering their 
wisdom imparts a sense of importance and reverence.  These depictions support the idea 
that despite the Stoic belief in suicide and determinism,115wholly unacceptable to Christian 
dogma, the Church still found Stoicism, and particularly Seneca’s moral ethics, appealing 
and valuable.  The work of Cicero and Seneca did much for the understanding of Stoicism 
in the middle ages.  Sarah Hutton reminds us that the Stoics were considered ‘admirable 
for the parallels with Christian ideals which they appeared to exhibit’.116 Other fourteenth-
century proponents of Senecan morality included Petrarch, Gower and Chaucer, the latter 
dubbed ‘Seneca in morals’ by Eustace Deschamps in a ballade (c. 1384-1390).117  
Petrarch’s De remediis utiusque fortunate (1366), his most popular work, was itself an 
imitation of a work erroneously ascribed to Seneca, which not only highlighted Seneca’s 
appeal ‘as a lay moralist for Christian consumption’, but also ‘did much to recommend 
Stoicism as a repository of moral sententiae’.118 
     While the harsher Stoic prescriptions may have found a willing audience amongst 
medieval moralists and theologians, Stoicism might not have been so keenly felt in the 
latter part of the sixteenth-century if not for the Northern European religious and civil wars 
that Jill Kraye sees as fundamental to the Neo-Stoics gaining footing.119  It was a time 
when ‘the Stoics appeared no longer quite so extreme; indeed it seemed that the only way 
                                                 
115 Sarah Hutton, ‘Platonism. Stoicism and Scepticism, and Classical Imitation’ in The Cambridge 
Companion to Renaissance Literature and Culture ed. by Michael Hattaway (London:  Wiley-Blackwell, 
2007), pp. 44-57 (p. 53). 
116 Hutton, p. 53. 
117 See Petrarch De remedied utriusque fortunae (1366) and John Gower’s reference to Seneca in his Mirour 
de l’omme,; for Chaucer reference see Alcuin Blamires, p. 9.  
118 Hutton, p. 54. 
119 Kraye, ‘Renaissance Ethics’, p. 71.  
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to control the inflamed passions which were ravaging society was to eradicate them 
completely, just as the Stoics had recommended’.120 This contributes to the sense of the 
public benefit of moral philosophy, as discussed in Section II in relation to early modern 
translations of Aristotle and Cicero’s work on friendship.   
     J.H.M. Salmon’s work explores the interest in Stoic ethics in England through an 
examination of Neo-Stoicism derived from Seneca and Tacitus in the work of Flemish 
humanist Justus Lipsius.121  Although Lipsius published an edition of Seneca’s works in 
1605, his De Constantia (1584) is credited with reinvigorating interest in Seneca’s ideas, 
through ‘a new interpretation of Seneca’.122 De Constantia was a work that encouraged 
‘fortitude and private prudence’ and provided a system of ‘practical ethics that adapted 
Stoic assumptions to an undogmatic Christianity’.123  Jan Papy suggests that Lipsius’ work 
was the ‘manifesto’ of a man who believed that Seneca’s thought could serve as ‘a 
consolation and a solution to the public calamities which he and his contemporaries were 
enduring’.124  Lipsius’ friendships with Sir Philip Sidney and Phillipe Duplessis-Mornay 
were instrumental in the transmission of Neo-Stoic ideas, which ‘flourished in Catholic as 
well as Protestant circles’, as Salmon relates that either directly, ‘through their own 
writings’ or indirectly, through ‘those of their clients’, some of the men with ties to the 
‘Senecan and Tacitean cults’ included: Francis Bacon, Charles Blount (Baron Mountjoy), 
William Cornwallis, Michel de Montaigne, John Florio, Fulke Greville, Bishop Joseph 
Hall (chaplain to Prince Henry, and dubbed the ‘English Seneca’), Henry Savile, Robert 
                                                 
120 Kraye, ‘Renaissance Ethics’, p. 71.  
121 J.H.M. Salmon ‘Seneca and Tacitus in Jacobean England’ in The Mental World the Jacobean Court ed. 
by Lindy Levy Peck (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 169-188, (p. 169). 
122 Salmon, pp. 170-171; J. H. M. Salmon, ‘Stoicism and Roman Example: Seneca and Tacitus in Jacobean 
England’ in Journal of the History of Ideas 50.2 (Apr. - Jun., 1989), pp. 199-225, (pp. 203-204); Jan Papy, 
‘Justus Lipsius’ in SEP (Fall 2008 Edition). 
123 Salmon, ‘Seneca and Tacitus in Jacobean England’, pp. 170-171; J. H. M. Salmon, ‘Stoicism and Roman 
Example’, pp. 203-204. 
124 Papy, ‘Lipsius’, SEP. 
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Sidney, and the dramatists Ben Jonson and Thomas Lodge, the latter also a translator of 
Seneca’s De beneficiis.125   
     Through the work of early humanists the Stoic canon was ‘enriched’ and ‘established’ 
and contributed to an understanding of Roman, and to a lesser extent of Greek Stoicism.126  
Stoic virtues included temperance, justice and humility which were also embraced and 
promoted by the (early and later) Church.127 One virtue that had great resonance in 
Elizabethan and Jacobean England was fortitude, and what Aquinas saw as an important 
‘attribute’ of it, constancy.128  While this is not a new idea, as Aristotle had also 
considered fortitude, as Blair Worden relates, ‘constancy is a Stoic virtue.’129  Yet, while 
Aristotelian ethics may have been an important part of the humanist education initiative,
William Prior notes, the difference between the Ancient Greek and Stoic approach to 
virtue rests on the Stoic emphasis on endurance.
 as 
 
                                                
130  Endurance, demonstrated through
 
125 Salmon, ‘Stoicism and Roman Example’, pp. 205, 207, 208, 219, 222.  This is not to say it didn’t have its 
detractors, namely James I.  Erasmus ‘admired and edited Seneca’ and was one humanist who was a 
‘powerful advocate’ of Stoicism despite the fact that he ‘mocks the Stoics’ in Praise of Folly’ see Hutton, p. 
54.  Francis Bacon also  evidences an understanding of Stoicism in his work, even though Salmon 
characterises him as  ‘no blind admirer of ancient Stoicism’ in Salmon, ‘Stoicism and Roman Example’, pp. 
212, 223; Salmon, ‘Seneca and Tacitus in Jacobean England’, pp. 176-178 (p. 183). 
126 Hutton, p. 53. 
127 The virtues were also similarly considered in Greek ethics, as Houser notes the Platonic influence on St. 
Ambrose’s cardinal virtues in R.E. Houser, ‘The Virtue of Courage’ in The Ethics of Aquinas ed. by Stephen 
J. Pope (Georgetown:  Georgetown  University Press, 2002), pp. 304-320 (pp. 304-305).  The Stoic influence 
on early Church virtues has been documented.  See Boyle who relates that William Peraldus’ (a ‘senior 
colleague’ of Aquinas) own Summa quotes classical philosophers including Aristotle, Cicero and Seneca in 
order ‘to define and document, among other things, the theological cardinal virtues’ in Leonard E Boyle, 
‘The Setting of the Summa Theologiae St. Thomas--Revisited’ in The Ethics of Aquinas ed. by Stephen J. 
Pope (Georgetown University Press, 2002), pp. 1- 16 (pp. 9-11). 
128 William Prior, Virtue and Knowledge: An Introduction to Ancient Greek Ethics (London: Taylor & 
Francis, 1991), p. 218; Houser, p. 316. 
129 Blair Worden, ‘Favourites on the English Stage’ in The World of the Favourite ed. by J.H. Elliot and L. 
W. B. Brockliss (New Haven and London:  Yale University Press, 1999), pp. 159-183 (p. 162) ; see also 
Prior, p. 218; Houser, p. 305. 
 Worden also has mentioned constancy in his work on ‘fortune’ and the favourite, but in a different context, 
arguing ‘favourites have no constant selves’, in ‘Favourites on the English Stage’ p. 162. 
130 Prior, p. 218. 
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constancy in adversity, becomes very important in the consideration of friendship at th
time, and consequently, in this th
is 
esis.131    
                                                
     A greater awareness of Stoicism was gained in the early modern period through the 
availability of the work of Cicero, Plutarch, Seneca and Montaigne.132  A consideration of 
the idea of constancy resonated in a variety of discursive forms, including Lipsius’ work, 
as previously discussed.  Arthur Golding’s translation of M. Jacques Hurault’s ‘Passions of 
the Mind’ (1595) is also concerned with this idea, emphasising its importance by defining 
it in relation to its ‘contrarie’:  ‘Inconstancie or unstedfastnesse, whereunto he opposeth 
Constancie, or Stedfastnesse’.133  Shakespeare’s Roman plays also demonstrate an 
understanding of constancy as a Stoic virtue, as Geoffrey Miles and Coppélia Kahn’s work 
underscores.134  Thomas Lodge’s late sixteenth-century writing demonstrates a 
preoccupation with this idea.135  It was something Elizabeth I found of interest in Seneca 
and expressed in a translation she made of his Moral Epistle CVII that she sent in a letter to 
her godson, John Harington, in 1567.  She writes, ‘This onlye lyeth in our power; to frame 
a stowte mynde and worthie a good bodie, by which we maye strongly withstand 
mishapps’.136   
     The fact that misfortune would befall one was expected, but Stoicism helped to frame 
one’s mind to steadfastness.  The help of a ‘constant’ friend in times of adversity could 
help make this possible. As such it is not surprising that this idea became important to the 
 
131 ‘Bearing with and accepting hardship’ as Stoic, not Socratic virtues, in Prior, p. 218. 
132 Hutton, pp. 53-54. 
133 In M. Jaques Hurault, Politicke, Moral, and Martial Discourses translated by Arthur Golding (London:  
Adam Islip, 1595), p. 65. 
134 Coppélia Kahn, Roman Shakespeare: Warriors, Wounds, and Women (London:  Routledge, 1997, pp. 99, 
100, 102; Geoffrey Miles, Shakespeare and the Constant Romans (Oxford:  Clarendon Press, 1996 ), passim. 
135 See for instance Lodge’s consideration of constancy in An Alarum Against Usurers (1584), Catharos 
(1591), The Famous, True and Historicall Life of Robert Second Duke of Normandy (1591), Euphues 
Shadow( 1592), Euphues Golden Legacie  (1592),  A Fig for Momus (1595), The Divel Conjured (1596) and 
A Margarite of America (1596). 
136 In Nugae Antiquae:  Being a Miscellaneous Collection of Original Papers, ed.Thomas Park, 2 vols. 
(London, 1804),1, pp. 109-114, (p. 112). 
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construction of male friendship.  It already figured heavily in early modern gender 
relations, with inconstancy part of the construction of femininity.137  The relationship 
between constancy and friendship is explicated in Seneca’s De providentia.  The work sets 
out to answer why, if there is a God or gods, bad things happen to good people.138  The 
idea of fortitude and strength in adversity are forwarded in Edw. Sherburne’s translation139 
which posits man’s relationship with God as amity, similar to Wilkinson’s translation of 
Aristotle’s Ethiques, using perfect friendship rhetoric of similitude and concord:   
   
  Twixt God and Good men there’s a friendship layd  
  Still Firme, by virtu’s Mediation made.  
  Did I say Friendship? An inforcive Tye  
  Or likenesse rather, and a Sympathie.140 
 
Here ‘firmness’ qualifies the friendship in Stoic terms, linking it to virtue.  The 
relationship is one that can be depended on, with God not only characterised as a faithful 
friend, but also as a beneficent father figure who ‘doth good Men, (like a severe Father,) 
Afflictions learne to beare’.141  But adversity does not only aid in building the requisite 
fortitude; equally, according to Seneca, it is an important measure of it.  Friendly relations 
can be a means not only to build, but also to test this virtue.  In De providentia God (or the 
gods) ask, how else may constancy be determined?   
                                                 
137 For instance see Constantia Munda The Worming of a Madde Dogge (1617) a response to Joseph 
Swetnam’s Araignment of Lewd Idle, Froward and Unconstant Women.  Her name is Latin for ‘pure 
constancy’ in Matthew Steggle, ‘Constantia Munda’ in Reading Early Modern Women: An Anthology of 
Texts in Manuscript and Print, 1550-1700 ed. by Melissa Smith and Elizabeth Sauer (London: Routledge, 
2004), pp. 66-67(p. 67). 
138 Lucius Annæus Seneca, Seneca’s answer to Lucilius his quaere why good men suffer misfortunes seeing 
there is a divine providence?  trans. by  E.S. ( London : Printed for Humphrey Moseley, 1648). Hereafter: 
Seneca, De providentia. 
139 Edw. Sherburne, ‘Epistle’, De providentia, sig. A4r. The title page cites author as E.S., Esq. The epistle 
bears the signature ‘Edw. Sherburne’. In the epistle the pages are by signature. The text is paginated 
beginning with 1. 
140 Seneca, De providentia, p. 4. 
141 Seneca, De providentia, p. 5. 
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  Whence shall I  
  Know with how constant, and compos’d a state  
  Thou canst brook slanders, and the Peoples Hate,  
  If in the Generall Plaudit thou grow old?142  
 
It is easy to see how this idea would resonate with Christian thought and the ascetic 
monastic life of fourth-century Church fathers, as the Old and New Testaments upheld the 
importance of this virtue in the stories of Noah, Moses, David and Goliath, and especially 
in the crucifixion and sacrifice of Christ.  There was a similar insistence on the idea of 
fortitude, sacrifice and virtue in the classical paradigm of perfect friendship. The integral 
role of constancy as the touchstone for perfect, true friendship is strongly felt throughout 
the early modern discourse on friendship.  Chapter 2 will begin to interrogate the dramatic 
treatment of this idea, recognisable in oft-repeated, various permutations of Cicero’s 
instruction that ‘we must in freendshype make tryall’.143   
 
IV. Seneca’s De beneficiis and Friendship:  Ideas and Translations 
Seneca’s De beneficiis has been described and considered critically to some extent as a 
text on gift-giving and exchange.144  Arthur Golding’s dedicatory epistle to his 1578 
edition reflects this idea:  the ‘why, how, when, too [sic] what ende, and on whom’ of 
benefitting, as well as ‘what reward is too bee looked for in the doing [sic] of it, and what 
                                                 
142 Seneca, De providentia, p. 18. 
143 The Booke of Freendeshipe, Newton, sig. D3v; This idea reflected in Euphues in the phrase: ‘trial shall 
prove trust’ in John Lyly, Euphues: The Anatomy of Wit and Euphues and His England ed. by Leah Scragg 
(Manchester and New York:  Manchester University Press, 2003), p. 46. 
144 Coppélia Kahn ‘”Magic of Bounty”: Timon of Athens, Jacobean Patronage, and Maternal Power’,  
Shakespeare Quarterly, 38.1 (Spring, 1987), pp. 34-57, (p. 49).  It is interesting that De beneficiis has not 
received as much attention or consideration as Marcel Mauss’ The Gift, a work that David Wootton rightly 
notes ‘whose subject matter is identical with that of Seneca, though strangely, Seneca is never mentioned’, in 
David Wootton ‘Francis Bacon:  Your Flexible Friend’ in The World of the Favourite ed. by JH Elliott and 
WB Brockliss (Yale and New Haven:  Yale University Press, 1999), pp.184-204, (p. 186). 
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frute it yeeldeth again’.145  But as David Wooton has noted, Seneca’s text is also important 
for its treatment of friendship.146  This is not only because the word friendship is invoked  
twenty-four times in Lodge’s translation and twelve in Golding’s, but mainly because of 
the direct link that Seneca draws between benefit and friendship, characterising the act of 
accepting benefits as ‘receyving of freendshipe’.147  It is not a theoretical exposition that 
details in full Seneca’s philosophy of friendship.  This was, it is believed, advanced in his 
lost treatise De Amicitia, of which only fragments remain.148 But the work of Senecan 
scholars such as Anna Lydia Motto point up that in De beneficiis and the Epistulae 
Morales there is much to learn about Seneca’s views on friendship.149  What De beneficiis 
provides is a discussion on the ‘social conventions’ of friendship, where friendship is 
posited as a social act, grounded in ethics and goodwill, but predicated on giving and 
receiving.150  
    In many ways, the ideas on giving and friendship forwarded in De beneficiis are quite 
similar to those proposed by Aristotle and Cicero in their works on friendship. Aristotle’s 
discussion of benefits suggests ‘it is a great pleasure when a man hath dooen service to his 
frendes’ and speaks to the idea of ‘gevyng and receivyng naturally from hand to hande’, 
while Cicero asserts that ‘love is confirmed by benefites received by Goodwyll approved, 
and by acquaintaunce adjoyned’.151  This link between goodwill and benefit is at the heart 
of Seneca’s work, as giving engenders ‘friendly goodwill’.  As Peterman explains, this is 
                                                 
145 Lucius Annaeus Seneca , The Woorke of the Excellent Philosopher Lucius Annaeus Seneca Concerning 
Benefyting That Is Too Say the Dooing, Receyuing, and Requyting of Good Turnes trans. by Arthur Golding 
(London : By [John Kingston for] Iohn Day, 1578), sig. *iir. (The pagination begins A1 with the text itself). 
Hereafter : De beneficiis, Golding. 
146 Wootton considers De beneficiis to be one of three classical works that are ‘prolonged mediations on 
friendship’ in Wootton, p. 186.  
147 De beneficiis, Golding, sig, F4v. 
148 Anna Lydia Motto, Further Essays on Seneca by Anna Lydia Motto (Frankfurt:  Peter Lang, 2001), p. 7. 
149 See Motto, pp. 7-16. 
150 See W. Peterman, Paul’s Gift from Philippi (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 52, 70. 
151 Ethiques, Wilkinson, sig. J1r; The Booke of Freendeshipe , Newton, sig. B6r. 
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all that is expected when bestowing a benefit.152  Giving and receiving are seen here as an 
integral part of the performance of friendship, an idea that became an important part of the 
early modern understanding of friendship, as William Cecil, Lord Burghley’s letter of 
advice to his son suggests:  
 
Be sure thou alwaies keepe some great man to thy friend, but trouble him not for 
trifles, complement him often. present him with many, yet small gifts and of little 
charge, And if thou hast cause to bestow any great gratuity, then let it be some such 
as may bee daily in sight, for otherwise thou shalt live like a hop without a pole, 
live in obscurity, and be made a footeball for every insulting companion to spurne 
at.153 
 
But Seneca speaks to this idea in relation to virtue, relating it to the idea of equality in 
friendship, which is essential to a classical understanding of friendship, known as ‘like for 
like’.154  The value in the requital of a benefit rests in the virtuous mind of the giver, not in 
the material good:   
 
he hath doone verie much: hee hath rendered good with a good will, yea & like for 
like also, whiche is the propertie of frendship. Ageine the payment of a Benefite is 
one way, and the payment of a det is another way. You muste not looke that I 
should shewe my payment too the eye: the thing is doone betweene mynd and 
mynd.155 
 
                                                 
152 See Peterman, p. 70. 
153 William Cecil, Lord Burghley, ‘The Counsell of a Father to His Sonne, in Ten Severall Precepts’ (London 
: Printed for Josepth [sic] Hunt, 1611), Fifth Precept, p. 1, (this is a one page document). 
154 Seneca, De beneficiis trans. by Thomas Lodge, rpt.  of 1612 edn. by Israel Gollancz (London:  J.M. Dent, 
1899), pp. 49-50.  Hereafter: De beneficiis, Lodge; De beneficiis, Golding, sig G3r.  
155 De beneficiis, Golding, sig G3r.  
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 Even though, as David Wootton notes, ‘friendship is inseparable, in the early modern 
period, from alliance, clientage and favouritism’156 (as Burghley’s letter suggests), 
Aristotle, Cicero and Seneca’s work speak to ideal relations despite the fact that their 
treatises were invoked as didactic texts in a world where friendships of utility were 
commonplace. To be sure, Arthur Golding saw the practical use of the text for harmonious 
relations at the Elizabethan Court where friendships of utility flourished.  He declares his 
impetus for the translation as follows:    
 
I have therefore thought this woorke not unmeete too bee put intoo our 
Moothertung,  that the mo myght take benefyte by it; nor yet unexpedient too 
comme in Courtyers handes, who shalbe so muche the greater Ornament too 
themselves, and too the place whereof they take their name, as their Courtesies and 
Benefytes bee mo and greater towardes others.157  
 
This suggestion by Golding of how personal application of key Senecan principles by 
courtiers could affect the Court reflects Seneca’s idea of the public value of beneficence in 
terms of concord and harmonious relations.  As Paul Veyne notes, Seneca maintains that 
‘beneficence is fundamental to society, creating the social bond’.158  He sees gratitude and 
beneficence as helping to create friendship:  ‘So is the Law of benefites a most holy law, 
wherout of sprinketh frendship’.159  Anna Lydia Motto explains that for Seneca, the 
‘crucial value of friendship’ rests on the principle that ‘each friend not only perfects 
himself but also finds the opportunity to assist the other’.160  What is central to this 
however is that ‘love and generosity’ drives the relationship rather than expectation of 
                                                 
156 Wootton, p. 188. 
157 De beneficiis, Golding, sig. *iiv. 
158 Paul Veyne, Seneca: the Life of a Stoic trans. from French by David Sullivan (New York:  Routledge, 
2003), p. 131. 
159 De beneficiis, Golding, sig. E4r. 
160 Motto, p. 11. 
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reciprocation and reward.161  This is not an endorsement of friendship as a useful 
commodity, or a recognition of utilitarian friendship, for Seneca’s ideas are very much in 
line with Cicero’s, in terms of upholding an ‘ethos of disinterested friendship’, for Seneca 
is avowedly against utilitarian friendship.162 As a Stoic, he would adhere to the belief that 
friendship should be conducted in a ‘completely unexploitative way’.163   As Motto 
explains, true Senecan friendship ‘relies on love and generosity without mediating a return 
for services rendered’.164  In this he shares a common understanding with Aristotle and 
Cicero that in true friendship ‘two soules are coupled together.’165  However, while 
Aristotle views friendship as a good, Seneca suggests that friendship is not a good in itself, 
but rather, that its practice and demonstration can help to foster virtue in oneself. This is 
why the Stoic ‘wise-man’ is deemed ‘self-sufficient’, because although he enjoys and 
desires friendship, it is in the ‘being’ a friend, not ‘having’ a friend that matters.166 
     In general, Seneca’s writings may not always subscribe to a strict Stoic philosophy, but 
they are strongly grounded in the Stoic belief that ‘only virtue is good’.167  It is from this 
principle that De beneficiis is figured, as Seneca takes the view from the outset that 
‘amongst so many and mighty vices there is no one more frequent than that of 
Ingratitude’.168 Like Christian humanists, Seneca saw the benefit of philosophical study to 
                                                 
161 Motto, pp.10-11. 
162 ‘Disinterested’ friendship in Kahn, ‘“Magic of Bounty”’, p. 48; Motto, p. 10. 
163 See Marcia L. Colish, The Stoic Tradition from Antiquity to the Early Middle Ages: Stoicism in Classical 
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friend, if to no other end but to exercise his amitie’ in Epistles, Lodge, Epistle IX, p. 175. 
167 Katja Vogt, “Seneca”, SEP (Fall 2008 Edition).  
168 De beneficiis, Lodge, p. 2; Golding terms it ‘unthankfulness’ in De beneficiis, Golding, sig. A1r.  
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public life, and one of his works, ‘On Mercy’ is considered ‘one of the earliest examples’ 
of speculum principis, or ‘mirror-for-princes’ literature.169   
     Erasmus published an edition of Seneca’s work in 1515 (Froden) and a revised edition 
in 1529 (Basel).170  The earliest vernacular translation of Seneca’s De beneficiis is by 
Nicholas Haward (1569).  It consists of only the first three books of the work.  The title 
betrays the work’s raison d’être:  The Line of Liberalitie Dulie Directinge the Wel 
Bestowing of benefites and Reprehending the Comonly Used Vice of Ingratitude.  It 
follows Wilkinson’s Ethiques in carrying out a similar religious reshaping.  In particular, 
Haward’s translation Christianises the pagan gods in Book 2 Chapter 29, where later 
translations by Arthur Golding (1578) and Thomas Lodge (1614) do not.  Haward’s 
mediation of Seneca on benefits and love also serves, similarly to the Ethiques, as a call 
for beneficent relations between men in keeping with the second of the ‘greatest’ of the 
Commandments, to ‘love thy neighbour’.171  Haward relates that God has made man in his 
image and has demonstrated the greatest love.  The implicit suggestion is that this 
relational model, which has been described as ‘the amitie betwixt Christ and his 
Church’,172 should be followed by men:  
 
yea God hath above al other thinges delt most beneficiallie with thée as with his 
owne dere derling. For verely truth it is that God who is immortall both hath done,  
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and stil doth love us & that tenderly, for certein token now herof, he hath made us 
lyke himself ye most evident argument of his parfect love. At whose handes we 
have received so great benefits besides, that impossible it is to have any gretter.173  
 
Golding’s and Lodge’s translations read similarly, but retain the ‘gods’.  Golding’s 
declares: 
 The Gods immortall have loved us and doo love us most deerly: and (which is the 
 greatest honour that could bee given) they have placed us next unto themselves. 




The immortal gods have and doe love us entirely, and (which is the greatest honour 
that could be given) they have placed us next unto themselves. Great things have 
we received, neither were we capable of greater.175 
 
 Although there is a slight alteration between Golding and Lodge, in that Golding suggests 
there is no greater gift than what the gods have bestowed, and Lodge suggests deferentially 
that men are not capable of such beneficence, both excerpts are devoid of contemporary 
religious parlance. Even so, the sense remains the same, as all three mediations provide an 
ideal model of beneficence and amity based on man’s relationship with a Supreme Being 
through which men can judge and mould their own behaviour.   
     The absence of a Christian perspective does not hold throughout either the Golding or 
the Lodge translation however, as there are references to the bounty of God, his divine 
providence and even a clear attempt to reconcile Seneca’s Fortune and Fate with the 
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Christian God.  In Book 4 Chapter 8 Lodge states:  ‘Call him then as thou pleasest, either 
Nature or Fate, or Fortune it makes no matter, because they all are the names of the 
selfsame God, who diversely useth his divine providence’.176  While this at first glance is 
an instance akin to that which was seen in translations of Aristotle and Cicero (and 
Haward’s Seneca above), it should be noted that later twentieth-century translations 
contain a similar mix of references to ‘some god’, ‘gods’ and ‘God’.177  And, as Sorenson 
notes, Lodge ‘does not conceal the fact that he takes up the attitude of a Christian’ in his 
translation.178 This is made clear at the outset in the preface to the reader, where Lodge 
implores: ‘Would God Christians would endeavour to practise his [Seneca’s] good 
precepts, to reform their own in seeing his errors; and perceiving so great light of learning 
from a pagan’s pen, aim at the true light of devotion and piety, which becometh 
Christians’.179    
     Lodge is described as both a Christian humanist and Catholic, and Golding, according 
to Sorenson, was a Puritan, and spent much of his translating life on Protestant texts, 
including Calvin’s sermons (1574).180  While Sorenson describes Golding’s translation of 
De beneficiis as ‘thorough, meticulous’, he suggests that while Lodge’s demonstrates ‘a 
good working knowledge of Latin’, it also ‘reveals such an abyss of ignorance that one can 
hardly believe that he had really been through the extensive grammar-school curriculum of 
the time’.181   But what is evident from a comparison of the two translations is the poetic 
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license that Lodge takes in terms of ‘embellishment’ and ‘ornamentation’,182 perhaps not 
unexpected given the extent of his other dramatic and literary pursuits.   
     Both Golding and Lodge had ties to the dramatic community, although Lodge’s were 
more extensive.  Golding’s translation of Ovid’s Metamorphoses (1567) and Lodge’s 
Rosalynde (1590) were both sources for Shakespeare’s work.  But Lodge had other links 
with the dramatic community through associations with Ralph Crane, Thomas Dekker and 
Phillip Henslowe, and through his collaboration with Robert Greene on A Looking Glass 
for London, which was acted under the auspices of Lord Strange’s Men in 1592.183   
Lodge’s writing and translation work demonstrate an interest in the topos of friendship, 
and his links to Oxford, Lincoln’s Inn and the theatre, makes it plausible that some of the 
ideas that he was familiar with may have circulated through his dramatic circle.184  So 
even though T. W. Baldwin’s work was unable to place a copy of De beneficiis in the 
hands of the English grammar schools’ future dramatists, perhaps the one that Lodge is 
said to have placed in the hands of Dekker helped to disseminate some of Seneca’s 
thoughts on friendship.  Section V will consider additional indirect methods of 
transmission of classical ideas on friendship, and examine how Aristotle, Cicero a
Seneca’s ideas were disseminated in isolatio
nd 
n from their works. 
                                                
 
V.  Early Modern Mediations and Transmission of Philosophical Ideas on Friendship 
In the 1595 Politicke, Moral, and Martial Discourses, written by M. Jaques Hurault and 
translated by Arthur Golding, a suggestion to the reader speaks to the issue of the 
abbreviated form that ideas on friendship sometimes took in contemporary mediations and 
 
182 Sorenson, pp. 138, 141. 
183 Tenney, pp. 42, 189. 
184 In his 1935 biography of Lodge, Edward Andrews Tenney claims that Lodge gave a copy of his 
translation of Seneca to Thomas Dekker, although I have been unable to find evidence to confirm this 
elsewhere. See Tenney, p. 189. 
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redactions.  It reads: ‘He that is desirous to see more, let him read Aristotles [sic] Morals, 
Lucians Toxaris, and Ciceros Laelius’.185   Readers and students in grammar schools may 
not have had the original Lysis of Plato, but they may have learned of its reasoning from 
Cicero’s Tusculan Disputations or another contemporary work.  Just as students may not 
have read Lucian’s Toxaris because perhaps their Latin was ‘small’ at the time, they may 
have come to its thought on friendship through works like Erasmus’s Moriae Encomium  
and Thomas More’s Utopia, which demonstrate Lucianic influence, or through 
representations in school books by Erasmus and other humanists.186 At St. Paul’s for 
instance, as T. W. Baldwin notes, the curriculum was built on Erasmus’ ideas, which were 
also represented in student texts.187   
     One of Erasmus’ more popular works, Adagia, was a collection of classical wisdom 
(including multiple entries on friendship) taken from authors including Aristotle, Cicero, 
Plato, Plutarch, Pythagoras and Seneca.188  Consequently, students would have access to 
their ideas even if their complete works were not employed as school texts.  The work was 
first published in 1500 with 818 proverbs.  It went through twenty-seven editions by 1536, 
growing in size until the final edition, which contained 4251 proverbs.189  In 1508 the 
subject of friendship begins the work, invoking the classical proverb from Pythagoras, 
Aristotle and Plato ‘amicorum communia omnia / Between friends all is common’.190  In 
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his accompanying discussion of the proverb Erasmus remarks that ‘nothing was ever said 
by a pagan philosopher which comes closer to the mind of Christ’, as he, too, follows 
translators in an attempt to relate this classical idea of friendship to a sense of community 
and ‘brotherly love’.191  This extension of amicitia and philia towards caritas is an 
important one, as seen in translations previously discussed, and had its roots in the early 
church.  It relates to Seneca’s idea of beneficence and was something that Erasmus was 
familiar with.  Invoking an idea from De beneficiis in his Adagia  Erasmus suggests:  ‘‘He 
who gives quickly gives twice’, explaining that ‘the lesson in this maxim is that we should 
not be dilatory or reluctant in helping our friends when they need it, but should do what we 
can for them on our own initiative without waiting to be asked’.192  These two examples 
suggest the extra-textual life philosophical ideas on friendship had, despite the observation 
by Baldwin that ‘Seneca in any extended form seldom appears in the grammar schools of 
the sixteenth-century’.193 The form may have been abbreviated, but the ideas on friendship 
from De beneficiis and Epistuale Morales were available and disseminated through others’ 
work beginning much earlier than that. 
       The early Tudor works of Robert Whittington (1480–1553?) speak further to this 
issue.  Whittington, a contemporary of William Lily, was a prosperous and favoured 
schoolmaster under Henry VIII ‘famous for his elementary Latin school books’.194  He 
translated from Latin into English Erasmus’s De civilitate morum puerilium (1532), 
Cicero’s De officiis, (1534), Paradoxa, (c.1534) and De senectute, (c.1535), as well as 
such works attributed to Seneca, including The Forme and Rule of Honest Lyvynge (1546), 
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The Mirrour or Glasse of Maners (1547), and De remediis fortuitorum (1547).195  Forme 
and Mirrour were later identified as the work of Saint Martin of Braga, a sixth-century 
theologian whose work evidences an understanding and use of Seneca’s work.196    
     With Whittington’s position and influence on learning at the time, whether the work 
was correctly ascribed or not, we might expect that Whittington may have imparted his 
‘knowledge’ of Aristotle and Seneca to his students in lessons or school texts, especially 
given the regard he pays Aristotle and Seneca in the prologue to The Mirrour or Glasse of 
Maners:   
 
Therefore for as muche as Aristotle is as a cheyf prince amonge these that be 
spoken of, natwithstandynge I can finde no man nother of our latyne men: nor yet 
of ye Grecions, whome to the reason of these vertuous practise & actions, which 
we require [require] of an honest man I maye compare to Seneca.197 
 
      Proverbial collections served as a popular source for disseminating classical ideas on 
friendship.  William Baldwin-Thomas Palfreyman’s Treatise of Morall Philosophie was 
considered ‘an Elizabethan best-seller’, with twenty-three editions published beginning in 
1547.198  Its popularity is put into perspective by Robert Hood Bowers who explains that 
its closest competitors for the most editions printed at the time were the editions of the 
Bible, at 283, and Arthur Dent’s The Plaine Mans Pathway to Heaven (1601) at 16.199 The 
Treatise includes an introduction to philosophy, short biographies, pithy precepts, and 
                                                 
195 ‘Robert Whittington’, DNB. 
196 See Charles Sanford Rayment , ‘Some Proposals for Changes in the Text of Martin of Braga’s De Ira’ 
The American Journal of Philology,  67.4 (1946), pp. 346-358, passim.  
197 Robert Whittington, The Mirrour or Glasse of Manners (London:  John Morris, 1547). There are no page 
numbers or signatures until B1 so the pages have been assigned beginning with the title page, as the text 
begins on the verso side of this page Mirrour, sigs. A4v-A5r. 
198 Robert Hood Bowers, ‘Introduction’ in William Baldwin’s A Treatise of Morall Philosophie, facsimile of 
the 1620 edition enlarged by Thomas Palfreyman (Gainesville:  Scholars Facsimilies, 1967), v-xiii (v). 
199 Bowers, v. 
59 
 
some expanded paragraphs of proverbial wisdom from over fifty-two thinkers from 
Pythagoras to Ambrose.  The work provides vernacular accessibility to ideas on friendship 
through its chapter ‘Of Friends, Friendship and Amitie,’ which relates the key tenets of 
perfect friendship represented in Aristotle, Cicero, and Seneca.  This chapter further 
highlights some of the ways in which different compilers ascribed ideas, which may in part 
be explained by the process through which the text was written.  This is detailed by the 
work’s 1557 reviser, Thomas Palfreyman, in his preface ‘To the Reader’:  ‘I called to 
remembrance the like worthy and notable sentences and good counsailes that I had often 
read in divers and sundry other works. And to the intent of placing them together, I might 
the better keepe them in memory’.200  Even with a gift of exceptional memory, one can see 
the potential for errors here unless Palfreyman had access to several volumes of treatises.  
      Entries on amity repeat the commonplace tenets of perfect friendship, emphasising 
ideas such as the requisite qualities of constancy, equality and succour.201  Also reiterated 
is a permutation of the ideal that sees the friend as another self:  making ‘one hart and 
minde, from many hartes and bodies’.202  But just as the didactic use of translations was 
evidenced in prefaces to the reader, the admonitory tone of the Treatise suggests a similar 
intent, as amongst its celebratory maxims on friendship are cautions that serve to educate 
the reader by corollary.203  Men are warned against ‘lightly’ taking friends and against the 
short endurance of new friendships.204  Similar to Cicero’s suggestion to try one’s friends 
in De amicitia, men are encouraged to ‘prove’ friends, and to be ‘slow to fall into 
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friendship’, with the exhortation to judge men first, choosing only those for friendship who 
are virtuous and follow truth’.205     
     Another work that excerpts classical thought on friendship is Nicholas Ling’s 
Politeupuia (1579).  Claiming to provide ‘Illiads of prayse for vertue’ and ‘good 
counsailes against vice’,206 the work is a collection of un-attributed precepts with a section 
‘Of friendship’ that, like Baldwin and Palfreyman’s Treatise, repeats much the same 
proverbial wisdom on ideal classical friendship.  It includes the following quotation, which 
reflects Seneca’s De beneficiis and demonstrates the ways in which extracted ideas, out of 
context and without explanation, had the potential to be misunderstood as they entered the 
discourse:  ‘Maintain thy friends with benefits, to make them more friendly’.207  The 
abbreviation of this idea figures friendship as a more reward-driven relationship.  Ling 
appears to be drawing from Seneca’s De beneficiis here.  Golding’s translation had been 
available for nearly twenty years by the time Politeuphuia was compiled.  But Ling’s 
mediation of the idea not only strays from the ideal, but also renders it less noble and fairly 
reductive. In Golding, the idea is represented as follows: ‘Benefiting is a felowlike thing: it 
purchaseth favour: it maketh men beholden’.208   
     To be sure this appears very much in line with the profitable, obligatory friendship that 
Ling’s mediation suggests, but this is explicated further in Golding, which may make this 
idea akin to a Stoic paradox, but nevertheless attempts to correct any potential for 
misunderstanding: 
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 That is a benefite, whiche a man giveth not for his owne sake, but for the   
 parties sake to whom hee giveth it. But hee that dooth himself a good turne,  
 dooth it for his owne sake: Ergo it is no benefite.209   
 
The explication of the idea abbreviated in Ling makes evident the idea of giving for the 
sake of the other, rather than in order to obligate reciprocation.  Benefits do have their 
rewards according to Seneca, but that is not why they should be given.  Ling does not 
make this important distinction and figures benefits as part of instrumental friendships of 
patronage and utility, where the continual flow of benefits or liberality is needed to ensure 
friendliness, much like Burghley’s advice to his son.  Further, Ling’s maxim does not heed 
the importance of selfless giving, and likewise, does not capture the essence of beneficent 
giving’s relationship to its demonstration of virtue that is forwarded in De beneficiis: ‘it is 
the propertie of a noble and vertuous minde, not too respect the profit of welldooing, but 
the welldooing itself’.210   
     Interestingly, Lodge’s 1614 translation of this idea, although maintaining a similar 
sense through words like ‘commerce’ and ‘interchange’ evokes the more business-like, 
transactional parlance that may make it seem like a less beneficent type of exchange:   
 
 For in what other thing are we secure but in this, that we are helped by mutual  
 offices, and interchangeable friendships? by this one and only commerce of  
 benefits our life is not only assured, but better defended.211  
   
The tenor of the Lodge translation is very much in line with the idea of beneficence in the 
earlier, anonymous play Timon (1602-3) that will be examined in Chapter 4.  Lodge’s 
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translation and the play reflect the sense of the transactional nature of Greco-Roman social 
reciprocity in the first century.212  The sense may derive also from Lodge’s (and the 
anonymous dramatist’s) acquaintance with the practice of law, or the post 1590s Court 
political milieu that gentleman experienced, given Lodge’s membership in Lincoln’s Inn 
beginning in 1578, and the play’s provenance at the Inns.  
     Even Lodge’s slightly nuanced translation points up the difficulty in interpreting the 
idea of benefit and friendship given the contemporary socio-political context.  In Seneca’s 
view, exchanges create ‘bonds of friendship’,213 as the friend attains the equality requisite 
of perfect classical friendship.  For as Seneca asserts, ‘The greatest friendship we can 
intend any man, is to make him equal with ourselves and suffer him in every sort and 
jointly to enjoy our goods and fortunes’.214  This understanding renders impossible 
asymmetrical friendships driven by need and reward.   The benefit is not meant to extract 
either favour or reciprocity, but rather, as Stephan Joubert relates, ‘the bestowal of benefits 
leads to a fides-relationship’,215 an idea that Mervyn James considers in relation to honour 
and good lordship, as will be explored in Chapter 4.  Taken out of context and re-presented 
in a curt maxim, however, Seneca’s idea about benefits may be easily misunderstood as a 
more practical, less virtuous quid pro quo relationship. 
     Although Ling’s work differs from the more scholarly and explanatory Adagia, both 
served as a repository for moral wisdom, even though Sasha Roberts states that 
commonplace books like Ling’s have often been ‘dismissed’ by critics for their 
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‘misleading compilations of bowdlerised verse’.216  Even so, the work of Ann Moss and 
Mary Thomas Crane illustrates the importance of the Renaissance commonplace book to 
education and the transmission of ideas.217  This learning by way of extract was a 
significant part of the humanist-inspired active reading process for grammar school 
students as well, who were encouraged to keep their own commonplace books.218  But as 
Sasha Roberts’ work further underscores, the compiler’s imprint on extracts for popular 
consumption cannot be denied.   She relates how England’s Parnassus (1600) by Robert 
Allot (printed by Ling) creates ‘new contexts and meanings’ for Shakespeare’s Venus and 
Adonis.219  This idea of subjective ‘imprint’ affecting the shape and form of ideas can also 
be extended to include readers themselves.220  The final arbitrators of written ideas, they 
kept their own commonplace books under tidy headings such as ‘Fortitudo’, ‘Harmonia’, 
‘Ingratitudo’, for compartmentalisation of  insights that delineated virtue from vice, as 
suggested by Erasmus in De Copia.221  It is evident how these categories might easily 
accommodate classical, and especially Stoic thought on friendship.  With this, and 
Erasmus’ Adagia and Ling’s Politeuphuia in mind, it is possible to see the wide variability 
of shape and form that ‘meaning’ might take in relation to an original idea on friendship.  
Through Ling’s redaction of Senecan thought a more worldly and limited sense of 
Seneca’s idea of giving and friendship enters the discourse.   
     Sententiae Pueriles by Leonard Culmann saw at least twelve editions from 1612-1697 
and acknowledges the continued popularity of such works as an educational tool late into 
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the seventeenth-century.  The work provides short sentences and phrases for beginning 
Latin students ‘to get both matter and phrase, most speedily and surely, without 
inconvenience’.222  The ‘matter’ of the first entry very concisely reminds the reader of his 
friendly responsibility:  ‘Help thy friends’.223  Friendship as a topic dominates the first 
seven entries (with three in total), and reflects key classical ideas:  the duty to assist, the 
need to ‘try’ and suggestion to ‘use thy friend’.224  The book takes a somewhat 
admonishing tone, emphasising through repetition certain key ideas that permeate the 
discourse, namely, the elusive nature of true friendship, the need to ‘try’ or ‘prove’ one’s 
friends in adversity and the problem with inconstancy in friendship (and women):  
‘Inconstancy doth  disdaine friendes’.225  The work demonstrates a familiarity with ideas 
from De beneficiis related to ingratitude, an idea that Seneca and Elyot link closely to 
friendship.  Culmann asserts, ‘Ingratitude [is] the head of all vices’, while Lodge’s 
translation of De beneficiis asserts, that there is no one vice ‘more frequent than that of 
ingratitude’.226  
     There were many other texts that contributed to the discourse of friendship, either 
registering an understanding of classical ideas, or providing contextual musings, including 
the work of Francis Bacon, Michel de Montaigne, and Thomas Elyot, to name but a few.  
The limitations of this study prevent a full treatment, but they will figure at intervals in the 
remaining chapters of this thesis. 
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VI. The Public Benefit and Use of Friendship 
Humanists who encouraged vernacular translations of classical works on friendship 
recognised the potential usefulness of friendship as a public good. After 1534 and the end 
of papal supremacy, the temptations of vice and rewards of Christian piety and virtue, for 
so long mainly imprinted by Roman Catholicism, were now additionally informed by 
translations and contemporary didactic works that appealed not only to Christian, but also 
to classical authority. By grounding theological doctrine in classical precedent the ideas 
gained added currency.  In his Epistulae Morales, Seneca advises Lucilius Junior of the 
primary benefit of philosophy: ‘Philosophie promiseth this first of all, common sense, 
humanitie, and entercourse and societie’.227  And the repercussive effects of friendship and 
concord on society were clearly understood.  A sermon preached by Robert Cushman in 
1620 at Plymouth, New England, and then printed for publication in London in 1621, 
serves as one example of the contemporary resonance of this idea and of its wide 
dissemination. Cushman’s sermon highlights the idea of one’s usefulness to others.  Meant 
to stand as a pointed example of the consequences of ignoring one’s responsibilities as a 
Christian friend, it recounts the events of the winter of 1620, which claimed the lives of 
half of the Pilgrims.228  The intent of the publication is made manifest in the dedicatory 
epistle and title page, which quotes Romans 12.10: ‘Be affectioned to love one another 
with brotherly love’.229  This is followed, in bold in the centre of the page, by the 
declaration: ‘WHEREIN IS SHEWED the danger of self-love, and the sweetnesse of true 
Friendship’.230  
                                                 
227 Epistles, Lodge, V, p. 37. 
228 Robert Cushman, A Sermon Preached at Plimmoth in New-England December 9. 1621 (London: Printed 
by J[ohn] D[awson] for John Bellamie, 1622), sig. A3r. 
229 Cushman, sig. A4r. 
230 Cushman, sig. A4r. 
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     The utilitarian nature of friendship is underscored in Cushman’s sermon, though viewed 
through the Christian idea of ‘one body in Christ’.  But most significantly, it emphasises a 
sense of the positive societal, rather than divine implications of equality and responsibility 
in friendship, as the burden for citizens’ welfare is shifted off of the church and common-
weale—relieving burgeoning pressure— and onto the friend:   ‘We are bound each to 
other, so that his wants must be my wants, his sorrowes my sorrowes, his sicknes my 
sicknes, and his welfare my welfare, for I am as he is’.231  The dedicatory epistle, written 
three days after the sermon was delivered, develops this idea further:  
 
 if any shall marvell at the publishing of this Treatise in England, seeing thereis no 
 want of good bookes, but rather want of men to use good bookes, let them know, 
 that the especiall end Is, that we may keepe those motives in memory for our 
 selves, &those that shall come after, to be a remedie against self-love the bane of 
 all societies.232   
 
Represented here is a much later iteration of the Christian perspective taken on the threat 
posed by self-love as seen in Wilkinson’s translation of Aristotle.   
     In closing the sermon, Cushman makes very clear the socio-political benefits of 
Christian amity, as well as the consequences of its absence, which he suggests was 
experienced at Plymouth:  
 And such a sweet sympathie were excellent, comfortable, yea heavenly, and is the 
 onely maker and conserver of Churches and common-wealthes, and where this is 
 wanting, ruine comes on quickly as it did here.233  
  
                                                 
231 Cushman, sig. C3r . 
232 Cushman, sig. A4r . 
233 Cushman, sig. C3r . 
67 
 
Cushman’s sermon serves a didactic purpose across the Atlantic in England.  While it is a 
vivid illustration that reveals the destruction possible in a world without friendship, it also 
posits friendship’s potential as a positive force for stability of the Church and 
Commonwealth.    
     The importance of this idea was not unique to Jacobean England, as a concern over 
stability and the belief in ‘ordering’ relations to aid that end234 was reflected in the 
Queen’s royal entry celebrations in London in 1559.  With the bloody Tudor past still 
looming over the coronation of Elizabeth, the recognition of the benefit of concord d
the pre-coronation festivities was emphasised.  There was a pageant on unity that took 
place at the upper end of Gracechurch Street during which a child, in part, read aloud 
‘coniunctæ manus forties tollunt onus / Regno pro minibus æneis ciuium concordia’:  
‘Joined hands are stronger to carry the burden / The concord of the citizens is like a bronz





 beneficiis.  It reads: 
                                                
235 Concord is tied to Aristotle’s view of friendship in 
Wilkinson’s Ethiques.  Friendship is ‘knitte of love and concord’ and the importance of a
‘concord of willes’ in friendship is promoted.236  The pageant’s appeal to concord cal
mind the idea of friendship and unity as serving as a defence against the vicissitudes of 
fortune as expressed in Golding’s translation of De
 
 For in what other thing have wee so muche saferie, as in helping one another  
 with mutuall freendlynes? Through this onely one intercourse of good turnes,  
 
234 For a discussion of the analogical model of ordering of authority in the family based on the governance of 
the Commonwealth, see Susan Dwyer Amussen, An Ordered Society:  Gender and Class in Early Modern 
England (New York:  Columbia University Press, 1988), p. 37. 
235 The Quenes Majesties Passage through the citie of London to Westminster the daye before her 
coronacion (London:  Richard Tottel, 1559) in The Queen’s Majesty’s Passage ed. by Germaine Warkentin 
(Toronto:  Centre for Reformation Studies, 2004), p. 81, 127 (Appendix III for translation). 
236 Wilkinson, Ethiques, sig. J5r. 
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 our life is both better furnished, & better fenced ageinst sodein assaultes. Put  
 everyman too himself alone, and what are wee? 237   
 
The public benefit of amicable relations between citizens is underscored in the pageant and 
the Senecan quote, as the protective nature of unity is asserted.  This would be an 
important message to promulgate at the start of Elizabeth’s reign. Although there were no 
vernacular translations of De beneficiis available at the time, the facility with Latin that the 
pageant writers and the Queen possessed, as well as the latter’s familiarity with Senecan 
thought, make it possible that the ideas from the work may have influenced the festivities’ 
composition. The resonance of the ideas on the social conventions of giving and receiving 
and gratitude can be felt.  According to Germaine Warkentin, a key aspect of the pageants 
around London on this occasion was an insistence on demonstrations of reciprocity 
through largesse and the ritual of exchange, which were symbolic displays of the bonds the 
new monarch forged with the populace.238  This relationship is figured as an amicable 
bond, similar to that which was forwarded in the Ethiques between subjects and monarch, 
based on beneficence and obligation in line with the amity between God and man.  It is an 
idea that resonates in an address Elizabeth gives later in her reign when she tells her 
Parliament’ I have Reigned with your Loves’ adding that she views ‘love and thanks’ 
‘unvaluable’.239  In this instance David Harris Sacks rightly notes that the Queen was 
asserting a ‘mutual love’ with her subjects ‘akin to the Greek ideal of philia, friendship’, to 
ensure ‘stability and order in the realm’.240 Although the reciprocity here is reminiscent of 
a patron-client relationship where the obligations of fidelity and service are sacrosanct, as 
                                                 
237 De beneficiis, Golding, sig. D3r. 
238 Germaine Warkentin, ‘Introduction’ in The Queen’s Majesty’s Passage, pp. 15-74 (pp. 54-55). 
239 In David Harris Sacks ‘The Countervailing of Benefits:  Monopoly, Liberty, and Benevolence in 
Elizabethan England’ in Tudor Political Culture ed. by Dale Hoak (Cambridge:  Cambridge University 
Press, 1995), pp. 272-291(p. 284). 
240 Sacks, pp. 283-284. 
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Sacks suggests, reciprocity, as envisaged by the Queen, went beyond material interest and 
‘created a moral community whose watchword was “love”’.241 
     The public benefit of friendship may have taken on an even more important dimension 
during 1570-1640, a period that Martin Ingram has identified as one of significant 
‘geographic mobility’ and associated conspicuous ‘social differentiation and economic 
inequalities’ on local and countrywide levels.242  Such changes in community could only 
serve to weaken ties amongst neighbours and heighten tensions. Keith Thomas argues that 
‘harmony was prized, whereas lawsuits which set neighbour against neighbour were 
(following I Corinthians 6:7) widely deplored as un-Christian breaches of charity’.243  
Nevertheless, as Ingram’s work attests, this period found church courts, secular tribunals, 
manorial and borough courts, courts of assize and county quarter sessions busy with 
‘resolution of conflict within the society’.244  Defamation cases that busied the High Court 
of Chivalry (or Earl Marshal’s Court) between 1 March 1633/4 and 4 December 1640 also 
support this idea.   
     The language used in interrogatories and submissions by parties after adjudication by 
the Court speaks to the belief that there was a keen awareness of how discordant relations 
on a personal level could affect conformity with the law, but also supports an 
understanding of the importance placed on friendship in the maintenance of order.  In the 
case of Turberville Morgan of Dover, Kent, gentleman v George Rookes of Horton, Kent, 
gentleman (Feb 1639-ct 1640) the potential for fidelity in friendship to give rise to an 
unfair trial was broached, as plaintiff interrogatories questioned whether a man would 
                                                 
241 Sacks, pp. 283-284. 
242 Martin Ingram, Church Courts, Sex and Marriage in England, 1570-1640 (Cambridge:  Cambridge 
University Press, 1987-1994; 1994), p. 71. 
243 Keith Thomas, The Ends of Life: Roads to Fulfilment in Early Modern England (Oxford:  Oxford 
University Press, 2009),p. 189. 
244 Ingram, p. 27. 
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perjure himself to save a friend: ‘Would Morgan’s witnesses Robert Tokeley, Samuel 
Dove, Hugh Lewis and James Watkins, depose untruthfully for reward or friendship?’245  
Friendship also played a part in the defence interrogatories in the case, as the depth of the 
friendship tie was questioned.  The defence asked if ‘there was such a league of friendship 
and correspondence between them’, and suggested that there indeed was, to the extent that 
Rookes subordinated kinship ties to friendship at the behest of Morgan.  The interrogatory 
further reads: ‘and did not Morgan inveigle and drawe Thomas Rookes to oppose his 
father in suites of lawe...’.246  This case questions the willingness of friends to betray other 
obligations, both familial and legal, in the name of friendship, and suggests that the fidelity 
with which some men adhered to their responsibilities in friendship could be at the 
expense of the other relationships.  
     The occasion of the action between Richard Porter of Launcells, Cornwall, gentleman v 
Thomas Rookes, gentleman (1620) is unknown, but the Court’s words also evidence 
concern for the repercussive public effects of private quarrels, and especially how Courts 
felt compelled to aid in the renewal of friendship ties: 
 
 Your petitioners, brought before your lordship twelve months since upon a   
difference that happened between them were some few daies in durance by your 
lordship’s command, and upon their discharge were bound to appeare before your 
lordship upon notice, and to keepe the peace towards all his Majestie’s subjects, 
and especially towards one another, which bonds have remained with your lordship 
ever since.247 
 
                                                 
245 Morgane v Rookes, Defendants case 14/3, The Court of Chivalry Website, Richard P. Cust and Andrew 
Hopper eds. The University of Birmingham http://www.court-of-chivalry.bham.ac.uk/ [Accessed 5 Aug 
2008] 
246 Morgane v Rookes , Defence interrogatories, No. 7, 14/3kk, Cust and Hopper, eds.  The ellipses are as 
found in the interrogatory.  
247 Porter v Rookes, EM327, Petition, Court of Chivalry, Cust and Hopper, eds. 
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The final petition that Porter and Rookes were to sign affirmed not only that they had 
resolved their differences but that they would re-establish amicable bonds.  The petition 
reads: 
 
Now forasmuch as your petitioners do hereby protest, upon their words as they are 
gentlemen, that all differences between them are fully reconciled to justice, 
friendship renewed between them, their humble suite is that your lordship would be 
pleased that the bonds may be cancelled, and your petitioners fully discharged from 
any further attendance in this business.248 
 
Being reconciled to justice was not enough.  Successful resolution not only rested on 
determination of guilt or innocence, but also on the re-establishment of friendship.   
     The defamation suit that Phillip Grigg, gentleman, brought against John Corditt and 
John Ellison in January 1638 adds weight to this idea.  In the end, both Corditt and Ellison 
signed separate submissions which iterated similar repentant apologies, but also included 
an acknowledgement of the effort that would be made to re-establish friendship and good 
will.  Corditt’s reads: 
 I doe hereby professe my hartie sorrowe for the same and doe intreate Mr Grigg to 
 pardon and remitt this my fault. And for the future I doe promise to carrie myselfe 
 with that respect towards him as shalbe fitt for me to give to a gent. of soe good 
 rancke and callinge and will indeavour to regaine his favour and friendship.249   
  
While it is possible that neither Corditt, Ellison, Porter nor Rookes actually intended to 
work towards the restoration of amicable bonds despite their signed oaths, what is clear is 
                                                 
248Porter v Rookes, EM327, Petition, Court of Chivalry, Cust and Hopper, eds. 




that the Court put much emphasis on this aspect, and saw personal friendships as integral 
to the maintenance of a harmonious society.  
     This chapter has highlighted the unique shape and form that some key classical ideas 
took as they entered the early modern discourse of friendship, and indicated how they 
became a significant part of the cultural consciousness. It has also highlighted the 
influence of Stoicism on early modern thought and the usefulness of considering Seneca’s 
De beneficiis in relation to friendship. Through an examination of the syncretisation of 
classical and Christian morality that was used to frame ‘laws’ of friendship, an important 
issue concerning application emerged.250  The problem of course is that codification, 
despite its infusion with Christian responsibilities to others, did not account for the wide 
variety of early modern meanings of friendship, especially what Aristotle would call 
‘lesser’ friendships, but rather, offered for individual application rules governing the ideal.  
This is an idea that will be considered throughout this thesis, in conjunction with an 
examination of the treatment of some key issues raised here. These include benefit, giving, 
and ingratitude.  They extend also to  confusion between philia and caritas, to notions of 
obligation and symmetry in friendship, and to problems arising from diluted and expanded 
definitions of friendship that invite competition for affection as friendship models are used 
to describe relations to wives.  The next chapter begins a consideration of the contributions 
made by drama to the early modern discourse of friendship through an examination of 
plays that depict idealised pairs of friends. 
 
 
                                                 
250 For the codification of friendship see Robert Stretter, ‘Cicero on Stage: Damon and Pithias and the Fate 
of Classical Friendship in English Renaissance Drama’ in Texas Studies in Literature and Language, 47.4 




The Academic Ideal 
The classical ideal was continually held up for emulation in order to encourage the 
cultivation and maintenance of friendship. This example faced contemporary challenges 
from views that suggested its illusory nature.  Commenting on the ‘iniquitie’ of his ‘time’ 
in 1589, Walter Dorke asserts that ‘a man may as soone see a black Swan, as finde out a 
faithfull friend’.1  Dorke’s observation strikes a similar note to Richard Brathwaite’s later 
view in The English Gentleman (1630) when he reflects on a similar diminishing integrity 
within contemporary society declaring, ‘perfection of friendship, is but a speculation’, 
adding, ‘it is rare to see a faithfull Damon or a Pythias; a Pylades or Orestes; a Bitias or a 
Pandarus; a Nisus or Euryalus’.2   
     Despite the forty-one years that separated their comments, Braithwaite and Dorke 
register a similar concern for one of the most revered, and emphasised qualities of perfect 
classical friendship as discussed in Chapter 1, namely, constancy.  But Braithwaite and 
Dorke’s comments also speak obliquely to one of constancy’s adjuncts:  sacrifice.  In using 
the phrase ‘finde out’ rather than ‘find’ or ‘see’, Dorke emphasises not the inability to 
locate an appropriate partner for friendship,  but rather, the importance of ‘discovering’ the 
friend through ‘trial’, as Cicero suggests.  Similarly, Brathwaite’s reflections suggest much 
the same; however, he does so in a way that became common in the early modern period in 
didactic works, literature, and translations of classical friendship treatises, through appeals 
to a reader’s understanding of the symbolism evoked by the names of idealised friendship 
                                                 
1 Walter Dorke, A Tipe or Figure of Friendship. (London: Thomas Orwin and Henry Kirkham, 1589), sig. 
A3v. 
2 Braithwaite here is expanding on the view Francis Bacon articulated in his 1612 essay ‘Of Friendship’ 
when he said, ‘Perfection of friendship is but a speculation.’ In Francis Bacon, 'Of Friendship' in The Essaies 
of Sir Francis Bacon (London:  John Beale, 1612), pp. 80-84 (p. 83); Richard Brathwaite, The English 
Gentleman (London:  John Haviland, 1630), sigs. Ii2r-Iiv. 
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pairs.  The pairs included Damon and Pythias and Orestes and Pylades.  Their names were 
synonymous with constancy and sacrifice, and their importance rested on what they 
represented, rather than in the complete narratives of their friendship.  This is perhaps why 
exposition of their stories of friendship infrequently accompanied their names.  This trend 
is reflected in Edmund Spenser’s The Faerie Queene: 
 
Such were great Hercules, and Hyllus deare; 
Trew Jonathan, and David trustie tryde; 
Stout Theses, and Pirithous his feare; 
Pylades and Orestes by his syde; 
Myld Titus and Gesippus without pryde; 
Damon and Pythias whom death could not seuer: 
All these and all that ever had bene tyde, 
In bands of friendship there did live for ever.3 
 
Along with classical pairs, Spenser includes the biblical image of perfection in friendship, 
David and Jonathan, as well as a more recent figuring from Boccaccio’s Decameron, Titus 
and Gesippus.  All, along with Achilles and Patroclus, were frequently invoked for 
didactic purposes and became paradigmatic for perfect friendship, as they embodied the 
virtuous Aristotelian and Ciceronean constant ideal.   
     Robert Stretter suggests that in terms of classical ideal friendship, ‘Aristotle, Cicero and 
Seneca, and others were the holy scriptures and men such as Orestes and Pylades were the 
saints’.4  And just as the wisdom from those ‘scriptures’ found their way into 
commonplace books in pithy precepts that evoked specific distinctive qualities of 
                                                 
3 Edmund Spenser, The Faerie Queene (London:  Printed by Richard Field for William Ponsonbie, 1596), 
Canto X Book IIII sig. K1v (no line numbers given).  
4Robert Stretter, ‘Cicero on Stage: Damon and Pithias and the Fate of Classical Friendship in English 
Renaissance Drama’, Texas Studies in Literature and Language, 47.4 Winter (2005), 345-365 (p. 349). 
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friendship, a mere mention of the names of the ‘saints’, namely, Orestes and Pylades, 
Damon and Pythias, or others, was enough to summon a vision of the embodiment of 
sacrifice and faithfulness requisite of true classical friendship, as Thomas Elyot defined it:  
‘a blessed conexion of sundry wylles, makynge of two persons one, in having and 
suffrying: And therefore a friend is properly named of Philosophers, the other I’.5   
     This chapter considers the dramatic retellings of narratives of perfect friendship by 
three early modern academic dramatists, all of whom received a classical Oxford 
education, namely Titus et Gesippus (1544) by John Foxe, The Excellent Comedie of two 
the moste faithfullest Freendes, Damon and Pithias (1565) by Richard Edwards, and The 
Tragedy of Orestes (1633) by Thomas Goffe.  Although Edwards and Goffe’s plays are in 
the vernacular, Foxe’s is in Latin, which makes its choice perhaps seem out of place.  But 
its translation into the native tongue of Cicero’s De amicitia may suggest Foxe’s attempt at 
aligning his play more closely with the classical friendship tradition, even though its 
narrative is derived from Boccaccio.  While all works in this chapter will be considered for 
their engagement with ideas of perfect classical friendship, this makes Foxe’s work an 
interesting addition, especially as Foxe dramatises a more contemporary, popular fiction 
from Boccaccio, of purportedly perfect friends to whom writers traditionally assigned 
idealised and equal status with classical friendship pairs.6  Further, Foxe’s play is 
noteworthy not only because it receives little or no attention, (despite what John Hazel 
Smith recognises as its worth as an early ‘epitome of English Renaissance comedy’, and 
Laurens Mills’ suggestion that it contributes to the original story ‘which helped popularise 
the theme’),7 but also for its consideration of the competing affective claims on friendship 
                                                 
5 Thomas Elyot, The Boke Named the Governour (London:  Thomas East, 1580), sig. P8v.  
6 Namely, Elyot, Governour, Spenser, Faerie Queene.  
7 John Hazel Smith, ‘Introduction’ in Two Latin Comedies By John Foxe the Martyrologist: Titus et 
Gesippus; Christus Triumphans (Ithaca and London:  Cornell University Press, 1973), pp. 1-48 (p. 9); 
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that later dramatists such as Thomas Heywood would explore in works such as A Woman 
Killed with Kindness (1603) and The English Traveller (c. 1627?) (which will be 
considered in Chapter 5 of this thesis). 
     This chapter begins with a brief review of the key contextual emphases of ideal 
friendship and a consideration of the cultural currency of friendship pairs.  The second part 
of the chapter is divided into three separate case studies which interrogate the plays’ 
engagement with the ideal, in light of their titular appeal as representative of perfect 
friendship.  The examination will ask how, and to what extent academic dramatists who 
invoked paradigmatic pairs for didactic purposes tested and reshaped the classical ideal 
and registered the cultural preoccupation with constancy and sacrifice in friendship.  It will 
consider forces exerting pressure on friendship such as adversity, the good of the state, 
obligation to family, and gratitude, deploying classical ideas from Aristotle, Cicero and 
Seneca.  
 
I.  Writing the Ideal   
When representing perfect friendship in didactic and literary works, great weight was 
given to the grand gestures friends made, or were willing to make, for each other’s benefit, 
most usually including the ultimate sacrifice:  risking or offering to trade one’s life for the 
other. This emphasis in the early modern conception of perfect friendship rested securely 
on the biblical directive of John 15, and prefigured in the biblical idealisation of David and 
Jonathan’s friendship: ‘Greater love hath no man, than this:that [sic] a man bestow his life 
                                                                                                                                                   
Laurens Mills suggests the play’s interest ‘lies almost wholly in the fact that it adds to the original story’, in 
Laurens J. Mills, One Soul in Bodies Twain:  Friendship in Tudor Literature and Stuart Drama 
(Bloomington:  Principia, 1937), p. 327.  Mills and Smith have given the play the most attention.  Smith in 




for his frendes’.8  The competing classical analogue of this idea was available in Nicholas 
Grimalde’s 1556 translation of Cicero’s De officiis, where Damon and Pythias are 
described as ‘so affectioned, one toward an other’ that although one was sentenced to die, 
‘the other becamme bounde body for body’, so that ‘he wolde himself dye for him’.9  In a 
similar way, in The Boke Named the Governour, Thomas Elyot’s retelling of the friendship 
of Orestes and Pylades only includes the action which demonstrates constancy in 
friendship in the face of death:  Pylades claiming to be Orestes so as to spare his friend’s 
life.10  And although in the same work he allots twenty-six pages to a detailed, more 
contemporary narrative of Titus and Gesippus, again, prominence is given to the self-
sacrifice of the pair.  While this narrative includes an added dimension of selflessness, 
namely, relinquishing one’s betrothed for a friend, it also asserts the requisite 
magnanimous and reputation-enhancing act of offering to trade one’s life for one’s friend.  
      To be sure, there were perhaps not all that many instances in reality where friends 
would be put to such harsh a test as giving one’s life for another, yet, to the early modern 
reader or playgoer these pairs summed up the length to which one should be expected to 
go, if called upon, defining that all-important value of constancy in friendship.  Biblical, 
classical, literary and historical examples abounded, with amicitia perfecta a prevalent 
motif.  The Bible in 1Samuel 18 (‘the first booke of the kinges’) recounted the bond 
between David and Jonathan.11  The friendship of Nisus and Euryalus and their honourable 
deaths at the hands of the Rutulians was recounted in Book IX of Virgil’s Aeneid, 
translated into the vernacular in 1562.  The friendship of Theseus and Perithous was retold 
                                                 
8 The Bible in Englishe (London:  Richarde Harrison, 1562), sig. G4v. 
9 Marcus Tullius Cicero, Marcus Tullius Ciceroes Thre [sic] Bokes of Duties,trans. by  Nicholas Grimalde 
(London:  Richard Tottel, 1556),  sig. P5r. 
10 Elyot, Governour, sigs. P8v –Q1r. 
11 Virgil, The Nyne Fyrst Bookes of the Eneidos of Virgil , trans. by Thomas Phaer  (London:  Rouland Hall, 
for Nicholas Englande, 1562); The Bible (1562), sig. Q3r. 
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and referred to in multiple works including: Castiglione’s The Courtier (1561), Arthur 
Golding’s translation of ‘The Eighth Book’ of Ovid’s Metamorphoses (1567), George 
Tubervile’s translation of Ovid’s ‘The Fourth Epistle:  Phaedra to Hippolytus’ (1567), and 
Thomas North’s Plutarch’s Lives of the Noble Grecians and Romanes (1579).  It is not 
surprising that by 1614 the pair would appear (though not in their historical depiction) as 
characters in a play about friendship by Shakespeare, The Two Noble Kinsmen.  
     The discourse of friendship was preoccupied by an emphasis on constancy and self-
sacrifice.  This provided the necessary counterpoint to contemporary laments over 
disappointments in friendship, especially the complaint that friends abandoned each other 
in adversity.  But ideal rhetoric and theoretical models of paradigmatic pairs did not 
necessarily translate into personal conduct.  As Lucian’s dialogue on friendship, Toxaris, 
suggests, the awe-inspiring models of perfect friendship that garnered much attention did 
not necessarily help to create the impetus for action among men:    
 
But when you should come to use it [friendship], you fall from your words, and 
taking wing, I know not how, shift your selves from the practice. And when you 
see such rare friendships presented on the stage in a Tragedy, you applaud, and 
clap hands; and when you see them mutually engaged in one anothers dangers, 
many of you shed teares: yet you your selves attempt nothing praise worthy for 
your friend.12   
 
Lucian recognises that men can appreciate the benefits of constancy and self-sacrifice in 
friendship, yet fail to enact their friendships according to ideal principles. Appreciation 
does not necessarily equate with emulation. And this is the problem with any ideal.  
Nevertheless, early modern playwrights drew from the dramatic capital that idealised pairs 
                                                 
12 Jasper Mayne, Part of Lucian Made English From the Originalle (London: Printed by H. Hall for R. 
Davis, 1638), sig. X3r. 
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provided for comedy and tragedy, just as Aeschylus, Euripedes, and Sophocles did long 
before them.  Christopher Marlowe and William Shakespeare made good use of the ideal’s 
cultural currency.  François de Belleforest may have provided the ‘basic story of a Prince 
of Denmark’ from a Scandinavian folktale by Saxo Grammaticus,13 but Shakespeare’s 
Hamlet bears some striking similarities to Euripedes’ Orestes, even though the perfect 
friends who Shakespeare invokes in the play are not Orestes and Pylades, but Damon and 
Pythias.  Shakespeare need only have Hamlet address Horatio as ‘O Damon dear’ 
(3.2.269), to conjure the notion of the closeness of the pair.14  But in a word, the reference 
to ‘Damon’ serves as more than mere compliment.  The word takes on a serious 
connotation, that would not be missed by an early modern audience, for if Horatio is 
Damon, then it implicitly renders Hamlet as Pythias, the man condemned, and suggests 
that Horatio will be called upon to save him, just as Damon did Pythias. But Hamlet’s 
eventual death contravenes the protective power promised by the ideal, as Horatio cannot 
save his friend.  Thus Shakespeare adds another layer to the reality of true friendship:  that 
disappointment need not only come from infidelity, but from the limitations of friendship’s 
potential in the face of external forces outside of its reach.  
     But invocation of ideal pairs also served as a tool for manipulation and subject of 
mockery.  Damon and Pythias serve a comic turn in Ben Jonson’s Bartholomew Faire 
(1614).  The pair are puppets, quite literally and figuratively, who are caught up in the 
immorality of Littlewit’s play world, their friendship’s ‘trial’ reduced to doggerel verse:  
                                                 
13 The plot source of Hamlet from the preface to Hamlet by Gary Taylor in William Shakespeare, Hamlet in 
William Shakespeare: The Complete Works ed. by Stanley Wells and Gary Taylor et al (Oxford:  Clarendon, 
1988), pp.653-690 (p. 653). 
14 A. D. Nutall considers this idea and especially Gilbert Murray’s earlier examination of similarities in 
Murray’s ‘Hamlet and Orestes’ in The Classical Tradition in Poetry (Oxford:  Oxford University Press,  
1927), pp. 205-240; See also Anthony David Nuttall, The Stoic in Love: Selected Essays on Literature and 
Ideas (Lanham, Maryland:  Rowman & Littlefield, 1990), pp. 27-40 (pp. 34-36); William Shakespeare, 
Hamlet in William Shakespeare: The Complete Works ed. by Stanley Wells and Gary Taylor et al (Oxford:  
Clarendon, 1988), pp.653-690. 
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‘Twixt Damon and Pythias here, friendship’s true trial / Though hourly they quarrel thus 
and roar each with other’(5.4.261-262).15 Dramatists also found that references to ideal 
friendship pairs served a strategic purpose to manipulate impression and feign sentiment. 
In Christopher Marlowe’s Tamburlaine, Part 1 (1587) invocation of Orestes and Pylades is 
meant to engender a sense of Tamburlaine’s loyalty beyond utility to Theridamus.  
Tamburlaine suggests that he will be as constant a friend to Theridamus as he is to his 
other, present friends:  ‘And by the love of Pyllades and Orestes, / Whose statues we adore 
in Scythia, / Thy selfe and them shall never part from me (in 1.2.242-244).16  Appeals to 
Orestes and Pylades are a rhetorical device meant to convince Theridamus of fidelity; here 
it functions akin to swearing an oath of allegiance to friendship. Whether the archetypical 
pairs were referred to for purposes of rewarding or courting friendship, deriding the ideal 
or to underscore the need for constancy in friendship through recounting their grand and 
life-saving gestures of self-sacrifice, ideal friendship pairs were frequently invoked as 
examples of the power and triumph of true friendship.  In the academic drama of Richard 
Edwards, John Foxe and Thomas Goffe, titles appeal to perfect friendship and evoke a 
sense of expectation of a celebration of its value.  How do they in fact speak to this 
anticipation of the ideal? 
 
II. John Foxe’s Titus et Gesippus 
Historian John Foxe wrote Titus et Gesippus in 1544, just before he left his post at Oxford 
and wrote his popular Actes and Monuments.  The play was meant to serve as a gift and a 
writing sample to demonstrate his competency for a teaching post to a Dr. Hensey of 
                                                 
15 Ben Jonson, Bartholomew Fair, Revels, ed. by Suzanne Gossett (Manchester:  Manchester University 
Press, 2000). 
16 Christopher Marlowe, Tamburlaine the Great, Revels, ed. by Joseph Sandy Cunningham (Manchester:  
Manchester University Press, 1981; rpt. 1999). 
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Exeter and a Mr. Hedley.17  This is all that is known about the intended recipients and the 
occasion of the play. The play, a romantic comedy, was written in Latin, and was based on 
Continental narratives of the friendship of Titus and Gesippus available as early as the 
fourteenth and fifteenth centuries in Boccaccio (the Decameron) and Filippo Beroaldo, 
respectively.18  After Foxe’s play, the story of Titus and Gesippus continued to be treated 
as material for comedy in two later versions:  Ralph Radcliffe’s The Most Firme 
Friendship of Titus and Gisippus (c.1546-1556), and Titus and Gisippus (1577), whose 
anonymous dramatist apparently thought it unnecessary to reinforce the emphasis on 
constancy adjectivally in the title.19 Both plays are lost.20 
     John Hazel Smith suggests that Foxe’s manuscript is ‘a very early draft’, although he 
suggests that the play may still have been performed, as was the custom with academic 
exercises, because of its closing address to the audience.21  Smith relates that the 
popularity of the tale itself rested in its mix of romance and morality and notes that the 
play is only ‘one step removed from the well-spring of all the sixteenth century versions of 
the Titus-Gesippus story,’ although my examination will suggest that that step and the 
changes it entails from its source narrative affect the representation of friendship 
significantly.22  Although the story of the pair, in its various retellings, generally appeals to 
the classical friendship tradition of Damon and Pythias and Orestes and Pylades, the tale 
seems a product of medieval romance more than of the classical friendship tradition.  
                                                 
17 John Hazel Smith, ‘Introduction’ in John Foxe, Titus et Gesippus in Two Latin Comedies By John Foxe the 
Martyrologist: Titus et Gesippus; Christus Triumphans ed. and trans. by John Hazel Smith (Ithaca and 
London:  Cornell University Press, 1973), pp. 1-49 (pp. 6-8). There is no further information about Hedley, 
as that is all that Foxe’ provides, in Hazel Smith, p. 7. 
18 Hazel Smith, p. 14. The play is not listed in Alfred Harbage and S. Schoenbaum, Annals of English Drama 
975-1700 rev edn, 1964 (London: Methuen, 1964); Hereafter: Annals. Its designation as a romantic comedy 
is from Hazel Smith, p. 9.  
19 Annals, pp. 28-29, 46-47. 
20 Annals, pp. 28-29, 46-47. 
21 Hazel Smith, p. 8. 
22 See Hazel Smith, p. 9. 
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Nevertheless, this did not stop the friendship of Titus and Gesippus from being held up as 
on par with ideal classical models, as the quotations from The Faerie Queene bears out.  
     Foxe draws from Thomas Elyot’s extended narrative of Titus and Gesippus in The Boke 
Named the Governour, which had at least seven printings from 1531 to 1580, as well as 
from Boccaccio’s ‘Tenth Day, Eighth Story’.23  The latter source was retold in William 
Walter’s rime royal translation The Hystory of Tytus & Gesyppus as early as 1525, but 
prior to this in Italian, German and French translations of the Decameron.24  And Smith’s 
detailing of the correspondence between the versions by Boccaccio, Elyot and Foxe is 
useful for these purposes, as it helps to further an understanding of Foxe’s own choices in 
terms of the representation of friendship.  Even so, curiously, in all three, there are two 
relatively overlooked, troubling aspects of the tale of ideal friends when it comes to the 
representation of amicitia perfecta.  The flaws rest in the contravention of virtue and 
equality, two requisite tenets of perfect, classical friendship.   
     Classical thought on virtue in friendship contend that friends should further ethical 
behaviour in each other, rather than uphold the other’s vice. Cicero tells his son in De 
officiis:  ‘a good man, for his frendes sake, nother will do against ye commonweale nother 
against his othe, & promes’.25  Plutarch voices a similar concern, arguing that one friend 
should not undertake for another anything that is ‘againste the common welth, or else 
against his othe or fidelitee. For the offence is not excusable, to say, thou dyddest it for thy 
                                                 
23 See Hazel Smith for sources, pp. 13-14. 
24 Florio’s translation of the Decameron was not available in English until 1620.  Hazel Smith contends the 
Walter translation is a translation of Beroaldo rather than Boccaccio. The title page from the EEBO text is 
missing and cannot be found in the British Library catalogue.  In the EEBO text the publication details on the 
final page do not credit either author, however, the EEBO citation credits Boccaccio as author.  I have treated 
the work as a translation of Boccaccio, as William Walter was known for translating the author, again in 
1532: Guystarde & Sygysmonde. Even though Beroaldo, an Italian humanist, was known for translations of 
Cicero, Plato and Pythagoras. Tales from the Decameron were available in ‘numerous printings’ in Italian.  
See Hazel Smith, p. 14. 
25 Marcus Tullius Cicero, Marcus Tullius Ciceroes Thre [sic] Bokes of Duties to Marcus His Sonne ,trans. by  
Nicholas Grimalde (London:  Richard Tottel, 1556), sig. P4v. 
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frendes sake’.26   Aristotle, for his part, claims that friends ‘become the better one by 
another’.27  But in all three configurations of the Titus and Gesippus story, Gesippus’ 
relinquishing of Sempronia to Titus involves deceit and the breaking of an oath to marry 
her.  An early modern reader accustomed to espousals and betrothals as verba de futuro 
contracts would understand that the breaking of such a contract would be considered a 
serious matter.28  This seriousness is registered in Boccaccio and Foxe.  In Boccaccio, 
Gesippus’ kinsmen find ‘he deserved for his false trayne / In depe pryson to suffre 
punysshement’, whilst similarly in Foxe, Chremes  refers to the subterfuge as ‘wickedness’ 
and deems his slave, Syrus, ‘a criminal’ for not informing him of it sooner. (2.7).29  In 
neither source is the friend assisting the other in terms of virtue; and further, by deceiving 
betrothed, parents, and kin, one could argue that they are furthering vice, as their 
friendship becomes what Cicero distinguished as ‘conspiracie’ and ‘not amitie’.30  
     Deception equally plays a role in other tales of perfect friends who claim to be the other 
in order to spare their friend’s life. These actions, however, are only employed in a life and 
death situation when one of the pair is about to be unjustly killed; they are not frivolously 
undertaken merely to please a friend and ease his lovesickness, as is the case in one 
instance in Titus et Gesippus.  In this way the narrative of Titus and Gesippus tests the 
ideal, and renders virtue negotiable. Plutarch notes that the only exception wherein 
                                                 
26 Plutarch ‘The Maner to Choose and Cherishe a Freend’ in The table of Cebes the Philosopher and How 
One Maye Take Profite of His Ennemies trans. from Plutarch [no trans]  (London:  in the house late Thomas 
Berthelettes, 1560), sig. G4r . 
27 Aristotle, The Ethiques of Aristotle trans. by John Wilkinson (London:  Richard Grafton, 1547), sig. J8r; In 
Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics trans. by David Ross, rev. by J.L. Ackrill and J.O. Urmson (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1925; repr. 1980, 1998) a friend’s influence ‘stimulates to noble actions’, Book 
VIII,  p. 192. 
28 See David Cressy, Birth, Marriage, and Death: Ritual, Religion, and the Life-cycle in Tudor and Stuart 
England (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 267. 
29 Giovanni Boccaccio, Hystory of Tytus & Gesyppus trans. by Wyllyam Walter (n. pub: 1525), sig. B2v 
(Here Sempronia is known as Sophrone); John Foxe, Titus et Gesippus  in Two Latin Comedies By John 
Foxe the Martyrologist: Titus et Gesippus; Christus Triumphans ed. and trans. by John Hazel Smith (Ithaca 
and London:  Cornell University Press, 1973), pp. 51-197.  There are no line numbers for the English text, 
only for the Latin. Citations are by act and scene division.  All future entries will refer to this edition. 
30 Cicero, Bokes of Duties to Marcus His Sonne, sig. P5r. 
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breaking one’s oath is acceptable is when a friend ‘standeth in jeopardy, either of his lyfe 
or of his good renoume’.31  Jonathan is willing to betray his father, family and wealth, to 
save the life of David.  Pylades claims to be Orestes to save his friend from an unjust death 
sentence.32  Likewise, Pythias remains as the bond for Damon who is to be put to death by 
the tyrant Dionysus.  Near the end of Boccaccio, Elyot and Foxe, Titus claims he is guilty 
of a crime to spare the innocent Gesippus.  His action, like those of Jonathan and Pylades, 
is justifiable under Plutarch’s imperative, as they meet the necessary criteria:  impending 
jeopardy of death.  When measured against this standard, the trick in switching Titus for 
Gesippus in the early part of the play, thus deceiving the bride, family and kinsmen falls 
far short. Gesippus’ avowed justification for his action: (‘Anyone who professes to be a 
friend in good times should prove that he is one in difficult times as well’) (1.9), is 
misguided, and points up a common misunderstanding of the classical laws of friendship, 
and a common concern of early modern authorities.  This idea was examined in Chapter 1 
in relation to Cicero’s discussion in De amicitia of ‘howe farre Love ought to stretche in 
Freendshippe’.33   
      Titus et Gesippus is a comedy, and this casts the deception of Sempronia and her 
family, through the use of the bed-trick, in a more playful light, diminishing its 
dishonourable quality to some extent. The bed- trick was not unusual to ‘set up’ or resolve’ 
a problem, as Marliss C. Desens relates.34  As such, it serves a useful purpose in this 
instance.  But Desens also argues that it was ‘more than an arbitrary plot device’.35  In the 
versions by Boccaccio and Elyot she sees it being used ‘to assert the superiority of male 
                                                 
31 Plutarch, ‘The Maner to Choose’, sig.G4r . 
32 This second-century representation is seen in Lucian’s Amores, ‘The History of Orestes and Pylades’. 
33 Marcus Tullius Cicero, The Booke of Freendeshipe in Fouure Severall Treatises of M. Tullius Cicero 
trans. by Thomas Newton. (London:  Thomas Marshe, 1577), sigs. B9v-C2r.  
34 Marliss C. Desens, The Bed-trick in English Renaissance Drama: Explorations in Gender, Sexuality, and 
Power (Newark:  University of Delaware Press, 1994), p. 16. 
35 Desens, p. 16 
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friendship over the relationship of husband and wife’.36  And this holds for Foxe’s play as 
well, as female agency is muted and denied, even though Foxe tries to reduce this effect 
through Sempronia’s encouraging reaction, which is a departure from Boccaccio, who 
depicts the wife as upset, and from Elyot, who does not address her view on the switch at 
all.  In Foxe’s version Sempronia contends that she actually is ‘more favourably disposed’ 
towards Titus (3.8).    
     One further way in which Foxe revises his source narrative is in the treatment of 
Chremes, Gesippus’ father.  Foxe’s play is the only version where Gesippus’ deceit occurs 
while Chremes is still alive.37 This is significant, because the use of the bed-trick while 
Chremes is alive suggests that all other relationships must be subordinated to friendship, 
even that of fathers and sons.  While ideal friendship frequently was portrayed as superior 
to the love of women, family and kin, as in The Faerie Queene and in the Morgan and 
Rooke Court of Chivalry Case adduced in Chapter 1, here it is anything but celebratory 
because it creates a fissure in two families over something trivial, a friend’s purported 
lovesickness.  Through this Foxe questions the very nature of obligation in friendship, as 
Gesippus understands that fidelity in friendship requires not only deception but dishonour, 
even when it involves indulging a friend in something as frivolous as his heterosexual 
desire.  Here obligation to friendship assumes greater importance, above all other duties:  
to one’s word, family and kin.  By introducing a woman, Foxe’s generic experiment 
highlights the extent to which blinding male friendship can lead men astray, an experiment 
that was replicated and reworked in later drama and prose.38 
     Desens argues that the bed-trick in Elyot’s narrative of Titus and Gesippus stands out as 
a ‘radical’ departure from the ‘well-ordered society’ that is so much a part of the 
                                                 
36 Desens, p. 25. 
37 Detailed plot correspondences in Hazel Smith, p. 15. 
38 See for instance John Lyly’s Euphues (1578) and John Fletcher’s Monsieur Thomas (c. 1610-1616). 
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Governour, and as a ‘social disruption’ caused by the subversion of the father’s right to 
choose his daughter’s husband.39  But it is also a serious digression from the ideal 
friendship that Foxe asserts through the play’s titular appeals to perfect friends.  The 
duplicity of the friends subverts the impact of the climactic ending, which echoes the 
sacrifice classical pairs such as Damon and Pythias were willing to make.  Further, it 
highlights the dissociation between the idealised discourse of classical friendship evoked 
through appeals to similitude, constancy and sacrifice and the action of the play.  In doing 
so, it mirrors the problematic nature of rhetorical assertions of perfect friendship when 
viewed in relation to its subsequent performance. While Titus and Gesippus are given 
equal stature with such exemplars as Damon and Pythias, their friendship fails to meet the 
criteria for inclusion.  In Boccaccio, Elyot and Foxe it falls short of the requisite virtue, as 
the friends do not promote each other’s moral goodness.  And in Foxe, the subversion 
throughout most of the play prior to the ending debases the ideal, as obligation in 
friendship becomes a destructive force, shattering long term familial ties and binding 
oaths, actually leading friends away from the path of virtue.  ‘Bring this off if you can 
manage it somehow’ (1.9), says Gesippus, after learning of Phormio’s plan to substitute 
Titus for him.  The deceptive action renders Titus and Gesippus (with Phormio joining 
them in an unholy triumvirate in Foxe) Ciceronean conspirators, as they unite to betray 
several innocent people because of lovesickness.  
     Foxe attempts to ameliorate this sense and promote the selflessness of Gesippus’ act 
through less than convincing appeals to the acute nature of Titus’ suffering.  As Robert 
Burton would later explain in the Anatomy of Melancholy, love’s melancholy was not 
                                                 
39 Desens, p. 25. 
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without its symptoms of ‘body or minde’.40  And the lovesickness exhibited by Titus does 
reflect a similar symptomatology to that which Burton describes: ‘palenesse, leanenesse, 
drinesse’.41   Even so, despite Burton’s observation that the disorder ‘is so irresistable [sic] 
and violent a passion’, and ‘controverted by some, whether Love-Melancholy may bee 
cured’, he concedes that it is not life-threatening:  ‘if it bee taken in time it may be helped, 
& by many good remedies amended’.42  Both Boccaccio and Elyot highlight the point that 
Titus’ love sickness is an ‘extremyte’ which warrants desperate measures, thus lessening to 
some extent the moral responsibility to be honest and keep one’s oath and guide a friend to 
right action.  In Elyot, Titus’ somatic presentation is underscored, ‘the wanne and pale 
coloure’ and ‘chekes meygre and leane’.43  In Boccaccio, Gesippus sees his act in giving 
up Sempronia as actually life-saving.44  But in Foxe, significantly, it is Phormio’s 
exploitation of Gesippus’ expected constancy in friendship which leads to this 
understanding.   In an attempt to manipulate Gesippus into demonstrating loyalty and 
relinquishing Sempronia to his master, Phormio likens Titus’ lovesickness to ‘a disease’ 
which is ‘incurable’, employing emotive adjectives and verbs like ‘torturing’, ‘wretched’ 
and ‘resurrect’ to convey a sense of desperation (1.9). Given Phormio’s intent, his 
testimony about Titus appears not only exaggerated, but also less trustworthy, especially in 
light of his recognition that Gesippus obeys the laws of friendship:  
 
My first snare must be set for Gesippus.  He’s always been a great friend of my 
master, as friendly as anyone—he hasn’t loved his own life more.  If he learned 
                                                 
40 Robert Burton, “Symptomes of Love-Melancholy” in The Anatomy of Melancholy (Oxford:  Printed by 
Iohn Lichfield and Iames Short for Henry Cripps, 1621), MEMB. 3. SUBSEC. 1, sig. Pp3v.  
41 Burton, ‘Symptomes’, MEMB. 3. SUBSEC. 1, sig. Pp3v. 
42 Robert Burton, ‘Cure of Love-Melancholy, by Labour, Diet, Physicke, Fasting, &c.,’ in The Anatomy of 
Melancholy (Oxford:  Printed by John Lichfield and James Short for Henry Cripps, 1621), MEMB. 5 
SUBSEC. 1, sig. Rr2v.  
43 Elyot, Governour, sig. Q7r. 
44 Boccaccio, sigs.A4r, A5r, A5v.  
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that my master is dying and that he could easily help him at the trifling cost of one 
girl, he wouldn’t let him die, I’m sure of that (1.5). 
 
Phormio underscores that friendship is a useful commodity, and acknowledges that 
sacrifice and constancy in friendship requires the friend to believe his act is life-saving, in 
keeping with stories of idealised pairs.  Without this imperative, Phormio does not see 
Gesippus relinquishing Sempronia.  
     Titus’ hyperbolic lover’s lament ‘I want to die [emphasis mine]’ uttered in 1.1, does 
nothing to contribute to the sense of impending death, but rather suggests his demise is a 
choice rather than a physiological certainty.  It contributes to the overall sense of the 
manipulability of friendship, as Titus, rather than going directly to Gesippus to ask for 
help, employs the aid of the cunning Phormio.  Phormio, as John Hazel Smith notes, is 
among the most important of Foxe’s additions to his sources, injecting Terentian comedy 
into the world of generic romance.45 His addition is critical to the understanding of how 
friendship is adduced in the play, for Phormio’s plotting underscores how outsiders may 
view the malleability of others’ exclusive friendships and how despite rhetorical appeals to 
perfection, external forces are able to intrude and influence. His action as intermediary 
between friends calls to mind Pandarus.  Except here, Phormio brokers a deal between the 
friends which allows Titus to remain one step removed from the deception of Gesippus.   
     Even so, Phormio’s presence and culpability in the scheming does not negate the fact 
that it is Titus, the purported friend of Gesippus, who sets in motion the exploitation of 
friendship.  Titus tells Phormio: ‘Kill me with your sword and deliver me from my 
miseries’ (1.1).  And after a quick retort from Phormio, Titus qualifies his statement with 
‘or’, as if to suggest he really has something else in mind:   ‘Or, if you can devise 
                                                 
45 Hazel Smith, p. 19. 
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something else, some other remedy— [emphasis mine]’(1.1).  This supports the notion that 
Titus’ request to die was nothing more than empty dramatic hyperbole aimed at achieving 
his own ends.  This is a significant departure from Elyot, for in Elyot when Titus requests 
punishment it is because he has betrayed friendship, not as in Foxe, because he is unable to 
marry Sempronia.  And despite John Hazel Smith’s contention that Titus does not know 
what Phormio is doing on his behalf, as ‘the help he specifies is for Phormio to kill him or 
arrange a postponement of Gesippus’s wedding so that Titus can leave town’, Titus’ hasty 
comeback, ‘Or’, suggests that if he doesn’t have anything himself in mind, he is clearly 
open to suggestions from the cunning Phormio.46  These actions are important, as they set 
in motion the debasing of constancy and sacrifice in friendship. 
     Despite the fact that Gesippus appears persuaded by Phormio’s diagnosis, telling him, 
‘If he [Titus] is so smitten with love that he must die without her, I am not such a 
scoundrel, Phormio, that I would ever allow his safety to be locked up in a prison of my 
joys’ (1.9), the play does not register a sense that Titus’ death is imminent (in part because 
this is a comedy).  Hence, Gesippus cannot be excused for having been tricked by 
Phormio, especially as his evaluation of the situation is coloured by his need to perform 
the grand gesture in friendship to prove his constancy.  He has ample opportunity to see 
Titus and judge his condition for himself.  Titus is not bedridden when he encounters him, 
and Gesippus does not comment on his friend’s physical debility brought on by 
lovesickness.  In fact, evidence to the contrary is present, not only in the rapidity of Titus’ 
recovery in time to consummate the marriage, but also in the exuberance he demonstrates.  
Nevertheless, Gesippus is blinded by obligation in friendship and the opportunity that the 
situation presents to demonstrate loyalty.  He declares to Phormio: ‘Anyone who professes 
                                                 
46 Hazel Smith, p. 21. 
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to be a friend in good times should prove that he is one in difficult times as well’ (1.9).  
But this ‘difficult’ time is not akin to that which engendered the sacrificial response from 
Pylades or Damon, and is a naïve interpretation of the commonplace ‘A true friend is best 
perceiued when a doubtfull matter is tryed’.47  
    In all three versions of the narrative there are implicit attempts to justify the deception, 
heightening its ethical quality.  Elyot makes the loftiest argument for the morality inherent 
in the deception and sacrifice, as Gesippus claims that it was God’s will that Sempronia 
should marry Titus.  In this way, Gesippus is beyond reproach, acting as an agent of God:  
‘Am I of that vertue, that I maye resist against celestiall influence, preordinate by 
providence divine?’ he asks, adding, ‘she was by him from the beginning prepared to be 
your Lady & wife’.48   But in Foxe, the appeal is to the idea of similitude in friendship.  In 
a soliloquy Gesippus suggests that it makes no difference whether he or Titus marries 
Sempronia, embracing a ‘one soul in two bodies’ view of their friendship:   
 
Really it’s nothing more than if she had married me, for Titus and I have an 
absolutely joint account. Thus I long for his good fortune and promote that entirely.  
If anything were good for him, I take it to be good for me, as if he were Gesippus 
and I Titus. For I take it as my [emphasis mine] rule for those who wish to be 
friends and not just be called friends, that each should bear each other’s mind, not 
his own, and each should live in the other’s body not less than in his own (2.1). 
 
The key here is that it is Gesippus’ rule and not Titus’ and this is unique to Foxe’s 
representation.  There is little consideration given to Gesippus’ mind by Titus. Gesippus, 
reflecting on his father’s reaction after the deception which allows Titus to marry 
                                                 
47 Nicholas Ling, Politeuphuia Wits Common wealth (London : Printed by I. R[oberts] for Nicholas Ling, 
1597), sig. J7v. 
48 Elyot, Governour, sigs. Q5r , Q6r . 
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Sempronia, reflects: ‘When he learns of it, oh, what remedy I will find for his rage?’(2.5). 
If Titus and Gesippus were truly of ‘one harte and minde’ then Titus surely would consider 
the cost of his friend’s sacrifice in terms of either Sempronia or Chremes, or both.49  In 
Elyot he not only does that, but also, declines the offer of Sempronia.   Elyot writes, he 
‘refused the benefite that hee offred, saying: that it were better, that a hundred suche 
unkynde wretches as he was should peryshe, than so noble a man, as was Gisippus, should 
susteyne reproche or domage’.50   Likewise, in Boccaccio, Gesippus’s demonstration of 
friendship, ‘made [Titus] hym have shame of his grete usurpinge’ and as such, he also is 
unwilling to accept Gesippus’s sacrifice in relinquishing Sempronia: 
  
Gesyppus thy grete liberalyte  
Is openly to me now manyfest  
Whiche on my parte sholde be shewed to the  
But I shall not obey to thy request  
To take thy wyfe the dede were unhonest51  
 
However, not only does Foxe’s Titus disregard the sacrifice and the effect it will have on 
Gesippus, but also, he never attempts, even half-heartedly, to protest Gesippus’ 
beneficence.  In fact, rather than a grateful lamentation for the grief he has caused his 
friend, Titus sings of his gratitude when he learns that Gesippus has relinquished 
Sempronia to him: 
TITUS [singing]   Oh happy day of shining joy, 
Owed of a fortune-favored boy 
A thousand thanks, a thousand gems, 
A thousand white-stoned diadems! 
                                                 
49 From ‘Of Friendship’ in Ling, Politeuphuia, sig. J7r. 
50 Elyot, Governour, sig. Q7r. 
51 Boccaccio, sig. A5v. 
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Away all sorrows, far away, 
Farewell to cares this glorious day. 
Io triumph, with delight I find 
Restored my blissful peace of mind. 
 
Oh life-renewing day, I cast 
Aside my robe of woes at last 
And joy to live eternity  
At peace with all divinity (2.2).   
 
     John Hazel Smith suggests that this is one of the details that Foxe includes ‘that make 
Titus appear insensitive’, but it goes further than that.52  Even though Titus does not know 
that Gesippus is watching, the reaction is not one of a true friend, for ‘where true friends 
are knit in love, there sorrowes are shared equally’.53  After the song celebrating the 
consummation, Titus adds, ‘What man beneath the sun has ever lived to whom a greater 
triumph can be given than mine today? [emphasis mine]’(2.2).  Even in the sixteenth 
century, the word ‘triumph’ suggested ‘victory, conquest, or the glory of this’,54  so this is 
a curious choice of words, which cannot be accounted for by a translation discrepancy, as 
in the original Latin, Titus proclaims: ‘“O dies festus” quin canimus triumphum, Phormio’  
(2.2.1).55  One might ask, over whom exactly has he triumphed?  His friend, Gesippus?  
Although Titus acknowledges his debt to Gesippus, Titus is clearly celebrating, singing a 
song of rejoicing and in no way is suggesting that he views this victory as pyrrhic; his 
friend loses, as he wins.  This is contrary to the classical view of the friend as the ‘other 
self’, as well as the representation in Boccaccio and Elyot, where Titus bemoans his 
friend’s loss rather than rejoices at his own gain.   
                                                 
52 Hazel Smith, p. 21. 
53 Ling, Politeuphuia, p. 63. 
54 ‘Triumph’, in Oxford English Dictionary def. 2a.  
55 Line numbers given for Latin only, p. 100. 
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     Foxe’s placing of Titus’ song of self-interest immediately after Gesippus’ soliloquy that 
asserts a ‘one soul in two bodies’ view of their friendship not only ‘adversely affects’ an 
audience’s view of Titus, as Hazel Smith suggests,  but further underscores the 
asymmetrical nature of this friendship.  This is an interesting idea in its own right in a play 
whose title suggests perfect friendship, but which is composed by Foxe to engender ex 
gratia help in securing a teaching post from Dr. Hensey of Exeter and Mr. Hedley. 56 In 
this way, the friendship of Titus and Gesippus does not speak to similitude in the way that 
Cicero meant when he characterised friendship as ‘a most perfect agreement of willes, 
desires, & opinions’, but rather does so in terms of appearance only, looking as much alike 
as (nearly) twins.57  This is not exclusive to Foxe.  Laurie Shannon has argued that ‘the 
scope of summa consensio’ pushes ‘beyond its classical definition’ in other Renaissance 
texts, including Elyot’s Governour.58  In Foxe it is used to accommodate the problem of 
the plot and the bed-trick.  Here, similitude is employed in a similar manner that Shannon 
found in Elyot’s treatment of Orestes and Pylades and Titus and Gesippus, where ‘likeness 
has been literalised as a wonder-generating physical fact’.59  The emphasis is not on ‘one 
soul’, but rather a similarity in the friends’ taste in women and their physical features.  
     Foxe’s play also registers an understanding of the link between beneficence and 
gratitude in friendship, as seen in Seneca’s De beneficiis, and in its early modern figuring 
in Elyot’s Governour.  In Chapter XIII of The Governour Elyot associates friendship with 
ingratitude:    
  
                                                 
56 Hazel Smith, p. 21.In a letter to Hedley, the play is referred to as ‘a little comic gift’.  there are no further 
details of a patronage request. In Smith, p. 7. 
57 The Booke of Freendeshipe Newton, sig. A7r; See Hazel Smith, ‘Correspondences’ in ‘Introduction’, p. 15. 
58 Laurie Shannon, Sovereign Amity:  Figures of Friendship in Shakespearean Contexts (Chicago:  
University of Chicago Press, 2002), pp. 41-42. 
59 Shannon, p. 43. 
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This I truste shal suffise, for the expressynge of that incomparable treasure, called 
amytie: in the declaration wherof I have aboden the longer, to the intente to 
perswade the reders, to enserche therfore vigilantly, and beinge so happy to fynde 
it, according to the sayde description, to embrace and honour it, abhorrynge above 
all thynges ingratytude, whiche pestylence hath longe tyme raygned amonge us, 
augmented by detraction, a corrupte and lothly syckenesse, wherof I wyll trayte in 
the laste parte of this warke, that men of good nature espienge it, nede not (if they 
list) be therwith deceyved.60 
 
Amity is a ‘treasure’, but ingratitude devalues it.  And Gesippus is represented in line with 
this view, denouncing Titus’ ingratitude.  His sense of obligation to Titus is driven by his 
own need to avoid the appearance of ingratitude in friendship.  After Phormio tells him of 
Titus’ lovesickness, Gesippus replies, ‘non sum tam ingratus, Phormio, Vt vnquam illius 
patiar salute in meis claudier voluptabius. Habeat’ (1.9.42-44).61  His avowed 
unwillingness to allow Titus to suffer because of his joy is strongly grounded in his 
appreciation for their friendship and the obligation that this requires, an obligation that 
Gesippus sees Titus as lacking when he does not recognise his friend.  Elyot speaks to this 
point in the narrative and asserts that Gesippus’ despair is the result of Titus’ 
ungratefulness in friendship:   
 
 But moste of all accusynge the ingratitude of Titus, for whom he suffred all  
 that mysery: the remembraunce wherof was so intollerable, that he determined  
 no lenger [sic] to lyve in that anguyshe and dolour.62 
 
                                                 
60 Elyot, Governour, sigs. U3v-U4r. 
61Smith translates this as ‘I am not such a scoundrel, Phormio, that I would ever allow his safety to be locked 
up in a prison of my joys’ (1.9 p. 95).  However, the sense of ‘ingratus’ here is more in keeping with this idea 
of ‘unthankful’, which is the way I translate it here.  See ‘Ingratus’ in Oxford Latin Dictionary (Oxford and 
New York:  Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 94; Although the text reads ‘unquam’, umquam is the sense 
‘at any time’, that fits the understanding here. 
62 Elyot, Governour, sig.,T2r. 
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     In Foxe, Gesippus’ willingness to admit guilt for a crime he did not commit responds to 
a similar despondency.  He identifies the cause of his situation, telling Fulvius, ‘I was 
gracious to an ungrateful man’(4.3) and responds to Fulvius’ question if he had a ‘friend 
here?’ with ‘I thought I did’ (4.3). Titus’ ingratitude has rendered him no longer a friend in 
Gesippus’ eyes. Gesippus may have been the epitome of the Senecan disinterested giver 
when he relinquished Sempronia, but his understanding of the obligatory nature of his 
beneficence is that it requires future reciprocation. Foxe strikes a similar note to Seneca, 
also reiterated in Elyot:  
   
 The most damnable vice, and moste against justice, in myn opinion, is  
 Ingratitude, commenly called unkindnesse. All be it, it is in divers formes, and 
 of sondry importaunce, as it is discrybed by Seneca in this fourme. He is unkynde 
 whiche denyeth to haue receyved any benefite, that in dede he hath receyved, He is 
 unkynde, that dissimuleth, he is unkynde, that recompenseth not: But he is moste 
 unkynde, that forgetteth.63  
 
     While Titus has previously recognised the importance of gratitude, he has done so only 
with the empty and exaggerated rhetoric necessary to ensure that he appear grateful to his 
friend.  He deems Gesippus’ act of relinquishing Sempronia ‘beneficio maximo’ (2.2.25), 
to be a very great benefit, and lauds him for his generosity, saying ‘Oh what I owe you for 
these favors if not to deliver myself utterly into your hands as a perpetual slave to your 
every command’ (2.2).64  Despite the hyperbole, the indication is that he understands that 
reciprocation is required.  But in the time that has passed since his return to Athens, 
Gesippus believes that Titus has forgotten his beneficence, and, importantly, their 
                                                 
63 Elyot, Governour, sig T6r. 
64 Ullrich Langer remarking on Boccaccio’s narrative suggests that the friendship of Titus and Gesippus is 
demonstrated by beneficia in  Perfect friendship:  Studies in Literature and Moral Philosophy from 
Boccaccio to Corneille (Geneva:  Droz, 1994), p. 46.  
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friendship.  Moreover, he has not reciprocated the benefit received.  But his lament in 3.9 
after Titus does not recognise him alters the sense one gets of his giving in the first 
instance, as the once disinterested giver, Gesippus suggests that quid pro quo is an 
expected part of friendship.  He strikes a similar note to Braithwaite and Dorke, as 
discussed at the beginning of this chapter, in a soliloquy that inveighs against the ‘times’ 
and the disloyalty of friends.  Gesippus says: 
 
Is this the way you repay your friends for favors, Titus, to refer to them as 
meddlers when you’re ashamed to acknowledge them?  Oh the customs, oh the 
times, what is this perfidy of men? And didn’t I forsee that it would be so?  When 
men are in need themselves, nothing is more sweet-natured than they; later, when 
they are puffed up by fortune, they know no one.  Oh ingratitude! Is there no 
trustworthiness in human behaviour? (3.9) 
 
Gesippus implicitly registers an understanding of the failure of the performance of 
friendship to engender a similar affective feeling, but moreover, he questions the type of 
friendship he shared with Titus in the first place.  What this soliloquy suggests is that the 
friendship was ‘temporarie’ in Senecan terms, because for Titus it was a friendship of 
utility.65  As opposed to the ideal, it is rather, what Seneca calls ‘the other’, which is not 
friendship, but rather, ‘traffique’, an exchange of goods, ‘which onely regardest profit, and 
that makest account of that which may yeelde thee commoditie’.66  But Gesippus’ need for 
demonstrated recompense and his denunciation of his friendship only adds weight to the 
critique of non-idealised friendship.  The ideal expressed by Epicurus eschews suspicion 
over intent or motivation for friendship:  ‘‘Distrust is wholly inconsistent with Friendship’ 
                                                 
65 Lucius Annaeus Seneca, His Epistles in The Workes of Lucius Annaeus Seneca translated by Thomas 
Lodge (London:  Printed by William Stansby, 1614), Epistle IX, p. 175. 
66 ‘Traffic’ def. 2a, OED. 
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he says.67   And this is upheld in perfect friendship narratives like Damon and Pythias, as 
Pythias has complete faith that Damon will return to accept his punishment, rather than 
leave him to suffer on his account.  Pythias makes excuses for his friend’s late return in the 
face of Dionysius’ goading that his friend has abandoned him, whereas in Foxe’s play, 
Gesippus’ soliloquy is accusatory and questions Titus’ motivations and friendship.     
     According to Elyot, those ‘in whom frenshyp is most frequente,’ also ‘therto be most 
aptely disposed’ and are ‘specially they, whiche be wyse, and of nature inclyned to 
Beneficence, Liberalitie, and Constance’.68  Foxe’s Gesippus is not so ‘aptly disposed’ 
even though he exhibits beneficence, liberality and to a certain extent, constancy (albeit 
not wisdom) because he condemns his friend and disavows their friendship for a lack of 
gratitude and reciprocation.  But just as Foxe suggests ingratitude’s ability to destroy 
friendship, he allows Titus a sudden conversion into the friend Gesippus thought he was at 
the beginning.  Titus is given his dramatic Pylades’ moment in 5.2, and in his reciprocation 
for Gesippus’ earlier beneficence, Titus upholds the Senecan idea that the return of a 
benefit is better late than never:  ‘he that rendereth not one good turne for an other, 
offendeth more than he that dooth it not speedily’.69  The scene is an Aristotelian 
anagnoristic happy ending, where recognition quite literally and figuratively occurs.  Titus 
finally ‘recognises’ his friend visually, moving from ‘ignorance to knowledge’ and 
‘producing friendship’.70 This punctuates the play with a nod to the personal and public 
benefits and healing powers of perfect friendship, for in Damon and Pythias fashion, Titus 
                                                 
67 Epicurus, Epicurus’s Morals trans. by Walter Charleton  (London : Printed by W. Wilson for Henry 
Herringman, 1656), IV, p. 180, sig. Aa2 v.. 
68 Elyot, Governour, sig R6v. 
69 Lucius Annaeus Seneca , The Woorke of the Excellent Philosopher Lucius Annaeus Seneca Concerning 
Benefyting That Is Too Say the Dooing, Receyving, and Requyting of Good Turnes trans. by Arthur Golding 
(London : By [John Kingston for] Iohn Day, 1578), sig.*2r. (The pagination begins A1 with the text itself), 
sig. A2r;* is the way the page is paginated. Hereafter:  De beneficiis, Golding. 
70 Components of anagnorisis in Terence Cave, Recognitions: A Study in Poetic (Oxford:  Oxford University 
Press, 1990; rpt from 1988 Clarendon edn.), p. 33. See also pp. 48, 53 for recognition in comedy. 
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and Gesippus’ final heroic acts of friendship prompts Martius, ‘the Roman cut-throat’, to 
confess and change his ways.  ‘Because of the great friendship of these two I am so moved 
to pity’ (5.5), he declares.  In the end Foxe’s play registers a similar understanding as 
perfect friendship narratives, that it is in the self- sacrificial act that true friends are 
revealed. Despite the play’s frequent departure from the Aristotelian, Ciceronean and 
Senecan tenets of perfect friendship, the ending reasserts the period’s preoccupation with 
the grand life-saving gesture through a scene depicting the touchstone of classical 
friendship:  the test of constancy in adversity. 
 
III.   Richard Edwards’ Damon and Pythias  
The date that the Oxford educated Richard Edwards wrote The Excellent Comedie of two 
the moste faithfullest Freendes, Damon and Pithias is unknown.71  The play was written 
for the Children of the Chapel.  Recent scholarship dates its most likely first performance 
at Whitehall at Christmas 1564-1565 by the Children of the Chapel, with subsequent 
performances possibly at Lincoln’s Inn in 1565 and at Oxford during a royal visit in 
1568.72 Edwards held the post of Master of the Chapel from 1561-1566. The play was first 
published in 1571. It is the only extant example of Edwards’ dramatic treatment of 
friendship; his Palamon and Arcyte, a reworking of Chaucer’s ‘The Knight’s Tale’ 
performed in 1566 for a royal visit to Oxford, is lost.  Harbage and Schoenbaum list the 
play as the first of two whose titles appeal to the idealised pair.  The second, Damon and 
                                                 
71 Damon and Pithias is listed as a tragicomedy in Harbage and Schoenbaum, but the title refers to it as The 
Excellent Comedie of two the moste faithfullest Freendes, Damon and Pithias, see Annals, pp. 38-39 and 
Richard Edwards, Damon and Pythias in The Works of Richard Edwards:  Politics, Poetry and Performance 
in Sixteenth Century England ed. by Ros King (Manchester: MUP, 2001), pp. 108-184 (p. 108). 
72 See ‘Introduction’, King, pp. 1-107 (p. 6-7) and  Stretter, p. 351, fn 16. See also John R. Elliot,‘Richard 
Edwards’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography. 
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Pithias (1600), now lost, was written by Henry Chettle and was performed under the 
auspices of the Admiral’s Men.73   
     Edwards’ Damon and Pithias closely adheres to Ciceronean convention in its 
representation of the classical ideal.  The pedagogy that pervades the work is reminiscent 
of the humanist grammar school curriculum and the teaching methods employed for 
imitation and retention, which would not have been lost on its young performers.  With 
classical sententiae on friendship from Cicero, infused with Aristotelian wisdom, as 
mediated by Erasmus’ Adagia, the work might easily be dismissed as a pedagogical 
exercise in De educatione puerorum.74  In his essay, ‘Cicero on Stage: Damon and Pithias 
and the Fate of Classical Friendship in English Renaissance Drama’, Robert Stretter 
characterises the play as follows: 
 
 In Damon and Pithias, Edwards creates a world that functions according to the 
 proverbs of the friendship tradition. Characters and situations exist to test and 
 ultimately to validate the adages that Edwards gleans primarily from Cicero’s De 
 amicitia and De officiis.75 
 
 Edwards’ dramatisation also negotiates with some of those ideas, however, and this will 
become important later in this section when the ending of the play is discussed. Stretter’s 
description of the play is correct to a certain extent in that the play is peppered with 
classical proverbial wisdom in Latin, but we should be careful not to dismiss it as simply 
an attempt to ‘dramatize an ethical treatise’,76 or view it as an exercise merely to counsel 
the Queen against flatters.  There is more to the play than the validation of Ciceronean 
                                                 
73 Annals, pp. 76-77. 
74For a discussion of Edwards’ use of proverbs and Erasmus’ Adagia, see  Stretter, p. 353. De educatione 
puerorum is a work on ‘the education or bringing up of children’ from Plutarch translated by Thomas Elyot 
(London:  Thomas Berthelet, 1532?). 
75 Stretter, p. 352. 
76 Quote from Stretter, p. 358. 
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ideals of friendship by Damon and Pythias.  The play speaks to issues in the translation of 
classical works that humanist writers on friendship had no control over:  interpretation and 
application by individual readers.  Some might follow a work’s governing principles to the 
letter, while others might invoke some aspects of it selectively to suit their own purposes.  
Through the use of proverbs in the mouths of true and false friends, Edwards suggests that 
sententiae are only words requiring the correct mind and virtue to put them into practice if 
they are to be considered truly ideal, as Aristotle and Seneca had claimed.   
     In Titus and Gesippus, Foxe touches on the idea that close, private friendship can 
destroy familial bonds, as well as have positive societal implications, including the 
reformation of criminal behaviour.  Edwards follows suit, in effect, creating a dramatic 
example of precisely the problem Cushman’s sermon outlining the death at the Plymouth 
colony raises (as discussed in Chapter 1).  Edwards’ play interrogates the importance of 
private friendship’s public resonance through a series of oppositions:  true friends and false 
friends, self-love and love of others, self- indulgence and self-sacrifice, and tyranny and 
justice, arriving finally at the root of the problem at Dionysius’ Court, namely, that enmity 
rather than friendship prevails.      
     Edwards juxtaposes the world of Aristippus, Carisophus and Dionysius with that of 
Damon and Pythias and figures friendship as two extremes:  either instrumental or perfect. 
Aristippus, Carisophus, Damon and Pythias are all well-versed in perfect friendship’s 
tenets, but despite Carisophus’ ability to recount its laws and to ask rhetorically, ‘Is there 
no perfect friendship but where is virtue and honesty? (1.14.46), he is unable to apply its 
principles because he lacks virtue.  He and Aristippus serve as examples of the problem of 
application when it comes to those whom Aristotle thought incapable of perfect friendship, 
namely, less than ‘good men’.  They are men in whose hands the laws of friendship can be 
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distorted and manipulated, as they embody the self-indulgence and self-centeredness that 
are anathema to the ideal. 
     Edwards explores this issue of goodness against the backdrop of Court politics where 
Dionysius rules with a beneficent iron glove, bestowing liberally on dissembling courtiers 
and fawning flatterers.  The philosopher turned courtier, Aristippus, says he has enjoyed 
the King’s favour in material terms and suggests that he has learned from classical 
precedent (and has advised Dionysius) that ‘the King’s praise stands chiefly in 
bountifulness’ (1.9.10, 12).77  But the type of bounty at Dionysius’ Court is devoid of the 
morality suggested by Seneca, who argues that, ‘bounty must be accompanied with love 
and charitie’,78  for the King’s beneficence rests not on affection, but rather on the 
expectation of obligation, reciprocity and reward.  Aristippus counsels Dionysius on the 
usefulness of beneficence, in much the same way that Seneca counselled the young Nero, 
suggesting that it is the way to engender favour and loyalty.79  This relational model of 
friendship between beneficent monarch and loyal subject is similar to the symbolic display 
of philia scripted for the festivities surrounding Elizabeth’s coronation and her speech to 
Parliament (see Chapter 1).  The difference lies in the fact that despite the reciprocation 
and obligation that were engendered in the pageants and the speech, philia and caritas 
were proposed.  The model at Dionysius’ Court however, is solely instrumental, and 
devoid of requisite feeling. 
                                                 
77 Richard Edwards, Damon and Pythias in The Works of Richard Edwards:  Politics, Poetry and 
Performance in Sixteenth Century England ed. by Ros King (Manchester: MUP, 2001),pp. 108-184.  All 
future references are from this edition. 
78 This is a note by Lodge in the margin in Lucius Annæus Seneca, De beneficiis trans. by Thomas Lodge, 
rpt.  of 1612 edn. by Israel Gollancz (London:  J.M. Dent, 1899), p. 44. From this point forward the reference 
will be De beneficiis, Lodge. 
79 In De Clementia Seneca reminds Nero that beneficence and justice are necessary qualities of a prince or 
king in C. J. Rowe, Malcolm Schofield, Simon Harrison, Melissa S. Lane, The Cambridge History of Greek 
and Roman Political Thought (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 410. 
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     The value of friendship is espoused in philosophical tracts, but at the Court its worth 
lies in material reward.  Aristippus, the philosopher, best understands the inability to enact 
principles of moral ethics at the Court in the absence of virtue, and turns to ‘Courtly 
philosophy’ (1.19).  He and Carisophus are caricatures of fawning flatterers, the 
embodiment of the men Seneca speaks against, who are not friends of kings, but rather are 
numbered as such only because they flatter, rather than counseling honestly and wisely.  
Seneca tells us that he ‘knowest not the value of friendship’, for he ‘understandest not, that 
thou shalt give him very much to whom thou givest a friend’ because a friend will offer 
good counsel.80   
     But equally, the monarch must also come to understand the value of friendship, as  
Edwards attempts to point out in his play’s oblique counsel to Elizabeth (despite his 
protestation in the prologue that ‘we talk of Dionysius’ court, we mean no court but that’) 
(40).  As such, he represents Dionysius’ Court as exemplar of what can happen in the 
absence of amicable relations, when a ruler is surrounded only by men like Aristippus and 
Carisophus who foster fear and distrust, feeding the more ‘brutish’ side of the monarch’s 
nature.  Edward’s treatment of this idea is demonstrative of Plutarch’s admonition: 
 
Now one of the meanes to beware of this flatterie, is to know and remember 
alwaies, that our soule consisteth of two parts, whereof the one is addicted to the 
truth, loving honestie and reason; the other more brutish, of the owne nature 
unreasonable, given to untruth and withall passionate. A true friend assisteth 
evermore the better part, in giving counsell and comfort, even as an expert and 
skilfull Physition, who hath an eie that aimeth alwaies at the maintenance and 
encrease of health: but the flatterer doth apply himselfe, and settleth to that part 
which is voide of reason and full of passions: this he scratcheth, this he tickleth 
                                                 
80De beneficiis, Lodge, pp. 262-263. 
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continually, this he stroketh and handleth in such sort, by devising some vicious 
and dishonest pleasures, that he withdraweth and turneth it away quite from the 
rule and guidance of reason.81  
 
Dionysius is ‘voide of reason and full of passions’, so much so that he is mistrustful and 
believes that ‘fear and terror defends kings only’ (1.10.219).  The unfounded accusation 
that Damon is a spy feeds his suspicion and as such, only Damon’s death will quell that 
feeling:  ‘Till he be gone whom I suspect, how shall I live quietly / Whose memory with 
chilling horror fills my breast day and night violently?’ (1.10.220-221).  This reaction 
seems out of proportion to the threat Damon actually poses, but Dionysius’s brutish side 
has been nurtured by Carisophus, and, without a trusty friend to appeal to his better nature, 
he seems destined to tyrannical rule.  So much so, that he cannot comprehend Eubulus’ 
talk of ‘merciful justice’ (1.10. 214).  Duty-bound to offer wise counsel, (perhaps as 
Edwards sees himself), Eubulus points out the folly and injustice inherent in seeking 
Damon’s death, telling Dionysius: ‘He only viewed your city, and will you for that make 
him away?’(1.10.158), but to no avail, the king is not moved.   
     Juxtaposed with a world where friendship is ‘spoke’ but not ‘meant’ (1.1.124), where 
self-indulgence, self-love and tyranny reign supreme and the public fallout from the 
absence of amity between King and subject is keenly felt, is the private world of true and 
selfless friendship demonstrated by Damon and Pythias.  There is no pecuniary exchange 
necessary here, as bounty is limited to self-sacrifice, for there are no material goods that 
can aid the condemned Damon.  Pythias’ understanding of giving calls to mind the story 
that Seneca recounts of Aeschines (a friend of Socrates), who although poor, wanted to 
give a worthy gift to Socrates but found the only thing he could give was friendship: ‘I will 
                                                 
81 Plutarch, The Philosophie Commonlie Called, the Morals trans. by Philemon Holland (London:  Arnold 
Hatfield, 1603), sigs. I2r-I2v. 
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give mine own, myself, and the best of me’.82  Similarly, Pythias has nothing to offer 
Damon but constancy in friendship, quite literally, his own self, his life for his friend.   
     In opposition to this selfless friendship of the ‘good’, is the friendship of utility of 
Aristippus and his rival courtier Carisophus, predicated, as Aristippus suggests, on the 
benefit that he anticipates it will bring:  ‘I have done very wisely to join in friendship with 
him, lest perhaps I / coming in his way might be nipped’ (1.1.119-121).  Neither 
Aristippus nor Carisophus is seeking to benefit the other in the Senecan spirit of 
friendship.  They typify the man described in De beneficiis, who ‘desireth nothing else, but 
that him self [sic] may be discharged, desireth by any means to accomplish the same, 
which is an argument of a most evil will’.83  Such a will is obscured here however, by 
Carisophus’ rhetoric, as his words invoke a sense of the Senecan precept that each friend 
will ‘apply himself to his friend’s commodity’.84  He says to Aristippus, ‘Since we are 
now so friendly joined, it seems to me / That one of us help each other in every 
degree’(1.1.86-87).  Here the image of perfect friendship’s virtue and mutual aid is 
suggested, but exploited.  In contrast with the main plot, here it is represented as sel
serving; the sentiment evoked lacks the honourable spirit of giving requisite to Senecan 
philosophy.  The beneficial act of forwarding each other at Court would not be wrong in 
itself, because Seneca accepts that benefit may profit the giver and receiver alike, but here
the benefit is tainted because it is sought, premeditated and requested. Seneca’s definiti





                                                
     
 a frendly good deede, giving gladnesse au[sic] taking pleasure in giving,   
 foreward and redie of it owne occord, too doo the thing that it dooeth. And  
 
82 De beneficiis, Lodge, p. 17. 
83 De beneficiis, Lodge, pp. 264-265. 
84 De beneficiis, Lodge, p. 265. 
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 therfore it is not material what is doon, or what is given, but with what   
 mind’.85  
  
The minds of Aristippus and Carisophus distort this view, as well as run counter to the 
spirit of true classical friendship, as both see and seek only a utilitarian end in an amicable 
union.  Aristippus recognises that Carisophus’ motivation for friendship was utility, telling 
him:  ‘My friendship though soughtest for thine own commodity / As worldly men do, by 
profit measuring amity’ (1.14. 37-38).   
     And the mind is the crux of the issue, as the beneficence of the King and the friendship 
of Aristippus and Carisophus are driven by selfish intent, at odds with the friendship of 
Damon and Pythias, who do not seek commodity in friendship, but rather represent a 
friend’s selfless, disinterested giving. With this in mind, the final recognition, which 
moves Dionysius to friendship through a hasty metamorphosis similar to that seen in Titus 
et Gesippus, is less miraculous than has been suggested,86 especially in terms of classical 
friendship.  The catalyst for Dionysius’ volte-face, which has been credited to his 
admiration for the friendship that Damon and Pythias share, stems from his attributing 
value to the noble acts of the pair, suggesting that his ‘mind’ has not been converted to 
unselfish virtue equal with Damon and Pythias.  When Dionysius says ‘there is no guard 
[compared to]87 a faithful friend’ (1.15.222), he recognises the potential usefulness of a 
friendship where the friend is willing to die for the other.  To Dionysius, friendship is still 
predicated on reward, the value of the benefit given, not the love of the friend.  His self-
interested vantage point is further evidenced in his expectation of reciprocity after granting 
                                                 
85 De beneficiis , Golding, Book 1, Chap 6, sig. B1v. 
86 Stretter sees it as ‘a final miracle enabled by the divine workings of amicitia’, p. 258. 
87 The footnote reads ‘compared with’, the word in the text is ‘unto’. 
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Damon clemency. Although the request asserts honourable intent, it nevertheless rests on 
utility.  He says: 
  Damon, have thou life, from death I pardon thee,  
   for which good turn, I crave this honour do me lend,  
   O friendly heart, let me link with you to you—make me the  
  third friend’ (1.15.226-228).   
 
The fact that Dionysius’ request is for reciprocation, no matter how honourable the pardon, 
reinforces the sense of the profit to be gained from friendship that pervades the subplot and 
is punctuated by the final song.  The song serves as an epilogue, and posits the preceding 
play as a ‘mirror for princes’.88  The emphasis on the private and public usefulness of 
friendship is articulated in the lines before the song: ‘The strongest guard that kings can 
have / Are constant friends their state to save’.   
 
  True friends for their true prince, refuse not their death, 
  The Lord grant her such friends, most noble Queen Elizabeth. 
  Long may she govern in honour and wealth, 
  Void of all sickness, in most perfect health, 
  Which health to prolong, as true friends require. 
  God grant she may have her own heart’s desire, 
  Which friends will defend with most steadfast faith,  
  The Lord grant her such friends, most noble Queen Elizabeth  
  (‘Last Song’ 7-14). 
 
     Here friendship is a gift from God, as seen in Harington’s translation of Cicero.89  But 
perhaps more importantly, the final song supports Stretter’s contention that ‘Edwards is 
                                                 
88 As such, it is part of a tradition which included Gorboduc (1561).  For the latter, see Andrew Hadfield, The 
English Renaissance 1500-1620 (Oxford:  Blackwell, 2001), p. 162. The dating of Gorboduc is the date of 
the first performance and is taken from Hadfield, p. 162.  
89 Marcus Tullius Cicero, The Booke of Freendeship of Marcus Tullie Cicero trans. by John Harington 
(London: Thomas Berthelette, 1562) , sigs. B6r -B7v. 
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intent on demonstrating that friendship rhetoric must always be coupled with action’.90  
For the action suggested and emphasised echoes the kind by which paradigmatic pairs 
have gained their reputations, namely, the grand sacrificial gesture.  Assimilating the 
relation of monarch and subject to the model of friendship has its benefits, as it obliges the 
latter to be willing to die for their prince.  This, Dionysius’ improbable change of heart 
notwithstanding, serves to reinforce the sense of the possibility of a better world enabled 
through friendship, as its reparative and harmonising power is highlighted.  Edwards 
demonstrates how private friendship can aid monarchs and public stability, as the court of 
Dionysius becomes a just and very different place after Damon and Pythias accept the king 
into their friendship.  Friendship has triumphed over tyranny, supporting Aristotle’s 
contention that ‘yf every man wer frendly to other, Justice shuld not nede: for whi? 
frendshippe destroyeth al strife, and every discorde that may be’.91  That is not to say that 
an audience would not be left with the sense of the possibilities for reward inherent in the 
pursuit of the elusive amicitia perfecta on a personal level, for that was undoubtedly part 
of the intent, given the play was written with its educable young performers in mind.  But 
the emphasis is on the far reaching effects personal friendships can have on society.     
     In order to achieve this sense of public utility, however, Edwards is willing to negotiate 
with classical precedent on the cultivation of friendship.  In doing so he takes up the issue 
of gratitude and its link to friendship, as Foxe did in Titus et Gesippus. Edwards would be 
aware of the commonplace admonition about ‘friends taken lightly’ and the suggestion that 
men rush into friendships at their peril, as Plutarch suggests in ‘The Maner to choose and 
cherishe a freende’.  According to Plutarch: 
 
                                                 
90 Stretter, p. 359. 
91 Ethiques, Wilkinson, sig. H3v . 
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 and in the getting of other thynges, men use great care and diligence, but in  
 choosyng of freendes they be veraie negeligent, nor they have not as it were  
 markes and tokens, by the which they maie deine those that ar fete to be   
 received into freendeship.92  
 
One might expect that Edwards’ didactic intent might compel him to enforce this idea for 
the benefit of the Chapel boys who would act his play.  Yet, faithful to Elyot’s humanistic 
telling of the tale, Edwards’ ending diverges from the Pythagorean account of the tale 
retold by Iamblichus in the fourth century in On the Pythagorean Way of Life.  In the 
historic account, Damon and Pythias ‘refuse’ to admit Dionysius into their friendship.93  In 
Edwards, Damon and Pythias do not even proceed slowly in entering upon a ‘friendship’ 
with Dionysius, in contravention of Cicero, from whom he draws his classical 
understanding.  Montaigne, quoting Cicero, argues that confirmation of friendship comes 
with time and discretion:   
 Omnino amicitiae corroboratis iam confirmatis ingenijs & aetatibus   
 indicandae sunt. Clearely friendships are to be indge[sic] by wits, and ages  
 already strengthened and confirmed. As for the rest, those we ordinarily call  
 friendes and amities, are but acquaintances and familiarities, tied together by  
 some occasion or commodities, by meanes whereof our mindes are   
 entertained’.94    
But Dionysius’ declaration that ‘before this day, I never knew what perfect friendship 
meant’ (1.15.219), does not reflect this understanding.  Further, as previously considered, 
his call ‘to be counted a perfect friend’ (1.15.244), rests on his understanding that to be 
                                                 
92 William Baldwin and Thomas Palfreyman, Treatise of Morall Philosophie, facsimile of the 1620 edition 
enlarged by Thomas Palfreyman (Gainesville:  Scholars Facsimilies, 1967),p. 178; Plutarch, ‘The Maner to 
Chose’  sig. G3r. 
93 David Konstan, Friendship in the Classical World (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 1997), 
p.114. 
94 Michel de Montaigne, ‘Of Friendship’ in Essays trans. by John Florio (London:  Printed by Melch. 
Bradwood for Edward Blount and William Barret, 1613), p. 92. Montaigne takes this from Cicero, De 
amicitia XX.  
109 
 
numbered as such he is entitled to certain benefits of the kind he witnessed in Damon and 
Pythias’ willingness to die for each other.   
     The swift acceptance of Dionysius into friendship by Pythias is an interesting turn by 
Edwards, especially as Pythias has embraced the tenets of amicitia perfecta to the classical 
letter throughout the play in his relations with Damon.  But his impulsive and naive 
response to Dionysius’ request seems out of place, as even though Dionysius promises to 
‘honour’ friendship and makes claims of virtue eschewing ‘tyranny, flattery and 
oppression’ (1.15.241, 243), it flies in the face of the judgment, measure and discernment 
required of perfection in friendship.  But Pythias’ response is motivated by gratitude, of 
the kind Seneca links to friendship, as discussed in Foxe’s play.  He replies to Dionysius:  
  
  For this your deed, most noble King, the gods advance your name,  
   And since to friendship’s lore you list your princely heart to frame, 
   With joyful heart, O King, most welcome now to me,  
   With you will I knit the perfect knot of amity’ (1.15.245-248).    
 
 Thus he indicates that it is the ‘deed’ that prompts friendship.  Pythias is appreciative that 
Dionysius has spared his and Damon’s lives, and this gratitude is expressed through 
consent to Dionysius’ wish.  For Pythias, the King’s beneficence engenders friendship in 
true Senecan fashion.  This idea has precedence in De beneficiis, as Seneca says ‘so is the 
Law of benefites a most holy law, wherout of sprinketh frendship’.95   But significantly, in 
his preceding sentence, Seneca speaks to the issue of discernment in relation to choosing 
one’s friends and bestowing benefits, declaring, ‘& freendship warneth mee too admit no 
unworthie persone’, suggesting that discernment still matters.96  But there is much public 
                                                 
95De beneficiis , Golding, sig. E4r. 
96 De beneficiis , Golding, sig. E4r. 
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benefit for the state riding on the extension of friendship to Dionysius; in such a case rules 
governing private friendship, namely, the requirement for discernment, are subordinated in 
contravention of the ideal. 
 
IV. Thomas Goffe’s The Tragedy of Orestes 
Nearly forty-five years after Edward’s play took to an academic stage at Oxford, Thomas 
Goffe’s The Tragedy of Orestes played on the Christ Church, Oxford stage.  The play was 
written and performed between 1613 and1618 whilst Goffe was an Oxford student, before 
he received his Bachelor of Divinity degree and became a Church of England 
Clergyman.97  The work was published posthumously (1633), as were with his other two 
plays The Raging Turk and The Courageous Turk. 98  
     Although The Tragedy of Orestes could be considered ‘amateurish’ in parts as Norbert 
F. O’Donnell notes, he also suggests, because of its affinity to commercial revenge 
tragedy, that it ‘is one academic play which might have succeeded as well on the stage of 
the Globe as in a college hall’.99  And perhaps it might have, for it draws from a rich 
classical Greek theatrical tradition, including Seneca’s Agamemnon, as well as the early 
modern revenge tragedy genre, thought to be established through Thomas Kyd’s The 
Spanish Tragedy (1587).100   In Orestes Goffe explores the avenger’s concomitant 
harbouring of revenge and philia. In his endeavour, Goffe centralises the importance of 
male friendship and questions the reputation for perfect amity that Orestes and Pylades 
                                                 
97 Norbert O’Donnell, ‘Shakespeare, Marston and the University:  The Sources of Thomas Goffe’s Orestes’, 
Studies in Philology, 50.3 (July 1953), pp. 476-484 (p. 476); Eleri Larkum, ‘Thomas Goffe’ DNB. 
98 Larkum, DNB. 
99 From what we know it did not play at the Globe. O’Donnell, p. 484. For his doctoral dissertation at the 
University of Ohio in 1950 O’ Donnell edited Goffe’s play. Annals, Appendix 3, p. 217. 
100 For influence of Agamemnon see O’Donnell, pp. 478-479; For Kyd and revenge tragedy see Janet Clare, 
Revenge Tragedies of the Renaissance (Tavistock: Northcote, 2006), p.3; dating from Clare, ‘Biographical 
and Historical Outline’, x. 
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enjoyed in the period through an engagement with the idea of the limits of obligation and 
unity in friendship.  
       In ‘The Prologue’ to the play, which stage directions indicate was ‘spoken by the 
Authour himselfe’, Goffe asserts that his intent was to ‘revive a tale, / Which once in 
Athens great Eurypedes / In better phrase at such a meeting told’.101  But Goffe’s play 
does not hold to any one source, ancient or contemporary, especially the author cited in
prologue, and the play suggested by its title, namely, Euripides’ Orestes.  Euripides’ 
Electra takes up the murder of Clytemnestra and her lover Aegystheus, but it is committed 
by Orestes and his sister Electra.  Iphigenia at Tauris is the play in which Pylades’ 
friendship is important, but it takes place after the murders. Similarly, Aeschylus’s trilogy 
the Oresteia recounts comparable events, but again, in the play where the killings occur, 
the Choephori, Pylades only reminds his friend to honour the gods in avenging the deaths; 
Orestes and Electra are complicit in the murders.  Goffe’s rendering conflates several of 
these accounts, in support of his prologue’s contention that he has constructed a ‘new 
edifice’ ‘from an old foundation’.
 the 
                                                
102  But the wattle and daub strengthening Goffe’s ‘new 
edifice’ came from more contemporary underpinnings, namely, John Marston’s Antonio’s 
Revenge (1600) and William Shakespeare’s Hamlet (1600). 103  Goffe’s creation involves 
the murder of Agamemnon, the killings of Clytemnestra and Aegystheus, and an ending 
that does not exonerate the avengers, as in Euripides, where Apollo sets everything right, 
Pylades marries Electra and Orestes marries Helen’s daughter Hermione.104  If Goffe did 
use Shakespeare’s Hamlet as a source, as Norbert F. O’Donnell suggested in his work on 
 
101 Thomas Goffe, ‘The Prologue’ in The Tragedy of Orestes (Printed by I. B. for Richard Meighen, 1633), 
sig A1v.  
102 See Euripides, Orestes in Orestes and Other Plays by Euripides trans. by Robin Waterfield (Oxford:  
Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 48-95 passim; Goffe, ‘Prologue’, sig A1v.  
103 See O’Donnell for a good discussion of Goffe’s use of Marston and Shakespeare, pp. 481-484. 
104 See Euripides, Orestes, pp. 48-95 passim. 
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the play in the fifties,105 then the depiction of Horatio, the Pylades counterpart, would have 
served as another example of the supportive, but non-conspiratorial role the friend plays, 
as seen in the Choephori.  Goffe however, chooses an alternate representation of the 
friend. 
     He spends the first four acts establishing the loyal friendship of Pylades.  Employing 
the parlance of true, classical friendship Orestes tells his friend: 
 
  Come now my dearest friend, my other self, 
   My empty soule is now fild to the top,  
  Brimfull with gladnesse and it must runne o’r  
   Into my deare friends heart (1.3).106   
 
But true to the tenets of perfect friendship, when gladness turns to misery, the friend’s 
heart must share the burden.  This burden is heavy in tragedy.  Even though Orestes sets a 
solitary course as he declares his intent to flee the court and find out who has killed his 
father, Pylades asserts his understanding of fidelity in adversity and union in friendship. 
When Orestes relates his plan, saying ‘I will flie’ and I’ll put a new shape on, / And live 
alone (2.3), Pylades counters his friend’s use of the pronoun ‘I’ with words that assert 
union:   
   Nay, not alone Orestes, whilst I live, 
   Shouldst make thy bed upon the rigid Alps, 
   Or frozen on the Caucasus, wrapt in sheets of snow, 
   I’d freeze unto thy side; (2.3) 
 
                                                 
105 O’Donnell, pp. 476, 481. 
106Thomas Goffe, The Tragedy of Orestes (Printed by I. B. for Richard Meighen, 1633). All subsequent 
references are from this edition. There are no line numbers. 
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Goffe continues this emphasis throughout Act 3 by use of first person pronouns ‘we’, ‘us’ 
and ‘our’: ‘our pillow’s a dead skull’, our comfort’, ‘we have a grave’ (3.6). Goffe’s 
university audience would recognise that Pylades’ actions adhere closely to those 
prescribed for the ideal friend in three main areas:  comfort, counsel, and the all-important 
constancy.  Nevertheless, even though these tenets are judged through action, and 
enactment is precisely what Goffe gives his audience through Pylades, he emphasises its 
importance through Orestes’ later reflections on it. This is significant because in dramatic 
representations of friendship the parlance of perfect amity is often asserted, but the 
application is frequently absent. Orestes acknowledges his friend’s ‘kinde counsell’ and 
tells him: 
   thou has plaid musique to my dolefull soule; 
   And when my heart was tympaniz’d with grief  
   Thou lauedst out some into thy heart from mine, 
   And kept it so from hurting (4.2). 
 
Pylades’ friendship is like a comforting melody to soothe Orestes’ stretched and swollen 
heart which has been overcome by grief.  His unswerving devotion and fidelity is a model 
of constancy in friendship.  When Tyndarus banishes the friends alone, saying ‘no one 
shall company the other’, the punishment is palpably felt.  It is not the lack of food, but the 
absence of the friend that is depicted as most severe.  Without Pylades consoling presence, 
the ‘tormenting furies’ overtake Orestes (5.6).   
     Tom MacFaul describes some of the roles that Horatio assumes in Hamlet as including 
those of a Baconian ‘deputy’, and a ‘sounding board’.107 Significantly, however, Hamlet is 
sole avenger, even if his friend’s presence is of consequence to the plot.  John Kerrigan has 
                                                 
107 Tom MacFaul, Male Friendship in Shakespeare and his Contemporaries (Cambridge:  Cambridge 
University Press, 2007), pp. 137-138. 
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noted that 'the prince excludes his audience, and, in the process, wins a depth and secrecy 
unlike anything found in Greek drama'.108 Goffe’s play reverses this distancing effect 
through the centralisation of Pylades role beyond his sources.  Through the close 
friendship of Orestes and Pylades revenge becomes a shared experience; its psychology 
laid bare for the audience through the interplay of the friends and the representation of 
their amity as perfect. Pylades’ constant friendship ensures that Orestes will not be a 
Hamlet-like figure negotiating the exigencies of revenge alone.  He is the vehicle through 
which revenge is assured; his verification of the vision of Agamemnon’s ghost provides 
the necessary catalyst to stay Orestes’ momentary hesitation because of the young child’s 
words of love. Orestes tells the young child, ‘Would thou wert not my mothers, I could 
weepe / But see, O see now my relenting heart’( 4.7). However, the ghost’s appearance at 
this crucial moment abruptly terminates any capitulation, especially because Orestes 
receives confirmation from Pylades of the reliability of the apparition.  With Pylades 
affirmative response to Orestes’ query, ‘didst thou see't, friend?’ (4.7) the possibly 
dismissed vision of the ghost of his wounded father transforms into a vivid reality and 
revenge follows on its heels. Pylades’ constant presence prevents Orestes from lapsing into 
moments of uncertainty and inaction.  
     The play’s moral ambiguity is realised through Pylades, whose acts waver slightly from 
his friend’s desired course, at times suggesting a vaguely disparate moral code.  He tries to 
stay Orestes’ unbridled revenge when the killers of Agamemnon were unknown (3.2), 
counsels against matricide (3.4) , and brings the child to Orestes in what appears a bid for 
pity, enjoining his friend, ‘I Faith Orestes prethee spare the child, / It hath no fault, but ‘tis 
too like the mother’ (4.7).  Even so, Goffe slowly transforms Pylades into a co-conspirator 
                                                 
108 John Kerrigan, Revenge Tragedy: Aeschylus to Armageddon (Oxford: Clarendon 1996; 2002), p. 173. 
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through Orestes’ appeals to obligation in friendship.  After Orestes stabs the child, there is 
no stage direction indicating that Pylades is trying to save him, but Orestes’ reproof 
suggests that Pylades has intervened in some way:  ‘ Hold Pylades, be stedfast, for by 
heaven / Hee wounds mee,  that perswades me not to wound’ (4.7).  Orestes directly 
appeals to fidelity in friendship to achieve cooperation.  He debases this ethic of constancy 
by using it as a tool for revenge. This friendship cannot accommodate justice and mercy, 
as Orestes proves when he calls for the ultimate test of friendship saying, ‘Be pittilesse 
now Pylades, be my friend’ (4.8).  Pylades is called to demonstrate unwavering love by 
aiding his friend in a merciless act of killing an innocent child.  In this way he perverts the 
integrity of perfect friendship, because as Aristotle argues, ‘only the good is lovable’.109 
Lorraine Smith Pangle explains Aristotle’s view in such situations when a friend’s virtue 
‘has begun to slip’ suggesting that ‘there is little hope here of re-establishing equality and 
intimacy between the friends’.110  But Goffe does not explore this tension.  Instead, he 
maintains the equality of the pair through Pylades’ affirmative answer to the call of 
constancy through abetting the immoral act.  The friends remain equal, but no longer in the 
shared ‘good’.  Paradoxically, the requisite test of friendship’s constancy that would 
normally inspire awe, as seen in Damon and Pythias, is debased.  This moment serves as a 
counterpoint to Aristotle’s idea that ‘yf every man wer frendly to other, Justice shuld not 
need’.111 
     When Orestes appeals to friendship’s duty in what he sees as a moment of 
equivocation, Goffe comes closest to his source in Euripides, not in character or action, but 
in his treatment of friendship.  David Konstan argues that in Euripides’ Orestes 
                                                 
109 Lorraine Smith Pangle, Aristotle and the Philosophy of Friendship (Cambridge:  Cambridge University 
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‘unhesitating support is treated as the essential criterion of friendship’.112 But the ordained 
act of just revenge by Apollo distances Euripides’ play from Goffe’s.  In this way the type 
of support that Goffe’s play insists upon through bloodthirsty acts might reverse any 
sympathy and appreciation for fidelity in friendship that the pair might have engendered 
from their audience. Janet Clare reminds us of the added effect that ‘conditions of 
performance’ have on the ‘emotional register’ of a play.113  In this instance, if Christ 
Church’s large hall’s seating arrangement was similar to that represented in an extant 
drawing for a visit by James 1 in 1605, the smaller stage’s immediate proximity to the 
audience and tightly compressed seating might have had the effect of closing the distance 
between the audience and the action.114 As Janet Clare has noted, onstage vengeance acted 
in a more intimate space does not necessarily arouse audience indignation as it might in the 
public theatre.115  Writing on Antonio’s Revenge Clare suggests that ‘the overwrought 
imagery, moreover, is an indication that we are not to take altogether seriously the 
histrionics of the play about to be performed’.116  This seems to hold for Goffe’s play as 
well, as he replicates exaggerated vengeful acts from his sources and allots all of Act 4 
Scene 8 to revenge.  Nevertheless, the child’s spurting blood, his cries of ‘save me, save 
me’ (4.8) and the cups of blood presented to his parents, Aegystheus and Clytemnestra that 
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indeed follow the prescribed pattern of vengeful ‘excess’ may still serve to reverse any 
empathy felt for the avenger and his accomplice here.117  
     The problem that the play posits in relation to the ideal friend comes through Pylades’ 
unquestioning loyalty in the face of immoral acts.  Classical friendship requires that a 
friend foster virtue in the other, as this chapter has outlined, but neither Orestes nor 
Pylades abides by this responsibility in friendship.  Even though Pylades does not wield 
the knife that kills Mysander and the child, because he does not attempt to dissuade 
Orestes from the murder of innocents through an appeal to virtue, he is just as culpable as 
his friend. In the end, he too, is condemned by Tyndarus, who outlines his crime as 
follows:  ‘You Pylades wich [sic] did so smoothly cloake, / The damnde [sic] profession 
hee did undertake’ (5.1).  However, Pylades has done more than that.  It is Pylades plan to 
hide at Court in the disguise, offering the idea as ‘The best plot I can thinke is this’ (4.2).  
His additional remark is what turns him from friend to confederate, as he tells Orestes: 
‘You may in time so minister to the King / Physiques occasion fit revenge may bring’ 
(4.2), knowing that the ministration will be murder.  Avenging the death of Agamemnon, 
as ordained by Apollo, contributed a sense of retributive justice to Euripides’ play that 
would be understood by its Ancient Greek audience.  But Goffe removes the god, and 
employs a Senecan ghost, and following Shakespeare, posits revenge as an act of 
obedience to the father. The classically educated Oxford audience familiar with the source 
might appreciate the ancient precedent for matricide even without Apollo’s order, and thus 
sympathise with Orestes and Pylades in these killings. Nonetheless, this scene is pivotal in 
establishing Pylades as not only a willing participant, but as an orchestrator.   
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     This is a turning point in the play in terms of friendly responsibility and virtue, as for 
the first time we see a shift in Pylades’ call for restraint with the suggestion that revenge is 
indeed part of the plan.  The murder of Mysander by Orestes, which follows the plan’s 
enactment, much like Hamlet’s killing of Polonius, adds another dimension to the play’s 
moral sensibility.  But this is complicated further by the ideal friend’s complicity. 
Mysander is a parasite and eavesdropper, similar to Polonius, and his death at the hands of 
Orestes carries the same immoral taint.  Because Pylades does not intervene to stop 
Mysander’s killing and employs a lie to suggest that the killing was in self-defence, he 
aligns him with his friend.  In doing so he remains loyal to friendship, but betrays virtue.  
But the unity of the friends is central to this scene.  As he kills Mysander, Orestes says ‘on 
thee our medicine first shall worke’ (emphasis mine) (4.3).  When the pair are confronted 
and asked who is responsible for the act, the declaration by each asserting their guilt does 
not seem heroic, or on a par with that of Damon and Pythias’ similar assertions at 
Dionysius’ Court.  Rather, it engenders a sense of a configuration of friendship similar to 
that which  Laurie Shannon sees as a ‘rebel compact’ in 2 Henry IV, where friendship 
‘circumvents the law’ and privileges ‘private interests’.118 An audience might see this as a 
defining moment in the pairs’ friendship, as it turns conspiratorial. 
      The aforementioned instances are two moments in the play when Pylades undergoes a 
test of constancy in friendship. In contravention of the principles of classical friendship, 
the killing of the child and Mysander are aberrant, dishonourable tests that engage with the 
Ciceronean question of ‘howe farre Love ought to stretche in Freendshippe’.119  Pylades’ 
blind fidelity and misunderstanding of the limits of true friendship calls to mind the 
example of Gaius Blossius in De amicitia.  Blossius is represented as a man who was 
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willing to burn a city, if his friend requested it.120  Up to this point in the play Goffe has 
registered a sense that sharing one’s friend’s burdens is implicit in the philosophical call 
for reciprocity and equality in friendship.  But through these tests that require ignoble 
behaviour he challenges Cicero’s idea that constancy and self-sacrifice has its limits.  
Cicero suggests: 
 
And first, a man must doe asmuche [sic] for his frend as he is possibly able: & 
next, asmuch as yt party whom he loveth & would further, is able to discharge. For 
a man cannot bring al his frends (though he be never in such high authoritie 
himselfe) to honorable advauncemente.121   
 
There is no ‘honourable advancement’ here, but rather, the beginning of a trajectory that 
ensures that the two practices which define the play—friendship and revenge—collide, as 
the test of killing the child pushes the boundaries of both.  As Janet Clare explains, a key 
aspect of Senecan revenge tragedy is ‘overreaching in retaliation, surpassing the original 
crime’.122 And it is this recognition by Orestes that drives the penultimate, most horrifying 
test of constancy depicted graphically onstage. ‘But who revengeth, must all meane 
exceed’ Orestes says (4.8). Because Pylades brings Orestes’ young half-brother to meet his 
grisly, protracted death, thus making him complicit in fratricide, his status as confederate 
in immorality is confirmed.  
     Orestes’ insistence on blind obedience in friendship arises from his own experience 
with its obligatory ties.  In exploring this idea in the play Goffe engages with Aristotle’s 
extended view of friendship from the Ethics:  friendships between husbands and wives and 
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fathers and sons.  Goffe’s use of these relational models for friendship helps an audience to 
understand the motivation behind Orestes’ unyielding belief in duty and obedience. This is 
made poignant in Orestes reflection that his father was ‘murdred of his friends’ (3.4), and 
in his lament, ‘Did ever foule, disastrous, friendlike hand / Cast up so huge a heape of 
well-bred mischief [?]’(4.2). Orestes suggests that Clytemnestra and Aegystheus have 
breached the laws of friendship in their murder of Agamemnon. In Euripides’ Orestes the 
protagonist registers a similar concern for duty apparent in his appeal to Menaleus to act 
‘as philoi should for philoi’;123 however, in Goffe’s play the emphasis rests on the 
friendship of father and son.   
     In the Ethics Aristotle outlines ‘corresponding forms of friendship’ and establishes 
hierarchies amongst them.124 The friendship, albeit unequal, between fathers and sons is 
highlighted. Wilkinson’s Ethiques explicates this formulation in terms reminiscent of the 
ideal: ‘The father loveth the sonne as hymself’. But the sonne loveth the father as a thyng 
made of him.125  The sense of attachment and unity here is underscored.  To Aristotle, ‘the 
friendship of the father’ surpasses the friendship between monarch and subject in the 
‘greatness of the benefits conferred’ by the father.126 Wilkinson reflects this understanding 
in his translation figuring the father as God.  Either way, a similar debt of obligation is 
asserted. What Aristotle proposes using the model of fathers and sons, is that ‘the father 
oughte to be honoured with the honoure dewe unto him’, for ‘when children render to 
parents what they ought to render to those who brought them into the world’ and vice 
versa, ‘the friendship of such persons will be abiding and excellent’.127  In Euripides 
Orestes, following Apollo’s orders and honouring his will is central to the friends’ distress, 
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but in the end is rewarded.  However, what Goffe suggests in the two competing 
‘friendships’ in his play—that of father and son, and son and friend— is that fidelity to the 
dead father obliges disobedience to laws of his friendship with Pylades.  Further, it brings 
with it the requirement that Pylades, as ‘other self,’ proves obedient to Orestes’ father-son 
relationship as well, through continued loyalty despite the immorality of the acts required 
to meet his friend’s filial responsibility. Just as Aristotle applies a hierarchy to different 
formulations of amity, so too, does Goffe.  The play makes clear the need for homosocial 
ties that bind and loyalty that persists beyond the grave, and understands that this extends 
to fathers and friends.  Orestes may claim he has ‘too rare gifts’ in his father and his 
friend’ (1.3), it is just that obedience to Agamemnon’s memory transcends obedience to 
virtue in his friendship with Pylades.  
     The father-son friendship adds another dimension to the understanding of revenge in 
the play.  Obedience to the father and honouring his memory requires punishing 
Aegystheus and Clytemnestra. The ghost of Agamemnon condemns Orestes for his 
‘yeelding soule’ saying ‘O can a child smile blanke the memory, / Of all these horrid 
wounds’ (4.7).  But Agamemnon does not call for retributive justice that would be morally 
justifiable, the kind that Apollo and Athena acknowledged as laudable in Aeschylus’ 
Oresteia.  Rather, he calls for bloodthirsty vengeance by reminding Orestes of Atreus’ 
‘venegefull soule’ (4.7).  Goffe’s audience would easily be able to bring to mind this 
reference to Agamemnon’s father who, in his own fit of revenge, killed the sons of his 
brother, Thyestes, and fed them to him.  The vicious model that Agamemnon’s ghost 
demands that Orestes follows steps beyond the proportionate ‘eye for an eye’.  The ghost’s 
appeal to the priority of filial rather than fraternal duty is manifest when he decries 
Orestes’ pity of his young half-brother and declares, ‘By all the rites of Father, I conjure 
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thee’ (4.7).  The hierarchy of familial friendship is reinforced:  to father first, not to his 
young brother. While the use of ‘conjure’ in this petition may reflect the ghost’s invocation 
of supernatural authority, or the sacred nature of the father son bond, interestingly, a use 
for ‘conjure’ also included something less honourable: ‘to be sworn together in a 
confederacy or conspiracy’.128 This latter connotation also ironically fits, and sheds light 
on the demand of allegiance that Orestes makes of his friend when he commands: ‘Be 
pittilesse now Pylades, be my friend’ (4.8).   
     Orestes’ ‘justice’ may appear to exceed proportion in its cruel, protracted enactment, 
but it is not only rooted in the familial tradition of revenge that he is reminded of by the 
ghost. After Orestes discovers his father’s lifeless body he declares of the unknown 
murder:  ‘If ever he have children let them be, / Murdered before his face, that he may 
know, / How nature binds a father and a sonne (1.6).  Seen from this perspective, the act of 
killing his young half-brother underscores the importance of the father-son bond, if carried 
out in front of the boy’s father Aegystheus.  The philia that he owes and must demonstrate 
to his deceased father is also reaffirmed.  This becomes part of the justice for his father’s 
murder.  In this way the revenge exacted on the child may not be viewed solely as a crime 
of passion or excess, but a calculated part of what Orestes views as just revenge. Pylades’ 
compliance with the act is in part because of his own understanding of the importance of 
the father-son bond, which was inculcated in him by his own father, Strophius.  This is 
underscored by his dying father’s bequest which reinforces a sense of the centrality of 
male friendship in all its formulations:  ‘I commend / Unto my son the heart of a true 
friend, / That’s all the will I leave, and let him know / Friendship should ever be, but most 
in woe’ (5.2). 
                                                 
128 ‘Conjure’ (v), def. 1b.,II.3, II, OED.  
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      Steadfast to the end, Pylades validates this legacy, as he searches for his exiled friend. 
Alone, separated from Orestes, Pylades declares, ‘Thus seeking others, I have lost my 
selfe’ (5.5).  While Goffe may have intended this to reflect Pylades’ persistent fidelity 
demonstrated through his prolonged pursuit of his friend, the words echo the loss of self 
that perfect friendship requires, and this play in particular traces, a self made unwillingly 
complicit and dishonourable.129  Goffe’s play supports Tom MacFaul’s conclusion that 
‘the plays and characters which centralize friendship are the ones that lead to the most 
attenuated selves’.130  The sense that Pylades’ self is ‘diminished’, subordinated to his 
friend’s needs and obligations holds through to the end, as he searches and find his ‘other 
self’, Orestes.  Upon, finding him he says: ‘O art thou deare friend, for thee I sought’ (5.5).  
Orestes and Pylades perish on each others’ rapiers in a joint suicide, but not before Orestes 
avows the extraordinary nature of their friendship and tells Pylades that they are ‘leaving 
all ages to deplore our death: / That friendships abstract perish with our breath’ (5.7).  This 
act and Tyndarus’ words reaffirm the constancy and unity in friendship that pervades the 
play:    
  No force so great, no so disaster wrong 
  As can unknit the bands which holdeth strong,  
  United hearts: who since they thus are dead, 
  One roome, one tombe shall hold them buried (5.8). 
 
     In the end, Orestes sacrifices himself, his friend, his half-brother, and his mother, for 
the sake of the father-son bond.  The hierarchical nature of this Aristotelian conception of 
friendship trumps all others.  Even though the play registers an understanding that the 
obligation to virtue in friendship is subordinated to the father-son bond, Goffe is 
                                                 
129 See MacFaul, pp. 1-2, 196-197. 
130 MacFaul, p. 196; MacFaul speaks of the ‘diminished and alienated self’ that results from ideal friendship 
in comedy and tragedy in MacFaul, pp. 1-2.  
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unyielding in his advance of ideal friendship’s constancy and unity, quite literally in the 
end through the comparison of Orestes and Pylades to the constellation Gemini, and their 
deaths ‘embracing each other’ (stage direction 5.7).  Their ending poignantly calls to mind 
the view of perfection in friendship that Thomas Elyot expressed as ‘a blessed conexion of 
sundry wylles, makynge of two persons one, in having and suffrying’.131   Even so, the 
representation of what has been asserted to be perfect friendship is not ideal because of the 
immoral acts of killing Mysander and the child.  As Aristotle claimed:   
 
Perfite Amite is in them that be good, and that be like in vertue, and beare good wil 
one to another, because they be like in their vertues. And this frendship is a way 
that conteyneth al goodnes, and amongest themthere [sic] is no delectacion nor 
evil.132   
 
Despite the pair’s historic renown made familiar in the early modern period through 
accounts by Cicero, Elyot, and Lucian, Goffe’s ‘friends’ cannot claim a similar status as 
their namesakes whose excellence in constancy and virtue in skirmishes with the Scythians 
promoted a Scythian law to ensure that children would visit the temple where an engraving 
was hung to honour the pair ‘so that it is easier for them to forget the name of their father, 
then be ignorant of the deeds of Orestes and Pylades’.133 Ironically, this suggests an 
enculturation of the importance of ideal friendship above the filial bond, in opposition to 
Goffe’s play which asserts the sanctity of philia between fathers and sons.    
     The ending of The Tragedy of Orestes endorses the eternal nature of friendship, as 
Cicero did in De amicitia through the recollection of Laelius and Scipio’s friendship. Even 
death is unable to sever the amicable bond.  In this, the play joins the others reviewed in 
                                                 
131 Elyot, Governour, sig. P8v. 
132 Ethiques, Wilkinson, sig. H4v. 
133 Jasper Mayne,  Lucian, sigs. X2r, X3r. 
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this chapter in its final avowal of constancy as requisite of ideal friendship.  It was the 
defining feature that made friendship pairs paradigmatic. The representation of ‘ideal’ 
friends by Edwards, Foxe and Goffe interrogate the earthly bounds of friendship and the 
weighty tensions pressing on it through obligations to self, family, and state that 
necessitate, in comedy and tragedy, that friends diverge from strict adherence to classical 
imperatives governing friendship, even, Damon and Pythias.  Robert Stretter notes that 
‘the visual and physical elements of theater inevitably exacerbate the gap between 
idealizing theory and the imperfect world of human action’.134  Even so, it did not follow 
that dramatists only saw the potential to lampoon the pursuit of perfection in friendship or 
the attempted application of its principles. This chapter looked at dramatic representations 
of the theoretical ideal. The next chapter considers work that explored, perhaps in greater 
dramatic fashion and complexity than Edwards, Foxe and Goffe, the exercise, and qualities 
of ideal friendship.  It examines how dramatists problematised and reconsidered what was 
ideal through issues of asymmetry and the use of the ‘friend’ as a character whose raison 




                                                 
134 Stretter, p. 360. Stretter argues that ‘the general shift in early English drama towards a parodic approach 
to ideal friendship can thus be seen as the natural consequence of the difficulty of enacting ethical 




Practice Makes Perfect? 
Seneca suggested that the Stoic sage was able to live without friendship.1  In this he 
disagreed considerably with Cicero who saw friendship as the foundation of personal and 
public life. 2  But Seneca favoured self-sufficiency and saw a great difference between 
needing a friend and having one.  The difference rests in being one:     
 
  the wise-man although he be content with himselfe, will notwithstanding   
 have a friend, if to no other end but to exercise his amitie, will not endure   
 that so great a vertue should remaine without use. 3 
 
In Senecan terms, having a friend allows one to practice friendship as a virtue, and requires  
a mind aligned with a more disproportionate and disinterested view of friendship, one 
where the focus is on giving and not receiving.  According to Seneca a friend should ‘not’ 
be sought 
 
 to have some one to assist him when he is sicke, relieve and ransome being  
 in need and captivitie,’ but rather, ‘to the end to have one for whom I may   
 die, whom I may accompanie in banishment, and for whose life and   
 preservation I  may expose my selfe to danger and deathe.4   
 
In this view, friendship becomes a way for one to better oneself, morally speaking, through 
altruistic acts towards the friend, as opposed to each friend seeking to better the other as 
                                                          
1 Lucius Annaeus Seneca, His Epistles in The workes of Lucius Annaeus Seneca translated by Thomas Lodge 
(London:  Printed by William Stansby, 1614), Epistle IX, p. 175. Hereafter:  Epistles, Lodge. 
2 Cicero asserts, ‘But if you should take oute of the worlde the knot of frendshyp, neyther can there any  
house,  neytherrany citie be able to continew, no not the tillage of the lande can endure’ in Marcus Tullius 
Cicero, The Book of Freendship of Marcus Tullie Cicero trans. by John Harington (London: Thomas 
Berthelette, 1562) , sigs. B8v-C1r. 
3 Epistles, Lodge , IX, p. 175. 




Aristotle suggests.5  While the end, increased virtue, is similar, this distinction is 
significant, as the sense of unity and the friend as the ‘other self’, becomes muted to 
asymmetry.6    
     As examined in the preceding chapter, narratives of ideal friends rested on a reciprocal 
willingness to embrace self-sacrifice; but dramatic interpretations posited this more 
forcefully against public pressures imposed on private friendship such as conformity to the 
law, stability of the commonwealth, family ties and justice.  The designated role of friend 
as a caretaker to the other however, was challenged, albeit it was still stressed, very much 
in line with advice literature and sermons such as Cushman’s at Plymouth.  It supported a 
continued emphasis on one’s responsibility as friend.  This perspective and the 
possibilities it engendered prompted writers like Thomas Breme to translate works that 
outlined in detail ‘the true duetie of one friend to another’ which he fervently wished ‘may 
be unfainedly practiced, and fol.lowed [sic] by those that seeke to preferre vertuous, 
honest, and lawfull amitie’.7 Breme’s ‘practice’ suggests the application of theory, whilst 
Seneca’s ‘exercise’ imparts a sense that the endeavour of the friend is required ‘to acquire 
or maintain proficiency’, so that he may advance in virtue.8   Even though Breme suggests 
a joint undertaking and Seneca a unilateral enterprise, the potential for asymmetry arises in 
the former as well, as opportunities to prove one’s friendship in adversity requires a 
change in the equal circumstances of the friend, rendering one friend ‘in need’ awaiting the 
other ‘in deed’. 
                                                          
5 Aristotle suggests, ‘that menne maie become the better one by another’ in Aristotle, The Ethiques of 
Aristotle (London:  Richard Grafton, 1547), sig. J8r. 
6 David Konstan examines asymmetry in friendship in Lucian in Friendship in the Classical World 
(Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press), pp. 118-119. 
7 Thomas Breme, ‘Preface to the gentle reader’ in The Mirrour of Friendship trans. by Thomas Breme 
(London:  Abel Jeffes, 1584), sig. A4r (the original Italian source has not been identified, but EEBO entry 
reads ‘collected out of sundry tongues by I.B. [i.e. T.B.? i.e. Thomas Breme?]’. 
8 ‘Practice’, def. 2a, The Oxford English Dictionary. 
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     Titus et Gesippus depicted a more contemporary figuring of perfect friendship.  
Although it drew from similar classical precedent, the challenge to the idea of ‘one soul in 
two bodies’ begins to be felt, as self-interest exposed concerns of ingratitude and 
asymmetry.  Even so, depictions of the ideal in Titus et Gesippus and The Tragedy of 
Orestes still rested on the responsibility of one friend to support, succour and make 
sacrifices for the other, prior to the instance of mutual magnanimity.  And importantly, the 
action of each play provided reciprocal opportunity for magnanimous selflessness on 
behalf of the friend. Hence, symmetry was eventually maintained or re-established.  In this 
way, academic dramatisations followed perfect friendship narratives in creating 
opportunities in the action where each friend would demonstrate beneficent selflessness 
and overall, reciprocity was stressed.   
     Commercial dramatists, however, began to explore the idea of perfect friendship in 
strictly asymmetrical terms.  They constructed, what will be referred to as an ‘ideal friend’.  
Evolving from Titus and Gesippus, this figure is a step removed from the classical ideal 
and tests the model of perfection on characters who are written as men, rather than 
archetypes.  This ideal friend was figured in terms of his friend’s needs.  He was at times 
ardently Senecan in his exercise of friendship, and at other times a useful Baconian deputy.  
His ‘practice’ of friendship was integral to the plot.  His stage ‘life’ was thinly drawn and 
revolved mainly around advancing his friend.   
     This conception of the ideal broke the circle of reciprocity that was so much a part of 
perfect friendship narratives and academic drama discussed in Chapter 2, for the plots only 
depicted the adversity of one, and the ‘trial’ of the other.  In this way, the malleability of 
the classical ideal was tested.  Thus, commercial dramatists challenged and probed 
friendship’s proportion and requital.  And they were not alone. Contemporary works by 
129 
 
Francis Bacon and Michel de Montaigne considered questions of friendship that pushed at 
the outer bounds of the ideal, albeit disparately.  In doing so, their essays expanded the 
scope of the ideal in both directions:  towards utility and dissolution on one end, and 
exclusive unity on the other.    
     Even though the ideal friend may be viewed similarly to other conventional characters 
that have been described as helpful in counteracting the ‘limited narrative possibilities’ of 
drama,9 their construction relies on the serious obligations of friendship.  This sets them 
apart from the two stock friendship characters noted by Stephen Orgel:  the ‘witty friend’ 
and the ‘malicious friend’.10  But the ideal friend is not memorable for his humour or 
plotting, and is more than a mere confidant or secondary character ‘whose main function is 
to provide a leading character with a friend to whom he or she can entrust confidences’.11  
Not unlike parasites, clever slaves, braggart soldiers, shrews and even the ‘ideal courtier,’ 
types who ‘come pre-packaged with set personalities and motivations’,12 the ideal friend 
reliably personifies certain expected qualities and behaviours in line with the discourse of 
perfect friendship from classical and contemporary sources.  He is written as constant, 
despite the nonreciprocal nature of the relationship with the object of his friendship, and 
his raison d’etre is simply to be the perfect friend in asymmetrically Senecan and 
Baconian terms.13   
                                                          
9 G.M. Pinciss, Literary Creations:  Conventional Characters in the Drama of Shakespeare and His 
Contemporaries (Wolfeboro, New Hampshire:  D.S. Brewer, 1988), p. 1. 
10 Stephen Orgel, The Authentic Shakespeare: And Other problems of the Early Modern Stage (New York 
and London:  Routledge), p. 157. 
11 Stanley Hochman, McGraw-Hill Encyclopedia of World Drama, 2nd edn, 5 vols (Bonn, Verlag für die 
Deutsche Wirtschaft AG:  1984), V, p. 229. 
12 Pinciss lists these as some of the stock characters, pp. 3, 6. 
13 Cicero understands friendship in its reciprocal form through ‘another self’ symbolism. 
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     There may have been only ten instances in early modern drama where a character was 
named simply ‘Friend’ in the dramatis personae, dialogue or stage directions,14 but there 
were others where the construction of the friend was essential to the plot and action and 
where the friend served as an important counterpoint to other relationships, providing 
dramatists with the means to interrogate the idea of constancy.  Although he was given no 
stage identity other than that of friend, he was distinctive for the way his depiction 
registered the evolution of the theoretical ideal in practice.   
     As Stephen Orgel relates, characters ‘are not people, they are elements of a linguistic 
structure, lines in a drama, and more basically, words on a page’.15  With reference to the 
perfect friend, the words and the actions he conveys echoes the parlance of a synthesis of 
the classical and contemporary ideal.  He reflects an understanding of certain friendship 
conventions, while at the same time his use signals an appreciation of the problems that 
can arise when one friend serves as the benefactor, and the other as the recipient of 
friendship. This chapter examines four ideal friends:  Eumenides in John Lyly’s Endymion 
(1588); Franklin in the anonymous Arden of Faversham (1591); Aramanus in The Faithful 
Friends (anon; 1614); and Aurelio in John Ford’s The Lady’s Trial (1638).  Their use as a 
touchstone for constancy and as a focus for the consideration of other relationships will be 
examined, as each amiable bond is set against a backdrop of betrayal and feigned 
friendship in one sense or another, and examined in light of fidelity in heterosexual 
relationships.16   
                                                          
14 Thomas L. Berger and William C. Bradford, Jr. An Index of Characters in Printed Drama to the 
Restoration (Englewood, Colorado:  Microcard, 1975), p. 60.  
15 Orgel, p. 8. 
16 Michael Hattaway points up Candido’s role as representative of the theme of constancy, a bulwark amidst 
a sea of change and immorality in Thomas Dekker’s I The Honest Whore (1604/5)  in Michael Hattaway 
‘Drama and Society’ in The Cambridge Companion to English Renaissance Drama, ed. by A.R. Braunmuller 
and Michael Hattaway, 2nd edn (Cambridge University Press, 2003),  pp. 93-130 (p.118). 
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     The plays cross genres and are sampled to include comedy, tragicomedy and domestic 
tragedy.  They span the period from Elizabethan to Caroline drama.  Thus, though 
indicative rather than exhaustive, they serve to demonstrate the evolution of the role of the 
ideal friend across time and genre.  Sections one and two provide a review of alternate 
views of the ideal through the work of Francis Bacon and Michel de Montaigne.  Section I 
considers the development of Francis Bacon’s view of friendship throughout his adult life.  
Section II provides a discussion of Michel de Montaigne’s understanding of ideal 
friendship outlined in his essay, ‘Of Friendship’.  Sections III-VII will consider each play 
individually for the ways in which they engage and test the ideal. 
 
 I.   Francis Bacon on Friendship  
Francis Bacon, Viscount St Alban (1561-1626), was a politician who held various posts 
throughout his active, forty-five years of public service.  He was a senior barrister at 
Gray’s Inn, clerk of the Star Chamber, attorney-general and solicitor-general. He was also 
a philosopher in his own right.17  Over the course of his life he wrote on many subjects, 
but the focus of this section will be his writing on friendship in his Essays of 1597, 1612 
and 1625.  Although Bacon gained a solid grounding in classical thought through his ea
education at home and during his years at Trinity College, Cambridge, and was well-
acquainted with the work of Aristotle, Cicero and Seneca, the evolution of Bacon’s 
philosophy of friendship reflects the exigencies of political life.  As David Wootton has 
shown, this influenced the formulation of friendship that Bacon expressed in his Essays, as 
rly 
                                                          
17 Markku Peltonen, ‘Francis Bacon’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography . 
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did three significant friendships Bacon shared, with Robert Devereux, the second Earl of 
Essex; George Villiers, Duke of Buckingham; and Toby Matthew.18   
     Wootton characterises Bacon’s friendship with Matthew as ‘ideal’, but this type of ideal 
friendship was far from that which Damon and Pythias were said to enjoy, in that its 
hallmark was asymmetry.  The politics of Elizabethan and Jacobean court life transformed 
the mutual interdependency of the classical ideal to variable dependency, as one friend is 
in a position to help the other at any given time and vice versa.  Although this negates the 
classical idea of similitude in terms of equal standing, it still provides for the ‘trial’ of 
friendship which reveals fidelity and ‘character’.19  And this became an important part of 
how Bacon viewed friendship, as evidenced in his essays.   
     Bacon’s early career demonstrates his lack of success as recipient of what he terms ‘the 
last fruit of friendship’ namely, ‘aid’.20  Essex’s attempts to intercede on his behalf for the 
solicitor-general post in 1595 were fruitless.  But equally, Bacon’s efforts to counsel Essex 
in his affairs with the Queen were unsuccessful.  It was at this point in his career that he 
wrote his first essay relating to friendship.  The timing corresponds to a period of strong 
factional politics at court, and as such, it comes as no surprise that ‘Of Followers and 
Friends’ pays little attention to friendship.  It speaks to followers mainly, and issues of 
‘use’ and ‘favour’ and registers a much different sentiment, not only from his later essays 
on friendship, but also from classical views.  The word friend is referred to only once, 
when Bacon claims that ‘to take advise of friends is ever honourable’.21   As Wootton 
rightly notes, ‘Bacon is adapting the ideal of friendship to reflect the realities of court life’ 
                                                          
18 David Wootton ‘Francis Bacon:  Your Flexible Friend’ in The World of the Favourite ed. by JH Elliott and 
WB Brockliss (London and New Haven:  Yale University Press, 1999), pp.184-204 (pp. 188-202). 
19 Wootton, p. 188. 
20Francis Bacon, The Essayes of Counsels, Civill and Morall (London:  John Havilland for Hanna Barret, 
1625), sigs. V3r-Y2r (sigs.Y1r-Y1v). 
21 Francis Bacon, Essayes:  Religious Meditations. Places of Perswasion and Disswasion (London:  
Humphrey Hooper, 1597), sigs. B4v-B5v (sig. B5v). 
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and is ‘rejecting Cicero’s and Montaigne’s ideal of the friend as the mirror of one’s true 
self’.22  And this is clear from the essay’s abandonment of the classical idea of similitude 
of circumstance and especially the failure to distinguish a follower from a friend, both 
manifest in Bacon’s closing declaration:  ‘There is Little friendship in the World, and 
Least of all betweene Equals, which was wont to be magnified.  That that is, is between 
Superiour and Inferiour, whose Fortunes may Comprehend, the One the Other’.23  
     Bacon’s 1612 essay ‘Of Friendship’, is the first one to consider friendship in an 
extended way.  The work opens with the declaration that ‘there is no greater desert or 
wilderness then to bee without true friends’, yet the rest of the work does not hold out the 
hope for true friendship as a possibility.24  It moves a step closer to the Ciceronean 
classical ideal than its predecessor, as it rejects the pursuit of friendship for the sake of 
utility, albeit unconvincingly. For even though the work delineates true from instrumental 
friendship, it also registers a sense of the interrelatedness of the two in that friendship 
brings with it the promise of rewards to its participants.  On one hand, Bacon asserts the 
exclusivity and affection of true friendship, claiming that ‘it is friendship, when a man can 
say to himselfe, I love this man without respect of utility. I am openhearted to him, I single 
him from the generality of those’.25   On the other hand, he points out the usefulness of the 
friend in strengthening one’s courage to withstand the vicissitudes of fortune:  ‘Therefore 
whosoever wanteth fortitude, let him worshippe Friendship.  For the yoke of Friendship 
maketh the yoke of fortune more light’.26  The idea stressed is that the constancy of the 
friend during times of adversity helps make the burden lighter.  This point may adhere to 
                                                          
22 Wootton, p. 195. 
23 ‘Of Followers and Friends’ in Essayes (1597), sig. B5v. 
24 Francis Bacon, ‘Of Friendship’ in The Essaies of Sir Francis Bacon (London: John Beale, 1612), pp. 80-
84 (p. 80). 
25‘Of Friendship’ in The Essaies (1612), pp. 83-84. 
26 ‘Of Friendship’ in The Essaies (1612), p. 81. 
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classical precedent and even invoke a Stoic sense, but Bacon posits it from the view of a 
passive recipient of friendship’s benefit, whereas Seneca sees it from the vantage point of a 
benefactor who exercises friendship rather than awaits a friend to supply what he lacks, 
namely fortitude.  In this way Bacon does not divorce himself fully from the idea of utility. 
He does, however, support the belief that true friendship is rare, but not in the 
extraordinary sense that Montaigne envisages it, as will be discussed subsequently.  Bacon 
assumes a more sceptical position about perfect friendship’s existence beyond the 
theoretical, stating (just as Braithwaite later articulates verbatim), that ‘perfection of 
friendship is but a speculation’.27 Written fifteen years after the end of his friendship with 
Essex, a dissolution ensured by the Queen’s insistence that Bacon demonstrate his fidelity 
to her by prosecuting his one-time friend, this pessimistic view is understandable.  It 
underscores the requirement to sacrifice private friendship for the sake of one’s success, 
and the stability of the commonwealth. 
     Bacon’s final essay ‘Of Friendship’ comes in 1625, a year before his death, in the wake 
of his own misfortune of scandal and disgrace. It also, significantly, comes at the end of 
his public life and after his prosecutorial work in the trial of King James’ favourite, Robert 
Carr, Earl of Somerset in 1616.  Somerset (and his wife, Frances Howard) stood accused 
of the poisoning death of Somerset’s one-time friend, Sir Thomas Overbury.  In his ‘The 
Charge against Somerset for the poisoning of Overbury’ (1616), Bacon suggests that it was 
an untoward effect of close friendship that contributed to the murder, namely Overbury’s 
dissatisfaction that he was ‘to be dispossessed’ of Somerset’s attention once Somerset 
decided to marry Frances Howard.  Bacon says:   
 
                                                          
27 ‘Of Friendship’ in The Essaies (1612), p. 83. 
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 as it is a principle in nature, that the best things are in their corruption the   
 worst, and the sweetest wine makes the sharpest vinegar, so fell it out with  
 them, that this excess (as I may term it) of friendship ended in mortal hatred  
 on my Lord Somerset’s part.28 
 
Bacon suggests that sometimes friendship can be too much of a good thing, when one 
party invests too deeply in its exclusivity and continuance, again highlighting the idea of 
the realistic potential for asymmetrical amity.   
     Just as the marriage and subsequent murder signalled an end to Somerset’s friendship 
with Overbury, Somerset’s trial and conviction similarly led to the dissolution of another 
he enjoyed, most notably, with the King.  Bacon’s 1625 essay is dedicated to James’ next 
royal favourite, Buckingham, whose court friendship with Bacon proved disappointing. 
The essay, however, was written at the urging of, and as Wooten suggests, for, Toby 
Matthew, ‘a true friend’.29  Even so, the sentiment voiced bears more of an understanding 
of the instrumental nature of friendship, rather than affection, as Bacon again assumes the 
view of the recipient rather than giver, outlining friendship’s ‘fruits’.30   He may follow 
classical precedent in upholding the responsibility of the friend to succour and provide 
counsel, but he debases the idea of the friend as ‘another self’.  His ideal ‘other self’ does 
not evoke a sense of completion and union, but rather, an opportunity for self-
advancement.  His ideal friend acts as agent to assist his partner in friendship.  Bacon says: 
 Here, the best way, to represent to life the manifold use of Frendship is to cast  
 and see, how many Things there are, which a Man cannot doe Himselfe; and  
 then it will appear that it was a Sparing Speech of the Ancients, to say, That a  
 frend is another Himselfe:  For that a Frend is farre more then Himselfe. [...]  
                                                          
28 Francis Bacon, ‘The Charge against Somerset for the poisoning of Overbury’ in Francis Bacon ed. by 
Brian Vickers (Oxford and New York:  Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 314-325 (p. 319). 
29 Wootton, p. 200. 
30 Bacon, The Essayes (1625), sigs. V3r-Y2 (sigs. X2r, X3v, X4r, X4v, V3v, V4r, Y1r). 
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 So that a Man hath, as it were, two Lives in his desires. A Man hath a Body,  
 and that Body is confined to a Place; but where Frendship is, all Offices of  
 Life are as it were granted to Him and his Deputy. For he may exercise them  
 by his Frend.31  
 
Bacon’s idea of ‘exercising’ friendship contrasts sharply with Seneca’s.  The former is 
self-directed, while the latter, although promoting one’s virtue, is other-directed.  Despite 
his purportedly close private friendship with Matthew, Bacon does not separate friendship 
from public life in this essay.  The prism through which he understands and defines 
friendship is inextricably linked to success in the public arena.  Here, success relies on the 
friend’s exercise of friendship, something Bacon put much stock in, but was frustrated by 
throughout his life.  At the end of his life, his ideal friend is still a necessity, but not for the 
soul, but rather, for the performance of the duties of public life. In the theatre of the court, 
the friend as supporting actor is indispensible, for as Bacon suggests:  ‘where a Man 
cannot fitly play his owne Part:  If he have not a Frend, he may quit the Stage’.32   
 
II.   Michel de Montaigne and Ideal Friendship  
Michel de Montaigne was a sixteenth century French courtier, a Mayor of Bordeaux, and a 
philosopher.33  Similar to Francis Bacon, he had an active political life conducted under 
difficult conditions.  As John O’Neill explains, it was ‘when the conflict between state and 
religion, interwoven with deadly quarrels, the massacre of Saint Barthélemy, and 
individual assassinations, could cost a man his life and property for just a word or thought 
                                                          
31 Bacon, The Essayes (1625), sig, Y1v. 
32 Bacon, The Essayes  (1625), sig. Y1r. 
33 John O’Neill, Essaying Montaigne:  A Study of the Renaissance Institution of Writing and Reading 
Volume 5 of Studies in Social and Political Thought, 2nd edn (Liverpool:  Liverpool University Press,  2001), 
p. 153; Ann Hartle, Michel de Montaigne: Accidental Philosopher (Cambridge:  Cambridge University 
Press, 2003), 1.  
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out of season.’34  Just as Bacon had in 1572, Montaigne writes about a variety of subjects 
in a collection of essays first published in two volumes in 1580.  He expands the work and 
publishes it as a complete, three volume edition in 1588.  John Florio’s 1603 translation 
made the work available to English readers.  Some critics view this translation of the 
Essays as a source for Shakespeare’s work.35   
     According to Ann Hartle, Montaigne’s work represents a new ‘philosophical form,’ far 
removed from medieval theology, and the ancient philosophical tradition.36  Unlike John 
Foxe’s Latinizing of his work to give it a more classical feel and demonstrate erudition, 
Montaigne writes his Essays in French rather than the Latin in which he was fluent.37  It 
has been proposed, because of the affinity of the title from the French verb ‘essayer’ that 
the work constitutes  ‘an attempt’, but  Hartle puts a finer point on this explaining that 
Montaigne’s ‘form articulates “that which is’”.38  This suggests that in the work 
Montaigne assumes a personal vantage point from which he describes life as he sees it.  
And indeed, he does.  While translations of classical theories and didactic works outlinin
the duties and obligations of the friend hold up historical and literary pairs as exemplar, 
Montaigne’s work provides a personal illustration of friendship that engages with and even
challenges certain classical ideas of perfect amity.  Unlike Bacon, however, the 




                                                          
private friendship.  
     Montaigne’s work is a celebration of his friendship with Etienne de la Boëtie.  He 
characterises this as an ‘unspotted friendship’, one ‘so entire and inviolably maintained
34 O’Neill, p. 153. 
35 On Shakespeare’s use of Montaigne in Andrew Hadfield, The English Renaissance 1500-1620 (Oxford:  
Blackwell, 2001), pp. 216, 218-219.; See also Robert Ellrodt, ‘Self-consciousness in Montaigne and 
Shakespeare’ in Shakespeare Survey 28:  Shakespeare and the Ideas of His Time ed. by Kenneth Muir, 
paperback reissue (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 37-50. 
36 Hartle, pp. 1, 63-64. 
37 Hartle, p. 64. 
38 Hartle, p. 64. 
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betweene us, that truely a man shall not commonly heare of the like; and amongst our 
moderne men no signe of any such is seene’.39  Although this is very similar in substance 
to the classical proclamations made about the amity shared by ideal friends, Montaigne 
very clear to distance his friendship with Boëtie from those heralded by ‘the ancients’, 
whose expan
is 
ded definitions of friendship (as discussed in Chapter 1) he viewed as far 
om ideal: 
h   
 
ciall,  
nd venerian,40 either particularly or conjointly beseeme  




really true friends. 43  As Montaigne saw it, the name ‘friendship’ should be reserved and 
                                                          
fr
 
 For generally, all those amities which are forged and nourished by    
 voluptuousnesse or profit, publike or private neede, are thereby so much t e
 lesse faire and generous, and so much the lesse true amities, in that they  
 intermeddle other causes, scope, and fruit with friendship, then it selfe   




What Montaigne suggests is that if the definition of friendship is more inclusive, and t
term is applied widely, as seen in early modern translations reviewed in Chapter 1, it 
debases perfect friendship’s exceptional and noble nature.  According to Montaigne,
we ordinarily call friendes and amities, are but acquaintances and familiarities, t
together by some occasion or commodities, by meanes whereof our mindes are 
entertained’.42  In this he aligns himself with Seneca who suggests the devaluation of the 
term through application to the ‘great troopes’ who ‘ knock at thy dores’, but who are not 
39 Michael Lord of Montaigne Essays trans. by John Florio (London : Printed by Melch. Bradwood for 
Edward Blount and William Barret, 1613), p. 90. 
40 ‘Venerian’, ‘influenced by’, or ‘inclined to wantonness’, def. 1a.b. from OED.  
41 Montaigne, Essays, Florio, p. 90. 
42 Montaigne, Essays, Florio, p. 92. 
43 See Seneca, De beneficiis trans. by Thomas Lodge, rpt.  of 1612 edn. by Israel Gollancz (London:  J.M. 
Dent, 1899), p. 263. Hereafter: De beneficiis, Lodge. 
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revered, with, for example, the relationship between children and parents ‘termed respect’ 
rather than amity.44 
     For Montaigne, perfect friendship was that which he shared with Boëtie, and not similar 
to that of  so-called paradigmatic pairs like Achilles and Patroclus, whose representation 
by Aeschylus Montaigne contends was not ideal, because it was not based on the 
recognition of ‘internall beauty’.45  He contends that his friendship, by comparison, was 
compelled by an attachment that defies explanation: 
 
 In the amitie I speake of, they entermixe and confound themselves one in the  
 other, with so Uniuersall a commixture, that they weare out, and can no more  
 finde the seame that hath conjoyned them together. If a man urge me to tell  
 wherefore I loved him, I feele it cannot be expressed, but by answering;   
 Because it was he, because it was my selfe.46 
 
As the product of a humanist education, Montaigne was well-versed in Aristotle, Cicero 
and Seneca.  Here, that familiarity is felt as he employs the parlance of perfect classical 
amity to characterise his friendship with the deceased Boëtie, a contemporary assertion of 
the friend as ‘another self’.  But unlike the friendship pair Titus and Gesippus, whose 
similitude was represented only in terms of physical appearance, Montaigne asserts that he 
and Boëtie, enjoyed a unity of heart and mind:  
 
 Our mindes have jumped so unitedly together, they have with so fervent an  
 aflection considered of each other, and with like affection so discovered   
 and sounded, even to the very bottome of ech others heart and entrails, that I  
                                                          
44 Montaigne, Essays, Florio, p. 90. 
45 Montaigne, Essays, Florio, p. 92. 




 did not onely know his, as well as mine owne, but I would (verily) rather have  
 trusted him concerning any matter of mine, than my selfe.47 
 
Montaigne explores the anecdote from De amicitia of Caius Blossius’ friendship with 
Tiberius Gracchus with this sense of unity in mind, providing greater clarity than the 
Newton translation of Cicero did, which had emphasised the treacherous nature of blind 
allegiance to the friend.48  Demonstrating an awareness of early modern objections to 
Cicero’s inclusion of this example of friendship, Montaigne suggests: 
 
 but yet those, who accuse this [Blossius’] answer as seditious, understand  
 not well this mysterie: and doe not presuppose in what termes he stood, and 
 that he held Gracchus his will in his sleeve, both by power and knowledge. 
 They were rather friends than Cittizens, rather friends than enemies of their 
 countrey, or friends of ambition and trouble. Having absolutely   
 committed themselves one to another, they perfecty held the reines of one   
 anothers inclination: and let this yoke be guided by vertue and conduct of   
 reason. [...] If their affections miscarried, according to my meaning, they   
 were neither friendes one to other, nor friends to themselves.49 
 
Montaigne’s view that ‘a singular and principall friendship dissolveth  all other duties, & 
freeth all other obligations’, registers a keen awareness of what Cicero meant, although 
early modern translator Newton had not explicated this in an attempt to downplay an 
instance of seditious behaviour.50  This introduces an important difference from the 
emphasis on public usefulness, self-sacrifice and inclusive amity proposed in the early 
modern discourse of friendship in translations, didactic works, sermons, and the literary 
                                                          
47 Montaigne, Essays, Florio, p. 93. 
48 Marcus Tullius Cicero, The Booke of Freendeshipe in Fouure Severall Treatises of M. Tullius Cicero 
trans. by Thomas Newton (London:  Thomas Marshe, 1577), sigs. B9v-C2r. 
49Montaigne, Essays, Florio, p. 93. 




and dramatic depictions of ideal friends.  According to Montaigne, to be a friend means 
that one has friendship at the forefront of one’s mind and actions, such that personal 
ambition or grievances against the state or others could not divert one’s attention away 
from friendship; therefore concern over leading one’s friend astray becomes a moot point.   
In a much later discussion of the negotiation of ‘uncertainties’ of friendship and its 
propensity for good as well as evil, Alan Bray suggests that ‘the ethics of friendship 
operated persuasively only in a larger frame of reference that lay outside the good of the 
individuals for whom the friendship was made [emphasis Bray]’.51  But Montaigne’s essay 
shifts the focus off of the instrumental ‘fruits’ and public benefit of friendship that was so 
much a part of the discourse, and reclaims the private nature of friendship, placing it 
within a narrow and more exclusive ‘frame of reference’:  that of the friends alone.  
     Montaigne’s essay is particularly interesting because it shows how the classical idea of 
friendship’s grounding in virtue and its link to reputation can be established in practice.  
He asserts this through his description of how he and Boëtie were drawn into their 
friendship without regard for gain:  ‘wee sought one another, before we had seene one 
another, and by the reports we heard one of another’.52  The essay itself serves as a 
testament to Boëtie and underscores the responsibility that Montaigne as friend undertook 
to ensure that similar to paradigmatic pairs Boëtie’s posthumous reputation for virtue and 
friendship was recognised. Indeed, this is an instance demonstrating Senecan gratitude and 
benefit in friendship. Montaigne does so by declaring that in both his friend was 
unsurpassed: ‘for even as he did excell me by an infinite distance in all other sufficiencies 
and vertues, so did he in all offices and duties of friendship’.53 But this statement, if not 
posthumous panegyric, underscores the unrealistic call for similitude in the theoretical 
                                                          
51 Alan Bray, The Friend (Chicago and London:  University of Chicago Press, 2003), p. 6. 
52 Montaigne, Essays, Florio, pp. 90, 93. 
53 Montaigne, Essays, Florio, p. 96.  
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ideal, as Montaigne acknowledges the differences that exist between himself and his friend 
in terms of virtue, and practice of friendship. And it is this idea of one friend surpassing 
the other in friendship’s practice that is part of the concern of the rest of this chapter, 
which examines the way dramatists figure and employ their perfect friends. 
 
III. Endymion 
Endymion was entered on the Stationers’ Register on 4 October 1591.54  Its date of 
composition is unknown.55  It was performed by Paul’s Boys in front of the Queen at 
Court during Candlemas in 1588.56 The earliest text of the play exists in the first 
published edition of 1591.57  The play’s dramatist was John Lyly, one of the ‘university 
wits’, who was educated at Magdalene College, Oxford.  The play is a comedy, a retelling 
of a ‘classical legend’ of a narrative recounted in Ovid, Lucian and Apollonius of Rhodes, 
as well as references in Cicero’s Tusculan Disputations, Aristotle’s Ethics, and 
Montaigne’s Essays.58 
     Lyly’s humanist education at Oxford would have made him familiar not only with 
classical myths, but also, with Latin and Greek scholarship on friendship.  One of the 
characters in Endymion is even a Greek court philosopher, named Pythagoras.  The 
character’s classical namesake was one of the earliest philosophers of friendship (c. 570 - 
                                                          
54 David Bevington, ‘Introduction’ in Endymion by John Lyly (Manchester:  Manchester University Press, 
1996), pp. 1-72 (p. 1).   
55 Andrew Hadfield places the play’s composition date as 1586/7 in Hadfield, p. 84. 
56 Bevington, p. 8.  
57 Alfred Harbage and S. Schoenbaum, Annals of English Drama 975-1700 rev edn, 1964 (London: 
Methuen, 1964), p. 53. 
58 Bevington, pp. 10-11; Contemporary references in Marc Antonio Zimara, The Problemes of Aristotle with 
Other Philosophers and Phisitions (Edinburgh:  Printed by Robert Waldgraue, 1595.), sigs. N2v-N3r; 
Reference to Endymion also in Michel de Montaigne, Essays trans. by John Florio (Printed by Melch. 
Bradwood for Edward Blount and William Barret, 1613), p. 495; Jill Levenson suggests that Lyly 
‘consulted’ Ovid’s Metamorphoses and Heroides, Cicero’s Tusculan Disputations, Castiglione’s The 
Courtier, and Marc Antonio Epicuro’s Mirzia in Jill Levenson, ‘Comedy’ in The Cambridge Companion to 
English Renaissance Drama ed. by A. R. Braunmuller and Michael Hattaway, 2nd edn (Cambridge:  
Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 254-291 (p. 262).  
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490 BCE) and although his writings are lost, he has been credited through the work of 
Iamblichus, and later, Erasmus, with describing the friend as ‘another self’.59  Endymion 
was not Lyly’s first literary consideration of the topos of friendship.  His earlier prose 
narrative Euphues: The Anatomy of Wit (1578), took up the theme with resounding 
success.  Leah Scragg notes, it was ‘the literary sensation of the age’, having thirty editions 
published between 1578 and 1630.60  Euphues bears some striking resemblances to the tale 
of Titus and Gesippus, although Lyly explores and problematises, more than celebrates, 
perfect friendship, just as he does in Endymion. 
      Endymion has received much attention for its potential reading as a political allegory 
representative of favour and factionalism at Elizabeth’s court, and its signalling of Lyly’s 
return to favour.61  But the work is also interesting for the way it once again engages with 
what David Bevington proposes was one of several ‘familiar Renaissance debating topics’, 
namely ‘love versus friendship’.62  Lyly does so, as he had in Euphues, through an 
exploration of the idea of the constancy of friends in light of heterosexual attraction to 
women.  In Endymion, however, the emphasis is not on the friendship of the pair, but 
rather, the practice of friendship by Eumenides.  Eumenides is neither depicted as 
Endymion’s ‘other self’, nor developed as a character in his own right, but rather, 
important in the play in his role as ‘well-wisher’ to Endymion, and through his actions as 
friend that drive the plot and its resolution.63   
                                                          
59 ‘Amicitia aequalitas. Amicus alter ipse’ ‘Frendship (sayth pythagors) is equalitie, & al one mynde or 
wyll’, in Desiderius Erasmus, Proverbes or Adagies (London:  Richard Bankes, 1539), sig. G5v. 
60 Leah Scragg, ‘Introduction’ in Euphues:  The Anatomy of Wit and Euphues and His England by John Lyly 
ed. By Leah Scragg (Manchester:  Manchester University Press, 2003), p. 2. 
61 Bevington, pp. 9, 27; Hadfield, p. 84. 
62 Bevington, pp. 11-12. 
63 Bevington notes that the name comes from the Greek for ‘eumenes’, and relates the name’s resonance in 
Aristotle’s definition of a friend, ‘one who wishes well for another’, pp. 13, 75, fn. 2; This is a more 
appropriate connotation here than the name’s link to madness or the Furies (Roman), or Erinyes (unresting, 




     Although the play opens with Endymion’s lament for Cynthia, the exchange between 
Eumenides and Endymion provides the first glimpse into Lyly’s development of the 
quality of their friendship, one based on asymmetry, and on Eumenides’ belief in 
Endymion’s goodness.  Throughout the first ninety-two lines, Eumenides is written as a 
true Ciceronean counsellor, dissuading his friend from his silly infatuation for Cynthia 
(whether she is in fact the moon or the Queen).  ‘Cease off, Endymion’, he says, ‘to feed 
so much upon fancies’ (1.1.28).64  He persists in his admonitions: ‘Stay there, Endymion.  
Thou that committest idolatry wilt straight blaspheme if thou be suffered’ (1.1.77-78).  
Endymion lashes out at him, remarking disparagingly, ‘Vain Eumenides, whose thoughts 
never grow higher than the crown of thy head!’ (1.1.81-82). Eumenides excuses his 
outburst, deeming it atypical.  He claims Endymion must be ‘bewitched’ suggesting, 
‘otherwise in a man of such rare virtues there could not harbour a mind of such extreme 
madness’ (1.1.88-91).  Here the quality of the friendship based on goodness is advanced by 
Lyly.  And despite the frivolous nature of the disagreement between the friends, there is an 
earnest assertion of friendly duty to advise honestly, akin to that which Cicero argues is 
paramount to perfect friendship:   
 
 Therfore it is not a freendes parte, to be suche unto him, as hee is to himselfe:   
 but hee ought rather to study and devise which way hee maye recomforte the  
 appalled mynde of his freende, and put him in good hope of a better   
 amendement.65   
 
     This scene ends with Eumenides playing his ‘part’ of faithful friend, as he relates 
before leaving the stage, ‘I will follow him, lest in this fancy of the moon he deprive 
                                                          
64 John Lyly, Endymion ed. by David Bevington (Manchester:  Manchester University Press, 1996).  All 
future references to this play will be taken from this edition. 
65 The Booke of Freendeshipe, Newton, sig. D2r.  
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himself of the sight of the sun’ (1.1.90-92).  His final words confirm that friendly 
responsibility requires that he ensure the light of reason shines perpetually on his friend.  
This ending note of constancy is underscored by contrast, as Lyly sets Eumenides’ loyalty 
against the jealously of the jilted Tellus, who decides to exact revenge on Endymion by 
casting him into a state where ‘he shall neither live nor die’ (1.2.42).  The place she 
envisions is where the affection of a friend and the love of a woman cannot be 
experienced, a place without intimate relationships.  Ironically, despite her aim, Tellus is 
unable to deprive Endymion of Eumenides’ friendship which thrives notwithstanding 
Endymion’s state.  Both Tellus and Eumenides have been disregarded by Endymion, yet 
only Eumenides’ love endures.   
     Lyly’s choice of the word ‘friend’ which Tellus uses to describe Endymion, serves to 
highlight this further, as it points up the problem in the arbitrary use of the term and its 
extension to other relationships which might not be guided by like affection and virtue.  
Here, Tellus’ friendship with Endymion stands in stark contrast to Eumenides’.  She 
declares, ‘She that is so oppressed with love that she is neither able with beauty nor wit to 
obtain her friend will rather use unlawful means than try untolerable pains’ (1.2.86-89).  
When compared with the selfless devotion of Eumenides, the fleeting and corrupt nature of 
Tellus’ self-centred ‘friendship’ is underscored, and constancy’s link to friendship’s 
foundation in virtue is promoted.  This sense continues into Act 3, as Eumenides pleads 
with Cynthia to restore the sleeping ‘honourable’ Endymion.  Eumenides asserts his 
connection to his friend, saying, ‘but such is my unspotted faith to Endymion that 
whatsoever seemeth a needle to prick his finger is a dagger to wound my heart’ (3.1.21-
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23).  The ‘unspotted faith’ calls to mind the ‘unspotted friendship’ Montaigne avowed with 
Boëtie,66 one where the friends’ pain is doubly felt by the other.  
     When the wise Geron tells Eumenides that ‘affection is grounded on virtue, and virtue 
is never peevish’ (3.4.64-65), he is not referring to the  philia between male friends,  but 
rather heterosexual love, further insisting on friendship’s superiority to the love of a 
woman.  In this exchange the audience learns of Eumenides’ affection for Semele, 
although a relationship is never developed.  The love interest serves a functional purpose 
only insofar as it allows Lyly to establish a basis for the necessary test of true friendship, 
as required of all narratives of ideal friends (as seen in Chapter 2).  The test reiterates the 
commonplace understanding that ‘trial shall prove trust’ that Lyly invokes in Euphues.67 
This scene in essence explores this maxim, as well as another on friendship that would 
become commonplace through inclusion in Nicholas Ling’s 1598 edition of Politeuphuia, 
Wits Common wealth:  ‘The love of men to women is a thing common, and of course; the 
friendship of man to man infinite, and immortal’ (3.4.121-123).68  Here Eumenides repeats 
the phrase but despite the ease with which it seems to trip off his tongue, Lyly 
problematises practicing what proverbial wisdom teaches, for Eumenides needs to ask his 
father for advice on its veracity.  What follows is a lengthy speech by Geron reinforcing 
the constancy and primacy of male friendship through an iteration of the classically-
inspired benefits of friendship over love. Even so, the wavering by Eumenides signals the 
clash between the disinterest required of perfect friendship and the self-interest of the 
friend. 
                                                          
66 Montaigne, Essays, Florio, p. 90. 
67 In Euphues:  The Anatomy of Wit in John Lyly, Euphues:  The Anatomy of Wit and Euphues and His 
England ed. by Leah Scragg (Manchester and New York:  Manchester University Press, 2003), p. 46. 
68 Politeuphuia Wits common wealth.(London : Printed by I. R[oberts] for Nicholas Ling,), p. 62v. 
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     Much like Gesippus in Foxe’s play, here Eumenides is forced to choose between love 
and friendship.  In a moment of soul-searching, he reflects aloud on the nobility of the 
choice between the two, paradoxically, a choice that his friend Endymion had not been 
willing to make when he disregarded Eumenides’ advice and friendship to seek Cynthia’s 
love.  In his instance of testing Eumenides ponders, ‘shall the enticing beauty of a most 
disdainful lady be of more force than the rare fidelity of a tried friend?’(3.4.119-121). The 
understanding here is that Endymion has proven to be a loyal friend in the past, despite the 
play’s depiction of his turn from Eumenides’ friendship in Act 1.  Lyly’s representation of 
the choice carries with it an articulation of a gender construct that figures women as 
attractive on the outside, but lacking in virtuous qualities on the inside.  Female 
inconstancy here is posited to elevate friendship above physical love, just as it was in 
Euphues.  This idea of friendship’s superiority is reinforced in 5.1 when Endymion awakes 
and Eumenides, the constant friend, reproves Floscula, saying, ‘do not that wrong to the 
settled friendship of a man as to compare it with the light affection of a woman’ (5.1.163-
165).   
     Eumenides’ choice between love and friendship may, from an audience’s standpoint, 
seem obvious.  It is something later plays, such as Thomas Heywood’s A Woman Killed 
with Kindness, (as will be reviewed in the next chapter) will grapple with.  But in 
Endymion Eumenides’ decision, although seemingly straightforward, still rings nobly and 
sacrificially.  Despite the play’s light-hearted look at love and friendship, and its comedic 
appeal, the gravity of the moment of sacrifice promotes a provisional sombre mood, as it 
did in the comedies reviewed in Chapter 2, namely, Damon and Pythias and Titus et 
Gesippus.  Through the moment of required sacrifice, Lyly aligns Eumenides with the 
paradigmatic ideal friend.  Eumenides’ response to the choice is reminiscent of that which 
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Foxe writes for Gesippus in his play when placed in the similar position of choosing 
between love and friendship:    
 
 Anyone who professes to be a friend in good times should prove that he is one  
 in difficult times as well.  Though I certainly can’t deny that I love her too, I  
 don’t love her so much that I would not readily put my friend ahead of   
 everything.’ (1.9)69 
 
     But Lyly prolongs Eumenides’ decision, as he ponders whether to ask for his love of 
Semele to be requited, or for his friend to be restored from sleep.  Although Lyly figures a 
similar hesitation in his earlier narrative Euphues, where the protagonist finally chooses to 
value self above friend concluding, ‘where love beareth sway, friendship can have no 
show’, in Endymion the wavering is short-lived (sixteen lines), and the view that ‘Love 
knoweth neither friendship nor kindred’ (3.4.116) is abandoned as Eumenides opts to aid 
his friend. 70 Lyly’s representation in Endymion contrasts with Gesippus’ immediate 
relinquishing of Sempronia in Foxe’s play.  Nevertheless, although Eumenides’ first 
thought is for himself, his struggle with his conscience creates dramatic tension, as the 
audience awaits the decision whether he will choose love or friendship.  It also serves to 
reveal a crack in the armour of friendship, as momentary self-interest rears its head.  Lyly 
does not dwell here, however, as in Eumenides’ self-reproof the obligations of true 
friendship triumph, commingled with a strong pull of public duty to the Queen:  ‘Hast thou 
forgotten both friendship and duty, care of Endymion and the commandments of Cynthia?’ 
(3.4.111-113). An understanding of the hierarchical nature of obligations of friendly 
fidelity are made manifest here.  Importantly so, perhaps, given the performance of the 
                                                          
69 John Foxe, Titus et Gesippus  in Two Latin Comedies By John Foxe the Martyrologist: Titus et Gesippus; 
Christus Triumphans ed. and trans. by John Hazel Smith (Ithaca and London:  Cornell University Press, 
1973). 
70 Lyly, Euphues, p. 55. 
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play before Elizabeth and Lyly’s own desire to be seen as her ‘friend’ after what 
Bevington notes was ‘four years of non-performance of his plays at court’.71  
     Even so, Lyly follows a similar course to Foxe in terms of the expectation of 
reciprocation in friendship.  Similar to Foxe’s Gesippus, who denounces his friendship to 
Titus after Titus does not recognise him, Eumenides, when Endymion cannot identify him, 
says ‘Ah my sweet Endymion, seest thou not Eumenides, thy faithful friend, thy faithful 
Eumenides, who for thy sake hath been careless of his own content?’ (5.1.37-40). 
Eumenides recounts his previous selfless act in the expectation of reciprocation, namely 
recognition, just as Gesippus does in Foxe’s play.  Eumenides will not receive satisfaction 
beyond this, as the plot does not allow for the sacrificial act by Endymion to even the 
score, as it did in Titus et Gesippus.  This contributes further to the play’s overall 
understanding of friendship as one-sided in nature, as Endymion is the recipient of 
friendship, and Eumenides is the benefactor.   
     While this is anathema to the classical ideal that stresses proportion, it was a view that 
friendship literature fostered through inscription of expectations of behaviour that 
implicitly emphasised friendship’s benefits.  Perhaps realistically recognising the reduced 
opportunities a man might be afforded to risk his life for a friend, ‘trials’ of friendship 
rested on classical duties in friendship that were undertaken, but not solicited, just as 
Lyly’s depiction of Eumenides does.   The marginalia in one page of Thomas Breme’s 
1584 The Mirrour of Friendship reads ‘Note how to know a perfect friend’, with the 
adjacent text outlining the conduct expected:  
  
 Hee then of good right ought to be called a friend, and esteemed as true  
                                                          
71 Bevington, p. 9. 
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 and perfect, that dothe willingly offer, departe, and give to his friend   
 those things that he lacketh, before he asketh  his ayde: and that speedily   
 commeth to succour & helpe his friend, being in peril, without calling, or   
 sending for, and therefore there is not, nor can not, be in this world better   
 friendship then this that I have spoken of, which is that commeth with a free  
 heart of himselfe to ayde his friend in necessitie, and to succour him when  
 he is in griefe or sorrow.72 
 
Here the ideal friend conforms to classical prescriptives of succour and aide, without 
expectation of reciprocation. But Breme makes a significant movement away from 
Cicero’s idea that friendship should not be sought to fill a weakness or help one secure 
what they ‘lack’.73  Importantly, Breme’s emphasis is on the requirement that the friend is 
self-motivated in acts of friendship.  This is a value Lyly explores through Eumenides, 
Endymion’s ‘well-wisher’, who is pressured only by his own fidelity to friendship to 
practice what he preaches. 
 
IV. Arden of Faversham  
Arden of Faversham (1591) was entered on the Stationers’ Register on 3 April 1592; 
however the play’s auspices, dramatist(s) and date of first performance are unknown.74  
The earliest text is the quarto playbook printed in 1592.75  The play draws from 
contemporary documents which detail the account of a real ‘domestic tragedy’, the 1551 
murder of Thomas Arden in Faversham, Kent, by his wife, her lover, and their 
accomplices.  Yet, there is one notable addition, Franklin, a friend for Arden.  Unlike in 
                                                          
72 Breme, sig. B3r. 
73 See Marcus Tullius Cicero, De Amicitia in Cicero, De Senectute, De Amicitia, De Divinatione, trans. by 
William Armistead Falconer, The Loeb classical Library (Cambridge, Massachusetts:  1927-2001 (2001), 
(pp. 103-211),  p. 141. 
74 Tom Lockwood, ‘Introduction’ Arden of Faversham ed. by Martin White, New Mermaids (London:  A & 
C Black, 2007), vii-xxx (vii, xxiii, xxv, xxvi). All history and publication information on the play is from 
here. 
75 Lockwood, xxv-xxvi. 
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Endymion, the friend does not drive the plot, but serves three main functions as a 
counterpoint to the infidelity and associations of utility orchestrated by ‘the bourgeoise 
Clytemnestra’,76 as an intermediary akin to the Baconian ‘deputy’, and as a foil to the 
would-be murderers aiding the ‘dramatic predicament’ that Tom Lockwood points out 
arises from a play where the audience already knows the protagonist will die.77 
     The anonymous dramatist’s choice of the name ‘Franklin’ is interesting, given its early 
modern usage to denote a landowner below the rank of a gentleman, and the play’s 
concern, through the characterisation of the greedy Arden, with the acquisition of lands.78  
But perhaps just as compelling is the affinity that this Franklin shares with Chaucer’s 
Franklin in the Canterbury Tales who also is chronicler of a tale of infidelity and marriage.  
Arden’s Franklin, however, is also cast as friend.  And despite his sideline distance from 
the main action, he still enjoys sufficient proximity to objectively comment on events, and 
provide insights into character, much like a witty servant, or more significantly, Lear’s 
fool.  To be sure, as Tom Lockwood has pointed out, as a character, Franklin’s ‘purpose’ is 
‘purely functional’.79  He is indeed similar to a choric voice.  At first glance, it appears he 
serves as not much more than an alternative to a soliloquy, a way for the anonymous 
dramatist(s) to reveal Arden’s feelings and inner turmoil to the audience.  In this way, and 
because he is fairly one-dimensional, it would be easy to discount him as merely a useful 
device.  But his significance lies in his function as friend and what his depiction 
contributes to the love and friendship debate, as a true friend’s constancy is posited against 
the marital infidelity of Alice and the false friendship of Mosby.     
                                                          
76 Frederick S. Boas in ‘Introduction’ to Arden of Faversham by William Green in Elizabethan Drama ed. by 
John Gassner and William Green (New York:  Applause, 1990), pp. 1-3 (p. 2). 
77 Lockwood, x-xi.  
78 The term was in use in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. See ‘Franklin’ in OED def. 2. 
79 Lockwood, xxviii. 
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     Franklin’s care of, and for his friend casts into deeper relief the malevolence Alice 
seeks to exact on her husband.  The juxtaposition between the fidelity of the friend and the 
betrayal by the wife, turns the motif of the ‘domestic triangle—wife, husband, husband’s 
friend’—considered by dramatists such as John Ford, upside down.80  In Arden the 
destabilising force is not the loyal friend, but the wife and her lover, who is lightly termed 
‘friend’.  As loyal friend, Franklin provides the substance to the underlying theme of 
friendship’s trustworthiness and superiority to other relationships, which resonates quietly 
in the background throughout the play. This begins with Franklin’s opening lines that 
signal an understanding of duty in friendship, which necessitates an attempt to alleviate 
Arden’s melancholy.  Franklin tells him, ‘Arden cheer up thy spirits and droop no more’, 
and later ‘comfort thyself, sweet friend’ (1.1.1, 20), after presenting him with news that 
Arden has secured the deeds of ‘all the lands of the Abbey of Faversham’ (1.1.5-6).81  
Arden reveals his suspicions about his wife and Mosby in a moment that underscores what 
Francis Bacon termed ‘The principall Fruit of Friendship’, namely ‘the ease and discharge 
of the Fulnesse and Swellings of the Heart, which Passions of all kinds doe cause and 
induce’.82  The comfort of the friend is acknowledged, as Arden tells Franklin, ‘Ah, but for 
thee, how odious were this life’ (1.1.10).  
     While Chaucer’s Franklin protests: ‘I lernyd never rethorik in certain / Thynge that I 
speke muste be bare and pleyn,’83 Arden’s Franklin embodies this idea.  His language is 
devoid of the perfect friendship rhetoric of ‘one soul in two bodies’ and his honest and 
plain speech becomes a contrast to the dissembling avowals of affection and friendship 
                                                          
80 Brian Opie notes Dorothy Farr’s designation of this in John Ford ‘Being All One”:  Ford’s Analysis of 
Love and Friendship in Loves Sacrifice and The Ladies Triall’ in John Ford Critical Re-Visions ed. by 
Michael Neill (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp.233-260 (p. 233). 
81 This and all subsequent references are from this edition: Anonymous, Arden of Faversham ed. by Martin 
White, New Mermaids (London:  A & C Black, 2007). 
82 Bacon, ‘Of Friendship’ (1632), sigs.V3v –V4r. 
83 Geoffrey Chaucer, ‘Prologue’ to ‘The Franklin’s Tale’ in The Canterbury Tales (Westminster:  William 
Caxton, 1483), fol. 114r, sig. P2r. 
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from Alice and Mosby.  This is not to say that Franklin is written without emotional 
attachment to Arden, for it is palpable when he tells his friend, ‘Yet let your comfort be 
that others bear / Your woes, twice doubled all, with patience’ (1.4.25-26). In fact, the text 
suggests that there is some ambiguity in the intensity of feeling Franklin harbours for 
Arden.  Franklin proposes to Arden: ‘lie with me at London all this term,’ (1.1.52) as part 
of a plan to help ‘ease’ Arden’s grief and ‘save’ Alice’s ‘chastity’ (1.1.45).  But this in 
itself seems an odd solution, which would give Alice and Mosby further opportunity for 
dalliance. Further, as Arden is saying goodbye to Alice, Franklin interrupts their farewell 
disapprovingly, saying to Arden, ‘Come, leave this dallying, and let us away’ (1.1.396).  
Tom Lockwood has rightly suggested that Franklin’s response to Arden’s complaint that 
he ‘cannot rest’ at his house because it is ‘irksome’ (1.4.27), is open for interpretation.  
When Franklin suggests, ‘then stay with me in London; go not home’ (1.4.28), he is 
indeed dissuading Arden from reconciliation.84  That said, care need be taken to promote a 
reading of this beyond male friendship, especially given Alan Bray’s work outlining the 
distinction between the intimacy of male friendship and male homosexuality and the 
‘facts’ of  ‘physical closeness’ which was part of the way ‘friendship worked’ in 
Renaissance England.85   Further, these instances when considered in relation to Franklin’s 
suggestions on ways that Arden can salvage his marriage, lend weight to an affective male 
friendship reading.  When Alice wishes to accompany the friends to Lord Cheiney’s 
Franklin recommends, ‘Why I pray you, sir, let her go along with us’ (1.10.20).  Later he 
advises Arden not to accentuate the pleasant details of their visit with Cheiney, ‘For that 
will make her think herself more wronged / In that we did not carry her along; / For sure 
she grieved that she was left behind’ (1.13.69-71).   
                                                          
84 For a discussion of this instance see Lockwood, xxix. 
85 Alan Bray, ‘Homosexuality and the Signs of Male Friendship in Elizabethan England’ History Workshop, 
29 (Spring, 1990), pp. 1-19 (p.p. 3-4). 
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     Franklin is further removed from his Chaucerian namesake who denies Greek or Latin 
learning and says, ‘I slept never in the mount of pernaso / Ne lernrd marcus Tullius 
Cithero’,86  for Arden’s anonymous dramatist figures his Franklin in some ways 
reminiscent of the Ciceronean friend who is charged to ‘bee glad in deede, freelye to geeve 
our freende good counsell’, but also, ‘to warne one another, not onely plainly, but (if 
occasion so serve) sharplye’.87  Franklin’s admonitions are at times severe and serve to 
interject reason into the emotion that ensnarls Arden.  After Alice’s explanation that she 
and Mosby were arm and arm only for ‘sport’ (1.13.90).  Franklin responds first 
interrupting her attempt to explain away their behaviour saying, ‘Marry, God defend me 
from such a jest!’ (1.13.98).  Franklin may not lay claim verbally to the status of Arden’s 
‘other self’ but he serves as such acting as the Jungian ego, the voice of truth and common 
sense that seeks to ground Arden in reality.88 Similarly, although he is not depicted as 
Arden’s soul mate in the classical sense, he is the ideal friend Thomas Breme described, 
one that gives to his friend ‘those things that he lacketh’.89  
     What Arden lacks is the ability to see things clearly; this includes himself and others. 
Through the dramatist’s construction of the friend, the familiar topos of self-delusion and 
perception can be explored, as it was in Lear through the wise fool.  Arden has seen 
tangible evidence of Alice and Mosby’s betrayal through love letters and the ring that he 
gave Alice on Mosby’s finger, yet Arden is easily mislead by denials of inappropriate 
behaviour.  When Arden tells Alice that he heard her call out for Mosby in her sleep, she 
attempts to downplay it, but Franklin interrupts and affirms Arden’s reading of the event 
                                                          
86 Chaucer, ‘Prologue’, fol. 114r, sig. P2r. 
87 The Booke of Freendeshipe, Newton, sig. C4v. 
88 For an explanation of the Jungian ego as the ‘center of consciousness and the agency responsible for 
reality testing, logical thinking and rational exercise of will’ see Michael Washburn, The Ego and The 
Dynamic Ground: A Transpersonal Theory of Human Development 2nd edn (Albany:  State University of 
New York Press, 1995), p. 13. 




(1.1.78).  After Arden apologises for his angry outburst and accusation and reclaims 
Mosby as a ‘friend’, Franklin warns, ‘Why, Master Arden, know you what you do? / Will 
you follow him that hath dishonoured you?  (1.13.135-136). In keeping with his role 
throughout the play, in the epilogue, it is Franklin who is tasked with the final words 
outlining ‘the truth of Arden’s death’ (1) that proves him still an honest counsellor:  
‘Arden lay murdered in that plot of ground / Which he by force and violence held from 
Reede’ (10-11).  Through the absence of posthumous panegyric to Arden, and ensuring the 
murderers are brought to justice, Franklin proves he is not only constant with regard to 
friendship, but also, to truth.   
     Despite the absence of Franklin in the real-life tragedy of Arden, the play suggests that 
it is in part Arden’s failure to give weight to Franklin’s friendly counsel and truth-telling 
that is his downfall.  This corresponding responsibility of the friend to heed friendly 
counsel was highlighted in Thomas Newton’s translation of Cicero:  ‘Let the Aucthoritie 
of Freendes (geving sound counsel) beare great sway and force in Frendship’  ‘and let 
suche aucthoritie so geeven be throughly [sic] obeyed.’90  This idea had significant 
contemporary resonance during the later 1590s, regarding Francis Bacon’s advice to his 
friend Essex, advice that went largely ignored and contributed to Essex’s downfall and 
death.  In Arden however, the problem of the degree of influence that Arden affords 
Franklin’s counsel is complicated by his desire to please his wife and save his marriage.  
There is a noticeable pull between friendship and marriage here, but marriage prevails.  
Ruled by desire and affection for Alice, the callous businessman who has aggressively 
procured lands from his neighbours (1.13.13) is easily deceived by his unfaithful wife, 
Alice, and false-friend, Mosby.   
                                                          
90 The Booke of Freendeshipe, Newton, sig. C4v. 
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     Throughout the play Franklin is constant in more ways than one:  steadfast, as well as 
ever attendant, the latter somewhat problematically so. When Arden remarks at the play’s 
onset, ‘Franklin, thy love prolongs my weary life’ (1.1.9) this might be read as Arden’s 
acknowledgment of the comfort brought by Franklin’s friendship in his time of distress.  
Additionally, however, the play bears a literal interpretation of the words, as Arden 
escapes his fate at every turn in Franklin’s presence.  This is how as a character he assists 
the dramatist to ‘generate the tension and suspense’ that Tom Lockwood identifies as 
necessary to engender audience attention in a play that draws from actual, known events.91  
His friendship with Arden provides something for the main character to ‘do’, as well as 
supplies the opportunity to stage (and foil) the would-be attempts on Arden’s life by 
delaying the inevitable.92  Franklin is something of a Sancho Panza in terms of the help 
and grounding in reality he provides during Arden’s travels and travails.  Arden is never 
without Franklin in a scene until the dinner party, when the murder takes place.  And here 
Franklin is conspicuously absent; more so because Michael creates the expectation in the 
audience that Arden is to bring him, along with Mosby and the others, to dinner (1.14.36).  
When Arden arrives with Mosby alone and remarks, ‘he and I are friends’ (1.1.176), the 
idea of the danger in misunderstanding how true friendship presents itself is heightened.  
In this scene of hospitality when expectations of affectionate and convivial behaviour are 
raised and engendered, the safety of the domestic space is shattered by Arden’s inability, 
and perhaps unwillingness, to recognise feigned friendship.  In the absence of the constant 
friend, Franklin, Arden loses his life.  Ironically, despite his travels and attempts on his life 
in the public space, Arden’s life is lost in what should be the safety and sanctity of his own 
home.  The dramatist turns ‘the codes of civility’ that Viviana Comensoli suggests are 
                                                          
91 Lockwood, xi. 
92 For a thoughtful discussion of the use of delay and failed murder attempts see Lockwood, xi-xii. 
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inscribed on the text93 upside down, as the false friend, Mosby, reveals himself, striking 
the first of the fatal blows.  Immune to Franklin’s admonitions, Arden, quite literally, has 
to be hit over the head with an iron before he is able to determine that Mosby is a false 
friend (1.14.232).    
          Franklin’s constancy however, is not to be taken at face value as an unquestionable 
good. The play indistinctly wonders if it can be too much of a good thing.  As previously 
discussed, a similar idea was raised by Bacon regarding the Carr and Overbury friendship.  
In Arden, while the dangers of false friends and unfaithful wives stand in stark contrast to 
Franklin’s steadfast friendship, the anonymous dramatist subtly underscores a potential 
drawback to a friend’s fervent practice of friendship, namely the inability of the friend to 
recognise that friendship has its limits.  This idea of boundaries and friendship’s ‘excess’ 
will be examined in detail in relation to The Lady’s Trial, in Section 6, but it is worth 
mentioning here. Franklin is embroiled in all of Arden’s intimate concerns, even in what 
one would normally expect to be private conversations between husband and wife.  The 
first conversation in which Arden suspects Alice of infidelity takes place in the morning, 
with Franklin already present. He has already been conversing with Arden, whilst Alice 
was still asleep (1.1.1-56).  While Arden reminisces aloud to Alice about their intimate 
encounters in happier days, specifically alluding to their sexual passion, Franklin is still 
onstage (1.1.57-63). When Arden tells Alice ‘thou hast killed my heart,’ disclosing that he 
heard her call out for Mosby in her sleep, it is Franklin who interrupts Alice’s denial, 
adding, ‘Mistress Alice, I heard you name him once or twice’ (1.1.78).  Franklin’s 
presence during private moments and his actions as mediator, answering for Arden, may 
reflect the idea of the friend as the Baconian deputy, but it also raises questions about 
                                                          
93 Viviana Comensoli, ‘Household Business’:  Domestic Plays of Early Modern England (Toronto:  
University of Toronto Press, 1996), p. 86. 
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access and prerogative in friendship, and how far ideal friendship requires the 
relinquishing of one’s privacy.  Although this is not developed, but rather subtly suggested 
in Arden, it becomes a more explicit, central concern in The Lady’s Trial.  In Arden, 
Franklin may be the epitome of what Seneca advised men to find: ‘a trusty friend, to whom 
we may freely & sincerely powre out our secrets’94  but his construction as a character 
whose raison d’etre is the practice of friendship bordering intrusiveness, adds a further 
dimension to asymmetry in friendship with regard to feeling as well as practice. 
 
V.  The Faithful Friends  
The Faithful Friends was entered in the Stationers’ Register on 29 June 1660 along with 
several other plays attributed to Francis Beaumont and John Fletcher by Humphrey 
Mosley.95  Based on Walter Greg’s work on the manuscript, G.M. Pinciss argues that this 
attribution ‘carries no weight whatever’, and places the play in three hands belonging to 
the 1620s.96   The play is listed as a comedy.97  Its auspices are unknown.98  The play was 
not published until 1812; its manuscript remains in the Dyce Collection at the Victoria and 
Albert Museum.99  
      The dating of the play during the last years of the Jacobean era is significant in terms 
of its consideration of the idea of royal ‘prerogative’ in friendship during a time when 
King James’ friendship with Buckingham was under scrutiny. Curtis Perry sees the play as 
engaging with the wrangling over Buckingham’s favour and specifically, his 1619 
                                                          
94 Seneca qtd in Robert Burton, in The Anatomy of Melancholy, ed. by Thomas C. Faulkner, Nicolas K. 
Kiessling and Rhonda Blair, 3 vols (Oxford: Clarendon, 1989-1994; 1990), II, Part. 2. Sect. 2. Memb. 6. 
Subsec. 1, p. 105, lines 31-32. 
95 Introduction to The Faithful Friends prepared by G.M. Pinciss and G.R. Proudfoot for The Malone Society 
(Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 1970; rpr. 1975), v-xviii (v,xv). 
96 Pinciss, xv; Schoenbaum and Harbage date the plays limits as 1613- c. 1621 in Annals, p. 104. 
97 Pinciss, v. 
98 Annals, p. 105. 
99 Pinciss, v. 
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advancement to admiral in the navy.100  Indeed, the play mirrors this situation in part, 
through the promotion of young Tullius to Roman general by the King.  As Perry’s work 
does a fine job of examining the idea of the King’s ‘prerogative pleasures,’101 this 
section’s focus is on the representation of Aramanus, written as an ideal friend to Tullius. 
Of all of the depictions of the ideal friend considered in this chapter, Aramanus’ pra
of friendship engages most with the classical ideal, and equally, Montaigne’s view.  H
character serves as the touchstone for perfect friendship against which other friendships 
and relationships in the play can be measured.  It is his friendship for, however, rather than 
friendship with, Tullius that the dramatist underscores, thus highlighting its asymmetrical 
nature and testing the idea of application of friendship theory through individual 
interpretation and exercise. 
ctice 
is 
                                                          
     G.M. Pinciss suggests that the play demonstrates ‘some knowledge of a schoolboy’s 
classics’.102  This idea is borne out not only in the play’s Roman setting and the use of 
Marcus Tullius as a name for one of the friends, but also in the play’s engagement with 
classical ideas of perfect friendship and specifically, through the construction of the ideal 
friend, Aramanus. He is given no other function or ‘life’ in the play other than that of an 
ideal friend in the best classical sense.  Defined in the dramatis personae in the manuscript 
as merely ‘Friend to young Tullius’, he is unlike Tullius’ other friend, Marius, who is 
deemed a brother, a lover as well as a friend.103 After the initial test and resolution of 
friendship where Aramanus proves steadfast, he is no longer part of the play or the main 
plot’s resolution, when Tullius and Philadelphia are reunited and Marius and Laelia 
100 Curtis Perry, Literature and Favoritism in Early Modern England (Cambridge:  Cambridge University 
Press, 2006), pp. 5-6. 
101 Perry, p.5. 
102 Pinciss, xv. 
103 Anonymous, The Faithful Friends prepared by G.M. Pinciss and G.R. Proudfoot for The Malone Society 
(Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 1970; rpr. 1975), fol. 1a, p. 1. All subsequent references to the play will 
be from this edition. 
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matched.  Amidst a constellation of less than perfect friendships, Aramanus’ practice of 
friendship stands out and highlights the lesser nature of friendships of utility between 
Rufinus and the King, and delectation104 among Snipsnap, Blacksnout and Calveskin.  It 
also stands in sharp contrast to that of his friend, Tullius, who lays claim to perfect 
friendship’s laws and reaps its fruits, but does not attend as carefully to its practice. 
     Montaigne’s description of his impetus for friendship with Boëtie resonates in the play, 
as the anonymous dramatist(s) underscores that Aramanus’ ‘yoke’ of friendship, is 
similarly ‘guided by vertue and conduct of reason’.105  Tullius’ virtue is held up at 
intervals to counteract the accusations of his elevation by favour, but also, importantly, 
because this is a precondition for perfect friendship.  It is one that the dramatist 
underscores through several characters commenting on Tullius’ virtue.  As such, the basis 
for Aramanus’ affection and practice is established in line with classical precedent.  
Tullius is deemed ‘truly Vertuous’ (fol. 4b 151).106  But the dramatist (s) problematises the 
idea of discerning virtue, especially later in the play, as jealousy and distrust, coupled with 
revenge become apparent in the purportedly virtuous Tullius, leading him to turn against 
his friend.  The play equally holds up Aramanus’ integrity, but in this regard the practice 
fits the verbal assertion of his virtue.  Tullius refers to Aramanus as ‘thou best of men, a 
true and faithful friend’, saying ‘I know thy love, and valor / both exceed comparision’ 
(fol. 11a 720-722).  Even though Tullius declares that Marius’ company in combat is ‘a 
second life to mee’ (fol. 6b 318), the play bears out a literal interpretation of this rather 
than a theoretical one of ‘another self’; for it is Aramanus whom he entrusts with caring 
for his prize possession, wife Philadelphia, while he is away.   
                                                          
104 These are considered pleasurable friendships in Aristotle, The Ethiques of Aristotle trans. by John 
Wilkinson (London:  Richard Grafton, 1547), sig. J7r. Hereafter: Ethiques, Wilkinson. 
105 Montaigne, Essays, Florio, p. 93. 
106 All references to the play are attributed by folio and line numbers. 
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     The first glimpse of the asymmetrical nature of the friendship however, is evident when 
Tullius fails to understand that his lack of expectation that Aramanus would accompany 
him to battle is an affront to friendship.  To a perfect friend such as Aramanus, even the 
thought that he would be willing to remain behind would cast doubt on his steadfastness in 
friendship.  This scene exposes the disjunction possible in idealised friendship as 
individual perspective precludes consummate unity of ‘one soul in two bodies’.  Tullius 
and Aramanus view, understand, and most importantly, apply, the rules of friendship 
differently, even though they both are familiar with, and invoke the parlance of perfect 
friendship.  The dramatist problematises the application of the ideal and tests its viability 
through Aramanus’ sole exercise as giver.  Through Aramanus he underscores the 
potential for disappointment in friendship, when one’s practice and belief in the reciprocal 
obligation of the ideal is unmatched by the friend.  Aramanus’ objection to being left 
behind arises from his understanding that the perfect friend is willing and expected to 
sacrifice his life if need be for his friend.  Tullius on the other hand, does not recognise this 
obligation or others that friendship imposes, only its rewards.  Tullius’ terse ‘farewell [my] 
deerest freinde’ upon his departure, and Aramanus’ heartfelt response point up their 
different understandings (fol. 11a 713).107  Affronted that he would be thought to consider 
abandoning his friend who is marching into danger, Aramanus says, appealing to the laws 
of constancy in friendship: 
   
  you wrong me friend [sic] to thinke my love so faint 
   to leave you now, no thoe your way were through  
  hels pitchy Cave, without a Sibells clue Ide fol.lowe ye  
  Sands shall be numbred first, the heavens stand still, 
  earth fly her Center, before death or (fol. 11a 715-719) 
                                                          
107 All brackets in quoted text in this section are those of its editors. 
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 Here Aramanus’ assertion that he would follow his friend to Hell is exaggerated, but 
generally, so is the classical claim of the existence of ideal friendship.  The goal is to 
convince Tullius of his constancy, and the paradigmatic perfect friendship appeal is the 
recognised way to do so.  Tullius interrupts Aramanus’ ‘death or’ mid sentence, reassuring 
him:  ‘forbeare thou best of men, a true and faithfull friend / urge not what cannot bee, / I 
know thy love, and valor / both exceed comparision, yet now thou must not goe’ (fol. 11a 
720-722).  Tullius suggests that Aramanus has not only rhetorically convinced him of his 
constancy, but has proven it previously. 
     Tullius’ wariness about his enemies seizing the opportunity to dishonour him while he 
is away is his priority.  Aramanus is to assume the role of ‘domestic governor’108 in his 
stead and battle with those who might try to assault Philadelphia’s honour.  Tullius 
instructs him:  ‘be thou her comfort, and believe me friend / the least of these, more, mutch 
more I esteeme / then if they manly brest should stand a shield [sic] / twixt mee and 
thowsand perills’ (fol. 11b 732-735).  Replaceability is a hallmark of perfect friendship 
narratives. A willingness to take the friend’s place in the face of threat was an important 
part of what made Damon and Pythias, Orestes and Pylades and Titus and Gesippus 
perfect pairs.  Here Aramanus’ friendship is to undergo its own ultimate test, as Tullius 
appoints him to stand in his stead as guardian of Philadelphia’s chastity.  This may seem 
like a tricky proposition (and is a situation other dramatists examine), but it is one that 
allows Tullius to acknowledge his faith in the amicable bond and Aramanus’ virtue.  In a 
more literal sense, it may be viewed as aligned with the idea of the friend as ‘another self’.  
Montaigne registered a similar understanding of confidence in the perfect friend, when he 
                                                          
108 This phrase from Catherine Richardson, Domestic Life and Domestic Tragedy in Early Modern England 
(Manchester:  Manchester University Press, 2006), p.114. 
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said of Boëtie:  ‘I would (verily) rather have trusted him concerning any matter of mine, 
than my selfe’.109  
     In his care of Philadelphia, Aramanus’ practice of ideal friendship rests on protecting 
Tullius’ honour, albeit at home.  Ironically, the situation constructed for him to 
demonstrate his constancy may have at first appeared less sacrificial than that of a 
willingness to die for Tullius in battle, as Patroclus did Achilles.  However, in protecting 
Tullius’ honour, Aramanus jeopardises himself, as he disregards the King’s wishes.  The 
King has promoted Tullius to general, not out of favour or friendship, but rather, as it is 
suggested early in the play, to ensure that he gains unfettered access to Philadelphia, the 
object of his desire.  The key to access rests with Aramanus, whom the King tries to enlist 
through Rufinus to act as pandar. When Aramanus tells Philadelphia, ‘I come to sue for 
Love’ expounding, ‘such Love as Tullius shall enjoy / when he lyes panting in these Ivory 
Armes’(fol. 16a 1141, 1144-1145),  an audience would reasonably assume that Aramanus 
has failed the test of friendship, just as Philadelphia does.  A forty-four line exchange 
between wife and friend takes place, heightening the dramatic tension (reminiscent of 
Wendoll and Anne’s in Heywood’s A Woman Killed with Kindness), as Philadelphia 
reproves Aramanus by appealing to inconstancy in friendship.  She says: 
 
  can you immagin I would trust my truth 
  or virgin honor, or the unspotted white 
  which Tullius neare unclaspt yet with a man 
  that proves so faithless to so good a friend (fol. 16 b 1173-1176). 
 
When Aramanus reveals that he is suing for the King and not himself, his obligation as 
friend and subject are tested, as is Philadelphia’s as wife and subject.  ‘Tis for the King’ 
                                                          
109 Montaigne, Essays, Florio, p. 93. 
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declares Aramanus, adding, ‘whose awfull dread Comaund / must be obeyd before our 
owne desires’ (fol. 17a 1189-1190).  When Aramanus discloses to Philadelphia that ‘what 
I spake / was only to confirme my sacred thoughts / of thy religious virtue’(fol. 17a 1206-
1209), he acknowledges that from the outset he has privileged private friendship over that 
of the King’s.  In this Aramanus is written as an ideal friend as Montaigne envisioned him, 
one who privileges private friendship, recognising that ‘a singular and principall friendship 
dissolveth all other duties, & freeth all other obligations’. 110 
     Curiously, his obligation as friend of Tullius extends to Philadelphia even when Tullius 
is present.  The dramatist expands the scope of ideal friend  beyond what was evidenced in 
Arden, as here the friend becomes a different sort of mediator between husband and wife, 
as not only keeper of the wife’s chastity, but also her chief source of consolation. It is a 
role familiar to the ideal friend, but here Tullius charges Aramanus with his wife’s 
emotional care. Perhaps in another nod to the interchangeable nature of ideal friends, the 
role normally reserved for Tullius as comforter of his wife, he passes to Aramanus.  This 
responsibility establishes a sense of the close bond between Aramanus and Philadelphia, 
which may raise audience’s suspicions in the scene where Aramanus tempts Philadelphia, 
but it may also be read as the use of the friend and the expectation of the extension of 
friendship to the wife after marriage.  When Plutarch speaks of ‘brotherly love’ in his 
Moralia he suggests that this is requisite between brethren:   
 
 but better it would be farre, if thy love and kind affections be extended   
 as far as to their wives fathers and daughters husbands, by carrying a   
                                                          
110 Montaigne, Essays, Florio, p. 94. 
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 friendly minde and readie will to pleasure them likewise, and to do for   
 them in all their occasions.111 
 
This idea is borne out in the play, as Philadelphia becomes the shared interest and concern 
of the husband and the friend, drawing them closer, as the translation of her name—
‘brotherly love’—suggests.  In this instance, Tullius tasks Aramanus to intervene on his 
behalf alerting Philadelphia to his impending departure.  Tullius enjoins him, ‘Worthy 
friend, / take off the [greife] edge of Philadelphas [sic] greefe / for this short separation, be 
you the first / that shall acquaint her with my great Comannd / it will abate some of the 
bitternes’ (fol. 5a, 215-219).  Aramanus’ reliability and usefulness as comforter is made 
manifest here, as is the sense of his indispensability to the marriage.  The dramatist 
suggests a broadened scope to the ideal friend’s practice of friendship which is not viewed 
as interference, but rather, welcomed and expected.  It is involvement on which 
Philadelphia has come to rely:  
  My Lords best friend, best welcome  
  oh Aramanus, free my sad fears from this 
  same killing sound, that flys from vulgar mouthes 
   words dipt in Gall have pearct my quickest sence 
  must Tulius leave mee (fol. 9 b, 563-567).   
 
     Despite Aramanus’ diligent practice of friendship, Tullius’ trust in him is short-lived, as   
Tullius’ jealousy and cuckold anxiety become the pretext for his willingness to believe 
accusations against Aramanus. Blinded by self-interest and the belief that ‘where shee 
falls, my fame is perished, / [...] all my name / lost and undone to all eternitie’ ( fol. 35b 
2724-2727), Tullius subordinates friendship to reputation. The sense of the asymmetrical 
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nature and understanding of this friendship is heightened as Tullius denounces Aramanus 
as a false friend, without explanation, deeming him a ‘villin’ (fol. 26 b 1976).  His censure 
is severe and includes the worst possible condemnation for an ideal friend:  a negative 
comparison of their friendship with that of Orestes and Pylades.  When Tullius says ‘the 
Storie of Orestes, was a fable’ (fol. 26 b 1977), he implies that his Pylades, Aramanus, has 
proved inconstant.  Even though his doubt of Aramanus ‘is wholly inconsistent with 
Friendship’ according to classical precedent,112 his soliloquy invokes the parlance of 
perfect friendship—co-joined souls, similitude, and sympathy—underscoring his 
familiarity with the duties and applicable rhetoric, if not with the practice.113  Tullius says: 
                                               but Aramanus 
  to see, the Antipathy twixt love and friendship 
  as if it were ingrafted in the soule 
  in which there is more pleasure then desire 
  in will and in affection, like twoe harts 
  close up  both in a mould that if one dye 
  the poisonous infection kills the other 
  I would I could forget thee for mee thinks 
  Im’e neare lone when I remember thee 
  such simpathie conditions manners speech 
  studies, pleasures, inclinations 
  bearing contynuall one thought and motion 
  for such are perfect friends. (fol. 30a, 2282 -2294) 
 The irony of course is that Aramanus has proved ever constant, the epitome of perfection 
in friendship.  His own soliloquy preceding Tullius’ outlines his unceasing attempt to find 
                                                          
112 Epicurus, Epicurus’s Morals trans. by Walter Charleton (London: Printed by W. Wilson for Henry 
Herringman, 1656), IV, p. 180, sig. Aa2 v.. 
113 ‘Sympathie’ in friendship Lucius Annæus Seneca, Seneca’s Answer to Lucilius His Quaere Why Good 
Men Suffer Misfortunes Seeing There Is a Divine Providence?  trans. by  E.S., Esq. ( London : Printed for 
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his friend and avenge what he believes is his friend’s death.  Further, the adjoining 
soliloquies highlight the striking difference between friendship’s theory and practice.  
Unlike Tullius’, Aramanus’ actions have been consistent with his rhetorical assertions of 
friendship.  His soliloquy supports his earlier affirmation of his willingness to move 
Heaven and Hell for his friend:    
  
  Thrice has my horse overthrown mee, the last tyme 
  feel starke dead under mee ominous signes, 
  the scortching beames too, weakens and makes faint 
  my brused limbs that I of force must rest, if rest dares 
  steale into the dwelling place of greefe and care (30 a 2255-2259). 
 
      In the end, Tullius cannot kill Aramanus, and accepts his friend’s version of the truth.  
His apology however, is understated and falls short:  ‘pardon mee / thus will I begg it from 
thee, jealousie and frantic rage [...] put mee past my selfe’(fol. 31b 2405-2409).  It sharply 
contrasts with his seventy-eight line intermittent, vitriolic denunciation of Aramanus and 
their friendship that preceded it, demonstrating that in the end the gulf between their 
understandings of friendship remains.  Shortly thereafter, Aramanus is no longer of 
functional use to the play, nor necessary for the final seven hundred and eighteen line 
resolution.  In the final scene, there is a question as to whether he is on stage, as the stage 
direction reads:  ‘Enter Philadelphia, Marius, Lelia etc’(fol. 42a).  If not, he is noticeably 
absent, for when the King refers to having ‘tryed you all’ in the end, it is the friend, 
Aramanus, and the wife, Philadelphia who have earned his title of ‘worthy’ (fol. 42a 
3182).  Thus the play ends with a nod to the successful undertaking of the duties of 
friendship and marriage.  It reinforces the play’s preoccupation with constancy through 
168 
 
two characters that were written to embody this ideal, the perfect friend and wife, 
suggesting that the title may not have anything to do with Tullius. 
 
VI. The Lady’s Trial 
The Lady’s Trial was licensed on 3 May 1638 and was staged the same year at the Cockpit 
theatre under the auspices of Beeston’s Boys.114  Its first and only early edition was printed 
in 1639.115  The play has been classified as both a comedy and tragicomedy.116  It was the 
final play written by John Ford, who was educated at Exeter College, Oxford, and was a 
member of the Middle Temple.117 It is a play that is frequently disregarded in favour of 
Ford’s other works, namely, ‘Tis a Pity She’s a Whore, The Broken Heart and Love’s 
Sacrifice.  It is generally not included in modern editions or compilations of Ford’s 
plays.118 According to Michael Neill, The Lady’s Trial is one of Ford’s later plays which 
evidences ‘a falling-off in dramatic power’.119  Relating that it represents Ford’s ‘last 
reworking of the Othello story’, Neill analogises the play’s Aurelio to Iago, but deems him 
a ‘benign-Iago-figure’.120  Despite this interesting comparison, Aurelio has not been 
subject to critical scrutiny.  This section undertakes that work and highlights Ford’s unique 
                                                          
114 Annals, pp. 136-137; See also, Michael Neill, ‘Introduction’ in John Ford:  Critical Re-Visions ed. by 
Michael Neill  (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 1988), p.1; Andrew Gurr, The Shakespearean 
Stage 1574-1642 3rd edn (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 2001), p.238; The managers of 
Beeston’s Boys (1637-1641) included Christopher Beeston, William Beeston and William Davenant, see 
Annals, p. 297.   
115 John Ford, The Ladys Triall (London: Printed by E[dward] G[riffin] for Henry Shephard, 1639). Harbage 
and Schoenbaum, p. 137;  
116 Michael Neill and John S. Keltie classify it as a tragicomedy.  See Neill, ‘John Ford’ in DNB and Keltie, 
‘Introduction’, The Lady’s Trial by John Ford ed. by John S. Keltie in The Works of British Dramatists  
(Edinburgh:  Nimmo, 1875), pp. 460-461 (p. 460); Harbage and Schoenbaum  classify it as a tragedy in 
Annals, p. 137. 
117 Neill, DNB. 
118 Modern editions are dated 1811, 1831, 1851 and an un-published PhD thesis in 1989 by Katsuhiko 
Nogami. John S. Keltie includes it in his Works of British Dramatists.  This is one of the more recent 
published ‘editions’, dated 1875, although it is part of a larger, selected work; Dorothy Farr takes this idea up 
noting that the play is also ‘little known’ in John Ford and the Caroline Theatre (London and Basingstoke:  
MacMillan, 1979), p. 149. 
119 ‘Ford’, DNB. 
120 ‘Ford’, DNB. 
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figuring and testing of the ideal friend who has evolved since Lyly’s Eumenides into a 
more complex and contextually resonant, self-interested friend, whose ardent asymmetrical 
practice of friendship is problematic.   
     Fords plays were written ‘almost exclusively’ for the private theatres, where well-
educated gentleman fully acquainted with classical ideas of friendship, were attendant.  
His work reflects the influence of his connection with the Neo-Stoic movement from 
which he was familiar and embraced in his early prose works The Golden Meane (1613) 
and A Line of Life (1620); it was a movement which demonstrated an appreciation of those 
parts of Stoic ethics compatible with Christianity, namely constancy and virtue, that was 
also evident in the work of Montaigne.121 These two Stoic ideals inform The Lady’s Trial, 
a play that as its title suggests, tests a wife’s fidelity, but also, calls into question, the 
friend’s; but in a way dissimilar to The Faithful Friends and perfect friendship narratives. 
Rather, it tests the limits of close male friendships as mirrored in life.   
     Ford’s ties with the Inns and his patrons at Court provided individual experiences with 
friendship and led to connections with (as opposed to intimate involvement in), failed, 
high-profile ones, including those of the Earl of Essex and Francis Bacon, and Thomas 
Overbury and Robert Carr, Earl of Somerset, favourite of James 1.  Ford had ‘sympathetic 
links’ with the Essex circle, according to Neill, and was associated with Overbury as a 
fellow member of the Middle Temple.122  He contributed to Overbury’s poetry and 
chronicled the ‘Overbury affair’ in a lost work entitled Sir Thomas Overbury’s Ghost.123  
Both Essex and Overbury’s friendships failed, and to differing degrees, can be said to have 
been an aggravating factor in their deaths.  For Essex it was the failure to attend to Bacon’s 
                                                          
121 See chapter 1 of this thesis; see also, ‘Neo-stoicism’ (4 May 2005) by John Sellars, Wolfson College, 
Oxford University in The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy ed. by James Fieser at the University of 
Tennessee at Martin . 
122 ‘Ford’, DNB. 
123 ‘Ford’, DNB. 
170 
 
advice to curb his ‘vaulting ambition’; for Overbury, as Bacon claimed, it was his ‘excess’ 
of friendship for Somerset, which ‘ended in mortal hatred’.124 John Ford’s understanding 
of the events surrounding both incidents, and the proceedings of subsequent trials all 
prosecuted by Bacon, may have influenced his figuring of friendship in The Lady’s Trial at 
the end of his career. There are certainly striking comparisons that can be drawn from the 
Overbury case—through Bacon’s account—and Ford’s depiction of the ideal friend, 
Aurelio, in The Lady’s Trial.  This will be examined in the latter part of this discussion.    
     In his examination of love and friendship in The Ladies Trial and Love’s Sacrifice 
Brian Opie observes that in the plays Ford is working out how both relationships can 
endure in a world ‘incapable of sustaining’ them.125  Certainly the earlier, contemporary 
examples may have contributed to Ford’s view and would perhaps still resonate amongst 
the gentlemen in attendance within the intimate space of the Cockpit. But while Othello, 
from which Ford draws, reflects Bacon’s idea that ‘there is little friendship in the world’, 
The Ladies Trial imagines a different world, where unmatched degrees of attachment and 
individual understanding of the obligations in friendship contributes to an altogether 
different type of asymmetrical practice, one in which there can be too much of a good 
thing.  
     Disproportionate intensity of feeling in male friendship is not an infrequent 
consideration in drama, as Alan Sinfield’s work on The Merchant of Venice and Twelfth 
Night has shown.126  In this chapter its seeds were evident in Arden of Faversham in a 
similar way that it presents itself in The Lady’s Trial, as the practice of the ideal friend 
presses against the friend’s marriage.  But Aurelio is even more ardent and intrusive in his 
                                                          
124 Macbeth 1.7.27 in  William Shakespeare, The Complete Works ed. by Stanley Wells and Gary Taylor et al 
(Oxford:  Clarendon, 1988), pp. 976-999; Bacon, ‘Charge’, Vickers, p. 319. 
125 Opie, p. 235. 
126 Alan Sinfield, Shakespeare, Authority and Sexuality:  Unfinished Business in Cultural Materialism 
(London and New York:  Routledge, 2006), passim. 
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practice than Franklin. Rather than Neill’s good-natured Iago characterisation (if that’s not 
a contradiction in terms), it might be more appropriate to view Aurelio as a rule-obsessed, 
over-zealous friend, for his intelligence127 does not derive from purposeful inventive 
deception, but misconstruction of a compromising situation because he prioritises 
friendship compulsively.  He approaches his friendship with Auria like a martinet; not only 
in the precision with which he attempts to apply its classical edicts, but in the way he 
views its reciprocal responsibilities. His first words upon his entrance in Act 1 support this 
idea. He responds to Auria’s enthusiastic greeting of ‘See, see! / Yet in another I am rich, a 
friend, / A perfect one, Aurelio’ with the objection: ‘No stranger to your bosom, sir, ere 
now, / You might have sorted me in your resolves, / Companion of your fortunes’ (1.1).128  
Aurelio’s reproof stems from Auria’s  unwillingness to seek his counsel and tell his friend 
of his plans to head to the wars to recover his dwindling fortunes.  Aurelio views Auria’s 
concealment as an affront to friendship and does not accept Auria’s explanation claiming, 
‘twas not friendly spoken’ (1.1).  But it becomes clear from the outset that Auria has failed 
to seek Aurelio’s advice because it has been historically antithetical to Auria’s exercising 
autonomy in personal affairs, namely, his choice of a wife. 
      The strict interpretation of the ideal friendship principle requiring ‘al one mynde or 
wyll’, suggests a type of unity that appears to subordinate the self. 129  But as Laurie 
Shannon has shown in her consideration of Ciceronean and Stoic thought, friendship’s 
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unity does not equate with a loss of personal sovereignty.130  She explains that 
‘friendship’s first figure is the self’, a self that is ‘autonomous and integral’.131  This idea 
helps to elucidate the friendship of Auria and Aurelio.  Written as merely an ideal friend, 
Aurelio is given no ‘self’, whereas Auria is given not only a life and a self, but also, a wife.  
This is why the friends differ in their approach to friendship, as Auria seeks to maintain 
personal autonomy, whilst Aurelio embodies the literal belief in the common mind and 
will of the ideal.  He is not content to merely offer advice on an ad hoc basis for he has a 
personal investment in Auria as his ‘other self’.  He heeds classical friendship’s call to 
counsel as a continual directive to action, rather than an assistive measure arising by 
situation or request. When Auria seeks to explain his rationale for leaving his wife to 
repair his financial state, saying ‘Hear me further’, Aurelio interrupts him disapprovingly 
saying:  
   Auria, take heed the covert of a folly  
   Willing to range, be not, without excuse,  
   Discover’d in the coinage of untruths;  
   I use no harder language. Thou art near  
   Already on a shipwreck, in forsaking  
   The holy land of friendship [and forbearing]  
   To talk your wants— Fie! (1.1)132 
 
 Aurelio adds to the charges against Auria’s practice of friendship by suggesting that 
because Auria has failed to alert him to his decreasing coffers, he has prevented Aurelio 
from demonstrating his constancy in adversity.  In perfect friendship, this imperative is 
                                                          
130 Laurie Shannon, Sovereign Amity:  Figures of Friendship in Shakespearean Contexts (Chicago and 
London:  University of Chicago Press, 2002), pp. 30-31. 
131 Shannon, p. 30. 
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sacrosanct, and Aurelio escalates its importance more so than Aramanus in The Faithful 
Friends, by suggesting that Auria’s breach is akin to breaking a holy law.  The invocation 
of the ‘holy land’ elevates the status of friendship by locating it in a hallowed realm.  But 
the ‘holy land’ was also the place where betrayal and denial of friends occurred and this 
allusion may also be an implied suggestion of the proximity this contravention comes to 
disloyalty in Aurelio’s eyes. Equally, there is a hint here that Aurelio views Auria as 
ungrateful for his friendly help. 
     The problem is that Aurelio does not trust Auria’s judgement, as suggested by his 
claim: 
   He who prescribes no law,  
   No limits of condition to the objects  
   Of his affection, but will merely wed  
   A face, because ‘tis round, or limn'd by nature  
   In purest red and white; or at the best,  
   For that his mistresse owes an excellence  
   Of qualities, knows when and how to speak,  
   Where to keep silence, with fit reasons why,  
   Whose virtues are her only dower else  
   In either kind, ought of himself to master  
   Such fortunes as add fuel to their loves;  
   For otherwise---but herein I am idle,  
   Have fool’d to little purpose  (1.1) 
 
Aurelio sees Auria’s marital choice as moved by passion, not reason, and as such, he is 
concerned by what he believes is his friend’s inability to see things clearly. As such, he 
appoints himself as guardian and protector of Auria’s reputation with an almost religious 
fervour.  Like Aramanus in The Faithful Friends, Aurelio stands in the husband’s stead, 
but his inability to recognise both physical and emotional boundaries between friendship 
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and marriage renders his actions intrusive, and is mirrored in his unwarranted entry into 
Spinella’s bedchamber where he misconstrues events.  Ironically, his own affection for 
Auria actually clouds his vision, for it is his perception of the bedchamber incident as 
infidelity that leads to the trial of the innocent Spinella.  In this instance it is Auria, the 
friend whom Aurelio believes to be guided by passion, who remains steadfast and rational.  
When Aurelio calls for revenge, in an un-Othello-like response Auria declares, ‘Revenge!  
for what?  uncharitable friend / On whom? lets speak a little, pray with reason’ (3.3).  Left 
to care for Spinella Aurelio takes this as his chance to prove his friendship—something 
Auria has previously denied him in the refusal of counsel—and this is what drives his 
zealous undertaking and clouds his perception of events. 
     This also informs his lack of remorse that borders on recalcitrance. In two instances 
where self-scrutiny and self-transformation are possible, Aurelio instead defends his 
actions against Auria’s reproof that his ‘rash indiscretion was the bellows / Which blew the 
coal (now kindled to a flame)’ (3.3).133  Aurelio’s unapologetic and unwavering responses 
signal an unwillingness to be viewed as causing distress, as this is contrary to the role of 
the friend.  But an audience is left to wonder if Aurelio protests too much. Perhaps, 
however, even though his actions may have done more harm than good, if understood in 
the context of his keen sense of duty as a friend that the play establishes in Act 1, they 
appear motivated less by Iago-like jealousy, and more by his raison d’être as merely ‘a 
friend to Auria’.134  Ford gives him no other life but that of a friend who tests the limits of 
friendship, and in the end, continues to assert resolute constancy in friendship, by 
                                                          
133 Catharine Edwards discusses the idea of self-scrutiny and self-transformation in Seneca’s letters to 
Lucilius and it is from here that I draw an understanding of this process in Ford. In Catharine Edwards, ‘Self-
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John G. Fitch (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 84-101; especially pp. 92-94. 
134 How Aurelio is listed in ‘The Speakers’ in John Ford, The Ladies Triall (London : Printed by E[dward] 
G[riffin] for Henry Shephard, 1639), sig. A4r. 
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declaring unapologetically that he would do the same again: ‘hear and believe it, / What I 
have done, was well done and well meant; / Twenty times over, were it new to do, / I’d 
do't and do't, and boast the pains religious’ (3.3).  Similar to Gesippus in Foxe’s play, 
Aurelio prefers death to dissolution of friendship, telling Auria ‘Yet since you shake me 
off, I slightly value / Other severity’ (3.3).  
      In effect, the ideal friend that Ford presents in Aurelio is strikingly similar in some 
ways to Francis Bacon’s characterisation of Overbury, whose ‘excess’ of friendship for 
Somerset led to his downfall. In his account of the Somerset prosecution for poisoning 
Overbury, Francis Bacon describes Overbury’s friendship for Somerset: 
 Sir Thomas Overbury for a long time was known to have had great interest  
 and great friendship with my Lord of Somerset, both in his meaner fortunes  
 and after; insomuch as he was a kind of oracle of direction unto him.135   
 
Overbury, too, opposed his friend’s marital choice, deeming Frances Howard ‘an 
unworthy woman’, but perhaps for less altruistic reasons.136  Bacon relates that ‘when 
Overbury saw that he was like to be dispossessed of my Lord here [Somerset], whom he 
had possessed so long, [...] he began not only to dissuade, but to deter him from that love 
and marriage’.137  Ford parallels this idea in The Lady’s Trial.  Spinella accuses Aurelio 
with misconstruing the incident in the bedchamber out of a desire to regain his place in 
Auria’s affection:  
                   Whiles you, belike,  
   Are furnish’d with some news for entertainment,  
   Which must become your friendship, to be knit  
   More fast betwixt your souls, by my removal,  
   Both from his heart and memory!   (2.4) 
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 She recognises Aurelio’s strict attendance to friendship’s precedents and understands this 
‘must’ compel him to report back to Auria.  Despite the play’s outcome in which the 
marriage bond remains strong and friendship maintained, Ford’s play, like the Somerset 
prosecution, signals the danger of friendship’s ‘excess’.  In Ford, it arises from a friend 
who practices friendship with rule-directed intensity, taking the ‘zeale’ that Cicero claims 
is ‘bredde in freendes’ too far.138 
     This chapter explored the various pressures placed on classical principles of friendship 
when put into practice in works that figured a further developed, ideal friend as an integral 
part of the action. The plays all point up the usefulness of the friend to plot, theme, and 
overall understanding.  At the same time, the works emphasised problems leading to 
asymmetrical practice including individual interpretation of friendship’s obligations, 
unequal affection, and differing degrees of  investment in friendship.  The next chapter 
moves a step further away from the ideal in its consideration of friendships of utility, 
where asymmetry of interest and reward drive its practice, further complicating 
friendship’s affective dimension. 
                                                          






Benefit, Fidelity and Performance in Friendships of Utility1 
 
The grief was palpable on 4 December 1572 at the Lancashire funeral of Edward Stanley, 
Earl of Derby, as attendants ‘with weeping hearts’ were ‘kneelinge on their knees’ while 
the earl was laid to rest.  This unmistakable graveside anguish recorded in the funeral 
account was not that of Stanley’s family, however, but rather, that of his yeomen, 
gentlemen ushers, comptroller Henry Stanley of Cross Hall; treasurer, Sir Richard 
Shireburn; and steward, William Massey, who symbolically ‘brake their white staves and 
roddes’of office ‘over their heades and threw the slivers of the same into the grave’.2  For 
these men, the future was uncertain, as the relationship they had with Stanley came to an 
end with his death.3  As the work of Alan Bray, Paul Hammond, Stephen Orgel, Eve 
Sedgwick and Curtis Perry suggest, reading homosocial relations during this period can be 
problematic. 4  This scene at Stanley’s funeral is no exception.  Were the men merely 
followers, similar to men Francis Bacon described in ‘Of Followers and Friends’, or were 
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account is part of the research for the MA submitted to the University of Birmingham September 2005 by 
Wendy Walters-DiTraglia.  
3 Derby’s generosity to his ‘men’ is well-documented, as some of his retainers benefited financially through 
leases of lands, whilst other men rose in the ranks of public office—e.g. Sir Piers Legh—during the earl’s 
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Workshop:  A Journal of Socialist and Feminist Historians 29 (1990), pp. 1-19; Mark Breitenberg, Anxious 
Masculinity in Early Modern England  (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 1996); Paul Hammond,  
Figuring Sex Between Men from Shakespeare to Rochester (Oxford: Clarendon, 2002); Stephen Orgel, 
Impersonations: The Performance of Gender in Shakespeare’s England. (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1997); 
Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, Between Men:  English Literature and Male Homosocial Desire (New York:  
Columbia University Press, 1985); Curtis Perry, Literature and Favoritism in Early Modern England 
(Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 2006). 
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they friends?  Were the tears the men shed those of grief, as their bond with Stanley ‘went 
beyond the more contractual implications of faithfulness’ that Mervyn James notes at 
times occurred in lord-affinity relations,5 or were they demonstrative of more than a hint 
of apprehension over their future livelihoods?  As James suggests, there was a close link 
that existed between ‘friendship, trust and fidelity’ in relationships of a lord and his 
followers, where faithful service was rewarded with ‘friendship’.6  But this type of 
friendship is unique in that it appears to move even farther from the ideal, as it is based on
inequality, figured in terms of necessity and reward and not compelled by virtue or love.  






mulations forward benefit. 
                                                
7  Albeit distinct from the ‘good’, it is of the sort that he describes as ‘profytable
and ‘loved’ for ‘gaines’.8  He does not however, endorse its practice.  Although he 
delineates it as a lesser form of friendship, he sees it as friendship nonetheless.  Even so, 
he outlines its drawbacks as similar to another lesser form of friendship, ‘delectation’, in 
that it ‘indureth so long as indureth the delectation and the perfite’.9  As James O. 
Grunebaum observes, Aristotle’s conceptions of friendship are differentiated only by the
bases for them: virtue, utility or pleasure.10 He does not consider the idea of affection in 
relation to these formulations.11 He does, however, draw an important similarity between 
the three.  Grunebaum explains that in Aristotle’s ideal and ‘less than ideal’ formulati
‘mutual assistance through reciprocal goodwill' is seen as ‘essential’.12 In this way, all 
three for
 
5 Mervyn James, Society, Politics and Culture: Studies in Early Modern England (Cambridge:  Cambridge 
University Press, 1986), p 330, fn 92 p. 330. 
6 James, p. 330, fn 92 p. 330. 
7 Aristotle, The Ethiques of Aristotle trans.  by John Wilkinson (London:  Richard Grafton, 1547), sig.H4r. 
8 Ethiques, Wilkinson, sig.H4r. 
9 Ethiques ,Wilkinson, sigs. H4r-H4v. 
10 James O. Grunebaum, Friendship: Liberty, Equality, and Utility (Ithaca:  SUNY Press, 2003), p. 40. 
11 Grunebaum, p. 38. 
12 Grunebaum, pp. 31-32. 
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     Cicero does not recognise this as friendship, for it lacks the foundation in affection and 
virtue.  He claims ‘frendship  prowles not after profit’.13  Similarly, Seneca views true 
friendship as ‘based on natural instinct and beneficence’ rather than ‘expediency or utility’, 
and sees the latter as motivated by ‘self-interest’.14  And self-interest is the key. In the 
previous chapter, the examination of constructions of ideal friends who dramatists figured 
as men rather than archetypes with ‘one soul’ exposed the illusion of similitude in 
friendship, as individual men understood, viewed, practiced and prioritised friendship 
differently.  Some clung to the vestiges of the classical ideal and imposed their application 
on their friends assiduously.  They were sometimes disappointed and frustrated as their 
friends recognised friendship’s benefits but did not match its obligations equally. The gap 
between self-interested friendship and disinterested friendship led to asymmetrical 
practice.  In friendships for profit, which from this point on will be referred to as 
friendships of utility (based  on later translations of Aristotle), variable asymmetrical 
practice was understood by both parties and was its hallmark.  It was a type of friendship 
that Francis Bacon lamented, when he closed ‘Of Followers and Friends’ with the words:  
‘there is little friendship in the world’, adding, ‘That that is, is betweene superior and 
inferiour, whose fortunes may comprehend, the one the other’.15  
      Practice of this type of friendship was not measured through application of classical 
ideals of counsel and succour, or magnanimous sacrifice.  It was based on the exchange of 
specific benefits that varied according to its individual participants.  Generally speaking, 
these were of a more demonstrable nature, yet not necessarily material.  So while the men 
                                                 
13 Marcus Tullius Cicero, The Booke of Freendeshippe in Fouure Severall Treatises of M. Tullius Cicero 
trans. by Thomas Newton (London:  Tho. Marshe, 1577), C7v; Cicero also discusses profit in same text, B6v-
B7r. Hereafter: Booke of Freendeshippe, Newton. 
14 Anna Lydia Motto Further Essays on Seneca Frankfurt:  Peter Lang, 2001), p.10. 




at Stanley’s funeral in no way equalled him in rank, status or economic standing and as 
such could not reciprocate his beneficence materially, they could demonstrate gratitude in 
other, more symbolic ways that would promote his reputation:  in the loyal diligence with 
which they undertook their offices, and in memoriam.  In this way, the private province of 
friendship became somewhat muted to its public link with affinity, honour and reputation.  
Practice became more akin to performance, sometimes on a grand scale, like the Stanley 
funeral.  The problem of course, is that some of these bonds may have engendered private 
affection, as well as loyalty amongst its participants. Lorna Hutson explains that in the 
sixteenth century friendship underwent a ‘transformation’ from ‘a code of “faithfulness” to 
‘that of an instrumental and affective relationship which might be generated, even between 
strangers, through emotionally persuasive communication, or the exchange of persuasive 
texts’.16  Determining the genuine degree of the affective bond generated through such 
performances, and indeed, discerning if a reciprocal one existed at all could be a  
difficult task, especially given the abandonment of the classical idea that like virtue was a 
prerequisite of friendship. 
     While the previous chapter recounted dramatic depictions of the ‘fruits of friendship’ 
realised by some friends who nobly, and even religiously, ‘practised’ it, this chapter 
examines the sweet rewards of amity that also engendered the establishment of friendships 
of utility.  Here the focus will be the rhetoric, scripting and performance of utilitarian 
friendship in obsequies, Court of Chivalry proceedings, and the Inns of Court and public 
stages.  This exploration moves from history to drama and back to history, with 
philosophical principles invoked when necessary, beginning with a consideration of the 
inherited manorial system, its sixteenth century transformation altering the way bonds 
                                                 
16 Lorna Hutson, The Usurer’s Daughter (London and New York:  Routledge, 1997), pp. 2-3. 
181 
 
between lords and their affinity were structured in the period.  In order to accurately 
historicise the work, a discussion of early modern gentry concerns of status, reputation and 
hospitality is included.  Seneca’s De beneficiis is employed as a comparative text when 
valuable, as are references to Cicero’s De amicitia and De officiis.17 This provides the 
context for a re-consideration of the anonymous Timon (1602-3) and Thomas Heywood’s 
A Woman Killed with Kindness  (1603)18 and will form the basis of an examination of the 
significance of their textual ‘meanings’ on the nature, philosophy and performance of 
utilitarian friendship in gentry culture.  The chapter concludes with a look at the rhetoric 
employed in epistolary performances of friendship through two of Erasmus’ letters 
included in the 1514 combined volume of De Copia and Parabolae and two of Francis 
Bacon’s letters to his friend, Toby Matthew.   
     The choice of an in-depth interrogation of utilitarian friendship in these two plays stems 
from ‘a confluence of feeling’ and understanding that emerges from their review within 
this particular historical context, which has not been previously considered in this way.  A 
Woman Killed with Kindness and Timon may seem peculiar bedfellows at first glance, as 
they are of different genres and were written for different audiences.  But their 
commonalities are significant, as they are written at a similar time, by dramatists familiar 
with the classics, with plots structured around aristocratic and gentry culture19 wherein 
                                                 
17Douglas Kries argues convincingly that De Officiis should be read less as a personal letter by Cicero to his 
son, Marcus, and more a didactic for the ‘aspiring young statesmen’ in Douglas Kries, ‘On the Intention of 
Cicero’s De Officiis’, The Review of Politics, 65.4 (Autumn, 2003), 375-393 (p. 379). 
18 For Timon, later scholarship by Bulman (1974) and agreement by Jowett (2004) sets the dating ‘soon after 
1601’, much later than 1586 asserted by Harbage . See Jowett, ‘Introduction’, in Timon of Athens by William 
Shakespeare, ed. by John Jowett (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 1-153 (p. 20).  In the 
introduction to the Malone Society edition of Timon, eds. Bulman, Nosworthy and Proudfoot (1978) set the 
limits as 1602-3.  This will be the date range settled on here. For A Woman Killed with Kindness, earliest 
printed text, Q1 1607 in Brian Scobie, ‘Introduction’,  A Woman Killed with Kindness by Thomas Heywood, 
ed. by Brian Scobie (London: A&C Black, 1985; rpt. 2003), vi-xxxvi, ( xxviii)  and Alfred Harbage Annals 
of English Drama 975-1600 rev. by S. Schoenbaum (London: Methuen, 1964), p. 86. 
19 For a description of ‘Who were the gentry?’ see Felicity Heal and Clive Holmes The Gentry in England 
and Wales 1500-1700 (Stanford:  Stanford University Press, 1994), pp. 7-8. 
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friendships of utility were endemic. More specifically, despite Timon’s Athenian setting, 
both plays evidence concerns similar to those that Brian Scobie notes of the subplot of A 
Woman Killed with Kindness, namely, ‘chivalrous values of reputation, gentility and 
aristocratic pride’, which are ‘medieval in character and social in preoccupation’.20  And 
these ideas have a direct relation to an understanding of utilitarian friendships within both 
plays.  Further, through the plays’ respective public and private spaces, of bustling Athens, 
and isolated country manor in the north, the dramatists paint a shared picture of a 
persistent loneliness amongst this social group, which drives their elusive pursuit for 
meaningful and unwavering affective bonds. In doing so, the dramatists problematise the 
ability to attain and sustain unequal friendships.  The genre categories notwithstanding, at 
the heart of one dramatist’s satire and another’s domestic tragedy is a portrayal of two men 
who seemingly have it all, but lose much, in their misdirected bids for true friendship.  
     Both plays have been derided critically, A Woman Killed with Kindness for its subplot 
and conclusion, most notably by William Hazlitt and TS Eliot, and Timon for its puerile 
nature when viewed in light of the later tragedy by Shakespeare and Middleton, Timon of 
Athens.21  This chapter offers a new reading of both plays, which hopes to overturn those 
views, examining the plays as a study of utilitarian friendship in gentry culture, based upon 
the usefulness of its partakers to each other, where position and liberality offer rewards to 
the recipient and giver alike.  Brian Scobie’s useful commentary on Heywood’s subplot 
and gentle values is a beginning, but this chapter will argue that ‘aristocratic pride’ is 
                                                 
20 Brian Scobie ‘Introduction’, vi, xvi. Scobie deems Heywood ‘something of a classicist’ noting his time at 
Cambridge and translation of Sallust (vi). Timon is anonymous but as Bulman and Nosworthy note, ‘the 
author was unquestionably well versed in Greek and Latin literature, in the form of philosophical disputation 
and in the process of law’ in ‘Introduction’ to Timon, Anon., ed. by JC Bulman, JM Nosworthy and GR 
Proudfoot, The Malone Society Reprints (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 1978; 1980), xiii-xiv, (xv).  
21 See Brian Scobie, ‘Introduction’, ix- x; George Steeven’s 1778 Edition of Shakespeare deems the play ‘a 
wretched one’, see Bulman, Nosworthy and Proudfoot  (xvii); Robert Hillis Goldsmith deems it ‘a rather 
childish, academic source’ in Robert Hillis Goldsmith, ‘Did Shakespeare Use the Old Timon 
Comedy?’Shakespeare Quarterly, 9.1 (Winter,1958), pp. 31-38 (p. 37). Jowett also notes Bulman’s cogent 
argument that the comedy is a source for Middleton and Shakespeare’s play in ‘Introduction’, p. 20. 
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present in the subplot as well as the main Frankford-Anne-Wendoll plot, presenting itself 
in ideas and expressions of beneficence and liberality and bound up with reputation, 
expectation and reward in a similar way that these ideas form the main concern of Timon.   
     In Natalie Zemon Davis’s study of ‘gift economies’ in sixteenth century France, she 
relates how hospitable acts of liberality by ‘high-ranking’ householders ‘not only 
confirmed local ties, but established reputation and rank’.22  Marcel Mauss’ later study, 
outlined in The Gift (1923-4) asserts a similar cultural understanding amongst North-West 
American Indian societies, concluding that ‘in some potlatch systems’ it was believed that 
‘the rich man who shows his wealth by spending recklessly is the man who wins 
prestige’.23  Zemon Davis and Mauss’ findings posit heightened reputation as a form of 
remuneration, and along with an in-depth consideration of the conventions of social 
exchange of friendship in De beneficiis, this idea will be explored in terms of Timon and A 
Woman Killed with Kindness. 
     The anonymous Timon is particularly suitable for this discussion because its dramatist, 
as John Jowett notes, ‘turns around the structural emphasis of Lucian’s dialogue, dealing in 
considerable length with Timon’s life in Athens’.24   In doing so the focus is turned to 
relationships with greater insights provided into friendship’s links with seeking and 
receiving honour and prestige.  Hence, this Timon not only offers an opportunity for 
contemplation because of its differing representation and critical dismissal, but also 
because it offers more potential to interrogate ideas of the economies of aristocratic 
utilitarian friendships, namely, expectation, liberality, reciprocity, reputation and reward. 
A similar resonance is found in A Woman Killed with Kindness.  First however,  a survey 
                                                 
22 Natalie Zemon Davis, ‘The Gift in Sixteenth-Century France (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 2000), 
p.58. 
23 Marcel Mauss, The Gift trans. by Ian Cunnison (Glencoe, Illinois:  Free Press, 1954), p.35. 
24 Jowett, ‘Introduction’, p. 21. 
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of the different discourses—historical, philosophical and legal—where these ideas were 
explored and the cultural spaces where they were performed will be undertaken to 
establish the context that will inform the readings.   
 
I. Affinity, Beneficence, Honour and Reputation  
Early references to friendship convey a sense of its utilitarian designation and 
understanding well before the early modern period.  To ‘friend’ was used as a verb, 
meaning ‘to act as friend’ which was described as ‘to assist, to help’.25  In 1400, one 
connotation for friend was ‘anything helpful’.26 Entries for this understanding of 
friendship beginning in 120527 places this designation in the midst of the medieval period, 
where the feudalistic structure was based on a useful system of exchange and reward 
between lords and their tenants.  As Mervyn James notes, the Tudor period however, 
heralded a change in contractual relations between lords and their followers, which led
shift in these relationships, as ‘royal authority’ was exercised in tenancy agreements
‘feudal ties declined’, and ‘the more informal relationship of friendship was all that 
remained’.




                                                
28  But the key in James’ analysis is the word ‘informal’.  Whilst this may 
suggest a more casual, familiar type of friendship, which may or may not have incl
affective bonds, understanding the nature of such  friendships is problematic because the 
relationships still rested firmly on utility, whether it was recognised or deemed as such.
The absence of equality and paramount importance of shared usefulness in such relations 
 
25 ‘Friend’ (v), def. 3 in The Oxford English Dictionary. 
26 ‘Friend’(n), def. 5d in OED. 
27 ‘Friend’, def. 5a :’One who wishes (another, a cause, etc.) well; a sympathiser, favourer, helper, patron or 
supporter; a supporter of an institution or the like, contributing help, money, etc.’(1205 earliest reference) 
Entry 5c  ‘friend in or at court: one who has ability and disposition to help another by his influence in high 
quarters (1400 earliest reference) in OED . 
28 James, pp. 330-331. 
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are the hallmarks of utilitarian friendship; a bond, as Aristippus advises Carisophus in 
Damon and Pythias wherein commodity ‘measures’ amity.29  
                                                
     This understanding of friendship was also an important part of the Elizabethan political 
culture, structured around what David Harris Sacks terms ‘the countervailing of benefits’ 
based on Senecan principles of ‘giving and receiving benefits’, which fuelled the 
patronage system.30  Seneca disavowed friendships for profit, but he recognised that 
beneficence could engender friendship.  In De beneficiis he suggests that the giving of a 
benefit is ‘wherout of sprinketh friendship’, and describes the act of accepting a benefit as 
‘receyuing of freendshipe’.31   The idea of benefit and friendship seems incongruous, but 
Seneca approaches the idea from a classical perspective which makes the two compatible.  
Reaffirming the classical call for affection and virtue in friendship, Seneca sees ‘genuine 
friendship’ as dependent on ‘love and generosity’.32  In this way, benefiting one’s friend is 
important because it fulfils the requirement that ‘each friend not only perfects himself but 
also finds the opportunity to assist the other’.33  Much like rules governing friendship, 
Seneca sets out rules to guide this practice of friendship, because he recognised that 
relationships frequently disintegrate because men lack an understanding of the principles 
of giving and receiving benefits.  The main problem, according to Seneca, arises from 
what he views as the most ‘frequent’ vice:  ingratitude.34  As discussed in Chapters 2 and 3 
ingratitude was a frequent complaint in the asymmetrical practice of friendship.  This was 
 
29 Richard Edwards, Damon and Pythias (1.14.57-58). Cicero also acknowledges ‘commodities’ in 
friendship in The Booke of Freendeshipe, Newton, sig. B2r. But the rewards emphasised are not material, 
and mainly the love of the friend, although the word chosen evokes another sense. 
30 David Harris Sacks ‘The Countervailing of Benefits:  Monopoly, Liberty, and Benevolence in Elizabethan 
England’ in Tudor Political Culture ed. by Dale Hoak, pp.272-291, (284-285). 
31 Lucius Annaeus Seneca , The Woorke of the Excellent Philosopher Lucius Annaeus Seneca Concerning 
Benefyting That Is Too Say the Dooing, Receyuing, and Requyting of Good Turnes trans. by Arthur Golding 
(London : By [John Kingston for] John Day, 1578), sigs. E4r , F4v. Hereafter: De beneficiis,  Golding. 
32 Motto, p. 10. 
33 Motto, p. 11. 
34 Seneca, De beneficiis trans. by Thomas Lodge, rpt.  of 1612 edn. by Israel Gollancz (London:  J.M. Dent, 
1899), p. 2. Hereafter : De beneficiis, Lodge. 
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a consideration of dramatists in their figuring of characters such as Gesippus, Eumenides 
and Aurelio.  Thomas Elyot, recounting the Titus and Gesippus narrative highlights the 
potential for the literal dissolution of friendship because of ungratefulness:  ‘the ingratitude 
of Titus, for whom he suffred all that mysery: the remembraunce wherof was so 
intollerable, that he determined no lenger to lyve in that anguyshe and dolour’.35   In De 
beneficiis Seneca addresses this problem in order to help men forge and sustain societal 
bonds of friendship.  He outlines in detail the responsibilities of giver and recipient alike, 
which include using ‘judgement and discretion’ in choosing a recipient, giving without 
turning it into a ‘debt’, and receiving with ‘thankfulness’.36  G. W. Peterson aptly notes 
that De beneficiis provides ‘a definition of what binds human society together’37 and the 
aim is to help men to keep those ties strong.  Even so, one can see how friendship that 
develops and must be sustained by exchange moves further away from the ideal.  
Additionally, it is apparent how this model could be misconstrued, and misapplied, and 
approached for gain and profit, rather than an affective bond, rendering friendship the 
useful commodity that Cicero and Seneca denounced.   
     On the other hand, Seneca saw how an understanding of the rules of social exchange 
might be helpful in governing such amicable relations.  And there were some formulations 
of early modern friendship that mirrored Seneca’s understanding that benefits can establish 
and sustain such ties.  Mervyn James talks about friendship relations between lords and 
their affinity which offered benefit to both parties, with ‘a lord’s friendship’ revealed ‘in 
the special trust, goodwill and favour extended to a dependant’ which in return obliged ‘a 
                                                 
35 Thomas Elyot, The Boke Named the Governour (London:  Thomas East, 1580), sig. T2r. 
36 De beneficiis, Lodge, pp. 4-11. 
37 G. W. Peterman, Paul’s Gift from Philippi :  Conventions of Gift Exchange and Christian Giving 
(Cambridge: and New York,  Cambridge University Press, 1997 ), p. 53. 
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response of fidelity and gratitude’.38  This reciprocal friendship relationship between the 
gentry and their retinue was part of the ‘lineage culture’ James’ work demonstrates was 
present in the north (the setting of Heywood’s play) during the sixteenth century, under 
families such as the Percies and Nevilles,39 dramatis personae of Shakespeare’s history 
plays.  This social bond established between the aristocracy and their retainers, followers 
and dependants promoted order through a ‘common allegiance to the great family which 
dispensed the benefits of “good lordship” in return for proffered fidelity and obedience’.40  
James cites the use of the term ‘friends’ by the fourth Duke of Norfolk and the earl of 
Northumberland to refer to politic relations with dependable followers, and suggests the 
likelihood that ‘friendship was increasingly emphasized in the relationship between lord 
and affinity’ during the Tudor reign.41  There is no doubt that fidelity engendered from 
these types of reciprocal friendships could be useful, especially during times of unrest and 
uprising.  A similar understanding was integral to the pageant associated with Elizabeth’s 
royal entry discussed in Chapter 1.  Here an inclusive definition of friendship between 
monarch and subjects was proffered, with the resulting unity portrayed symbolically as a 
'rampart for the kingdom’.42  Even though there is neither a ‘one soul in two bodies’ unity, 
nor necessarily an affective connection asserted in this understanding of friendship, there 
still remains a reflection of the anticipation of constancy proposed in discussions of the 
classical ideal:  that ever important help in adversity.   
      Not only was it thought that these friendships could protect, but also, they were 
believed to help promote virtue, much like their classical forerunners. This was significant, 
                                                 
38 James, p. 330; fn 92 p. 330. 
39 James, p. 274 
40 James, p. 271. 
41 James, p.331, p. 331 fn. 95. 
42 The Quenes Majesties Passage through the citie of London to Westminster the daye before her coronacion 
(London:  Richard Tottel, 1559) in The Queen’s Majesty’s Passage  ed. by Germaine Warkentin (Toronto:  




in that the obligation of beneficence and the performance of virtuous acts was an integral 
part of the ‘honour culture’ and ‘chivalric ethos’43 amidst the ranks of the aristocracy in 
the Elizabethan and Stuart periods.  Mervyn James notes that a lord’s entry into t
‘community of honour’ required ‘virtuous deeds’, which were aimed at demonstrating ‘the 
innate quality of his honourable blood’.
he 
                                                
44  According to Malcom Smuts, ‘rival claims of 
education and merit’ by Elizabethan humanists, challenged lineage as ‘a plurality of the 
published literature stressed the superiority of virtue to birth in conferring honour’.45  One 
such work, The Accedens of Armory (1562) by Gerard Legh, highlights this understanding, 
asserting ‘Noblenes of vertue’is gained ‘by exercise of good workes, with whom they are 
familiar’.46  Familiars typically referred to members of ‘one’s family or household’ or 
those with whom one was ‘extremely friendly’ or otherwise ‘intimately associated’.47 This 
definition would extend to those with whom one shared kinship ties, as well as friends.  In 
this way, it would correlate with Seneca’s idea about friendship as providing an 
opportunity to ‘perfect’ oneself, as well as one’s friend.48  This idea had greater 
contemporary resonance however, as more weight was given to the proactive undertaking 
of deeds that demonstrate virtue. As Legh contends, ‘So much is noblenes of vertue, more 
precious then noblenes of lignage [sic].’49  So while the Cushman sermon cited in Chapter 
1 suggested the public usefulness of acting as a friend to one’s neighbour, there were many 
individual benefits to be gained from munificence.  Public shows of Christian friendship 
 
43 These terms discussed in James,  pp. 308-413. 
44 James, p. 332. This aspect of lineage conferring honour but ‘supplemented by virtue ‘was represented in 
the Boke of St. Albans (1486-1610 several printings between this period) and a translation of Lull’s The Book 
of the Ordre of Chyvalry (1483-5). See James, p. 310. 
45 Malcom Smuts, Culture and Power in England 1585-1685 (New York:  St. Martin’s Press, 1999), pp. 8-
11. 
46 Gerard Legh,,The Accedens of Armory (London: Richard Tottill [sic?], 1562), fol 23r. 
47 ‘Familiar’, def. 1a, 2 in ’OED. 
48 Lydia Ann Motto defines this as ‘the crucial value of friendship’ as per Seneca in Motto, Essays, p. 11. 
49 Legh, fols 22v-r. This work was brought to my attention in Mervyn  James’work. He quotes the second 
citation himself on p. 332. 
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could also contribute to the accretion of godly, moral virtue and public reputation, again, 
tied in with the chivalric concept of honour.50   
     This idea of concern for one’s honour and reputation, and the latter’s potential as a 
transactional commodity is important for our purposes and resonates in posthumous 
tributes to other gentry at the time.  In epitaphs and funeral sermons, men like Thomas 
Dutton, Esquire of Cheshire, were remembered for their liberality towards their ‘poore 
friends and neighbours’.51  The inscription on John Warburton’s brass plaque 
commemorating this Cheshire gentleman’s life remembers Warburton as a ‘friend to the 
poor’.52  The one hundred poor at Stanley’s funeral attests to his beneficence, which if 
Stowe’s accounts are correct was substantial, on a daily basis over 35 years.53  While 
today we would deem someone who was generous a humanitarian, we might not 
necessarily refer to them as a friend, but in early modern England this was indeed one o
the many ‘faces’ of friendship.  It corresponds to the inclusive amity discussed as caritas 
in Chapter 1 in relation to Wilkinson's translation of Aristotle’s Ethics.
f 
ons and 
                                                
54  For men of 
gentle birth like Dutton, Stanley and Warburton, such acts of friendship could serve a 
beneficial purpose even after their deaths, in terms of enhancing their social memory and 
their families’ social identity. This is why the acts were referenced in funeral serm
 
50 See James, p. 327-330. 
51 For instance, see the funeral sermon of Thomas Dutton of Dutton, Esquire, after his death on 28 December 
1614, by  Richard Eaton, minister. Richard Eaton, A Sermon Preached at the Funeralls of that Worthie and 
Worshipfull Gentleman, Master Thomas Dutton of Dutton, Esquire (London:  John Legatt for Samuel Man, 
1616), D2v .  Part of the research for the MA at University of Birmingham, Wendy-Walters DiTraglia, 2005. 
52 This section of the brass reads: ‘IN RELIGIONE CONSTANS/ AMATOR LITERARV & AMICVS 
PAVPERV’John Warburton (d. 1575),  brass plaque in the Warburton Chapel  (c. 15th c. chantry chapel), St. 
Mary and All Saints, Great Budworth, Cheshire. This from Wendy Walters-DiTraglia, ‘Death’, Part  pp.35-
54, (p. 52).  
53 Stowe contends that the earl, as well as feeding ‘especially aged persons, twice a day 60. and beside all 
comers, thrice a weeke’, also supplied ‘another, 2700. with meate, drink money and money worth’ on ‘Good 
fryday’ for thirty-five years. In John Stowe, The Annales or Generall Chronicle of England (London:  
Thomas Adams, 1615), p. 673 lines 58 v-59v; 3 r-6 r. Thomas William King suggests that Stowe was incorrect 
about the holiday, and that it was actually Christmas in ‘Edward Earl of Derby 1572’ in Lancashire Funeral 
Certificates ed. by Thomas William King with additions by FR Raines (Printed for the Chetham Society:  
1869), pp. 11-12. 
54 Ethiques , Wilkinson, sigs.H7v-H8r. 
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on funerary monuments and why the poor were included in the heraldic funerary ritual.55  
The benefit was also felt publicly, especially as benefactors such as Stanley met some of 
the food needs of the poorer citizens.  Not only would this benefit the commonwealth 
fiscally, but given the potential for unrest during times of dearth, Stanley’s acts may hav
helped to foster that all important st
e 
ability.    
                                                
  
 II. Demonstrations of Fidelity   
Even though friendships of utility did not require life-saving sacrificial acts to display 
constancy, there were other essential demonstrations of fidelity that were expected and 
mutually understood.  Again, given the unequal bases for these friendships and the 
frequent disparity in rank and status of its participants, non-pecuniary demonstrations 
served a useful purpose.  The prose elegy, ‘The Dead Man’s Right’ (1593), written for 
Robert Dudley, Earl of Leicester (1588 d.) is illustrative of the connection made between 
honour and virtuous acts, but also serves as another example of an act of posthumous 
fidelity by a friend or follower.56   Speaking in defence of Dudley’s reputation, the writer, 
known only as RS, asks rhetorically (and defiantly), ‘Did he purchase his honours 
otherwise than by his vertues, [...]?’57  Here the friend deflects the aspersions cast on his 
dead friend’s reputation. 
     Whilst obedience and fidelity historically included military defence of land, Smuts 
notes, by the end of the sixteenth century English noblemen had ceased their journeying 
about with ‘cavalcades of armed retainers’.58  Fidelity now could be judged by one’s 
willingness to defend the reputation of one’s lord.  Maintaining an honourable reputation 
 
55 See Wendy Walters-DiTraglia (now Trevor), ‘Death’, Part 1, pp. 103-116. 
56 R.S. is unknown but is posited to be Richard Stapleton (friend of the dramatist George Chapman).  R.S. of 
the Inner Temple, The Phoenix Nest (London: John Jackson, 1593), sig. A3v. 
57 R.S., Phoenix, sig. A3v. 
58 Smuts, p. 8. 
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was essential.  The preponderance of defamation cases brought before the High Court of 
Chivalry through 1633/34 in an attempt to curtail duelling speaks to this persisting 
concern.59  The May 1640- January 1641 case of Thomas Badd of Camsoyell, Fareham, 
Hampshire, esquire against Robert Rigges of Fareham, Hampshire, gentleman, illustrates 
the understanding of friendship between lord and follower and how public demonstrations 
of fidelity may be viewed in these relationships. Badd’s action stems from his claim that at 
the Red Lion Inn on 27 January 1639/40 Rigges said:  
 
 Thou art a base fellow and the sonne of a Cobler and no gentleman. And  
 knowing that your petitioner hath particular relation to a right honourable Earl 
 of this Kingdome, Knight of the Garter and one of the Privy Councell to his  
 Majestie, he told your petitioner in a geering and scornfull manner, I know  
 your great friend and names the said Earle, saying he was a poore beggarly  
 lord and cared not a jot for what he could do for your petitioner.60 
 
Badd views the affronts to his gentle status as impugning his reputation, but also considers 
the insults made publicly against his ‘great friend’ Edward Sackville, Baron Buckhurst, 4th 
Earl of Dorset.  He considers them damaging enough to report them to the earl.  Rigges 
denies the allegations and suggests that Badd has reported the ‘pretended words’ because 
Rigges has ‘indicted Badd for contemptuous words against the king at the Hampshire 
assizes in June 1640’. 61 Either way, Badd understands that his reporting, whether true or 
false, will help to stand him in good stead with the earl, who subsequently files a petition 
against Rigges.  The friendship of the earl and Badd is not described in detail, but it is 
                                                 
59 R.P.Cust and A.J.Hopper (eds), Cases in the High Court of Chivalry, 1634-1640  (Harleian Society, new 
series vol. 18, 2006) < http://www.court-of-chivalry.bham.ac.uk/newcourt.htm> [accessed 23 June 2008] 
60 From ‘The case of Thomas Badd of Camsoyell, Fareham, co. Hampshire esq v Robert Riggs the elder of 
Fareham, co. Hampshire, gent.June-Dec 1640’, Petition 5/48 in Cust and Hopper.  
61 From ‘Edward Sackville, 4th Earl of Dorset, against Robert Rigges of Fareham, Hampshire’ June-
December 1640 in Cust and Hopper.  
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clear that Badd is one of his ‘men’. The libel account of Thomas Badd’s reply to Rigges 
suggests the utility of his friendship with the earl:  ‘Thomas Badd answering that he never 
yet had any cause worth the troubling of the Lord of Dorset, but if he had it was likely he 
would repayre to his lordship, and make use of him’.62 Badd demonstrates an 
understanding that his friendship with the earl can be useful, but also that he has 
obligations to reciprocate when presented with an opportunity.  This incident provided just 
such an opportunity; an occasion to demonstrate fidelity through concern for a friend’s 
reputation, similar to that which R.S. seized in his print defence of Dudley, and Stanley’s 
men took at his graveside. A consideration of this historical context and the associated 
ideas of beneficence, performance, reputation, and reciprocity will inform the alternate 
readings of Timon and A Woman Killed with Kindness that follow. 
 
  III. Timon:  Audience, Performance, Narrative                                                                             
There is little written about Timon.  Its dramatist is unknown. J. C. Bulman and J. M. 
Nosworthy have identified two scribes’ hands in the manuscript, which is housed in the 
Victoria and Albert Museum.63  Because of the play’s Shakespearean and Jonsonian 
‘echoes’ the play has been dated c. 1602-1603.64  Bulman and Nosworthy argue for the 
‘virtual certainty’ that the play ‘was written for a performance at one of the Inns of Court’, 
possibly the Inner Temple.65   
     The importance of dramatic performance to aristocratic culture has been studied by Ann 
Jennalie Cook and Susan Westfall, as well as Andrew Gurr, who notes the frequency of 
                                                 
62 Libel 20/1g from Edward Sackville, 4th Earl of Dorset v Robert Rigges of Fareham, co. Hampshhire, gent. 
June-Dec 1640 in  Cust and Hopper.   
63 Bulman and Nosworthy, ‘Introduction’, v. 
64 Bulman and Nosworthy, xiii-xiv. 
65 Bulman and Nosworthy, xi-xiii; John Jowett gives this view merit in Jowett, ‘Introduction’, Timon of 
Athens, p. 20. 
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afternoon visits to London playhouses by Inns of Court students.66  As dramatic venues, 
Cook describes the Inns of Court as ‘entrenched areas of theatrical activity’.67 Comedies 
that satirise persons, politics or societal concerns are as old as treatises on friendship, as 
the comedies of Aristophanes and Pherecrates, The Birds, and The Savages bear out.  Inns 
of Courts students seemed to follow this theatrical tradition in the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries, ‘ridiculing their superiors’ and ‘satririzing legal forms, procedures 
and personages’ in holiday revels. 68  A. Wigfall Green’s research on drama on the Inns of 
Court stages finds there was a broad interest:  in the classical, tragic, didactic and 
comedic.69  Gorbuduc (1561/2) graced the Inner Temple stage in 1561/2, Jocasta and The 
Comedy of Errors played at Gray’s Inn in 1566 and 1594 respectively, and Twelfth Night 
was on stage at the Middle Temple in 1601/2.70  It is easy to understand how Timon’s 
anonymous dramatist saw, in what Greg suggests was at first a literary manuscript,71 its 
potential, when he perhaps unknowingly followed in Aristophanes’ footsteps, who, long 
before, ‘ridiculed [Timon] in comedy’.72  The choice of the story of Timon is in keeping 
with the interests of the Inns’ audiences, and its satirical treatment makes it easy to see 
how it could suit a holiday revel.  Not only might it satisfy a taste for the classical or 
                                                 
66 See for example, Ann Jennalie Cook, ‘Audiences:  Investigation, Interpretation, Invention’in A New 
History of Early English Drama ed. by John D. Cox and David Scott Kastan  (New York:  Columbia 
University Press, 1997), pp. 305-320 and Suzanne R. Westfall, Patrons and Performance : Early Tudor 
Household Revels (Oxford : Clarendon, 1990); Andrew Gurr, Playgoing in Shakespeare’s London, 2nd edn 
(Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 68-69, 73. 
67 Cook, p. 307. 
68 A. Wigfall Green The Inns of Court and Early English Drama (New Haven:  Yale University Press, 1931), 
p.1. 
69 For discussion on genre and plays, and Inner Temple records, see Green, pp. 142-157.  Tragedies do 
account for a significant proportion of the plays listed in the Inner Temple records (pp. 153-155) and Green 
argues that ‘the romantic element of Gorbuduc’ was ‘definitely subordinated to political didacticism’, p. 144. 
70. For dating of performances see Harbage, Annals, Green (Records, pp. 153-155) and Bulman et al, xiv.  
For Twelfth Night and Comedy the records of Inner Temple in Green are employed. 
71Greg in Bulman and Nosworthy, viii.  The revisions, JC Bulman and JM Nosworthy argue, ‘appear to be 
more theatrical than literary in nature’,  x. 
72 Armstrong notes Aristophanes treatment of the Timon character in A. Macc. Armstrong, ‘Timon of Athens 
a Legendary Figure?’, Greece & Rome, Second Series, 34.1 (April., 1987), 7-11 (p. 11). Further, he relates 
that there was a comedy written by Antiphanes in the fourth century called Timon (p. 8) and that he ‘is first 
mentioned’ in Aristophanes The Birds and Phrynichus The Recluse (8), the latter, like Timon, also a 
‘character play’, p. 8.   
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didactic, its young educated audience capable of seeing the Aristotelian, Ciceronean and 
Senecan resonances and contraventions, but it may also have garnered appreciation from 
the young would-be courtiers for the lampooning of the politics of friendships of utility. 
Given the importance of instrumental73 friendships to the futures of these gentlemen, it is 
not surprising that amity was a theme of other Inns’ productions.  Gesta Grayorum, the 
1594/5 Christmas revels at Gray’s Inn, included a masque with the Goddess of Amity and 
Orestes and Pylades.  The Inner Temple hosted the (now lost) play Lady Amity c. 1604.74 
     Ancient works by Aristophanes, Comicus, Lucian, Neanthes, Plato, Plutarch and Strabo 
all reference the figure of Timon, the misanthrope,75 but it was the early modern 
translations of Lucian and Plutarch that contributed to the period’s understanding of the 
story, and served as a source for both Timon and the later, Timon of Athens by Thomas 
Middleton and William Shakespeare.76  Shakespeare and Middleton’s tragic treatment of 
the narrative may retain some of the Lucianic satire,77 but the anonymous dramatist’s 
comedic handling of the tale frequently pushes it to the point of caricature. Even so, this 
work, which is thought to be a source for Shakespeare’s play,78 maintains an underlying 
admonitory sense, despite Timon’s epilogue wherein his ‘heart grows milde & laies aside 
its hate’ (fol. 24a, 2622). This ending was perhaps more suited to its holiday revel occasion 
and its young gentlemen audience at the Inn, who would find that the reality of court life 
would preclude their eschewing mankind in favour of forging useful friendships at court.  
 
                                                 
73 The term ‘instrumental’ to describe such friendships is from Hutson, p. 3. 
74 Recorded in Harbage, Annals, p. 88. 
75 See Armstrong pp.7-11.  
76See Jowett, pp.18-19; Francis Hickes of Christ Church Oxford was one such translator of the work from 
Greek to English; Interestingly, even Thomas Heywood recounts ‘the argument of the dialogue’ of Timon in 
Pleasant Dialogues and Dramma’s, selected out of Lucian, Erasmus, Textor, Ovid, &c. (London: Printed by 
R. O[ulton] for R. H[earne],1637); Scholarship supports this work as the source for the anonymous comedy, 
as well as Shakespeare and Middleton’s work, see Jowett, pp.18-19 and Bulman and Nosworthy,  xiv. 
77 Jowett, p. 24. 
78 See Jowett, p. 20; See also Bulman and Nosworthy, xvi. 
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IV. Beneficence and Friendship in Timon  
 Recent scholarship on Middleton and Shakespeare’s Timon of Athens does not consider 
the work in relation to Seneca’s De beneficiis.79 However, Tom MacFaul’s suggestion that 
Shakespeare’s Timon ‘expresses friendship through giving’ correlates to what is at the 
heart of Seneca’s work, ‘that beneficence wisely given establishes friendships’.80  This is 
an important point which is explored in the anonymous Timon and can be further 
understood when considered in conjunction with Seneca’s ideas on friendship and giving 
in De beneficiis.    
     Exchange and reciprocal giving is not at odds with the practice of classical friendship.   
Even Cicero in De amicitia recognises, as Peterman notes, that ‘the giving and receiving of 
favours is a part of friendship.’81 That said, as Cicero sees it, this giving should not be held 
to reckoning:  
 
 Me thinketh trewe freendeship is a richer and a bountifuller thyng, and doeth  
 not take so narrowe heade to geve no more than it maie receive. Neither is  
 there suche feare to bee taken in freendeship, that we lease not a good tourne,  
 or let it fal in the mire, or that we heape not up more benefites than just   
 measure. 82 
 
Cicero does not expound on how these relations should be ordered, as his perfect 
friendship, grounded in the virtue of its participants, would undoubtedly ensure honourable 
behaviour along these lines.  Seneca however, despite his agreement that perfect friendship 
could be realised (albeit by Stoic sages), also believed, as Anna Lydia Motto claims, ‘that 
                                                 
79 Tom MacFaul, Male Friendship in Shakespeare and his Contemporaries (Cambridge:  Cambridge 
University Press, 2007), p. 145;  John Jowett cites Cicero’s De amicitia as a source for the play’s 
understanding of friendship, in ‘Jowett, p. 69. 
80 MacFaul, p. 145; Peterman, p.66. 
81 Peterman, p. 63. 
82 Marcus Tullius Cicero, The Booke of Freendeship of Marcus Tullie Cicero trans. by John Harington 
(London: Thomas Berthelette, 1562), E7r-E7v. Hereafter: The Booke of Freendeship, Harington.  
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friendship is essential in order to put into practice one’s knowledge, beneficence, charity, 
humanitas’.83  As such, he outlines the importance of giving and receiving in friendship in 
practical terms, so that amicable bonds can be maintained for the benefit of society and 
one’s virtue. As noted in Chapter 1, Arthur Golding and Thomas Lodge recognised the 
usefulness of De beneficiis in terms of the astute advice it provided to sustain the many 
formulations of friendship that men enjoyed in early modern England.  One of those 
formulations, discussed in the beginning of this chapter was that between a lord and his 
men.  This is the model that Timon’s dramatist explores.   
     The unequal relationship is established based on Timon’s wealth and others’ need. 
Timon sees himself as a friend to those who are less economically advantaged. When his 
faithful servant, Laches, returns home with sacks of golden talents and asks if he should 
put them away for safe-keeping, Timon replies munificently, ‘Lett poore men somewhat 
take of my greate plenty / I would not have them grieve, that they went / empty from 
Timons threshould, and I will not see / my pensive freinds to pyne with penurie’(1.1.13-
16). The ‘poor men’ become ‘friends’ in the final alliterative reference through their 
partaking of his benefit.  In doing so, Timon acknowledges his understanding that in 
giving he is bestowing friendship. Additonally, the dramatist suggests that Timon is 
practicing his virtue through friendship in true Senecan fashion.  This beneficent friendship 
reflects the inclusive amity described by Aristotle as ‘the love that ought to bee amongest 
menne’, whereby ‘the greater man ought to geve unto the lesse winnyng, & the lesse ought 
to geve unto the greater honor and reverence’.84  The friendship Aristotle proposes is not 
based on reciprocal affection, but rather, on the valuable reward realised by its participants 
                                                 
83 Motto, p. 10. 
84 Ethiques, Wilkinson, sigs. J1v-J2r. 
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according to their needs; reward that needs to continue on each side for the bond to remain 
intact.   
     Affection however, could be engendered through the friendly act.  As discussed earlier, 
Seneca claims in De beneficiis it is from the benefit ‘wherout of sprinketh friendship’, as 
the friendly act engenders a feeling of goodwill, an amicable bond.85  In accepting the 
benefit, the recipient is ‘receyuing of freendshipe’.86  Returning to the display of 
friendship at the Stanley funeral that opened this chapter, this idea gets full expressi
Here beneficence prompted a show of that affection. If the tears of mourning witnessed a
the graveside were any indication, Stanley engendered the love of his subordinate 
‘friends’.  He had a reputation for beneficence that was earned through his generous acts.  
And this is precisely the amicable bond that Timon believes he has established with hi
‘friends’ through his giving. The problem is that Timon is not a Senecan disinterested 
giver. He does not approach his giving according to Senecan philosophy which is strongly 





                                                
 And since the greatest friendship we can intend to any man, is to make him  
 equall with our selves, and suffer him in everie sort and joyntly to enjoy our  
 goods and fortunes; so ought we equally to advise him to the good and honour  
 of us both. I will give unto him in his necessitie, yet in such manner and   
 measure, that I will shunne mine owne miserie: If I see him in danger of life, I  
 will succour him;87  
      As this suggests, giving in friendship does not necessarily refer to material 
possessions:  ‘this man giveth succours; that ornament; these other consolations’; all are 
 
85 De beneficiis, Golding, sig. E4r. 
86 De beneficiis, Golding, sig F4v. 
87 De beneficiis, Lodge, pp. 49-50. 
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capable of engendering a feeling of goodwill which creates an amicable bond. 88  What the 
play registers however, is the sense that giving must be realised solely in outward shows or 
performance in material terms. It also places an emphasis on reciprocal reward.  This is 
seen in Timon’s continual pursuit of furthered reputation for giving.  It distinguishes this 
Timon from the Timon in Middleton and Shakespeare’s work whom Tom MacFaul finds 
‘does not want to be repaid’, and rejects ‘any attempts to reciprocate friendship’.89  
Nevertheless, repayment is central to an understanding of giving and friendship, even in 
Seneca.  The key is that the benefactor gives without the expectation of reciprocation.  
However, he should receive it, along with gratitude from the recipient. This is disinterested 
giving at its best and is a hallmark of virtue and sagacity.   
     The representation of Timon’s giving differentiates him as a self-interested giver. His 
preoccupation with the honour he might realise from beneficent acts supports this idea.  
Although his interest reflects the early modern aristocratic concern of reputation that 
affected Stanley, and would not be lost on the gentleman audience at the Inns of Court, 
here it is treated sardonically, his concern exaggerated.  Timon understands the link 
between virtue and giving, denouncing the rich man who may ‘sitt at home and hugg 
himselfe  / rubbing his greedy right hand wth. his gould’(1.1.44-45).   He is depicted as 
understanding that virtue is a conveyor of honour, and liberality a virtue.  Twenty-four 
lines after a philanthropic declaration to share his riches with the poor, however, he revels 
in the honour and reverence his giving engenders:    
  
It is to me a Tryumph and a glorye 
that people fynger poynt at me and saye 
this, this is he, that his lardge wealth and store 
                                                 
88 De beneficiis, Lodge p. 92. 
89MacFaul, p. 144. 
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scatters among the Comons & the poore (1.1.40-43) 
 
Recognition for one’s beneficence is not in itself problematic.  According to Seneca, 
‘fame’ is indeed the ‘second frute’ of giving.90  But there is a difference between this as a 
consequence and this as an incentive, as Seneca makes clear:  ‘For his intent was not too 
have anie thing in recompence: for then had it not bin a benefite but a bargeine’.91  It is 
this distinction that renders the friendship in giving as one of utility, for in true friendshi
friend seeks to benefit the other without considering recompense, whereas a bargain is a 
‘transaction’ akin to ‘an agreement between two parties settling how much each gives and 
takes, or what each performs and receives’.
p a 
                                                
92  So when Timon tells Laches, ‘lett the people 
knowe / How bountifull the hands of Timon are’ (1.1.48-49), his giving appears more of a 
Senecan bargain than a benefit. And the dramatist pushes this idea even further, 
punctuating the scene with a vociferous declaration by Timon reaffirming his 
preoccupation with his reputation: 
 
 The noyse ascend’s to heav’n; Timon’s greate name 
 In the Gods eares resounds, to his great fame 
 This I hear willinglie and t’is farre sweeter 
 then sound of harpe, or any pleasant meetre 
 I magnified by the peoples crye 
 shall mount in glorye to the heavens high. (1.1.52-57) 
 
     The virtue that Timon recognised as arising from giving is conspicuously absent from 
this soliloquy.  In his appeal to glory he reveals that it is not virtue, but rather the pursuit of 
fame that drives his giving.  Fame is the reward that Timon seeks and receives and it may 
 
90 Seneca, De beneficiis, trans. by Golding, sig G2v. 
91 Seneca, De beneficiis, trans. by Golding, sig. G1v. 
92 ‘Bargain’, def. 2a, OED. 
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even be more important to him than his riches.  This pronouncement of his preoccupation 
with reputation takes on even greater significance through its hyperbolic push to the 
celestial sphere, as Timon sees his acts as worthy of recognition by the gods.  The 
dramatist’s mockery of beneficent giving notwithstanding, an audience is still left with an 
understanding of how easily acts of beneficence can become blemished by hubris. They 
may have been already have been familiar with Cicero’s thoughts on misapplied liberality: 
 
 A man may see some also doo much, not by nature so liberall, as led with a certein 
 glorie, yt they may seeme bountieful: which thinges may be thought to come rather 
 of a bragge than of a free hert. Such a falsse fainig is a nearer neibour to vanitie, 
 than either to liberalitie, or to honestie.93 
 
This distinction between true beneficence and vainglorious liberality is highlighted here by 
Cicero.  He is clear that this giving is not driven by innate virtue, but rather, a desire for 
glory.   This idea resonates in Timon’s repeated calls for public affirmation of his 
liberality. His giving is tainted with a self-interest that contravenes the virtue of 
beneficence.  When Timon pays Eutrapelus’ debt to the usurer, Abysuss, commanding 
‘Carry my name unto the Judges’ (1.2 85.), his comment contributes further to this sense 
and suggests that Timon’s reputation is a transactional commodity.  
     There is a particularly striking instance of self-glorification in Act 1 Scene 5.  Here, the 
dramatist mocks a superior’s bestowing of offices upon an inferior and unworthy recipient, 
an act that had cultural resonance. In a literal and preposterous application of Seneca’s idea 
to make a man ‘equal with our selves’,94  Timon, like a beneficent God, elevates 
Hemogenes, a fiddler, to equal rank and status.  He tells him, ‘What dost thou with this 
                                                 
93 Cicero, Marcus Tullius, De officiis trans.by  Nicholas Grimalde (London : Richard Tottel, 1556),sigs. 18v-
19r. 
 
94 De beneficiis, Lodge, pp. 49-50. 
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tott[ered]er’d habitt? I / will have thee proudlie goe in rich apparel / Hould up thye heade; I 
will maynteyne it’ (1.5.495-497).95  The idea of course is absurd, and would undoubtedly 
engender appreciable laughter from the audience.  And although the dramatist mocks the 
idea that a wealthy aristocrat would make a man of lower rank and status his actual equal, 
he suggests the rewards possible from well-chosen friendships through Hemogenes, a man 
who ‘this daye rose with his Arse upwards / to daye a fiddler and at night a Noble’ 
(1.5.498-499).  Despite the humour, however, later, when Hemogenes refuses to aid 
Timon, the lord who ‘raised him’, the dramatist evokes a sober sense that parity in 
friendship through material goods does not equate with like affection.  Making a friend 
one’s equal does not create a union of souls as the rhetoric asserts. Further, rank and status 
does not ensure virtuous friendship, for despite Hemogenes’ rich garments and elevated 
position, in Timon’s penury he does not reciprocate Timon’s beneficence.  Although he 
tells Laches ‘Thy masters harde misfortune I lament’ (fol. 15a, 1563), when Timon asks 
for housing, saying ‘Suffer mee not to perish with the colde’ (fol. 17a, 1840), Hemogenes 
rebukes him saying ‘Bee [.] gone, bee gone, thou art troublesome I say’ (fol. 17a, 1849).  
    Timon appeals to the constancy requisite of perfect friendship in his time of need, as if 
the bonds he has engendered with his followers were other than useful. He selectively 
applies the rules of giving and friendship, conflating them with perfect amity. The 
dramatist echoes this idea as well as the disjunction between philosophical theory and 
practice most resoundingly in the subplot where the philosophers are mocked as 
‘fooleosophers’(fol. 24a, 2609).  Stilpo and Speusippus are thinkers who descant 
illogically with innumerable pat sententiae and references to Aristotle as a ‘blockhead’ 
(fol. 22a, 2378).  In one instance Stilpo breaks from his nonsensical metaphysical musings 
                                                 
95 Hemogenes is also represented in the text as Hermogenes.  
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to tell Hemogenes that his ‘phrases’ are worth more than Hemogenes is offering to pay for 
them (fol. 17a, 1828-1830).  In a rare moment of rational thought, Stilpo raises the 
question that the play, and perhaps the educated audience, asks of philosophy:  ‘Dost 
thinke Philosphy is soe little worth?’ (fol. 17a, 1830). The answer that the play offers is a 
resounding yes, especially regarding individual understanding of theory and practice.  In 
this instance the dramatist strikes at the heart of philosophy’s use:  for erudition or 
application?  Is the ‘possession’ of theory enough?   
     Timon possesses an understanding of some of the ideological principles underpinning 
friendship, especially those that provide him with benefit, yet he does not recognise the 
need to apply them anything less than selectively. Further, he is educated in the parlance of 
true friendship and appeals to its principles of constancy, similitude and trial, but he fails 
to understand how its philosophy translates into virtuous action devoid of self-interest.  
Similarly, despite Hemogenes’ protest of ‘love’ of the philosophers’ ‘witty disputations’, 
when Stilpo tells him that ‘a man may love two manner of waies, effectively or causally’,  
this insightful reflection receives no response or contemplation, but rather gives way to a 
question Hemogenes indicates has ‘long troubled’ him:  ‘Whether there be a man in the 
moone?’ (fol. 17a, 1803, 1807-1808).  Hemogenes becomes the embodiment of man’s 
inability to separate the wheat from the chafe in terms of prioritising the use of 
philosophical ideas; Timon epitomises the worthlessness of philosophical learning without 
exercise of its precepts. The dramatist suggests that knowing is not enough.   
     The irony of course, is that the fooleosophers actually spout some pearls of wisdom 
amidst their nonsensical musings. Even though Stilpo’s comment that ‘a man may love 
two manner of waies, effectively or causally’ (17a, 1803) is lost on Hemogenes, it is 
central to the play.  It reflects Aristotle’s distinction between perfect amity and that which 
203 
 
he describes as ‘profytable’, and ‘loved’ for ‘gaines’,96 by delineating friendship along 
‘effective’ and ‘casual’ lines.97  This opposition sets friendship compelled by benefit, 
against the more noble type of friendship that occurs by chance, without thought of gain.  
The latter is reminiscent of Montaigne’s claim to the cause of his friendship with Boëtie:  
‘If a man urge me to tell wherefore I loved him, I feele it cannot be expressed, but by 
answering; Because it was he, because it was my selfe’.98  This distinction may be lost on 
the play’s protagonist, but the dramatist ensures that amidst the frivolity of the plot and 
subplots it remains evident.  In this way he mitigates audience identification with Timon as 
a sympathetic figure who has been duped by false friends.  
     The inclusive use of the term ‘friend’ that Montaigne decried as diluting the ideal is 
pointed up here, as Timon refers to both himself and his followers as ‘friends’.  Timon 
refers to himself as a ‘needy friend’ and says ‘I am compelled by necessity to prove my 
friends’ (fol 15b, 1610-1611 1632).  Unlike the affective bonds Stanley’s giving 
engendered, Timon’s giving has not, because he has not bestowed with the right mind.  
The benefactor should ‘keep no account or memory of their good deeds’ according to 
Seneca, but as previously discussed, the continual call for honour and esteem suggests 
Timon is keeping a mental register of his acts.99  The key here is the way that each 
participant views the relationship. Timon pays Eutrapelus’ debt in excess of what is 
required, saying, ‘yea, take ffyue, while I have gould I will not see my ffreinds to stand in 
neede’(fol. 2a, 121-122).  He believes that his beneficence has created an amicable bond. 
                                                 
96 Ethiques , Wilkinson, sig.H4r. 
97 The manuscript reads ‘causally’. The OED cites this play as an origin of the use of ‘effectively’ (Def 2a), 
(1600), but in doing so refers to ’causally’ as ‘casually’. Casually, (def. 1b, 2) rather than ‘causally’ makes 
sense here if ‘effectively’ is meant. However, even though there is no entry in the OED for ‘affectively’ 
before 1631, there is one for ‘affective’ (1443), which might make plausible another reading, in that ‘causal’ 
also was in use (1570):  ‘affectively and causally’.   
98 Michael Lord of Montaigne, ‘Of Friendship’ in Essays trans. by John Florio (London : Printed by Melch. 
Bradwood for Edward Blount and William Barret, 1613), p. 92. 
99 De beneficiis, Lodge, p. 12. 
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Eutrapelus is relieved and naturally thankful.  He calls Timon a ‘Heroicke Spiritt!’(fol. 2a, 
123). But the dramatist suggests that a hero is altogether different from a friend. In his 
response, all that Eutrapelus acknowledges is his appreciation, not his friendship.  And this 
is significant because it is at the core of the play’s understanding of benefitting and 
friendship:  that not everyone understands a benefit as conferring affective friendship.  It’s 
not that Timon sees his generosity as buying friends, but rather, as engendering a 
reciprocal friendly feeling.  In this way, he views Eutrapelus and each of the men he 
benefits as friends.  In De beneficiis Seneca does put some responsibility on the recipient, 
saying that the ‘reception of benefit implies the existence or establishment of a friendship’; 
however, the giver must be prudent.100  
 
V. Ingratitude, Discretion and Friendship in Timon  
While friendship ‘can be established’101 through acts of beneficence, it does not 
necessarily mean that it is received as friendship, because according to Seneca, what 
matters is the virtue of those on whom one bestows benefits.  In the play’s source, ‘Timon 
or, The Misanthrope’, Lucian explores this idea, negotiating the tension between the 
protagonist’s munificence and foolishness and its relation to friendship.  Timon’s 
culpability is suggested by Mercury’s speech:   
 Some say his bountie undid him, and his kindnesse, and commiseration   
 towards all that craved of him; but, in plaine termes, it was his folly,   
 simplicitie & indiscretion in making choice of his friends, not knowing that  
 hee bestowed his liberalitie upon crowes and wolves’.102   
 
                                                 
100 Peterman, p. 54. 
101 Peterman, p. 54. 
102 Lucian, Certain Select Dialogues trans. by Francis Hickes  (Oxford: William Turner, 1634), fol. 154. 
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Mercury may be surveying the views about Timon’s responsibility, but he does not 
conclude that Timon is ‘a man more sinned against’.103  In Timon of Athens Shakespeare 
and Middleton allow their audience the latitude to judge whether the protagonist is the 
victim of his own foolish generosity or of unscrupulous, flattering, fortune-seeking friends. 
But Lucian’s account is quite clear and corresponds to the perspective on liberality 
prefigured in De beneficiis that places the blame for the failure of beneficent giving to 
maintain amicable bonds squarely on the benefactor.104  It begins with the benefactor’s 
imprudence and is compounded by incorrect behaviour by the recipient.  At the heart of 
the issue is ingratitude.  According to Seneca, ‘mens indiscretion in giving & receiving 
benefits maketh ingratitude so frequent’.105  This discretion requires, according to Seneca, 
that one chooses men ‘who are worthy to partake’ of one’s benefits.106  As he sees it, the 
nature of the man affects the way he receives the benefit, as well as the accompanying 
friendship. And this idea is tested in the play through Timon’s rash liberality, and the 
clamour of his newfound ‘friends’ in his times of bounty. The trusty Laches alerts Timon 
to his potential new friend, Demogenes, and wonders why Timon ‘suffers’ the fiddler in 
his house, telling him ‘there’s not a veryer knave in all the towne’ (fol. 5a, 457-458).  So 
when Timon appeals to Senecan laws of giving and receiving and declares Demogenes, 
and the others ‘ingrateful’, he may be correct, but he has chosen them as recipients without 
deeming them ‘worthy’ (fol.17a, 1798).  As such, according to Senecan principles, he can 
expect ingratitude.  The case of Stanley, the earl of Derby, helps to illustrate this 
                                                 
103 William Shakespeare, King Lear from Q 1608, Scene 9, line 60 in William Shakespeare, The Complete 
Works ed. by Stanley Wells and Gary Taylor et al. (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 1988-1998; 1998), pp. 
909-941. 
104 John Jowettt notes there is no early modern performance history on the play, although it is listed in the 
First Folio with the plays said to be performed by the King’s Men. See Jowett ‘Introduction’,Timon of 
Athens, p. 8. Harbage and Schoenbaum list it as ‘unacted?’ in Annals, p. 94-95. 
105 In marginalia in Lucius Annaeus Seneca, De beneficiis in The Workes of Lucius Annaeus Seneca 
translated by Thomas Lodge (London:  Printed by William Stansby, 1614), sig. B1r. This is not in the 
Gollancz reprint. It reads ‘indifference’, p. 2. 
106 Seneca, De beneficiis, Lodge, pp. 2,-3. 
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understanding in practice.  Although his munificence was characterised as ‘remarkable’, 
the account of his giving qualifies this idea, indicating that it was reserved for selected 
persons: to ‘such as showed themselves grateful to him’.107  The final act of their requisite 
gratitude was performed through attendance at the funeral where all would view the 
outpouring of support for Stanley, furthering his social memory, and the reputation of the 
Stanley name.108  In the play, Timon expects similar gratitude and fidelity, yet, he does not 
understand the Senecan precept, as Stanley did, that ‘we sow not our seeds in a fruitless 
and barren ground’.109  
     Without worthy recipients, the friendships that Timon engenders are of pure utility and 
devoid of affection. This is in some ways similar to the ‘category error’ MacFaul notes is 
at work in Timon of Athens, as Timon confuses ‘the economic with the affective’.110  But 
in the anonymous Timon it is more akin to confusion over what constitutes true friendship 
and precisely what type of friendship he believes that his giving is proffering.  To his 
friends, the friendship is of pure utility, driven by reward and reciprocation. When 
Eutrapelus acknowledges Timon’s generosity, telling him ‘I will thee adore and sacrifice 
to thee in ffranckinsence’(fol. 2a, 123-124), he is not acknowledging friendship, but rather, 
debt.  Eutrapelus’ response to Timon suggests his view of the relationship as very much 
akin to that which he enjoyed with the usurer, Abysuss, predicated on pecuniary assistance 
in time of trouble.  When Eutrapelus says ‘I will’, the use of the future tense is an indicator 
that he expects that this debt too, will one day be due.   
     Timon cultivates a similar relationship with Demeas. He willingly pays Demeas’ debt, 
                                                 
107 King, Lancashire Funeral Certificates, p.11. 
108 It is said that ‘he never forced any service at his tenant’s hands’, and that ‘no gentleman ever waited in his 
service without allowance, as well wages as otherwise, for horse and man’.  This was not the end of  the 
reward  that men like Stanley get for his beneficence:  virtue is forwarded. This was not the end of Stanley’s 
social acts of amity, as in his will he made bequeaths to the poor, and provided for all of the servants, those 
graveside mourners, ‘to have every of them a year’s wages’ in King, Lancashire Funeral Certificates, p.11. 
109 Seneca, De beneficiis, Lodge, p. 2. 
110MacFaul, p. 145. 
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 but after Demeas’ voiced gratitude, Timon says: ‘I putte my talents to strange usury / To 
 gaine  mee friends, that they may follow mee’(2.4.859-860).111  A lord with followers  
would signify wealth and help reinforce status and reputation, so this may speak once 
again to  the desire to foster reputation.  Additionally, however, it may speak to a similar 
confusion between the ‘economic and affective’ that MacFaul observed in Middleton 
 and Shakespeare’s Timon.112  The use of the term usury speaks against friendship, as 
 ‘usury’ presupposes ‘advantage’, furthering inequality.  If anything, it conjures a sense of  
a more  instrumental than affective  bond.  It acknowledges a desire for an ‘excessive’ 
 return on Timon’s money, as he expects to receive more than he originally loans. Further, 
this Shylock-like quality of exploitation has no place in affective friendship and begs a 
comparison between Timon and Abysuss, deeemed 'thou Damned Usurer' (fol 2a, 105). 
Here he becomes Demeas' usurer, not his friend. And like a relationship with a usurer that 
begins with appreciation and help, and ends when the debt is called, Timon's friendships 
last only as long as Aristotle suggests that such friendships would.  They indureth so long 
as indureth the delectation and the perfite’.113     
     The relationship between friendship and credit had contemporary resonance.  As 
Alexandra Shepard has noted, father-son advice literature that proffered guidance on 
 successful relations between men cautioned sons to maintain ‘economic independence 
from other men’, particularly friends.  Walter Raleigh counselled his son in choosing 
 friends, and emphasised discretion.  In particular, he suggests that his son avoid those who  
might require pecuniary assistance. It’s better to receive than give, according to Raleigh’s 
 advice:   
                                                 
111 By comparison, usuary and friendship are anathema to Antonio in Shakespeare’s The Merchant of Venice: 
‘or when did friendship take / A breed for bareen metal of his friend? (1.3.131-132). 
112 MacFaul, p. 145. 
113 ‘Profit’ from Ethiques, Wilkinson, sigs. H4r-H4v. 
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  for by them thou shalt bee judged what thou art; let them therefore be   
 wise and vertuous, and none of those that follow thee for gaine, but   
 make election rather of thy Betters then thy Inferiors, shunning    
 alwayes such as are poore & needie.114  
 
In Chapter 1 we saw Burghley’s advice to his son on the choice of friends.  Burghley also 
spoke directly to helping one’s friend in financial need, advising:   
 
 Beware of suertiship for thy best friend, for he that payeth an other mans   
 debts, seekes his owne decay, but if thou canst not otherwise choose rather then to 
 lend that money from thy selfe upon good bonds, (though thou borrow  
 it) So maist thou pleasure thy friend and happely secure thy selfe.115 
  
Burghley’s advice walks that fine line between wanting to ‘pleasure’ the friend and protect 
oneself.  Burghley’s advice takes this a step further in an additional precept and 
acknowledges an age-old problem related to mixing friendship and credit, namely the 
dissolution of the friendship.  He distinguishes the fine line between amity and enmity and 
suggests how such transactions in friendship can push bonds towards the latter: 
 
 Trust no man with thy credit or estate, for it is a méere folly for a man to   
 enthrall himselfe to his friend further then if just cause be offered, he should  
 not dare to become otherwise thy enemie.116  
 
Timon’s dramatist engages a similar audience as Burghley and Raleigh, with like ideas, but 
admonishes perhaps more appetisingly, but not less effectively, through satire.  Timon is 
                                                 
114 Walter Raleigh, Instructions to His Sonne and to Posterity (London: Benjamin Fisher, 1632), sigs. B1v-
B2r. 
115 William Cecil, Lord Burghley, The Counsell of a Father to His Sonne, in Ten Severall Precepts (London: 
Printed for Josepth [sic] Hunt, 1611), Precept 7, all one page. 
116 Cecil, Counsell, Precept 9. 
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the epitome of indiscretion in friendship and giving.  He represents men whose ‘trust’ is 
ill-conceived, and who are consequently disappointed by friendship. 
 
VI. Beneficence, Friendship and Reputation in A Woman Killed with Kindness 
There is little information available about the first performance of Thomas Heywood’s A 
Woman Killed with Kindness.  Harbage and Schoenbaum write that a payment for the play 
was made to Heywood between 12 February and 6 March 1603.117  The play was under 
the auspices of the Earl of Worcester’s Men with whom Heywood was affiliated beginni
‘around 1600’.
ng 
                                                
118 Andrew Gurr places it at the Rose playhouse, one of the theatres the 
company was associated with.119  It came at the early stages of Heywood’s playwriting 
career, which has been traced to as early as October 1596, through a payment (loan) to the 
Admiral’s Men for one of his works.120  The earliest recorded text of the play is the 1607 
Quarto edition, identified by Martin Wiggins as deriving from Heywood’s ‘foul papers’.121  
The play is a domestic tragedy, set in a northern country home where gentry hospitality, 
giving and receiving all play a part in the development and maintenance of amicable 
bonds. 
      In Sir Henry Wooton’s view, ‘Every Mans proper Mansion House and Home ’was not 
his castle, but ‘the Theater of his Hospitality’122 and  Master Frankford’s hasty offer to the 
down on his luck, Gentleman Wendoll of a ’man’, a ‘gelding’, his ‘table’ and his 
 
117 Annals, p. 86. 
118 See Scobie, vii and Annals, p. 87. 
119 Andrew Gurr, The Shakespearean Stage 1574-1642, 3rd edn (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 
2001), p. 243. 
120 Scobie, vi. 
121 Martin Wiggins, ‘Introduction’ in Thomas Heywood,  A Woman Killed with Kindness in A Woman Killed 
with Kindness and Other Domestic Plays ed. by Martin Wiggins (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 2008), 
vii-xxxix (xxxvii). 
122 Sir Henry Wooton, ‘Of the Elements of Architecture’, Part II (London:  John Bill, 1624), p. 82, liv. 
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‘purse’(1.4.70)123 portrays Frankford as performing his part as beneficent host and giver. 
Adding to this sense is Wendoll’s admission in soliloquy that he is ‘a man by whom in no 
kind [Frankford] could gain’ (1.6.36). He acknowledges requisite gratitude for Frankford’s 
beneficence and suggests that he has intention of reciprocating at some point:  
 
  Master Frankford, I have oft been bound to you 
  By many favours; this exceeds them all 
  That I shall never merit your least favour. 
  But when your last remembrance I forget, 
  Heaven at my soul exact that weighty debt. (4.72-76) 
 
Wendoll’s response to such generosity is in line with Senecan principles of reciprocation 
and the rules of civil courtesy expounded on by conduct writers in the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries, well-known to gentry culture.  But also, while there is a sense that 
an obligatory bond has been established, the language of ‘debt’ and ‘favour’ do not support 
a belief that Wendoll views this bond as an affective one.  Rather, Heywood crafts his 
reply employing the rhetoric of deference similar to that which is taught in such works like 
The Courte of Civill Courtesie (1577), whose subtitle reveals its intent:  
 
 fitly furnished with a pleasant  porte of  stately phrases and pithie precepts, 
assembled in the behalfe of all younge  gentlemen and others that are desirous to 
frame their behaviour according to their estates at  all times and in all companies, 
therby to purchase worthy prayse  of their inferiours and estimation and credite 
amonge theyr betters.124   
                                                 
123 Thomas Heywood, A Woman Killed with Kindness in A Woman Killed with Kindness and Other Domestic 
Plays ed. by Martin Wiggins (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 69-128.  All future references are 
from this edition. 
124 S.R, The Courte of Civill Courtesie  (London: by Richard Jones, 1577). EEBO identifies the author as 
S.R. Gent, with ‘Samuel Rowlands?’  listed as a potential ‘other author’.  Anna Bryson in From Courtesy to 
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 Interestingly, here again financial terms are employed—purchase and credit—to suggest 
 the transactional quality of esteem and praise in the period.  This parlance is not peculiar 
 to the period.  G. W. Peterman’s work underscores its presence in first-century Greco-
Roman social relations.125  Heywood represents Wendoll as just such a young gentleman 
of inferior means, who might attend to such didactic literature, one looking to 'purchase' 
such ‘credite’ and estimation, here, from Frankford. The purchase that he wishes to make 
is future favour.  The frame of the deferential behaviour is scripted to maximise advantage 
and benefit.  The courteous reply to Frankford’s generosity is similar in sentiment and tone 
to the advice given in The Courte on how to respond to ‘a noble person pleasantly, that is 
of acquaintance which must bee also pleasantly answered’: 
 
 My Lorde I have had to good experience of your former curtesies, bothe towards 
mee and other my freeindes, as I had need with my service to goe aboute to 
recompence some parte of that, beefore I come in debt for any more: But the lesse 
wee can requite, the more wee muste stande bounde.126  
 
     The idea is to reverence the giver through voiced gratitude and acknowledge obligation, 
very much in line with De beneficiis. Interestingly, as Anna Bryson notes, ‘in the 
Elizabethan Courte of Civill Courtesie the older courtesy-defining categories of “lord”, 
“servant”, and “guest” have been replaced by ‘“better”, “equal”, “stranger” and 
“friend”’.127  Bryson further relates that the altered categories reflect ‘changing conditions’ 
which ‘made their perception and expression a more urgent matter of concern in the 
                                                                                                                                                   
Civility:  Changing Codes of Conduct in Early Modern England (Oxford:  Clarendon, 1998) suggests the 
author is ‘probably’ Simon Robson, p. 292. 
125 Peterman, p. 64. 
126 S.R, Courte, sig. F4v. 
127 Anna Bryson, From Courtesy to Civility : Changing Codes of Conduct in Early Modern England 
(Oxford:  Clarendon, 1998), p. 137. 
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conduct of social life’ during the period.128  This supports an understanding of the 
expanded definition of friendship during the period.  Further, the application of the 
designation ‘friend’ in relationships formerly marked by service and hospitable acts 
widens the scope for misunderstanding in these relationships.  One can see the potential for 
misconstruing one’s duties as well as the affective dimension of the bond.  Heywood 
explores this idea through Frankford and Wendoll.  Their relationship traverses all but one 
of the latter categories Bryson outlines.  Wendoll is a virtual stranger invited into the 
home, but soon becomes a cherished friend.  His response to Frankford is similar to the 
one from The Courte, which is intended for a ‘better’, not a friend.  The response is not 
familiar in any way, as he addresses Frankford as ‘Master Frankford’ (4.72).  And 
although a gentleman of equal in rank, Wendoll is not on par with Frankford in terms of 
status. This idea will become important later when we consider to what extent the 
dramatist depicts Frankford as mistaking true friendship for useful amity.   
     Wendoll’s appreciation, articulated in line with the Courte’s finely crafted rhetoric, 
serves to reinforce Frankford’s status, rank and superiority.  And this is part of Frankford’s 
reward.  Nevertheless, he looks for something else.  He tells Wendoll, ‘I know you / 
Virtuous, and therefore grateful’ (1.4.77-78).  Again, as noted in Timon and recounted in 
relation to Stanley, gratitude was a persistent concern of the benefactor. This idea is 
reiterated throughout the period in drama, literature, and historic accounts,129 and its 
understanding is expressed clearly in Chapter 33 of De Beneficiis where Seneca offers the 
view from the recipient’s vantage point:  
  
                                                 
128 Bryson, p. 138. 
129 For instance, see William Stanley, A Briefe Discuverie of Doctor Allens Seditious Drifts (London: 
Printed by I. W[olfe] for Francis Coldock, 1588), p. 97. 
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 He hath bestowed a good turne uppon mee, and I have accepted it even as he would  
 have wished.  Now hath he the thing that he sought, yea & the only thing that he 
 sought: for I am thankfull. Herafter remaineth the use of mee, and some 
 commoditie  too redound  [sic] too him by my thankfullnesse’.130   
  
The idea that gratefulness is essential to such friendships is made manifest here.  
Additionally, the recipient understands not only that the ‘good turn’ is acknowledged, but 
also, that the act has created a bond of obligation for the future.  This understanding is 
evidenced in Wendoll’s response to Frankford, wherein he acknowledges his ‘weighty 
debt’ to his benefactor (4.76).   
     Frankford’s beneficence towards Wendoll, a man ‘of small means’ and ‘pressed by 
want’(1.4.31-32) may serve as a useful plot device by Heywood to engender audience 
sympathy for Frankford when he is betrayed by Wendoll and Anne, but his liberality, 
much like Timon’s, is not disinterested. An understanding of the effect of attending to the 
conventions of early modern hospitality may help to open this reading further.  According 
to Felicity Heal and Clive Holmes, in the sixteenth and seventeenth-centuries ‘the image of  
generosity and openness was sustained wherever the family concerned was in quest of 
social influence’.131 Although this was most realisable between families of equal rank and 
status where ‘reciprocal exchanges of honour could occur and loyalties be affirmed’.132 
Heywood’s Frankford attempts its achievement through a caritas-like giving through 
friendship with Wendoll. In his soliloquy in Act 4, Frankford asserts a similar concern for 
his reputation, rank and status that was evident in Timon.  He says:  
 
   I am a gentleman, and by my birth 
                                                 
130 De beneficiis, Golding, sig. G2v. 
131 Felicity Heal and Clive Holmes, The Gentry in England and Wales 1500-1700 (Stanford:  Stanford 
University Press, 1994), p. 283. 
132 Heal and Holmes, p. 283. 
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   Companion with a king.  A king’s no more, 
   I am possessed of many fair revenues,  
   Sufficient to maintain a gentleman.  (1.4.3-6) 
 
 At first this may appear an interesting, perhaps excessive, addition by Heywood.  He has 
already established Frankford’s social position in the play’s opening scene when Sir 
Charles comments on his noble descent, and his new wife’s pedigree is established: born 
of nobility and sister to a knight (1.1.69).  This reiteration of rank and status could be an 
oversight  by Heywood, given Q1 (1607) in use here is generally accepted as being from 
authorial fouls papers, not a theatrical prompt book, and contains some ‘minor errors’.133  
But just as plausibly it may be employed as a way for Heywood to emphasise and reflect 
upon Frankford’s preoccupation with his rank and status, the latter of which has been 
compromised as Frankford  is ‘no longer a  member of the court elite’.134 Perhaps 
Heywood had in mind the Court experiences of men like Sir John Harington and Sir 
Thomas Wyatt, their careers, as Heal and Holmes note, ‘catapulting between success at 
Court and banishment and disgrace in the country’.135  This would help to explain the 
intimation in the soliloquy that Frankford has in some way fallen out of favour, which 
speaks to an overall understanding of the nature of friendships of utility in the play.  
Further, it supports the argument that reputation, not disinterested friendship, is a driving 
force behind Frankford’s demonstrated beneficence.  
     Beneficent, reputation-enhancing (or saving) acts which further the social identity of 
gentry are an important concern of the play.  They are figured as self-denying and ill-
considered, and even satirised in the subplot, just as they are in Timon.  Sir Charles’ 
                                                 
133 Both Wiggins and Scobie note the variances between the extant Q1 and Q3 (1617); Wiggins terms them 
‘a range of minor errors’ in ‘Introduction’, xxxviii. 
134 Wiggins, ‘Explanatory Notes’, fn 4-6, p.308 in  A Woman Killed with Kindness and Other Domestic Plays 
ed. by Martin Wiggins (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 2008). 
135 Heal and Holmes, p. 277. 
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troubles begin because he views an insult made about his hawk as an affront to his 
reputation as a gentleman.   While a hawk was indeed a recreational staple for the English 
country gentleman, Sir Charles’ escalation of a petty comment by Sir Francis that his hawk 
was ‘a rifler’ (1.3.27) into an argument that ends with a huntsman and falconer dead serves 
to highlight the absurdity of the aristocratic concern for reputation here, a consideration 
examined in relation to the Court of Chivalry cases earlier in the chapter. Further, Sir 
Charles may enter in Scene 14 ‘gentlemanlike’,136 but his actions aimed to maintain his 
honour and reputation belie the stage direction.  Charles refers to himself as akin to ‘a 
barbarous outlaw or an uncivil kern’ because he asks Susan to sacrifice her virginal honour 
to Sir Francis to repay the debt Charles believes he owes to him (1.14.5).  His concern for 
his reputation and honour are paramount and take precedence over his sister’s virtue.  
Charles acknowledges his private behaviour is boorish, and significantly, not on par with 
his rank,137 but he is more preoccupied with how he is viewed publicly, as Heywood 
makes clear in Charles’ plea to Susan: ‘Wouldst thou see me live / A bankrupt beggar in 
the world’s disgrace / And die indebted to my enemies? / Wouldst thou behold me stand 
like a huge beam / In the world’s eye, a byword and a scorn?’(14.11-15). Charles is willing 
to sacrifice the brother-sister relationship in order to maintain instrumental homosocial 
bonds.  Further, he is driven by the need to retain his reputation for gratefulness to Sir 
Francis for his kindness in freeing him from prison, even though Sir Francis is not a friend.  
The problem is that the beneficial act has, in Senecan terms, engendered a certain amicable 
bond, and through its acceptance, Charles understands that he must reciprocate. 
                                                 
136 Stage direction beginning of Scene 14. 
137 ‘Kern’ def. 2. OED:  ‘a rustic, peasant, boor; contemptuously vagabond’. 
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     Heywood satirises the extent to which a man of such rank is willing to go, as he did 
with the hawk, but here the cost is in human terms.  Sir Charles, in contemplating how to 
reciprocate, asserts the need to ‘requisite that grace’:   
 
   But he, nor father, nor ally, nor friend, 
   More than a stranger, both remote in blood 
   And in his heart opposed my enemy 
   That this high bounty should proceed from him! 
   O there I lose myself.  What should I say? 
   What think?  what do, his bounty to repay? (1.10. 113-118) 
 
Charles is bewildered by the gesture, especially given that he and Sir Francis did not share 
any kinship or amicable bonds previously.  Although Sir Francis’ act appears to have 
engendered goodwill from Sir Charles, Susan indicates that his giving was self-interested.  
She tells her brother:  
   You wonder, I am sure, whence this strange kindness 
   Proceeds in Acton.  I will tell you brother; 
   He dotes on men and oft hath sent me gifts, 
   Letters and tokens. I refused them all.  (1.10.119-122) 
 
Charles is not moved, and does not reflect on Francis’ worthiness as giver or recipient.  
Attending only to the conventions of social reciprocity, he is determined to outdo his 
benefactor by giving all that he has to give:  Susan.  He understands that this is the only 
way to ensure the maintenance of the amicable bond, demonstrate gratefulness, and stand 
him in good stead for future favour.  He says: ‘I have enough; though poor, my heart is set 
/ In one rich gift to pay back all my debt’ (1.10. 123-124).  Sacrifice in this hasty, self-




     Returning to the main plot, some of Frankford’s beneficent acts are less sacrificial, but 
remain of questionable necessity.  They reflect a similar need, however, to further or 
maintain his reputation for kindness and generosity. When Sir Francis suggests that 
Frankford’s absence from his guests at the wedding would cause them ‘to doubt their 
welcome’, adding, ‘and charge you with unkindness’, Frankford says he will ‘prevent it’, 
leaving his kinsmen and putting off his nuptial night, in order to forestall a negative view 
of himself in the eyes of his friends (1.1.77-78).  In another instance, when Nicholas 
approaches Frankford to tell him of Wendoll’s affair with Anne, Frankford immediately 
and automatically assumes that his man is coming to him for money and offers him half a 
crown before Nicholas even speaks. Later, when the youth comes to bring the letter useful 
to his plan to secure evidence of their adultery, Frankford instructs Nicholas to ‘Have him 
into the cellar: let him taste / A cup of our March beer.  Go, make him drink’(1.11.48-49).  
The directive to ‘make’ him drink is significant, as it suggests that an offer is not enough.  
The recipient must be forced to partake of the goodwill extended if necessary, in order that 
Frankford’s reputation for generous hospitality be furthered.  This recipient is not a 
kinsman, but rather, a ‘stripling’ messenger, yet he is afforded the hospitality and social 
friendship reserved for members of his social circle (1.11.46).  Martin Wiggins suggests 
that the aforementioned is one of those acts of ‘generosity’ which are ‘only the material 
expression of his positive feelings towards its recipient’.138  There is, perhaps, something 
more to it. For the country gentleman during the Elizabethan and Jacobean periods 
hospitality remained one of the important ‘expressions of status’.139  With this in mind, 
like Timon’s offering of five talents, when four are sufficient to pay Eutrapelus’ debt, 
Frankford’s acts, especially extending such hospitality to Wendoll and even a mere 
                                                 
138 ‘Introduction’, Wiggins, xvi. 
139 Bryson, p. 140. 
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delivery boy, are not only excessive, going beyond the necessary limits of generosity 
required for the situation, but also, may be viewed as a by-product of conspicuous 
consumption, which serves to once again demonstrate superiority and reinforce reputation.   
     Ironically, the most self-denying act of liberality portrayed in the play is Frankford’s 
welcoming of Wendoll into his home. Frankford has a wife and kinsmen of even higher 
rank and status, but his need for a friend on whom he can practice his beneficence leads 
him to make gross misjudgements. Frankford asserts his happiness in Scene 4, outlining 
his many blessings of wealth and a loving wife.  He ends this review saying:  ‘If man on 
earth may truly happy be, / Of these at once possessed, sure I am he’ (1.4.13-14).  But 
there is uncertainty here, for eleven lines later, he is evaluating Wendoll’s attributes for 
companionship, and hastily deems him suitable saying, ‘I have preferred him to a second 
place / In my opinion and my best regard’ (1.4.33-34).  As Martin Wiggins suggests, this 
position of ‘second’ is in relation to Anne, who is first.140  Despite Frankford’s verbal 
ordering of his affections where Anne is given primacy, the relationship with his wife is 
not sufficiently fulfilling to preclude him from seeking to develop a close male friendship 
with Wendoll. As Jennifer Panek suggests, ‘once married, he [Frankford] proceeds to seek 
out someone to fill the place that his wife ought to hold’.141  The friendship he cultivates 
through reckless beneficence, leads him to jeopardise his relationship with his wife.  
Frankford may afford Anne first place in theory, but in practice the sense that the play 
evokes is that a man’s aspiration for reputation and realisation of male amicable bonds 
transcends marital bonds.   
     Frankford protests too much when he indicates that he has it all.  Removed from his 
position at Court, he sees in Wendoll a way to recoup his reputation and an opportunity to 
                                                 
140 Wiggins, ‘Notes’, fn. 4, p. 308. 
141 Jennifer Panek, ‘Punishing Adultery in A Woman Killed with Kindness’ in Studies in English Literature, 
1500-1900,  34.2, Elizabethan and Jacobean Drama  (Spring, 1994), pp. 357-378 (p. 364). 
219 
 
re-establish male homosocial bonds, which may prove instrumental at some point.  This 
idea calls to mind the friendship of Francis Bacon and Toby Matthew insofar as its 
epistolary performance provided Bacon with comfort and attachment to affairs of state 
during his exile from James’ court.  The problem with this formulation of friendship, 
especially as Heywood figures it, is that a friend becomes a necessity.  This idea may be 
explained through consideration of Seneca’s Epistle IX where friendship is posited as 
divorced from the idea of self-completion. Seneca argues that ‘the soveraigne good seeketh 
not externall instruments, it is wholly accomplished in it selfe’.142 The fully-realised self 
does not need friendship.  One does not seek friendship to provide what one lacks, but 
brings a whole self to friendship. This idea is evidenced in Cicero, as Laurie Shannon has 
shown in her work on ‘soveraigne amitie’.143  Shannon relates that the friend is 
‘emphatically independent’ and that this quality frees friendships from a basis of 
‘weakness or need’.144  In the absence of this, Seneca sees the emergence of utility in 
friendship, as an unfulfilled self looks for fulfilment in the friend. He says: ‘It beginneth to 
bee subject unto fortune, if it have neede to seeke any part of it selfe out of it selfe’.145  
     This accords with the representation of Frankford.  To Frankford, Wendoll becomes, 
‘as necessary as his digestion’ (1.6.41).  Wendoll may declare himself ‘a man by whom in 
no kind he could gain’, but to Frankford, his friendship is a necessity (1.6.36).  Although 
he cannot provide pecuniary reward, Wendoll can provide companionship and allow for 
demonstrations of the virtues of benevolence, hospitality and liberality, which have the 
potential to convey esteem.  Because of his need to reaffirm his standing amongst his 
                                                 
142 Lucius Annaeus Seneca, His Epistles in The Workes of Lucius Annaeus Seneca, translated by Thomas 
Lodge (London:  Printed by William Stansby, 1614), Epistle IX, p. 176. Hereafter: Epistles, Lodge. 
143 Laurie Shannon, Sovereign Amity:  Figures of Friendship in Shakespearean Contexts (Chicago and 
London:  University of Chicago Press, 2002), p. 30. 
144 Shannon, pp. 30-31. 
145 Epistles, Epistle IX, Lodge, p. 176. 
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kinsmen, Frankford must be seen to be hospitable and generous, and at great expense. 
Leaving Wendoll alone in his house, commanding that he ‘keep his table, use his servants, 
/ And be a present Frankford in his absence’ is one way of demonstrating beneficence 
(1.6.76-77).  It is also surprising and ill-considered, especially given the alert raised about 
Anne’s attractiveness to men in the opening scene of the play (1.1.24).  It speaks to the 
lengths that Frankford is willing to go, and sacrifices he is willing to make, to maintain 
appearances of wealth and status, reflecting a similar early modern concern.  Early in the 
play Anne is described as ‘Beauty and Perfection’s eldest daughter’ and metaphorically 
likened to ‘a gold chain’ to ‘adorn’ Frankford’s neck (1.24, 65).  To this her husband 
responds, ‘But that I know your virtues and chaste thoughts, / I should be jealous of your 
praise, Sir Charles’ (1.26-27).  With the understanding of his wife’s allure and his 
proclaimed valuation of her as highest ‘of all the sweet felicities on earth’ (1.4.10), his 
decision to leave her in the care of Wendoll while away strikes a similar note as Charles’ 
willingness to sacrifice his sister, Susan.  In this aristocratic, homosocial world, a  
purportedly beloved woman’s virtue is as much a marketable commodity as reputation and 
demonstrations of friendship. Ironically, despite Frankford’s ostensible kindness,  
surprisingly, it is only Sir Francis who is unwilling to trade on a woman's virtue in the end. 
     After Frankford’s betrayal by Anne and Wendoll, Heywood does not implicate 
Frankford in any way for his folly in welcoming Wendoll so freely into his home in the 
first place.  Even though early modern constructs of masculinity did make the husband 
responsible for his wife’s chastity, and as such, here, Frankford would be somewhat 
culpable, Heywood directly avoids any explicit suggestion of responsibility through self-
recrimination by Frankford.  Rather, Frankford continues to be depicted as having been 
exceedingly generous. He asks Anne, ‘Wast thou not supplied / With every pleasure, 
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fashion, and new toy, / Nay, even beyond my calling? (1.13.106-108). Frankford is 
portrayed as very much the victim here, but also again, Heywood ensures that reputation 
continues to be an issue.  Frankford responds to Anne’s self-abasement saying ‘Now I 
protest, I think ’tis I am tainted’ (1.13.85). He speaks of the shame of adultery as ‘my 
shame’ (1.13.10) and later he talks of ‘the blemish of my house’ (1.13.117) (emphases 
mine).  In this scene through Frankford Heywood reflects early modern aristocratic anxiety 
about inheritance, particularly relating to children and land-owning families and property, 
both, again, linked to Frankford’s reputation.  Frankford argues Anne’s adultery ‘Hath 
stained their [the children’s] names with stripe of bastardy’ (1.13.124).  Here, as Martin 
Wiggins suggests, Frankford is not suggesting that the children are not his, but more 
importantly, ‘that their legitimacy will forever be doubted’.146 The emphasis again is 
reputation, and the sense that he, and his ‘good’ name will be dishonoured. 
     But Frankford’s temperance, fostered by the maid that stays his hand, provides an 
opportunity for his reputation to be re-claimed.  The scene encourages a Christ-like 
comparison, as Frankford refuses to kill the adulterous pair with his rapier, but grants them 
Christian mercy:  ‘I would not damn two precious souls/ Bought with my Savior’s blood, 
and send them laden / With all their scarlet sins upon their backs / Unto a fearful 
judgement’ (1.13.43-46).  In fact, as Frankford becomes their adjudicator on earth, his 
status is heightened in terms of the moral dichotomy established with the fallen Eve and 
betraying Judas Iscariot on one hand, and the mercifully kind husband/ friend on the other. 
In his recrimination of the pair, Frankford asserts his superiority through assuming the 
position of judge, and also implicitly suggests that the crime that they are guilty of is 
ingratitude.  
                                                 
146 Wiggins, ‘Notes’, fn. 124, p. 315. 
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     Beneficence and gratitude are integral to the play’s understanding of friendship. When 
Wendoll contemplates adultery with Anne, his soliloquy acknowledges that friendship has 
been engendered through beneficence and that certain expectations of behaviour are 
required.  He says:  ‘and to wound his name / That holds thy name so dear, or rend his 
heart / To whom thy heart was joined and knit together’ (1.6.47-49).  But his self-
remonstration is most telling:  ‘And shall I wrong this man?  Base man, ingrate!’ (1.6.43). 
Ingratitude in friendship here takes precedence in his consideration rather than the overall 
immorality of the adulterous act.  As the inferior friend, all that Wendoll has been able to 
offer Frankford is furthered reputation for beneficence, and gratitude.  Here he 
acknowledges that his act of adultery will undo both, as it will dishonour Frankford 
publically, and reveal him as ungrateful. When Frankford learns of Wendoll’s infidelity, he 
refers to him as ‘that Judas that hath borne my purse!’ (1.8.100). The reference to Judas 
would be enough to evoke a sense of the epitome of betrayal in friendship, but here the 
qualification—‘that hath borne my purse’—additionally charges Wendoll with violation of 
the rules governing benefitting and friendship.  Wendoll has received a benefit and he has 
repaid it with ingratitude, infidelity and by making his friend a cuckold.  
    Heywood prolongs the dispensation of justice to Anne, while he affords little attention 
to Wendoll’s punishment.  Even so, Frankford’s last words to Wendoll, and Wendoll’s 
understanding of what they mean, suggests that his sentence is indeed severe and perhaps 
will be protracted.  Franklin repudiates Wendoll for violating the conventions of friendship 
and giving, telling him:  ‘When thou record'st my many courtesies/ And shalt compare 
them with thy treacherous heart, / Lay them together, weigh them equally, / ’twill be 
revenge enough.  Go, to thy friend / A Judas;  pray, pray lest I live to see / Thee Judas-like, 
hanged on an elder tree’ (1.13.71-76).  The use of the term ‘courtesies’ again, calls to mind 
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the polite giving and receiving that are a part of the social act of friendship.  And 
Frankford declares that the many benefits that he has bestowed on Wendoll have been 
reciprocated improperly, with infidelity.  Frankford’s understanding of friendship follows 
Seneca’s idea that the amicable bond is created through the goodwill that giving engenders 
in the recipient. He believes that his giving has bestowed friendship and his expectation 
was that Wendoll accepted friendship along with the benefit.  The attributive ‘thy friend’ 
he uses to rebuke Wendoll signals the symbolic return of Wendoll’s friendship by 
Frankford, a breaking of the amicable bond.  Further, the reference to the Judas-tree may 
imply that Frankford thinks Wendoll ought to follow in his namesake’s suicidal footsteps, 
or, just as plausibly, may suggest that Wendoll has quite figuratively hung himself, in 
terms of future prospects for beneficent friendship.  This punishment for ungratefulness 
Wendoll acknowledges may haunt him for quite some time when he says: 
 
   And  I must now go and wander like Cain 
   In foreign countries and remoted climes,  
   where the report of my ingratitude 
   cannot be heard.  [...] 
   when I have recovered, and by travel 
   gotten those perfect tongues, and that these rumours 
   may in their height abate, I will return; 
   and I divine, however now dejected, 
   my worth and parts by some great man praised, 
   at my return I may in court be raised. (1.16.124-134) 
 
The problem of course with Wendoll’s plan is that such friendships require gratitude and 
reciprocation from the inferior participant. This is something that Wendoll has failed to 
demonstrate other than verbally. What this soliloquy registers is an understanding of the 
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consequences of such behaviour and highlights that non-reciprocation and ingratitude in 
friendship places a young gentleman’s success in jeopardy.  It is a similar concern that 
Raleigh speaks to in his advice to his son when he suggests: 
 
  for if thou givest twenty guifts,[sic] and refuse to doe the like but once, all  
  that thou hast done will bee lost, and such men will become thy mortall  
  Enemies.147    
 
VII. The Symbiotics of Friendship in Timon and A Woman Killed with Kindness 
In Timon and A Woman Killed with Kindness the protagonists are superiors who bestow 
benefits that they believe create amicable bonds with men of inferior means.  The problem 
posited in both plays is the expectation of what this type of friendship obliges. Timon and 
Frankford look for the benefit of constancy promised by amicitia perfecta when the bonds 
they forge are not intimate and affective, but rather, social and useful. They desire the 
rewards of friendships built on virtue, and ‘the very love it self’,148 but they have not 
established their friendships on these grounds.  In both plays the search may be for the 
ideal, the contemporary model of perfection gleaned from De amicitia, but the 
disillusioned realisation is with the reality of friendships of utility.  
     Both dramatists point up the rewards gained equally in these friendships, despite the 
protagonists’ denunciation of their friends for receiving and not giving.  It would be easy 
to deem Frankford and Timon’s ‘friends’ parasites, a conventional character employed in 
other dramatic works of the time. However, because the emphasis in both plays is on 
reciprocal rewards obtained, and the dramatists depict obligation and expectation on both 
sides, the symbiotics of these relationships more closely resemble mutualism, as there is 
                                                 
147 Raleigh, Instructions, sig. B2r. 
148 Booke of Freendeshippe, sig. B7r. 
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benefit to be had on both sides. The theoretical model of mutualism asserts that it is the 
‘relative magnitude of costs and benefits that determines the outcome of the 
interaction’.149 And in the plays, in the end, the magnitude of the cost is too high a price
both sides, with all parties abandoning the interaction when their interests are 
compromised, whether it is their fortune, their friendship, or their wife.  This renders th





nds rings hollow. 
                                                
150  In this way Timon 
and even Frankford, albeit to a lesser extent, may be viewed not as victims of disloyal 
friends or parasites, but rather exemplar of reputation-preoccupied,  wealthy aristocrats 
who have not proffered virtuous friendship, but expect its rewards.  Audiences who were
apt to judge them may have been familiar with Cicero’s view of such men.  He claimed, 
‘men yt flow in wealthe are not to be hearde, if at any time they dispute of frendship, 
wherof they have neither by Practise, neyther[sic]  by knowledge, anye understandinge
Timon and Frankford ‘dispute of friendship’, yet their practice is selective and arbitrary.  
As such, the bitter denunciation of their frie
VIII. Epistolary Performance of Friendship 
Timon and A Woman Killed with Kindness question the extent to which affective bonds 
exist, are recognisable, and understood in less than ‘ideal’ friendships. This is a matter that 
the weeping men at Stanley’s grave bring to bear, and which may be better understood 
through an examination of the performance of friendship in early modern letters.  Lisa 
Jardine’s work on epistolary instruction and the use of Erasmus’s De Copia towards this 
 
149 Bernhard Stadler, Anthony Frederick George Dixon, ‘Theories on Co-operation’ in Mutualism:  Ants and 
Their Insect Partners (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 14. 
150 For the differentiation between mutualism and parasitism see Stadler, et al, p. 14. 
151 Booke of Freendeshippe, Newton, sig. C7v. 
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end, finds that it ‘develops a technology of affect to “fabricate intimacy”’.152  The notion 
that closeness or familiarity can, should or even need be manufactured is significant, as it 
begs the question, how reliable are demonstrations of friendship?   The idea that a ‘rhetoric 
of affection’ was something to be taught displaces the sense of an intrinsic emotive 
dimension one expects of friendship.  Further, it speaks to the difficulty that arises in 
trying to discern true feeling from constructs of friendship and social interaction based on 
Erasmian models that Magnusson suggests ‘perform horizontal relations of reciprocal 
friendship’.153 There have been alternative readings of Erasmian practices, which 
underscore the different ways epistolary performance may be understood.  Magnusson 
notes the fine line between flattery and politeness, while anthropologists Penelope Brown 
and Stephen Levinson see what Magnusson calls Erasmus’ ‘prolific inventories for 
ingratiation’, as the ‘building blocks of friendship and intimacy’.154  
     As we saw in the consideration of De beneficiis, acts had the ability to engender a 
goodwill that led to friendship.  This idea receives full expression in a letter that Erasmus 
includes in a volume of his works that Lisa Jardine characterises as ‘a textual gift, an 
amicitia or friendship transaction’.155  The letter is demonstrative of the ‘building blocks’ 
to which Brown and Levinson refer.  It reflects on the benefit that Erasmus has received 
from Matthias Schürer, a Strasbourg printer who printed some of his work and is an 
illustration of the Senecan idea that the beneficent act and its reception may be viewed as 
giving and receiving of friendship.  Erasmus writes:  
                                                 
152 Lisa Jardine, ‘Reading and the Technology of Textual Affect:  Erasmus’s familiar letters and 
Shakespeare’s King Lear’ in Reading Shakespeare Historically (New York and London:  Routledge, 1996), 
pp. 78-97, (pp. 84-85). 
153 Lynne Magnusson, Shakespeare and Social Dialogue:  Dramatic Language and Elizabethan Letters 
(Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 61. 
154 Magnusson, p. 68; the views of Penelope Brown and Stephen Levinson are discussed in  Magnusson, pp. 
69. 
155 Jardine, p. 85. 
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  And so, were I not deeply attached to Matthias. I should rightly be accused of  
 having iron and adamant where my heart should be, such was his initiative in  
 offering by acts of kindness to become my friend. Nor will I act so as to fall  
 short in spirit at least and in readiness, although it was he who began it.156  
 
The word ‘act’ is invoked twice and speaks to the idea of performance of friendship even 
when it comes to proffering feeling or ‘spirit’.157  Schürer extended friendship through the 
‘act of kindness’ that he performed in publishing Erasmus’ work.  The ‘acts of kindness’, 
as Jardine observes, ‘were no less acts of friendship for the fact that Schürer’s relationship 
is a professional one’.158  In this way Erasmus lends credence to an understanding of 
friendship that was enacted outside the bounds of the Ciceronean model and structured 
similarly to Senecan conventions on giving and receiving.   
     Erasmus’ letter reveals the way that giving can establish amicable bonds.  It also 
acknowledges that Erasmus has accepted Schürer’s friendship and is ‘ready’ to requite it in 
Senecan fashion. The epistolary act and its public presentation in the volume demonstrate 
the requisite gratitude that Seneca outlined as necessary for the continuance of amicable 
bonds. Most importantly perhaps, like the demonstration at the Stanley funeral, it is done 
publically; for the letter is not addressed to Schürer but Jakob Wimpfeling, the 
‘spokesman’ for Strasbourg’s sodalitas literaria’ with whom Erasmus was associated.159 
Erasmus certainly had a familiarity with Seneca’s ideas.  After moving from Strasbourg he 
established a work place in Basle where he completed his edition of Seneca.160 
                                                 
156 Letter reprinted in Jardine, p. 86. 
157 The understanding of ‘spirit’ here is ‘the active or essential principle or power of some emotion, frame of 
mind’ def. 7a (Wyclif, 1382) , OED. 
158 Jardine, p. 86. 
159 Jardine, p. 85. 
160 Jardine, p. 86. 
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     Erasmus’ letter registers a sense that affection accompanies the instrumentality of his 
friendship with Schürer.  Nevertheless, he employs a similar epistolary ‘staging’ for a 
prefatory letter in the Parabolae to a Pieter Gilles of Antwerp, whom Jardine deems 
Erasmus’ ‘close friend’.161  At the beginning of the letter he delineates true, intimate 
friendship from the ‘commonplace’, asserting that which he shares with Gilles is the latter.  
Erasmus aims to distinguish his friendship with Gilles by claiming that ‘commonplace’ 
friends are ‘attached to material things; and if ever they have to face separation, they 
favour a frequent exchange of rings, knives, caps, and other tokens of the kind, for fear 
that their affection may cool when intercourse is interrupted’.162  Lorna Hutson’s review of 
the letter outlines Erasmus’ attempt to ‘elevate’ his gift of the book from other tokens of 
‘commonplace’ friendship; however, importantly, Hutson demonstrates that the exchange 
of gifts in commonplace friendship as well as the kind that Erasmus asserts with Gilles, are 
both representative of the ‘exchange’ of ‘good faith and honour’ through the ‘pledge’ that 
the object represents.163 In this way the two formulations of friendship may be viewed as 
less distinct than Erasmus contends.  This is an important idea that speaks to the question 
that Hutson’s work in The Usurer’s Daughter raised and that helped to inform this thesis:  
to what extent can friendship really be separated from utility in the period?164  Erasmus’ 
letter lends support to the idea that despite claims to the contrary, maybe it cannot.  
      It might also be useful to consider Hutson’s point beyond the bounds of the gift-
exchange economy explored in Marcel Mauss’ The Gift and examine Erasmus’ letter in 
relation to Seneca’s ideas of benefit and friendship.  Erasmus raises the point about the 
materiality of the gift as a designator of the quality of friendship and suggests the necessity 
                                                 
161 Jardine, p. 85. The idea of  ‘staging’ of ‘epistolary technology’ in Jardine, p. 88. 
162 Letter reprinted in Jardine, p. 87. 
163 Hutson, pp. 4-5. 
164 Hutson, p. 62. 
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of the token to call to mind the friend.  A most extreme example of this of course is found 
in rings bequeathed to friends in wills. This was not uncommon among the wealthy, as 
Keith Thomas explains that the wealthy ‘preserved symbolic reminders of their intimate 
relationships’ in the form of ‘miniatures, posies, rings and locks of hair’.165  But such gifts 
did not necessarily debase friendship, or preclude an affective dimension, as giving and 
receiving could be a part of its expression as De beneficiis demonstrates.  Further, as 
discussed earlier in the chapter, benefit in friendship was not limited to material exchange. 
Benefit could, at different times throughout friendship’s course, include ‘succours’, 
‘ornament’, as well as ‘other consolations’.166 Equally, it is plausible that a token could be 
read as a form of ‘consolation’ during periods of absence, as Lisa Jardine’s work on letters 
suggests, rather than demonstrative of a less affective or effective, form of friendship. 167   
     Erasmus invokes the similitude of amicitia perfect asserting that his friendship with 
Gilles ‘rests wholly in a meeting of minds and the enjoyment of studies in common’, but 
paradoxically closes with the extension of a token himself, his Parabolae, saying, ‘and so I 
send a present –no common present, for you are no common friend, but many jewels in 
one small book’.168 As Jardine notes, ‘written texts are the ideal tokens for such enduring 
[intellectual] friendships’.169  They are nevertheless, exemplar of giving and benefit in 
friendship, just as De beneficiis outlines.  It is just that in Erasmus’ letter he asserts that it 
is given to a friend with whom he claims a more intimate than instrumental bond, even 
though as Natalie Zemon Davis points out, Gilles ‘helped Erasmus sell his books’.170   
                                                 
165 Keith Thomas, The Ends of Life: Roads to Fulfilment in Early Modern England (Oxford:  Oxford 
University Press, 2009), p. 188. 
166 De beneficiis, Lodge, p. 92 
167 Jardine, p. 80. 
168 Letter, Jardine, p. 87. 
169 Jardine, p. 87. 
170 Natalie Zemon Davis, ‘Beyond the Market: Books as Gifts in Sixteenth-Century France’, The Prothero 
Lecture Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, Fifth Series, 33 (1983), pp. 69-88 (p. 77); See also 
Hutson, p. 5. 
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     Erasmus’ letters take us back to Chapter 2 and the consideration of benefit that was 
seen as anathema to ideal friendship.  The epistolary performance and crafting of affective 
rhetoric is similar to the appeal to paradigmatic friendship pairs, as they attempt to 
engender a similar effect.  In both instances, as in the case of friendships of utility, the 
difficulty in discerning the true depth of the affective bond is problematic for friendships’ 
participants.  To close the chapter, two letters which passed between friends Francis Bacon 
and Toby Matthew are examined to demonstrate this idea.  Bacon and Matthew, a man 
sixteen years his junior, enjoyed a long-term friendship.  Lisa Jardine and Alan Stewart 
note that Francis and his brother, Nicholas Bacon were men who ‘constructed their lives 
around intricate networks of friendship and service’, but observe that Francis’ relationship 
with Matthew went beyond the ‘tired bids for patronage’.171 Even so, the two letters 
written to Matthew by Bacon in 1621(2) and 1623 172 respectively, highlight the 
complicated nature of delineating affection and instrumentality in friendship.  In the first, 
an affective bond of amity is asserted, as Bacon suggests that Matthew is the inspiration 
for the revision of his essay ‘Of Friendship’ (1625): 
 
Good Mr. Matthew, 
It is not for nothing that I have deferred my essay De Amicitia, whereby it hath 
expected the proof of your great freindship [sic] towards me.  Whatsoever the event 
be (wherein I depend upon God, who ordaineth the effect, the instrument, all) yet 
your incessant thinking of me, without loss of a moment of time, or a hint of 
                                                 
171 Lisa Jardine and Alan Stewart, Hostage to Fortune: The Troubled Life of Francis Bacon 1561-1626 
(London:  Victor Gollancz, 1998), p. 520. 
172 Spedding dates the first sometime in 1621-2 and the second between 17 June 1623 and July 1623 in The 
Letters and the Life of Francis Bacon ed by James Spedding vol 7 (London:  Longman, Greene, Longman 
and Roberts, 1861) in The Works of Francis Bacon ed by James Spedding, Robert Leslie Ellis and Douglas 
Denon Heath Vol XIIII (London: Longman et al, 1862), p. 430. 
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occasion, or a circumstance of endeavour, or a stroke of a pulse, in demonstration 
of love and affection to me doth infinitely tie me to you.173 
 
There is a reflection of the Senecan principle of giving as engendering sustained friendship 
here, for implicit is the understanding that Matthew’s friendship is ‘great’ because of his 
many demonstrations of affection.  Bacon acknowledges that these acts have forged an 
abiding ‘tie’.  But unlike Erasmus’ letter to Schürer, there is little assertion of reciprocal 
feeling, as Bacon’s letter, to a man who is purportedly a close friend, is remarkably 
reserved in emotion, especially given the tenor of Matthew’s attentions referenced by 
Bacon. The letter’s voice does not conjure a feeling of a friendship based on mutual 
affection, despite a hint of a palpable bond between the two men.  Even so, it is as if Bacon 
almost basks in the adoration displayed by Matthew, in a similar way that Timon and 
Frankford savoured the attention of their inferior friends.  
     There is the requisite implied gratitude in the letter, but given the asymmetrical 
affection it asserts it becomes problematic to read this letter as demonstrative of the 
existence of (or depth of) an affective bond between Bacon and Matthew.  Given Bacon 
and Matthew’s education they were both familiar with pedagogical models of familiar 
letters.  Bacon’s correspondence illustrates his use of the form to secure suits.  While 
Bacon signs the letter to Matthew ‘Your most affectionate and assured friend’, this closing, 
or a similar permutation of ‘your assured friend’, was one of several stock phrases, used to 
close a letter.  In Nicholas Breton’s Conceyted Letters: ‘the perfections or arte of 
episteling (1618, 1632, 1638) it is used in the response to a sample letter ‘from a Knight to 
a Nobleman, for the entertaining of a Secretary’, in appreciation for a new employee.174 
The letter does not suggest that the two men exchanging letters are friends, but merely that 
                                                 
173 Spedding, p. 430. 
174 Nicholas Breton, Conceyted Letters: (London:  Printed by B. Alsop for Samuel Rand, 1618), sig. C3r. 
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the knight has heard of the death of the lord’s secretary and proffers a suit for the post on 
behalf of a kinsman, which the lord accepts.  Yet, the closing of this letter is similar to that 
employed by Bacon to Matthew.  Further, closings which recall amicitia perfecta’s ‘one 
soul in two bodies’, such as, ‘Yours as mine owne’ and  its response, ‘Yours, or not mine 
owne’ are found both in a ‘Letter To A Friend to Borrowe Money’ (and the friend’s 
response) and ‘A Letter to a Friend, on the otherside [sic]of the Sea’(and response); the 
latter asks for nothing more than some news of the friend’s welfare and goings on, the 
former, for five pounds.175  Here, there is indeed a ‘confusing’ of ‘the economic and 
affective’.176  Overall then, how is a man to discern the type of friendship that he has 
transacted? 
     Bacon’s revision of ‘Of Friendship’ is thought to be a tribute to the affective friendship 
he enjoyed with Matthew and written, as the letter suggests, at his friend’s request.  It takes 
a less cynical view of friendship, with reduced emphasis on a friend’s usefulness, but it 
does not abandon the idea of utility altogether.  As discussed in Chapter 3, in this essay 
Bacon explains how a friend may open doors to opportunity, by acting as one’s deputy.  
He also asserts how useful a friend can be in terms of one’s reputation:  
 
 A man can scarce allege his owne Merits with modesty much less extoll them:  A 
 man cannot sometimes brooke to Supplicate or Beg: [...] But all these Things, are 
 Graceful in a Friends Mouth, which are blushing in a Mans Owne.177   
 
     Although Jardine and Stewart claim that Matthew in no way wielded the type of power 
that Essex and Villiers enjoyed at certain times at Court, Matthew also was useful to 
                                                 
175 Breton, Letters, sigs. A4r- A4v, C4v-D2r. Original, non-standardised capitalisation of titles retained. 
176 This idea, and coining of phrase, discussed earlier in relation to Timon of Athens by Tom MacFaul, p.145. 
177 Francis Bacon, ‘Of Friendship’ in The Essayes or Counsels, Civill and Morall of Francis Bacon, Viscount 
St. Alban (London:  John Haviland, 1632), sig. Y2r. 
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Bacon, and vice versa.178  They relate that Matthew delivered important correspondence 
for Bacon early and late in his career and that Bacon vacated his St Albans seat in 
Parliament for Matthew and instead sat for Ipswich.179  As David Wootton contends, 
Matthew was well-connected at court.180  This is clear from a letter that Bacon writes to 
Matthew three years before Bacon dies in 1626.  It is similar to many of the letters that 
Bacon wrote to others throughout his career wherein he requested assistance in suits.  He 
writes in part to Matthew: 
 
so as with great confidence I commend myself to you, hoping that you will do what 
in you lieth to prepare the Prince and Duke to think of me upon their return.  And if 
you have any relation to the Infata, I doubt not but it shall be also to my use.181  
 
Although this letter’s tone differs significantly from the first’s more intimate one, this does 
not necessarily speak against what David Wootton contends was Bacon’s finding ‘true 
friendship’ in Matthew.182  This is especially understandable with Aristotle’s belief that all 
formulations of friendship can exhibit ‘mutual assistance and goodwill’. Wootton’s 
observation on Bacon’s friendships of utility illustrates this coexistence:  
 
 throughout his career he had sought to adapt the language and sentiments of  
 friendship to the demands of court life, where friendship was inseparable from  
 flattery, patronage and favouritism.  At court there was no love without utility,  
 and perfection of friendship was ‘but a speculation’.183  
                                                 
178 Jardine and Stewart, Bacon, p. 483. 
179 Jardine and Stewart, Bacon, pp. 520, 276. 
180 David Wootton, ‘Francis Bacon:  Your Flexible Friend’ in The World of the Favourite ed. by JH Elliott 
and WB Brockliss (London and New Haven:  Yale University Press, 1999), pp.184-204 (p. 200). 
181 The letter is placed by Spedding between 17 June 1623 and July 1623 in in The Letters and the Life of 
Francis Bacon ed by James Spedding vol 7 (London:  Longman, Greene, Longman and Roberts, 1861) in 
The Works of Francis Bacon ed by James Spedding, Robert Leslie Ellis and Douglas Denon Heath Vol XIIII 
(London: Longman et al, 1862) , p. 430. 
182 Wootton, p, 201. 
183 Wootton, p, 201. 
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      A comparison of the dates of both letters that Bacon writes to Matthew with the dates of 
Matthew’s second exile, from 1619-1622, supports Wootton’s assessment. If Spedding’s 
dating of both letters to Matthew is correct, then the first one discussed, signed ‘your 
assured friend’, came whilst Matthew was in exile.184  It makes no requests of a man who 
is no position to be of assistance.  The second, dated between 17 June- July 1623 comes 
after Matthew’s return to Court and the King’s favour.  It acknowledges Matthew’s 
diplomatic role, which began that spring (and led to his knighthood that October) in 
helping with the negotiations for the marriage to the Infanta.185  Thus, even in the twilight 
of his life and career, Bacon saw the use of a friend with whom it is believed he shared a 
close affective bond. 
     The letters of Bacon and Erasmus, the Stanley tribute and James’ description of 
relationships between gentry and their followers all highlight the difficulty that not only 
researchers face in trying to ‘read’ amicable bonds between men when political and social 
realities necessitated a conflation of ideal and useful friendship, but more importantly 
perhaps, the problems that early modern men faced trying to discern the same, as the 
rhetoric and performance of true and useful friendship sometimes crossed paths.  At a time 
when, as Jason Scott-Warren observes, ‘on the ladder of status, everyone was at once 
patron and client, dispensing favours to those beneath them and begging favours from 
those higher up’186 what Heywood and the anonymous dramatist of Timon capture in their 
representations in a sometimes satirical, sometimes sober way, are the multi-dimensional 
ways such relationships can be read and misunderstood.   
                                                 
184 The date of Matthew’s second exile from 1619-22 from A. J. Loomie, ‘Sir Toby Matthew’, The Oxford 
Dictionary of National Biography.  
185 Loomie, ‘Matthew’, DNB. 




    This chapter examined the treatment of another formulation of unequal friendship that 
drew from the theoretical ideal.  The following chapter takes this idea further, examining 
the problems created by the shared parlance of ideal friendship and marriage through 
Heywood’s representation of the status of the friend after marriage in The Rape of Lucrece 





A ‘Woe’ to Male Friendship?1   
On the 6 August 1628 Thomas Heywood’s The Rape of Lucrece was performed at the 
Cockpit Theatre by Queen Henrietta’s Men.2  Less than a year later, in 1629, nearly 
twenty-five years after its first performance, William Shakespeare’s Othello took the stage 
at the Blackfriars Theatre. Both plays were revivals:  Lucrece from the Red Bull c. 1608 
and Othello from its performances at Whitehall in front of King James 1 on 1 November 
1604, at Oxford and the Globe in 1610, and again at court for Princess Elizabeth's 
marriage in 1612/13.3  The plays had been written close to a time when drama evidenced a 
‘preoccupation with marriage’, often posited in relation to its co-existence with 
friendship.4 Shakespeare’s treatment of this combined theme in Othello and The Winter’s 
Tale (1610) suggests that the two relationships are incompatible. As Allan Bloom notes, in 
The Winter’s Tale he calls into question the viability of male friendship after marriage, 
finally endorsing ‘a definite primacy to marriage over friendship’.5 Othello (1603/4) may 
be viewed somewhat similarly, for despite much of the play’s action suggesting otherwise, 
ultimately the friendship that challenged marriage is denounced, and marital union is only 
symbolically re-established in death.   
                                                          
1 This idea from the characterisation of women as ‘a woe onto [sic] man’ from Chapter 1 of Joseph Swetnam, 
The Araignment of Lewd, Idle, Froward, Inconstant Women (London:  Printed by George Purslowe for 
Thomas Archer, 1615). 
2 Paulina Kewes, ‘Roman History and Early Stuart Drama: Thomas Heywood’s The Rape of Lucrece’, ELR 
32 (2002), 239-67, (p.241); Andrew Gurr Playgoing in Shakespeare’s London, 2nd edn. (Cambridge:  
Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 198.  
3 In ‘Appendix’ Andrew Gurr, The Shakespearean Stage,  3rd edn. (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 
2001), p. 240; Michael Neill, ‘Introduction’, Othello, the Moor of Venice by William Shakespeare ed. by 
Michael Neill (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 1-194, (p. 2). See also Andrew Hadfield, A 
Routledge Literary Sourcebook on William Shakespeare's Othello (London: Routledge, 2003), p. 36. 
4 Kathleen E. McLuskie notes there was a ‘preoccupation with marriage in the plays of the turn of the 
century’ in Dekker and Heywood:  Professional Dramatists (London:  St. Martins, 1994), p. 95.  
Additionally, Heywood’s A Woman Killed with Kindness was written at this time (1607). 
5 Allan Bloom, Shakespeare on Love and Friendship (Chicago and London:  University of Chicago Press, 
1993), p. 110. 
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     Lucrece and Othello were first performed during the early days of King James’ 
friendship with Robert Carr, Earl of Somerset. Their revivals coincided with the ‘early 
marital discord’ at the Caroline court between Charles 1 and Queen Henrietta Maria, and 
the halcyon days of George Villiers, Duke of Buckingham, the royal friend and favourite 
at both Charles and James’ courts.6  Villiers was in the audience at the Cockpit on the 6 
August during the performance of Lucrece.  The theatre visit was in the wake of the 
Remonstrance drafted by Parliament that denounced the King’s friend, laying at his feet 
the commonwealth’s troubles.7  Villiers attendance at the play is not necessarily 
remarkable, as it was one of his royal duties. He had escorted the Ambassador of Savoy to 
the Globe for a performance of Fletcher and Shakespeare’s Henry VIII (1611) earlier in the 
month,8  a play revived for only one performance at the behest of Villiers (who is reported 
to have left after Buckingham’s death).9  What is interesting to consider is not the later 
theatre visit’s temporal proximity to Villiers’ murder or the circumstances surrounding the 
revival of Henry VIII, but the plays’ shared interest in the historical treatment of the 
primacy of homosocial bonding figured in relation to fidelity and marriage, something of 
great relevance to Buckingham’s career and life at court.   
     In Othello and the Winter’s Tale Shakespeare examines friendship and marriage 
through jealousy.  Tom MacFaul suggests that this plot line may be viewed as a genre, 
                                                          
6 For James’ relationship with Queen Anne and Buckingham see David M. Bergeron, King James & Letters 
of Homoerotic Desire (Iowa City:  University of Iowa Press, 1999), pp. 98-107. For Charles’ relationship 
with Queen Henrietta Maria and friendship with Buckingham, see Michelle Anne White, Henrietta Maria 
and the English Civil Wars (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006), pp. 12-13. 
7The culminating section reads: ‘the principall cause of which evils and dangers, we conceve to be the 
excessive power of the Duke of Buckingham, and the abuse of that power’ in A Remonstrance Presented to 
His Majesty by the Parliament in June Anno Dom. 1628 (London : 1643), sig. A4v. 
8 The visit to the Globe is recounted in Appendix 1, Gurr, Playgoing, p. 209. 
9 J. M. R. Margeson ,‘Introduction’, King Henry VIII by William Shakespeare ed. by J. M. R. Margeson 
(Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 1-63 (p. 48). Curtis Perry notes that there existed a 
similar ‘resentment’ at the courts of Henry VIII and James I when it came to ‘the politics of access’ in 
Literature and Favouritism in Early Modern England (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 
18. Blair Worden relates that at the Henry VIII performance ‘observers remarked on his [Buckingham’s] 
resemblance to Woolsey’ in ‘Favourites on the English Stage’ in The World of the Favourite ed. by JH 
Elliott and W B Brockliss (London and New Haven:  Yale University Press, 1999), pp. 160-183 (p. 171). 
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given its ‘sufficiently common’ use; a use that provides the basis for dramatists to consider 
‘the nature of ideal friendship’, which is ‘ultimately shown to be a hollow rhetorical 
construct’.10  Even so, in The Rape of Lucrece and The English Traveller, Thomas 
Heywood steps beyond this generic formulation as he envisages the possibilities for the co-
existence of marriage and friendship.  In the previous chapter we saw how Heywood 
highlighted the instrumentality of male bonds after marriage in A Woman Killed with 
Kindness.  He did so through his depictions of Frankford and Sir Charles, men who afford 
primacy to male bonds at high costs to wives and sisters.  In Lucrece and The English 
Traveller Heywood explores this further. He advances beyond Shakespeare’s treatment 
and resolution of the theme in Othello and The Winters’ Tale and his insistence on 
jealousy and betrayal at the expense of developing the friendship of Othello and Cassio or 
Leontes and Polixenes. This makes Heywood’s dramatic contributions to the discourse of 
friendship and marriage in these two plays not only noteworthy, but a fitting close to this 
study.   
      Heywood and Shakespeare’s treatment of friendship and marriage in the 
aforementioned plays raise some interesting questions, but they strongly beg one question 
above all:  if both friendship and marriage are necessary for social stability and success, 
and marriage equates with fully realised manhood, how do men negotiate the bounds and 
bonds of friendship and division of loyalties of husbands after marriage?11  Shakespeare’s 
Othello and The Winter’s Tale reveal the competing pull of the two and the problems that 
arise when primacy is given to one over the other. This chapter will consider how Thomas 
Heywood treats these two socially constructed, idealised relationships by exploring the 
                                                          
10 Tom MacFaul, Male Friendship in Shakespeare and His Contemporaries (Cambridge:  Cambridge 
University Press, 2007), p. 65. 
11   For marriage as part of the achievement of manhood see Alexandra Shepard, Meanings of Manhood in 
Early Modern England (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp.83, 87-88. 
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correlation between the religious language that prescribed marriage and the classical 
humanist parlance of male friendship made familiar in this study.  The first part of the 
chapter considers the cultural and theatrical contexts which may have played a part in the 
renewed interest in friendship and marriage.  The second part discusses the codification of 
friendship and marriage through shared language in classical, religious and contemporary 
works to highlight the inherent conflict established through shared discourse.  The third 
section will explore how Heywood addresses this conflict and the ideal in The Rape of 
Lucrece and The English Traveller. 
 
I. Cultural and Theatrical Contexts 
Lucrece and Othello were only two of the plays performed during the twelve year period 
1627-1639 that examined friendship and marriage.  Several, like Lucrece, were part of the 
repertory for the Cockpit under Christopher Beeston and included:  Heywood’s The 
English Traveller (c. 1627?), John Ford’s Love’s Sacrifice (1631?) and The Lady’s Trial 
(1638), and James Shirley’s Love’s Cruelty (part of the 1631 and 1639 repertories of 
Queen Henrietta’s Men and Beeston’s Boys respectively).12 Each of the plays re-work the 
friendship and marriage theme in their own unique ways, despite the obvious resonance, to 
a lesser or greater extent, of Othello. This perhaps argues less for the dramatists’ personal 
interest in the subject matter, and more for an astute Beeston, who was a savvy theatre and 
company manager.13  But also, it may in part relate to the literary connectedness of the 
dramatists.   
                                                          
12 Repertory and dates from ‘Appendix’, Gurr, Shakespearean Stage,  pp. 232-243.  
13 Andrew Gurr, Playgoing,  pp. 175-176. 
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     Critics have noted with some regularity the shared affinities between Ford, Heywood, 
Shakespeare and Shirley in their use of the love and friendship theme.14  Martin Butler 
identifies Shirley’s Love’s Cruelty as having similarities with Ford’s Love’s Sacrifice.15 
Further, A.T. Moore and Martin Butler have underscored the debt owed to Othello in 
Love’s Sacrifice, through either ‘allusions’ or ‘borrowings’.16  Heywood was a closer 
contemporary of Shakespeare than either Ford or Shirley, but his works were not merely 
written in Shakespeare’s shadow.  David Farley Hills locates A Woman Killed with 
Kindness at the Rose in ‘late February or early March 1603’, nearly a year before Othello’s 
first public performance when the theatres re-opened after plague closure in March 1604, 
and suggests that Othello was ‘a Globe reply to Heywood’s apparently highly successful 
domestic tragedy’.17  Paulina Kewes notes another response by Shakespeare to Heywood, 
arguing that the change of the title of Shakespeare’s narrative poem Lucrece (1594) to The 
Rape of Lucrece when published in 1616 (Q6), ‘was surely prompted by the publisher’s 
desire to capitalize on the popularity of Heywood’s stage version which by then had gone 
through three editions, in 1608, 1609, and 1641’.18  Both of these examples point up the 
nature of dramatic production (and perhaps commerce), and suggest that dramatists’ works 
could be in dialogue with one another.  It also lends credence to the view that there was 
robust dramatic life and creativity that prefigured, as well as followed, Shakespeare, 
                                                          
14 Martin Butler, dating The English Traveller 1633, finds the husband-wife-friend triangle ‘oddly Fordian’ 
and posits Heywood’s A Woman Killed with Kindness  may ‘lie behind’ Ford’s Love’s Sacrifice in  Martin 
Butler, ‘Love’s Sacrifice:  Ford’s Metatheatrical Tragedy’ in John Ford:  Critical Re-Visions  ed. by Michael 
Neill (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 201- 228, (p. 227). 
15 Butler, p. 208. 
16 See A. T. Moore, ‘Introduction’ in Love’s Sacrifice by John Ford (Manchester and New York:  Manchester 
University Press, 2002), pp. 1-107, (pp. 25-28; 26 ‘borrowings’); For ‘allusions’ see Butler, p. 217. 
17 David Farley-Hills, Shakespeare and the Rival Playwrights 1600-1606 (London:  Routledge:  1990), pp. 
104-105. 
18 Paulina Kewes, ‘Roman History and Early Stuart Drama: Thomas Heywood’s The Rape of Lucrece’, ELR 
32 (2002), 239-67, (p.247). 
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especially evident in the way the friendship and marriage theme was refigured and 
reinvigorated by Heywood.  
     This notable attention given to friendship and marriage in drama came as a married 
King followed a Virgin Queen on the throne and correlates to what Gina Hausknecht finds 
were ‘a proliferation of books on marriage’.19  Two of the texts that took up the subject of 
marriage, with particular focus on wives, were written by Thomas Heywood:  Gynaikeion 
(1624) and A Curtaine Lecture (1637).  Although Hausknecht accounts for the rise in 
output in part by noting an increase in the publication of books in general, she also 
suggests that perhaps it was linked to ‘renewed public interest in discourse about marriage’ 
that accompanied the new King.20  There was also a continued print interest in friendship 
at the time, with works that considered the integral nature of friendship to life, like Robert 
Burton’s Anatomy of Melancholy, which had five, pre-Civil war editions. This interest may 
be in part explained by the publicity surrounding relations in the royal household between 
James 1, Queen Anne and Buckingham. The persistent interest in stage favourites may 
have a similar explanation.  Work by Curtis Perry and Blair Worden link the interest in 
dramatic representation of favourites to the period of Elizabethan and Stuart concern over 
their prerogative.21 Even so, it is important to acknowledge, as Worden suggests, that the 
drama may not necessarily reflect ‘the operation of power’ itself, but rather, ‘public 
perceptions of it’; perceptions that Worden notes ‘crossed the gulf between literature and 
life’.22  The correspondence of themes germane to Buckingham’s life at court reflected 
                                                          
19 Gina Hausknecht, ‘ “So Many Shipwracke for Want of Better Knowledge”: The Imaginary Husband in 
Stuart Marriage Advice’, The Huntington Library Quarterly, 64. 1/2 (2001), pp. 81-106, (p. 83).   
20 Hausknecht, p. 83. 
21 Perry notes that that ‘upwards of fifty extant plays from 1587-1642’ have royal favouritism as their central 
concern, p. 3; Worden, pp. 159-160.   
22 Worden, p. 160. 
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onstage whilst he was in audience is intriguing at best, but also, it might serve as yet 
another example of how relatively close the borders of that divide came at times.  
 
II. Shared Discourse and the Codification of Friendship and Marriage 
Chapter 1 of this study examined the appropriation of classical philosophy by the Church 
fathers and early modern humanists to order amicable relations between men. The 
subsequent chapters considered the dramatic potential of problematising the strict 
codification of friendship figured through idealised rhetoric. But classical friendship 
rhetoric proved useful in shaping early modern marriage as well.  And when dramatists 
like Heywood added a wife to the equation, the responsibilities of stage husbands were 
compounded, mirroring early modern expectations of masculinity, as men attempted to 
negotiate two intimate relations which were codified similarly. At issue was the social 
imperative to be both friend and husband, and the competing benefits offered by each.  
This section will explore some of the points of intersection in order to highlight the 
contexts within which Heywood would understand both. 
      Patriarchal early modern society necessitated that gentlemen establish and nurture 
close friendship ties.  Lord Burghley’s advice to his son, Robert Cecil, discussed in 
Chapter 1, makes clear the implications for inattention to one’s useful friend, namely, 
insignificance. He warns:  ‘for otherwise in this ambitious age thou mayest remain like a 
hop without a pole, live in obscurity, and be made a football for every insulting companion 
to spurn at’.23 Equally, however, because marriage was seen as a stabilising factor in 
society, men were encouraged to marry, as constructs of ‘normative, or patriarchal 
                                                          
23 William Cecil, Lord Burghley, The Counsell of a Father to His Sonne, in Ten Severall Precepts (London : 
Printed for Josepth [sic] Hunt, 1611), Fifth Precept, p. 1, (this is a one page document). 
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manhood’ favoured married men.24  As Alexandra Shepard notes, ‘conduct writers 
identified three principal gateways to patriarchal privilege:  age, marital status, and more 
obliquely, social status’.25  And herein the tension between friendship and marriage begins 
to be felt, as instrumental friendships, much like ‘good’ marriages, also helped to confer 
the honour and prestige necessary to achieve one’s social status in relation to rank, as 
Burghley’s advice suggests.  Cultivating male friendships then, could not, and did not, end 
when a man said ‘I do’.   
     While the institutionalisation of marriage and Christian exegesis communicated in 
sermons and advice literature supported the primacy of marriage, the marital relationship 
was cast in classical friendship terms. Rhetorically, (and otherwise) this set marriage in 
competition with male friendship.  Lisa Jardine’s work on companionate marriage 
underscores the sources of conflict between the two, noting that the reformed Church’s 
‘marriage-model (mutual consent; free choice; partnership) made it readily comparable 
with intimate male friendship’.26  While the Christian perspective on the primacy of 
marriage left no doubt for any man taking part in the marriage ceremony (Form of 
Solemnization of Matrimony from The Book of Common Prayer 1559), the reiteration and 
reinforcement of that message read from pulpits on occasions throughout the church year 
in An Homily of the State of Matrimony (1562) provides just one clue as to the competing 
aims of friendship and marriage.  The second sentence reads: ‘It is instituted of God, to the 
intent that man and woman should live lawfully in a perpetual friendship’.27  The use of 
the word ‘friendship’ to characterise marriage is interesting, especially as Constance M. 
                                                          
24 Shepard, pp. 9, 87. 
25 Shepard, p. 9. 
26 In Lisa Jardine, Reading Shakespeare Historically (London and New York:  Routledge, 1996), p. 130. 
27 ‘An Homily of the State of Matrimony’  (1562) in Homilies Appointed to be Read in Churches in the Time 
of Queen Elizabeth (London: Printed for the Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, 1851), pp. 534-
549, (p. 534) 
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Furey suggests that ‘early modern Europeans assumed that it was men, not women who 
were best equipped for friendship and other communal relations’ (and to whom friendship 
literature was addressed).28  It is understandable however, given that the comparative 
example was made by men (namely, the Church fathers and theologians), for men.  As 
men were charged with ensuring the success of the marital relationship, a model that 
mirrored a relationship with which they were already familiar could be useful.   
     This figuring of marriage as amity can be traced to Thomas Aquinas, who was among 
other medieval theologians who figured marriage as 'love or friendship between 
spouses’.29  Aquinas posits marriage as a ‘friendship of equality’, invoking the notion of 
the mutuality held as the basis for male friendship:  sharing all things in common.30  This 
is an idea which is Pythagorean in origin, articulated in Plato’s Phaedrus and reiterated 
throughout the early modern period. Citing a Christianised derivation of ‘one soul in two 
bodies’ from Genesis— ‘they shall become one flesshe’—Aquinas asserts that ‘the love of 
man and woman is counted strongest of all’.31  This in itself is not unusual, as at the time 
he was writing Aquinas was responsible for a ‘new modus vivendi between faith and 
philosophy'.32  Yet, this idea of husbands and wives as ‘one flesh’, reiterated in the 
marriage service from St. Paul’s letter to the Ephesians (5: 31) is bound up in gender 
inequalities. If the husband is privileged over the wife, and she is merely part of his body 
                                                          
28 Constance M. Furey, Erasmus, Contarini, and the Religious Republic of Letters (Cambridge:  Cambridge 
University Press, 2006), p. 18. 
29 Conor McCarthy, Marriage in Medieval England: Law, Literature, and Practice (Woodbridge: Boydell 
Press, 2004) , p.95. 
30 This explanation arises in the context of a discussion of why polygamy is unacceptable in Thomas 
Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles trans. by Joseph Rickaby (London: Burns and Oates, 1905), 3.124; See 
also  William E. May, ‘Contemporary Perspectives on Thomistic Natural Law’ in St. Thomas Aquinas and 
the Natural Law Tradition: Contemporary Perspectives ed. by  John Goyette, Mark Latkovic and Richard S. 
Myers, (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2004)  pp. 113-156 (p. 141); From 
Genesis: ‘For this cause shall a man leave his father, and his mother, and shall be joyned with his wyfe / and 
they  shall become  one flesshe’ in The Byble in Englyshe (London: by [Thomas] Petyt, and [Robert] 
Redman, for Thomas Berthelet, 1540), sig. A1v. 
31Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles , 3.123. 




where he is the head, there can be no equality as Aquinas suggests. The idea of men joined 
by a soul in perfect friendship however, links the very essence of the self, and despite its 
more quixotic view, in theory suggests a more equitable and noble union.  When King 
James asserted in Basilikon Doron (1603) that a wife should be treated as 'the halfe of your 
selfe', he came rhetorically closer to classical friendship’s view of the friend as ‘another 
self’ from the Nicomachean Ethics: that ‘frendes have one life and one bloud’.33  This may 
in part reflect his simultaneous experience with close male friendship and marriage.  But it 
is clear that despite religious precedent maintaining marriage’s primacy, shared symbolic 
imagery and language and constructs of femininity and masculinity set friendship and 
marriage in conflict.   
     This was heightened further through the shared benefits offered by male friendship and 
marriage, making friends and wives potentially equal competitors for affection and 
fidelity.  As previously mentioned, the friend could help further reputation and confer 
honour.  In a similar way, however, so too could a chaste and obedient wife with 
established kinship ties and influence.  King Kames reinforces the latter in his advice to his 
son in Basilikon Doron, noting marriage’s ability to confer ‘friendship by alliance’.34  This 
idea made early modern marital choice a vital concern (more so among elite families), and 
as important perhaps, as Burghley’s suggested selection of a well-placed friend.35  
     And just as the friend was called to promote virtue through moral correction and 
guidance, so, too, was the wife.  Gina Hausknecht’s work on early Stuart advice literature 
underscores this idea, relating that Alexander Niccholes reference to a man without a wife 
as ‘a man unbuilt’ in his Discourse of Marriage and Wiving (1615) suggests an inability to 
                                                          
33 James I, King of England, Basilikon Doron (London: E. Allde for E. White, 1603), p. 64; The Ethiques of 
Aristotle, ( London:  Richard Grafton, 1547), chapter xlvii, sig. J6r. 
34Basilikon Doron , p. 61. 
35 Jardine, pp. 114-115. See also Ralph Houlbrooke, The English Family 1450-1700 (London: Longman, 
1984), p. 73-74. 
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reach moral potential without one, rendering a man ‘not fully a man.’36  One can already 
begin to see the friction here between friendship and marriage literature as overlapping 
duties to promote virtue are apportioned between friend and wife.  While Niccholes’ work 
and William Whatley’s A Bride-Bush (1617) supported the Aristotelian claim that virtue 
was not in man by nature by asserting the need for an earthly moral guide, the suggestion 
that the wife might fulfil this role set the position of the friend and wife at added variance.  
Whatley urged wives ‘to draw’ their husbands ‘out of sin’, and as a co-partner gave them 
equal responsibility to ‘mitigate’ any ‘distemperatures’, thereby charging wives to promote 
virtue in a similar way as Aristotle did the friend, when he claimed ‘menne maie become 
the better one by another’.37 Marriage itself was seen to further this end, through 
sanctioned sexual intimacy for those who lacked the ‘gift of continency’, as the second 
‘cause’ of matrimony was its use as ‘a remedy against sin, and to avoid fornication’.38  The 
third ‘cause’ of matrimony outlined in ‘The Form of Solemnization of Matrimony’ was 
‘mutual society, help and comfort’.39  This also challenged the responsibility afforded the 
ideal friend to provide succour.  In actuality, the key differences between classically-
ordered male friendship and early modern marriage rested on marriage’s first ‘cause’:  
procreation; its ability to provide lineal continuity through children, and its sanctification 
of sexual intimacy. That said, evidence suggests that some men did conduct intimate 
sexual relationships with other men, despite the fact that such relations were considered 
                                                          
36 Hausknecht,  p. 82. 
37 William Whatley, A Bride-Bush or Wedding Sermon (London:  Printed for William Jaggard for Nicholas 
Bourne, 1617), p. 12; Ethiques, Wilkinson, sig. J8r. 
38 ‘The Form of Solemnization of Matrimony’ in The Book of Common Prayer 1559:  The Elizabethan 
Prayer Book ed. by John Booty (Washington:  Folger Books, 1976), pp. 290-291. Hereafter:  BCP. 
39 In BCP, p. 291. 
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political, sexual and religious crimes, and they did so, as Alan Bray notes, ‘within social 
contexts which an Elizabethan would have called friendship’.40      
     Marriage’s primacy over friendship was supported by liturgical practice and didactic 
marriage manuals (like the aforementioned).  Even so, the views of writers such as 
Edmund Tilney, who claimed that 'no friendship, or amitie is, or ought to be more déere, 
and surer, than the love of man and wife’ met with challenges from alternative voices in 
print.41 One influential dissenting view was from Saint Augustine.  His major works, Citie 
of God  and Confessions were available in English translation in 1610 and 1631 
respectively, but his thought was invoked in other contemporary works.  Thomas 
Heywood demonstrates his familiarity with Augustinian thought in Gynaikeion, Nine 
Bookes of Various History Concerninge Women (1624), a work which is a synthesis of 
Christian theology and classical philosophy drawing from ideas of other Church fathers as 
well as Aristotle, Cicero, Plutarch and Pythagoras.42 Augustine takes a less cooperative 
view of marital union than Aquinas, assigning Eve's main role as procreation, not as 
companionship for Adam.43 In De Genesi ad litteram his perspective on friendship in 
marriage is somewhat obliquely defined, as Carolinne White’s translation suggests:  ‘how 
much better would two male friends live together, alike for company and conversation, 
than a man and a woman’.44  This idea reflects a similar understanding of the philosophy 
                                                          
40 Alan Bray, ‘Homosexuality and the Signs of Male Friendship in Elizabethan England’, History Workshop 
29 (Spring, 1990), pp. 1-19, (pp. 2, 5, 14). 
41 Edmund Tilney, The Flower of Friendshippe ( London:  Henrie Denham, 1571), sig. A3v. 
42 Augustine is invoked throughout.  For all others see Thomas Heywood, Gynaikeion (London: Adam Islip, 
1624), passim and pp. 271, 426, 618-619, especially.  
43 Gerald Bonner, ‘The Figure of Eve in Augustine's Theology’ in Studia Patristica, Vol XXXIII, Papers 
Presented at the Twelfth International Conference on Patristic Studies Held in Oxford 1995: Augustine and 
His Opponents, Jerome, Other Latin Fathers After Nicaea ed. by Elizabeth A. Livingstone (Leuven:  Peeters, 
1997), pp. 22-34, (p.22).  
44 From De Genesi ad litteram, IX, v, 9 as quoted in Carolinne White, Christian Friendship in the Fourth 
Century (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 10 and as ‘Quanto enim congruentius ad 
conuiuendum et colloquendum duo amici pariter quam uir et mulier habitarent’ as quoted in Bonner, p. 22. 
According to Bonner, the idea is that a male companion would be more ‘useful’. For consonance in thinking 
on friendship with Cicero, see also White, p. 50.     
248 
 
and practice of classical amity outlined by Aristotle and Cicero, and perhaps Augustine’s 
own experience with male friendship.45  Interestingly however, Aristotle posits marriage 
as philia.46 John Watt’s translation of Augustine’s Confessions offers a perspective on th
theologian’s view of male friendship that may inform his view about friendship and 
marriage.  In a recollection of the loss of a dear friend, the unity of ideal friendship is 
invoked:  
e 
                                                          
  
 for I still thought my soule and his soule, to have beene but one soule in two  
 bodies and therefore was my life a very horror to me, because I would not live  
 by halves. And even therefore perchance was I afraid to dye, lest he should  
 wholy die, whom so passionately I had loved.47 
 
The friendship is described as intimate and intense; the mourning of the friend is 
reminiscent of the same in De amicitia.  Although Augustinian thought acknowledges that 
the wife might serve as companion, the Citie of God supports a similar view as the 
Confessions, proposing that the ‘affection of sure friends’ and ‘unfained faith’, not 
marriage, are the only ‘comfort’ man has ‘in this vale of immortal miseries’.48 With both 
texts in mind, Augustine’s view appears to elevate the male homosocial bond above the 
marriage relationship, perhaps not surprisingly given that marriage was not an option for 
him.  Even so, Augustine accepts the necessity of the marital union for peopling God’s 
45 For Romans marriage was ‘designed for the production of legitimate children’, see Susan Treggiari, 
Roman Marriage:  iusti coniuges from the Time of Cicero to the Time of Ulpian (Oxford:  Clarendon, 1991), 
p. 8; See also the first book of Cicero’s De officiis, ‘On Marriage’ (London:  Printed by H. Lownes, for 
Thomas Man, 1616), pp. 115-117.  This work claims in its title that it was translated ‘chiefly for the good of 
schools’, and  emphasises the procreative end, as does Aristotle’s The First Book, Politiques or Discourses of 
Government (London:  Adam Islip, 1598), p. 8. 
46 Ethiques, Wilkinson,  sig.H8r; see also Valerie Wayne, ‘Introduction’ to The Flower of Friendship: A 
Renaissance Dialogue Contesting Marriage (Ithaca:  Cornell University Press, 1992), p. 15. 
47 In Saint Augustine, Confessions trans. by William Watts (London: Printed by John Norton, for John 
Partridge, 1631), Book 4, Chapter 6, pp. 166-168. 
48 Saint Augustine, Of the Citie of God trans. by I.H. (London: Printed by George Eld, 1610),  Book 19, Chap 
8, p. 764; See also Wayne, p. 14.  
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kingdom, something Aquinas’ view challenged.49  Augustine’s view makes plain the 
conflicting tendencies within religious discourse on marriage that may have contributed to 
the mixed messages being conveyed.  This is something that is evidenced later in Erasmus’ 
Matrimonii encomium (1536), a work that encourages a friend to marry.  In the work 
Erasmus emphasises the superiority of the marital relationship over ‘other’ friendships 
because of its reliability and enduring quality: ‘in other frendshyps, howe greate 
symulation is ther? howe greate falsyte? Yea they, whome we judge over best frendes, 
lyke as the swalous flee’.50  Likening marriage to friendship, there is the ‘one soul in two 
bodies’ suggestion:  ‘it is an especyall swetnes to have one with whom ye may 
communycate the secrete affectyons of your mynde, with whom ye may speake even as it 
were with your owne selfe’.51  Interestingly Erasmus’ well-known Adages begins with an 
entry related to male friendship and equality, with line five deeming the friend as ‘another 
self’.52   
     Two final contemporary examples contribute to an understanding of the blurred 
theoretical boundaries between friendship and marriage in the period and the contradictory 
messages that became a part of the discourse of both.  A succinct entry in Politeuphuia 
(1597) pointedly challenges the idea of marriage’s precedence over male friendship, noting 
that:  ‘The love of men to women is a thing common, and of course, but the friendship of 
man to man, infinite and immortal’.53  In the same edition, is a conflicting entry which 
suggests that friendship ought to take marriage as its model, claiming that ‘friendship 
ought to resemble the love betweene man and wife; that is, of two bodies to be made one 
                                                          
49 St. Augustine, Citie of God , p. 764. 
50 Desiderius Erasmus, Matrimonii encomium trans. by Rychard Tavernour (London:  Robert Redman, 
1536), sig. C6v. 
51 Erasmus, Matrimonii, sigs. C6r- C6v. 
52 Desiderius Erasmus, Adages ed. by Margaret Mann Phillips, Roger Aubrey, et al.  (Toronto:  University of 
Toronto Press, 1982), p.31 (Ii2, line 5). 
53 Politeuphuia , (London:  I. Roberts for Nicholas Ling, 1598), sig. I7v . No author stated. 
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will and affection’.54  Whether or not the author understood that the origin of this 
sentiment was in classical friendship rhetoric, the significance of an early modern 
colloquial work adopting a marital framework to systematise friendship demonstrates not 
only misunderstanding in attribution, but more importantly, the way in which friendship 
and marriage were seen not only to imitate, but also, perhaps, to potentially replace each 
other.  Robert Burton’s Anatomy of Melancholy is another case in point.  The work was 
popular, with at least twelve printings from 1597-1641. It casts friendship as a hallowed 
union akin to marriage:  'Friendship is an holy name and a sacred communion of friends.  
As the Sunne is in the firmament, so is friendship in the world, a most divine and heavenly 
band’.55  While friendship lacks the religious sanction of marriage, Burton’s work affords 
it like status, the words calling to mind ‘the holy estate of matrimony’ proffered in the 
Elizabethan marriage ceremony.56  This idea becomes important to the discussion of 
friendship in The English Traveller that will be examined in Section III. 
     This discussion has illustrated the shared parlance and the different prioritisation 
afforded friendship and marriage in works available in the period. The focus on the 
collective descriptions of the two relationships that men were expected to cultivate and 
sustain highlights friendship’s usefulness as a preparation to marriage; and perhaps this 
was understood by writers who viewed them similarly. Katharine W. Swett’s study of the 
friendship circle of Sir Richard Wynn of Gwydir Caernarfonshire speaks to this idea.  She 
argues that successful pre-marital male friendships could actually benefit future marital 
relations:  ‘friendship encouraged certain skills and habits conducive to loving marriages 
                                                          
54 Politeuphuia, sig. K1r . 
55 Robert Burton, The Anatomy of Melancholy (Oxford : Printed by John Lichfield and James Short, for 
Henry Cripps, 1621),  Fol 519 Part 3 Sec 1 Mem 3 subs 1; The 1651 edition was printed after Burton’s death.  
For note on editions see ‘Introduction’ by JB Bamborough in Robert Burton The Anatomy of Melancholy ed. 
by Thomas C. Faulkner, Nicolas K. Kiessling and Rhonda Blair (Oxford:  Clarendon Press, 1989), 3 vols; 
(vol 1),xxxviii.   
56 BCP, p. 297. 
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as well, such as fluent communication, comfort in expressing affection and articulating 
emotional needs, thoughtfulness, and the capacity for loyalty’.57  Her study found that ‘the 
points of intersection between marriage and companionate friendship indicate that they 
could be mutually sustaining’.58  In principle, this makes sense, but in practice, given the 
blurred distinctions between the two this could be problematic. This section has explored 
the possible bases for the tension between idealised friendship and marriage through the 
shared discourse of the classical friendship and early modern marriage models.  The 
concluding section will take an extended look at how Thomas Heywood treats this conflict 
of co-existent, but mutually exclusive affective relationships.  
 
III. Gynaikeion and Figuring the Co-existence of Friendship and Marriage  
in The English Traveller and The Rape of Lucrece 
Christian writers on marriage may have been surprised by Thomas Heywood’s didactic 
foray into print extolling the virtues of chaste and constant wives in Gynaikeion (1624) 59 
and A Curtaine Lecture (1637); however, the dramatist had already revealed the 
compatibility of moral instruction and the dramatist’s pen in his Apology for Actors (1612) 
and demonstrated its force in A Woman Killed with Kindness (1603) and The Rape of 
Lucrece (1608).  These plays, as well as The English Traveller (c. 1624) reflect 
Heywood’s central concern in his prose works Gynaikeion  and A Curtaine Lecture (1637):  
how to be an ideal wife.  He may have viewed himself as following in the footsteps of the 
‘wise men of Greece’ who ‘could by their industry, finde out no neerer or directer course 
                                                          
57 The study was post-civil war, 1654-1674, in Katharine W. Swett,‘“The Account between Us”: Honor, 
Reciprocity and Companionship in Male Friendship in the Later Seventeenth Century’ Albion: A Quarterly 
Journal Concerned with British Studies, 3.1 (Spring 1999), 1-30, (p. 25). 
58 Swett, p.29. 
59 Merchant and Wiggins place The English Traveller before Gynaikeion see Paul Merchant, ‘Introduction’ 
Thomas Heywood: Three Marriage Plays (Manchester and New York:  Manchester University Press, 1996), 
pp.1-36 (p. 14); see also Martin Wiggins  Appendix 2 in Thomas Heywood, A Woman Killed with Kindness 
and Other Domestic Plays ed. by Martin Wiggins (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 2008), p.289. 
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to plant humanity and manners in the hearts of the multitude then to instruct them by 
moralized mysteries, what vices to avoyd, what vertues to embrace; what enormtyes to 
abandon’, but in doing so, his work also forges a classical and early modern connection 
similar to that which is at the heart of this study.60  Classical examples of wifely chastity 
and virtue heralded in his Gynaikeion inform his work, as Heywood undoubtedly saw the 
parallels between the patriarchal Greek and Roman societies where a woman’s chastity 
concerned men, and where the imperative to marry rested on ‘the production of legitimate 
children’.61  Equally, there was a corresponding association between friendship and 
marriage as ‘friendship went hand in hand with kinship, and marriage might place the seal 
on a friendship’.62   In A Curtaine Lecture Heywood acknowledges the procreative 
function of marriage to people God’s kingdom in a similar way that classically Greek 
marriage was envisaged as an end to people the democracy.63  Heywood engages with the 
aforementioned classical ideas on marriage in the Gynaikeion through his championing of 
historically chaste and self-less wives.  Additionally, he contributes to the written sense of 
the early modern rhetorical debate between friendship and marriage by outlining a view of 
marriage that resembles friendship, even in terms of choice: 
 
 The sacred institution of marriage, was not onely for procreation, but that man  
 should make choice of a woman, and a woman to make election of a husband,  
                                                          
60 Thomas Heywood, An Apology for Actors (London : Printed by Nicholas Okes, 1612), sig. C3r. 
61 On procreation as the basis for marriage see Susan Treggiari, Roman Marriage,  p. 8;  Bruce W. Winter 
relates Augustus’ ‘desire to restrain through legal means the conduct of the new Roman wives and secure 
their commitment to chastity in marriage’ and the outlining of specific clothing in the lex Iulia meant to 
‘advertise the wearer's chastity’, delineating  the modest wife from the adulteress and prostitute  in  Roman 
Wives, Roman Widows:  The Appearance of New Women and the Pauline Communities (Grand Rapids; 
Cambridge: W. B. Eerdmans, 2003), pp. 58, 84; Mark Breitenberg discusses ‘pervasive masculine anxiety 
toward female chastity in early modern texts’ in Anxious Masculinity in Early Modern England  (Cambridge:  
Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 5.   
62 Florence Dupont, Daily Life in Ancient Rome trans. by Christopher Woodall (Oxford; Malden, Mass.: 
Blackwell, 1994), p. 17; for a similar understanding of the importance of marriage in creating ties in Greece, 
see Encyclopedia of Ancient Greece ed. by Nigel Guy Wilson (New York:  Routledge, 2006 ), p. 450. 
63 For the ends of Ancient Greek marriage see Wilson, p. 450. 
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 as companions and comforters one of another as well in adversitie as   
 prosperitie.64 
 
Here Heywood takes up the idea of mutual help as the cause of marriage from the Book of 
Common Prayer.  This figuring of the wife as a friend continues in the work through 
examples of wives whose constancy and actions challenge those prescribed for the ideal 
friend.  Heywood employs the parlance of perfect friendship’s ultimate test of fidelity to  
argue that the virtuous wife rivals a Damon or Pythias: 
 
 An admirable and rare president in man, and a husband; which I can easily instance 
 in woman, and a wife: for as there is nothing more divelish and deadly than a 
 malitious and ill disposed woman, so there is on the contrarie, nothing more 
 wholesome and comfortable to man than one provident, gentle, and well 
 addicted; for as she that is good and honest, will upon just necessitie lay downe 
 her life for her husbands health and safetie, so the other will as willingly 
 prostitute hers for his distruction and  ruin.65 
  
In Lucrece this idea of safeguarding the husband is explored beyond the threat against life 
and in relation to honour and reputation. In Gynaikeion the historical model Heywood 
holds up for emulation is Seneca’s wife, Pompeia Paulina.  To Heywood Pompeia was the 
model of wifely constancy, as she tried to follow Seneca to his death by suicide but was 
stopped by Nero.66  In the above citation, Heywood ‘easily’ affords virtuous wives a 
similar status to estimable husbands.  And on the whole, the attention paid to marriage in 
the work prioritises it over male friendship.  This is seen in the section entitled ‘The 
Moderne History of an Adultresse’ which is an earlier, narrative version of The English 
                                                          
64 Heywood, Gynaikeion, p. 180 
65 Heywood, Gynaikeion, p. 120. 
66 Heywood, Gynaikeion, p. 160. 
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Traveller that Heywood describes as modelling a ‘moderne Historie lately happening’.67 
Unlike the play, friendship is relegated to the background.68  This may speak to 
Heywood’s understanding of the dramatic interest to be engendered by the representation 
of friendship.   
     Heywood’s prose works can be read as a defence of marriage and the virtuous wife.  In 
The English Traveller and The Rape of Lucrece Heywood diverges from his apologist 
stance, as well as from Shakespeare’s final preferencing of marriage to friendship in 
Othello and The Winter’s Tale, and subordinates marriage to male friendship.  He does so 
through action, characterisation and dialogue that emphasise the importance of homosocial 
male bonding, prioritise the friend and accentuate weaknesses in the early modern 
marriage models; in doing so, Heywood highlights the shared benefits, and language of 
friendship and marriage.  Consequently, he leaves his audience and reader with the idea 
that male friendship is privileged above marriage.  Perhaps more importantly, however is 
the sense that emerges of  the ease with which the wife may be replaced by the friend. 
     Exposing the flaws in the early modern marriage models is one way in which Heywood 
promotes the superiority of male friendship in both plays. The English Traveller and The 
Rape of Lucrece can be viewed as representing the companionate marriage and the 
‘loving’ marriage models, respectively.  In The English Traveller the Wincott marriage is 
characterised as ‘a match’ (1.1.59). Wincott’s wife’s description of her marriage lends 
credence to the companionate, useful understanding of the word, as she tells Young 
Geraldine she ‘never wished nor sought’ her union with Wincott, but added ‘Now done, I 
not repent it’ (2.1.231-232).  Wincott’s wife does not imply that she was coerced, but 
rather, perhaps, encouraged. Significantly, however, she does not describe her feelings as 
                                                          
67 Heywood, Gynaikeion, p. 193. 
68 Heywood, Gynaikeion, pp. 192-193. 
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love.  And this is central here as Heywood gives no indication that the match was based on 
love on either side.  
     From the husband’s perspective we are given no evidence of his affection for his wife 
until the end of the play when she dies and Wincott indicates he is so ‘wretched in her 
loss’ as ‘she was so good a creature’ (5.1.212, 214).  This sentiment pales in comparison to 
the effusive affection that Wincott displays and voices for Young Geraldine beginning in 
Act 1 scene 1, when he enthusiastically declares his friendship for the young man to his 
wife, saying, ‘O this gentleman I love, nay almost dote on’ (1.1.177-178), soon after 
embracing Young Geraldine.  In staging this keenness for Young Geraldine through words 
as well as a physical demonstration of affection and positing it in opposition to the lack of 
intimacy voiced as  ‘small doings at home’ (1.1.40) between the older Wincott and his 
younger wife, Heywood emphasises  the importance of the young friend.  The overall 
sense is that in the absence of physical intimacy and true love in the marriage an affective 
void is created which must be filled.  In the play it is filled by an intimate adulterous 
liaison with Dalavill for Wincott’s wife and a close male friendship with Young Geraldine 
for Wincott.  In order to submit the ideal friend to the test of constancy, however, 
Heywood problematises this configuration even further, through the close and free access 
that Young Geraldine is allowed with Wincott’s wife, who equally recognises his many 
attributes.      
     Interestingly, the main appraisal of the Wincott marriage comes not from those closest 
to it, namely, the Wincotts, but rather, from Young Geraldine.  This is a curious turn by 
Heywood in that Young Geraldine’s description of the marriage as an ideal union is not 
borne out by the action or plot, and is contradictory to the wife’s characterisation. This 
unreliable complication can be seen as more of a plot device to engender sympathy for 
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Wincott and Young Geraldine after the wife’s adultery, as it heightens the intensity of 
disappointment and empathy from the audience when a fall is from a pedestal.  But further, 
this also serves to highlight Young Geraldine’s character, adding weight to the superiority 
of friendship, as Young Geraldine is figured as a very suitable, loyal friend, for his 
understanding of relationships is through the prism of their ideal constructions.   
     Young Geraldine’s portrayal as constant friend and his idealised understanding of 
marriage places him in sharp contrast to the fallen spouse who reflects poorly on the ideal 
of the wife as faithful friend.  When Young Geraldine says to Wincott’s wife, ‘so mutual is 
your true conjugal love’ (2.1.225), the irony is not yet palpable to the audience, as she has 
yet to prove unfaithful.  The phrase however, is similar to one that Heywood invokes in 
Gynaikeion in reference to women he deems noble for their devotion, chastity and 
constancy towards their husbands.69  He enquires rhetorically, ‘In what greater virtue can 
either sex expresse themselves, than in true coniujall love?’70  The Latin derivative 
'coniugium' is associated with coniungere, 'to join together', and evokes a similar sense as 
the Elizabethan marriage service dictum: ‘those whom God has joined together, let no man 
put asunder’.71  The mutual conjugality asserted does not suggest a ‘match’ for dowry, 
procreation or kinship ties, as the Wincott marriage does, but something altogether nobler. 
This marriage ‘match’ reflects a similar unity called for in ideal male friendship: the 
formation of a whole, ‘something which exactly corresponds to or complements another’ 
more pointedly, ‘something forming one of a matching pair’.72 Young Geraldine’s 
reference to the Wincott marriage in this way may be at odds with the wife’s view and 
                                                          
69 Heywood, Gynaikeion, p. 119. 
70 Heywood, Gynaikeion, p. 119. 
71In Tregiarri, p. 6. Here Treigarri also notes that ‘the ancients were uncertain whether it derived from the 
verb coniungere, to join, or from iugum, a yoke’; ‘Those whom God has joined together, let no man put 
asunder’ in ‘The Form of Solemnization of Matrimony’ in BCP,  p. 293 
72 ‘Match’, def. 5 (usage from 1474), OED. 
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overall depiction in the play, but it engenders a dramatic sense of that shared symbolic 
imagery of amicable and marital unions:  ‘one soul in two bodies’.  And this is the model 
brought forth for Wincott’s wife by the idealistic Young Geraldine, just as Heywood made 
it available for his women readers in Gynaikeion; the problem of course with all theoretical 
ideals—as the play bears out (and this thesis has illustrated)— is in the ability and 
willingness to apply it.  
     Young Geraldine’s idyllic view of the Wincott marriage is naive at best.  It could be 
argued that it reflects the unmarried man’s experience with the model of perfect friendship 
and an attempt to understand the marital relationship through a reliance on a comparable 
ideal.  An audience would be aware of the early modern theoretical frameworks within 
which friendship and marriage were figured correspondingly.  This perspective is made 
manifest in Young Geraldine’s description of Wincott’s attachment to him in marital 
terms.  He indicates that Wincott ‘is so wedded to my company’ (1.1.70).  Additionally, 
Young Geraldine ascribes similar obligations to friendship and marriage and expects that 
Wincott’s wife will do the same, most notably with respect to fidelity. Young Geraldine 
will not cuckold his friend, Wincott, even though he loves his wife and is given ample 
access and opportunity.  He indicates that he will await Wincott’s death, an occasion he 
does not wish imminent, to marry his widow.  This is how Heywood establishes the 
requisite ‘test’ that all ideal friends must undergo, a test Young Geraldine is portrayed to 
pass nobly.  This is a stage moment not represented in the narrative in Gynaikeion.  In the 
tragicomedy Young Geraldine says ‘my soul doth wish / A Nestor’s age, so much he 
merits from me’ (2.1.253-254), but in Gynaikeion the wife wishes her husband a long 
life.73 On the stage the dramatic force of the constant friend acting in selfless idealised 
fashion would be felt, calling to mind the Gesippus-like quality of Young Geraldine and 
                                                          
73 Heywood, Gynaikeion, pp. 193-194. 
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reaffirming the trustworthiness of male friendship.  The interrogation of the Wincott 
marriage and the choice to heighten the steadfastness of Young Geraldine and diminish the 
virtue of the wife emphasises the dissonance between the companionate marital ideal and 
the reality, while at the same time it proffers a reliable alternative in male friendship.   
     In the play this alternative is pursued with vigour by Wincott, who exhibits a near 
obsessive interest in keeping Young Geraldine close.  By suggesting that his wife’s sister, 
Pru would be a good marriage match for Young Geraldine, Wincott is not asserting a 
diminution in his affection for his friend, but rather, an expectation that the marital union 
would assure continuance of their friendship. Through wives male homosocial bonds were 
established and maintained.  Close friendships were not necessarily threatened by 
marriage, as men understood the social, economic and procreative necessity for marital 
unions; James I even ‘urged Buckingham to marry’.74    
      Wincott’s desire to retain Young Geraldine’s friendship and company comes at the 
expense of the young man’s relationship with his father. This selfish fascination with 
Young Geraldine is not, philosophically speaking, similar to the Greek philia or friendship 
that Plato recounts in the Phaedrus wherein the friend does not seek to deny his friend the 
company of others.75  Rather, it is more in line with the actions of a lover.76  Kathy Eden’s 
work on Plato notes that it is lovers, not friends, who ‘seek to deprive their beloveds in an 
effort to ensure their inferiority and continued dependence’.77  The play does not support a 
homoerotic reading, but it is difficult to reconcile Wincott’s enthusiastic attentiveness to 
Young Geraldine and dismiss his efforts to keep his young friend close, especially as both 
                                                          
74 David Bergeron, Royal Family, Royal Lovers: King James of England and Scotland  (Columbia and 
London:  University of Missouri Press, 1991), p. 170. 
75 See Kathy Eden, Friends Hold All Things in Common:  Tradition, Intellectual Property and the Adages of 
Erasmus (London and New Haven:  Yale University Press, 2001), p. 71. 
76 Eden, p. 71. 
77 Eden, p. 70. 
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actions are undertaken at the expense of his marriage. Alan Bray’s work on male 
friendship in Elizabethan England notes the difficulty in reading ‘signs’ of affection, 
relating that kisses and embraces, as well as the use of the word ‘love’ were ‘accustomed 
conventions of  Elizabethan friendship’, as well as part of more homosexual relationships 
between men.78  With this in mind, an audience might read Wincott’s actions and 
attentions as nothing more than fervent friendship.  Yet, because of the deliberate attention 
Heywood affords the Young Geraldine in Wincott’s affection, the friend emerges from the 
play as more important to Wincott than his wife.  In De educatione puerorum (1532) 
Thomas Elyot explained ‘howe we ought to favour our frends, to love womenne with 
measure’.79 Thomas Heywood’s depiction of Wincott’s relationships with Young 
Geraldine and his wife registers a similar sense. 
      Old Geraldine comments on his son’s constant presence in Wincott’s home, telling 
Wincott: ‘You have took him from me quite, and have, I think, / Adopted him into your 
family, / He stays with me so seldom’ (3.1.7-9).  It was not unusual that a friend might act 
as an ‘other father’ to a son of a friend.  Thomas Lupset’s dedication to the son of a friend 
in An Exhortation to Yonge Men (1535) bears this out.80  But there is no sense that Young 
Geraldine is in need of moral guidance or that Wincott imparts any. Even so, Old 
Geraldine’s suggestion that his son has become part of Wincott’s family is significant, 
because early in the play, it could be thought that Young Geraldine serves as the son that 
Wincott never had. Later however, this idea is invalidated with Wincott’s admission that 
Young Geraldine is his ‘chief friend’ (5.1.251).  Heywood does not repeat this idea in 
                                                          
78 Bray, p. 7. 
79 Thomas Elyot, De educatione puerorum (London: Thomas Berthelet, (1532), sig. D1v.     
80 Thomas Lupset, An Exhortation to Yonge Men Perswading Them to Walke in the Pathe Way that Leadeth 
to Honeste and Goodnes (London:  Thomase Berthelet, 1535), p. 4. 
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Gynaikeion where lineal ‘anxiety,’81 not amity, is invoked as the basis for the relationship 
between the older and younger man. The husband has ‘no issue’ by the wife and the young 
man is chosen by the husband as an heir, not a friend.82  
     The child-parent relationship had been discussed in relation to friendship by Aristotle, 
albeit not as a model of the ideal.83  As Roger Crisp’s reading of the Nicomachean Ethics 
suggests, the child, quite literally, can also be seen as ‘another self’.84  But even a 
suggestion of a filial friendship in the play underscores further the ambiguousness of 
relational boundaries, a parallel to which is evident in the terms of endearment James 1 
used for Buckingham: ‘son, friend, sweetheart, wife, child’.85  This idea is fully realised in 
Wincott’s penultimate avowal to Young Geraldine: 
 
   This meeting that was made 
   Only to take of you a parting leave 
   Shall now be made a marriage of our love 
   Which none save only death shall separate (5.1.251-254)  
 
Wincott’s description of friendship is evocative of the marriage vow:  ‘till death us 
depart’.86  This depiction is a reminder of the fluidity of the shared language across 
relational boundaries in the period, while the overall representation of the relationship 
between Wincott and Young Geraldine in the play, especially in this moment after the 
wife’s death, heightens the sense of male friendship’s enduring inviolability.  
                                                          
81 This ‘anxiety’ is discussed by Lisa Jardine in ‘Companionate Marriage Versus Male Friendship:  Anxiety 
for the Linea Family in Jacobean Drama’ in Reading Shakespeare Historically, pp. 114-131. 
82 Heywood, Gynaikeion, p. 193. 
83 Kristján Kristjánsson makes a compelling case for an Aristotelian sense of a ‘natural friendship’, whilst 
underscoring the inability of this friendship to reach idealised, virtuous heights in Aristotle, Emotions, and 
Education (Aldershot:  Ashgate, 2007), p. 115. 
84 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. by Roger Crisp (Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 159. 
85 Bergeron, Royal Family, Royal Lovers, p. 165. 
86 Note ‘depart’ rather than the later ‘do part’ in BCP, p. 292. 
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     But what type of friendship exactly? Heywood’s construction of the ideal friend in 
Young Geraldine is not based solely on the Ciceronean model of perfection. Notably, 
Young Geraldine demonstrates Stoic resolve in terms of Wincott’s wife, restraining his 
emotions and passions and demonstrating the constancy requisite of perfect friendship.  
Even so, the basis of Wincott’s friendship with the young man is reminiscent in part of 
Heywood’s treatment of Frankford’s desire for Wendoll’s companionship. Young 
Geraldine fills a void. It may have grown from the young man’s ‘infancy’, but in Wincott’s 
later years, he finds in Geraldine an opportunity to relive a youth that he himself has not 
experienced.  This is something that only a homosocial relationship could offer.  After 
Young Geraldine regales Wincott and his wife with the stories of his travel, Wincott 
responds:   
   And what more pleasure to an old man’s ear,  
   That never drew save his own country’s air,  
   Than hear such things related?  I do exceed him  
   In years, I must confess, yet he much older  
   Than I in his experience. (1.1.122-126) 
 
This idea is bound in gender inequalities as Wincott’s wife, despite her youth, would be 
unable to provide such tales of adventure to pique her husband’s curiosity, let alone his 
attention.  Moreover, and perhaps most importantly, she has been unable to provide 
Wincott with an heir.  As this was undoubtedly part of the bargain of the Wincott’s May-
December match, Wincott’s wife becomes a less attractive companion than Young 
Geraldine who is able to fill the void. As we saw in Chapter 3, according to Cicero, 
friendship should not be established on the basis of need, as this ‘assigns’ friendship to 'a 
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lowly pedigree' and an origin far from noble’.87  Heywood’s construction adheres to the 
more contemporary view espoused by Thomas Breme, as the ideal friend is posited as one 
who, in part,  will ‘give to his friend those things that he lacketh’.88 Heywood’s ideal 
friend in The English Traveller is still on unequal footing with his friend in terms of status, 
just as he was in A Woman Killed with Kindness, but here he is figured as a loyal, constant 
companion, who becomes part son, part surrogate wife.  
     Heywood may be reworking some of the material from A Woman Killed with Kindness 
here, but his choices in The English Traveller reinforce the sense of potential for loyalty in 
male friendship. Young Geraldine’s friendship with Dalavill is mainly to be assumed.  It is 
neither interrogated, nor described (at all).  Especially absent is the parlance of perfect 
friendship that Heywood used to characterise and highlight Frankford’s friendship for 
Wendoll in A Woman Killed with Kindness. The treatment of the Dalavill-Young 
Geraldine friendship also differs from Gynaikeion, where the similar narrative deems the 
Dalavill doppelganger the young man’s ‘neerest and most familiar friend'.89  Instead 
Heywood underscores Wincott’s friendship with Young Geraldine, and mutes Dalavill’s 
scenes of machination, limiting them to brief instances in 3.1, 3.3, and 4.1.  The idea of the 
diminished importance of the Young Geraldine-Dalavill friendship is supported through 
the lack of attention it is given in the confrontation scene after the adultery is revealed.  
This takes place between only Young Geraldine and Wincott’s wife.  Heywood diminishes 
the effect of betrayal in friendship through a simple one line condemnation of Dalavill 
from Young Geraldine that avoids any mention of friendship.  After Wincott’s wife 
                                                          
87 Marcus Tullius Cicero, De Amicitia in Cicero, De Senectute, De Amicitia, De Divinatione, trans. by 
William Armistead Falconer, The Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, Massachusetts:  1927-2001; 2001), 
pp. 103-211 (p. 141). 
88 Thomas Breme, The Mirrour of Friendship trans. by Thomas Breme (London:  Abel Jeffes, 1584), sig. 
B3r. 
89 Heywood, Gynaikeion, p. 194; Heywood does not give the characters in the narrative names. 
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swoons, Young Geraldine says to Dalavill:  ‘Go take her up whom thou hast oft thrown 
down, Villain’ (5.1.176).  Dalavill has not been condemned as a false friend or Judas here, 
but rather, as a tempter of Wincott’s wife.  Heywood’s focus in this scene is on the wife’s 
transgression.  He affords fifty-two lines to Young Geraldine’s confrontation with, and 
reprimand of her.  The focus in A Woman Killed with Kindness is also mainly on the wife 
after the betrayal, but there are several instances where Wendoll’s disloyalty is 
highlighted. The loss felt at the end of A Woman Killed with Kindness with the death of 
Anne and the loss of male friendship is absent in The English Traveller, despite the demise 
of Wincott’s wife and Dalavill’s departure.  Over twenty years after he wrote A Woman 
Killed with Kindness Heywood gave his betraying friend a different biblical referent 
transforming him from a Judas to a devil, but the diminished import given to Dalavill’s 
Iago-like behaviour, and an ending that effortlessly replaces the wife with the friend, 
reaffirms strong male amicable bonds and holds out hope for the restorative power of loyal 
friendship.  
     The marriage model that Heywood presents in The Rape of Lucrece is optimistic and 
holds out the greatest hope for marriage’s primacy, as it appears to be based on mutual 
affection. Yet, at the same time, Heywood demonstrates that it, too, is bound by the 
conventions and strictures of the patriarchal society within which it exists and functions.  
Historically, Ancient Rome may have been geographically and temporally distant from 
early modern England, but as Heywood understood, the situation between men and women 
was strikingly similar, as the pull of public duty and the rewards to be received in terms of 
honour reinforced the primacy of homosocial relations. The military friendships depicted 
in Lucrece on which the success of the Republic rested were similar to the ‘mutual bonds 
of friendship and patronage’ that Richard Alston observes were responsible for the success 
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of Ancient Rome in the first three centuries.90  This type of friendship, albeit martial, 
would resonate clearly with men in the audience, including Buckingham, who would draw 
distinct parallels with those ties that bind and the ones necessary for success at Court.   
     The addition of the wife to this world, counterpointing the sharp pull of public duty, 
was something that Shakespeare considers at the outset of Othello, when the Moor leaves 
his new bride for a mission to Cyprus.  In contrast, Lucrece’s early representation of the 
marital relationship of Collatine and Lucrece subverts this idea, as the husband and wife 
relationship is depicted as close, with homosocial business subordinated to the marriage.  
Sextus tells Brutus that Collatine will not be venturing to the oracle with his male 
companions because he ‘is troubled with the common disease of all new-married men; he’s 
sick of the wife’ (1.3, p. 132).91 Just as he does in The English Traveller, where Dalavill 
and Young Geraldine provide commentary on the Wincott marriage, Heywood does here 
with Sextus.  It is the first suggestion of the friend’s continued closeness to Collatine, 
despite the marriage, as he has intimate knowledge of a private nature.  This onstage 
reflection is symptomatic of early modern domestic matters where the line between public 
and private was easily breached. Here it signals the beginning of Sextus’ encroaching 
proximity to the marriage, seen in his light-hearted additional comment, ‘Lucrece will not 
let him go’ (1.3, p. 342).   
     But also, this scene contributes to the sense that the husband and wife relationship is 
prioritised at this point, as Collatine is depicted as eschewing male adventure in favour of 
spending time with his wife. In the moment of homosocial bonding, where Aruns, Brutus 
and Sextus plan the journey to the oracle and Sextus comments on Collatine’s marriage, 
                                                          
90 Richard Alston, Soldier and Society in Roman Egypt: A Social History (London and New York:  
Routledge, 1995), p. 161. 
91 Thomas Heywood, The Rape of Lucrece in The Best Plays of the Old Dramatists: Thomas Heywood ed. by 
A. Wilson Verity, pp. 327-427. All future references are from this edition. There are no line numbers, so 
page numbers are included. 
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Collatine is absent. Heywood contributes to this sense later in Act 2, when the Clown 
relates the recent news of camp, city and country to Collatine before first relaying a 
message from Lucrece that Collatine is urgently needed at home.  Collatine reproves him, 
saying ‘And couldst thou not have told me? Lucrece stay, / And I stand trifling here! 
Follow, Away!’ (2.1, p. 350).  But the tension between the call of homosocial business at 
court capable of conveying honour, and his duties as husband can be felt when Collatine 
complains that the camaraderie of friends ‘makes me lose my hours / At home with 
Lucrece, and abandon court’ (2.1, p. 348).  Here, the divided loyalties of an active civic 
life that necessitates long periods of absence from home and one’s wife are tangibly felt, 
and parallel the plight of early modern gentry and noble men. While this differs from the 
chosen absence from the marital bed by Wincott, distance is distance and whether it is 
emotional or physical its effect can be the same: disintegration of the husband and wife 
relationship, and leaving a void to be filled by male friendship.  Whether the male friend is 
chosen for affection and pleasant diversion as in A Woman Killed with Kindness and The 
English Traveller, or for loftier calls of honour and glory, as suggested in Lucrece, both 
are choices nonetheless, and Heywood relates the potential consequences of each.    
     In Lucrece that choice is signalled later than in The English Traveller, specifically in 
Act 3.  The marriage’s end will not be caused directly by neglect and lack of strong 
affective ties between husband and wife, as is suggested in The English Traveller; its 
disintegration begins with the choice of Collatine to grant the friend continued access to 
his domestic affairs and space. This is a common topos used by Heywood to test male 
friendship and wifely chastity.  He employs it in A Woman Killed with Kindness, The 
English Traveller and again here.  In Lucrece it sets in motion the prioritising of friendship 
over marriage, escalating to the point that the friend is welcomed into the home while 
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Collatine is away, just as he is in A Woman Killed with Kindness, thus allowing the rape of 
Lucrece. Heywood begins this trajectory towards marital disintegration through Collatine’s 
participation in the wager with his friends about their wives.  This action brings the friends 
into the private, domestic space.  In Act 3, scene 4, Lucrece entreats her husband to remain 
at home: ‘I hope my Collatine will not so leave his Lucrece’ (3.4, p. 380), she says, asking 
shortly thereafter, ‘Will my husband repose this night with me?’ (3.4, p. 381).  But her 
pleas are rejected.  
     This scene underscores that Collatine is no longer ‘sick of the wife’ (1.3, p. 342), but 
rather, ‘swayed’ by the call of duty and friends (3.4, p. 381).  Lucrece’s first plea is 
directed towards her husband’s friends.  This may be a reflection of her understanding of 
the friends’ importance, but also may be explained in terms of the Plutarchan expectation 
that a wife was ‘to have no peculiar friends by herself, but to use her husbands [sic] friends 
and take them as her owne’.92  By directing her first comment to the friends she is 
acknowledging their superiority as men in general, but also, as friends who have influence 
over her husband.  But the second request is directed to Collatine, who does not answer, 
but rather, allows his friend, Sextus, who will betray him, to speak for him, granting him 
temporary charge of the wife.  Sextus responds unequivocally, ‘He must:  we have but 
idled from the camp, to try a merry wager about their wives’ (3.4, p. 380).  From the 
comments about the marriage in Act 2, to the middle of Act 3, Sextus has moved closer to 
the marriage and the wife. Collatine’s abdication of household governance is not too 
dissimilar to the way in which Heywood writes Frankford as relinquishing domestic 
authority to Wendoll in his absence in A Woman Killed with Kindness, and granting 
Dalavill and Young Geraldine unbounded, open hospitality in The English Traveller, in 
                                                          
92 Plutarch of Chaeronea, The Philosophie, Commonlie Called the Morals trans. by Philemon Holland  
(London : Printed by Arnold Hatfield, 1603), p. 319. 
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that they all provide access and opportunity for betrayal.93   However, in Lucrece, by 
allowing Sextus to answer for him, Collatine relinquishes autonomy as well.  If we 
consider this in terms of perfect friendship, which requires abandoning self-interest for 
communal good—‘one soul in two bodies’—Heywood aligns Collatine with his friends 
rather than his wife.  In doing so Heywood retains the sense evoked in his other plays 
previously discussed, that male friendship requires demonstrations of beneficence and 
trust, even if it is at the expense of the wife.  To be sure, his allegiance to friendship is 
imperative for the future stability of Rome.  This is one of the larger concerns of the play 
as well as its historical analogue and Heywood reaffirms this sense.  As a commander (and 
future consul), he would recognise that ‘ties of obligation, friendship and loyalty would 
bind members of a unit together and would further bind those men to their commanding 
officer.’94  This strong pull of homosocial bonds is seen in the unmarried Brutus, who will 
eventually lead the charge against the Tarquins.  In Brutus Heywood realises a man with a 
clear sense of where his priorities and loyalties would lie should he have a wife.  His 
response to Sextus’ quip underscores this idea:   'Had I both [wit and a wife], yet should 
you prevail with me above either’ (1.3, p. 343). 
     Male friendship is further prioritised in the play through a contrast of two marital 
relationships that accommodate male friendship differently.  Male friendship figures 
significantly in Collatine and Lucrece’s marriage as discussed above; however, the 
marriage of Tarquin and Tullia allows for no outside influence by friends.  In fact, it 
displaces all other ties that bind, including parental, as Servius is slain so that Tarquin may 
ascend to power. Through Tarquin and Tullia’s marriage Heywood figures a close 
                                                          
93 Here I develop a suggestion made by Catherine Richardson who explains that ‘Arden’s role as domestic 
governor is called into question’ in Arden of Faversham in Domestic Life and Domestic Tragedy in early 
modern England (Manchester and New York:  Manchester University Press, 2006), p.114. 
94 Alston, p. 160. 
268 
 
attachment to the wife as a sign of male weakness, and a recipe for tyranny.  Brutus 
articulates this understanding when he suggests that Tarquin is either ‘a foole or a 
madman’ because he allows himself to be ‘over-ruld by a curst wife in private’ (1.2, p. 
335).  Tarquin’s loyalties have shifted from friends and kinsmen to his wife, now that he is 
King.  Lucretius complains of Tarquin’s rejection of friendly counsel alleging: 
                                                               he despises  
   The intent of all our speeches, our advices, 
   And counsel, thinking his own judgment only 
   To be approved in matters military,  
   And in affairs domestic; we are but mutes,  
   And fellows of no parts, viols unstrung,  
   Our notes too harsh to strike in princes’ ears. (2.1, p. 345).  
 
The musical metaphor underscores the dissonant note that friendly counsel now strikes, as 
there is no longer a part for male friends on Tarquin and Tullia’s stage. The male members 
of Tarquin’s ensemble have been replaced by the singular Queen consort, who has become 
chief counsellor and confidant.95  Tarquin’s involvement in the usurpation and murder of 
his father-in-law (with his wife) has isolated him from his men, as has his ascension to the 
throne. Through this marriage, which calls to mind the Macbeth union, Heywood similarly 
problematises a close and exclusive marital attachment to the wife.  It is through this prism 
it is understood that Collatine’s ascension to consul at the end of the play will necessitate a 
shift in priorities towards friendship. 
     Heywood affords considerable attention to this marriage, in which is manifested a sense 
of idealised marital union, albeit an unholy conspiratorial communion of thought and 
aspiration. This unity is evident in the couple’s verbal exchange, where Tullia’s words are 
                                                          
95 For an explanation of viols and early modern music see David Lindley, Shakespeare and Music, (London:  
Thompson Learning, 2006), especially pp. 99, 236. 
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a seamless continuation of Tarquin’s, with each employing the words ‘we’ and ‘our’: ‘we 
have sought to win’, ‘we are secure’, ‘our greatest strength’ (2.3, p. 355).  In Goffe’s 
Orestes a similar sense was conveyed of Ciceronean unanimity in male friendship:  ‘a 
most perfect agreement of willes, desires, & opinions’.96  Through the couple, Heywood 
offers a contrast to the marriage of Lucrece and Collatine.  The marital closeness of the 
Tarquins is driven by a wife overstepping gender constructs and disrupting homosocial 
connections by usurping the role of friends and favourites as counsellor in affairs of state. 
In essence, Tullia has become like the self- serving male friends we saw in Chapter 2 at 
Dionysius’ Court in Damon and Pythias.  The tyranny this wreaks on the state heightens 
the imperative for noble friendship as opposed to marriage, calling to mind the Aristotelian 
idea that even ‘mighty riche princes’ require friendship, even more so than other men 
perhaps, because their fall is more ‘perilous’.97  Through this glaring example of the threat 
posed by a move towards the wife and away from the homosocial ties that honourably 
counsel and bind, Collatine’s dissociation from Lucrece appears compulsory for the 
success of the Republic and maintenance of the patriarchal order, for despite being an 
affective marriage, the relationship cannot viably replace male friendship when it comes to 
the public space.  As per Aristotle, friendship and justice go hand in hand.98 
     While Tullia is depicted as perhaps as ‘unsexed’ as Lady Macbeth through her plotting 
of her father’s demise, and goading, ‘I am no wife of Tarquin’s if not King’ (1.1, p. 332), 
Heywood’s adherence to early modern stereotypes of femininity in his portrayal of 
Lucrece (and Wincott’s wife) is an additional way in which he contributes to a sense of the 
inability of friendship and marriage to co-exist. He outlines the way to choose a wife in A 
                                                          
96 Marcus Tullius Cicero, The Booke of Freendeshipe in Fouure Severall Treatises of M. Tullius Cicero 
trans. by Thomas Newton. (London:  Thomas Marshe, 1577),  sig. A7r. 
97 Ethiques, Wilkinson, sig. H3r-H3v. 
98 ‘yf every man wer frendly to other, Justice shuld not nede: for whi? frendshippe destroyeth al strife, and 
every discorde that may be’ in Ethiques, Wilkinson, sig. H3v. 
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Curtaine Lecture (1637) in a similar way that Plutarch advises men to choose a friend.  He 
suggests a man should assess ‘the fancies of her mind; and take her not for her outward 
person, but her inward perfection. For if thou makest election of beauty, it fadeth; if of 
riches, they soone waste; if of fame, it oft proves false; if of vertue, that only continues’.99  
Nevertheless, in The English Traveller and Lucrece Heywood depicts the wives in line 
with early modern gender stereotypes of women, emphasising both wives’ beauty, as well 
as their virtue.  Wincott’s wife is described as ‘a lady, / For beauty and for virtue 
unparalleled, / Nor can you name that thing to grace a woman / She has not in a full 
perfection (1.1.54-57).  Equally, he upholds Lucrece’s historic renown:  ‘her beauty hath 
relation to her virtue, and her virtue correspondent to her beauty, and in both she is 
matchless’ (3.4, p. 379).  The problem here of course is that the two men who take note of, 
and comment on, their friends’ wives’ attributes, are Dalavill and Sextus, the eventual 
betrayers.   
     In Sextus’ answer to Lucrece’s entreaty that her husband remain at home, he uses the 
word ‘idle’ to describe the friends’ venturing into the domestic space to test the wives.  
Thus, he associates the domestic space with triviality, and diminishes its importance, 
suggesting it is a place ‘serving no purpose, useless’.100  This reduces the men’s venturing 
into it as nothing but a lark, and a worthless endeavour. Sextus very clearly differentiates 
between the male and female spaces of activity and supports the idea of the superior value 
placed on the male dominated public space of homosocial activity and bonding.  Heywood 
explores this idea further in his Gynaikeion, the title of which refers to a Greek woman’s 
space in the home, where she would carry out her duties. Cynthia Patterson relates that 
                                                          
99 Thomas Heywood, A Curtaine Lecture (London:  n.p., 1637), p. 75. See also Plutarch, ‘The Maner to 
Chose and Cherysshe a Frende’ in De capienda ex inimicis utilitate.trans. by Thomas Elyot (London, 1531) , 
beginning sig. 13v, passim. 
100 ‘Idle’ in The Oxford English Dictionary Def. 3 a. (1597).  
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although some historians have considered this space as a form of seclusion, this was not 
the case, while Robert Garland notes the gynaikeion was designed because ‘Greek 
husbands regarded it as a matter of honour that their wives not be exposed to the public 
gaze even when at home’.101  This is an interesting idea, especially given the central 
concern of wifely chastity in The English Traveller and Lucrece.  But interestingly in both 
plays, the husbands themselves open the private space to the ‘gaze’ of purported and 
untried ‘friends’, putting their wives in jeopardy, as the women become the trial to prove 
friendship. The gynaikeion that Heywood constructs for his stage wives stands in 
contradistinction to Lucretius’ view that ‘home breeds safety’ (2.12, p. 343), as their 
domestic spaces are misused to threaten virtue and honour.  Because friendship is 
prioritised, friends are afforded access and increased proximity to the private space of the 
marriage and the wife; husbands are depicted as ignorant of the Plutarchan warning about 
the possibilities for betrayal by the friend: ‘that thou committe nothynge to hym / but that 
thou woldest comm
                                                          
itte to an enmie’.102   
     In Lucrece, while the rape is the final and ultimate violation of the sanctity of the 
marriage, the penultimate instance of intrusion by the friend is already emblematic of the 
way the boundaries between friendship and marriage have been traversed in the play, 
through the delivery of the ring by Sextus. This marks the first occasion when Collatine 
provides unsupervised access into the domestic space.  This ingress of the friend into the 
private domain of husband and wife in the husband’s absence is particularly symbolic 
because of the implication of the ‘private token’ (3.5, p. 382) the friend is to convey:  a 
ring.  The ring is not in Heywood’s source or in Shakespeare’s poem (1594), but is of 
significance in the c. 1571 Titian painting, depicting the rape, entitled ‘Tarquin and 
101 Cynthia Patterson, The Family in Greek History (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998), p. 
126; Robert Garland,  Daily Life of the Ancient Greeks (Westport, Conn:  Greenwood, 1998), p. 85. 
102 Plutarch, ‘Maner to Chose’, sig.14v.     
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Lucretia’. Catherine Belsey notes the ring’s ‘critical placement’ on the canvas, ‘one-third 
of the way down vertically’.103  But also, significantly, Lucrece is holding up her ringed 
hand near the heart of her husband’s friend.104  Heywood treats the ring as similarly central 
to his scene.  Akin to Desdemona’s handkerchief in its link to the wife’s chastity, its main 
significance, however, lies in its relation to its meaning as a token given during the 
marriage ceremony. Generally, writers in the early modern period saw the wedding ring as 
‘a token of love and commitment’, as David Cressy notes:  for Richard Hooker it was ‘an 
especial pledge of faith and fidelity’, for Henry Swinburne, a mark of ‘perfect unity and 
indissoluble conjunction’.105 The conveyance of the ring by the husband’s friend here as a 
token of remembrance of their recent union and reaffirmation of their vows creates a 
fissure in the inviolability of that union, as the transfer to the wife is not directly from the 
husband, but mediated by the friend (in a perverse twist of the role of a best-man).106 
Ironically, rather than representative of faith and fidelity, it becomes linked with 
disloyalty, as it foreshadows the dissolution of friendship, and the end of the marriage. 
Interestingly, rings in the early modern period also served a symbolic purpose when it 
came to friendship, given as a token of remembrance to male friends after one’s death.107 
     As this scene demonstrates, Heywood does not strictly adhere to his source material. By 
reading his choices against his sources we can see how he gives prominence to friendship. 
As Paulina Kewes points out, The Rape of Lucrece is alone among late Elizabethan and 
                                                          
103 Catherine Belsey, ‘Textual Analysis as a Research Method’ in Research Methods for English Studies ed. 
by Gabriele Griffin (Edinburgh:  Edinburgh University Press, 2005), pp. 157-174, (p. 167). 
104 Tiziano Vecellio (Titian) 1568-71 Rape of Lucretia (Tarquin and Lucretia). The painting is in The 
Fitzwilliam Museum, Cambridge.  
105 David Cressy, Birth, Marriage, and Death: Ritual, Religion, and the Life-cycle in Tudor and Stuart 
England (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 342-343. 
106 Cressy notes that ‘godly critics’ in Tudor and Stuart England disapproved of the use of the ring, but that 
James I viewed the ring as fundamental in Birth, Marriage and Death, pp. 344-345.  
107 See Cressy, p. 438 and Keith Thomas, The Ends of Life: Roads to Fulfilment in Early Modern England 
(Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. 188, 251. 
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early Jacobean Roman plays in its blatant renunciation of historical authenticity’.108 In 
another significant deviation, Heywood re-writes the ending, diverging from the 
representation in Shakespeare’s narrative poem, and as Kewes observes, ‘drastically 
compresses’ the rape.109 Certainly plays and poems work differently, and what might be 
expressed in the written word may be more problematic to represent on stage, but this 
compression serves an important function in Heywood’s overall treatment of friendship’s 
superiority, as his condensing of the betrayal by the false friend not only downplays its 
significance, but also, allows the focus to be shifted to the depiction of its converse:  
steadfast friendship.  He follows a similar course in The English Traveller, as previously 
discussed.  In both plays this assigns a greater significance to the altruistic and honourable 
deeds of the loyal friend, namely, the self-sacrificial revenge, after the rape headed by 
Brutus, and the self-denial of Young Geraldine, rather than reinforce the deeds of the false 
ones.  While an audience is left with an understanding that friends can indeed be 
Machiavels, moreover, Heywood impresses upon them that in the face of trials friends can 
be steadfast and ‘performe the part of a faithfull friend’.110  This is a significant point of 
departure from Shakespeare’s emphasis in A Winter’s Tale and especially Othello, where 
the ending suggests the outlook for loyal friendship is bleak. In this way Heywood’s 
contribution to the discourse of marriage and friendship is notably different. 
     Despite the deaths of Wincott’s wife and Lucrece in The English Traveller and Lucrece, 
in the end, male homosocial bonds are strengthened and re-established. In both plays, the 
wives are, albeit in differing ways, integral to this resolution.  As Janet Clare notes, 
Lucrece, in her final moments of life, ‘is instrumental in inciting Junius Brutus, her father 
                                                          
108 Kewes, p. 250. 
109 Kewes, p. 247. 
110 Richard Barckley, The Felicitie of Man, or, His Summum Bonum (London : Printed by R. Young for Rich: 
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and her husband to rise against and depose Tarquin. Without her incitement there would be 
no rebellion and no challenge to tyranny’.111  Additionally, there would be no test of 
Brutus’ loyalty to Collatine.  Lucrece’s recounting of the rape leads to a moment of sworn 
brotherhood and the reaffirmation of unity between the men, as they pledge their 
allegiance on Brutus’ sword and vow fidelity to unite in ‘just revenge’:  ‘As you are 
Romans, and esteem your fame / More than your lives/ [...] / Revive your native valours, 
be yourselves, / And join with Brutus/ [...]/ swear!’ (5.1, p. 407).  Heywood furthers this 
sense with another dramatic choice that differs from his source. He does not merely banish 
the Tarquins; rather, they are killed, allowing Brutus to die avenging the rape of Lucrece 
by killing Sextus.  This is a significant alteration from the source and from Shakespeare’s 
poem, because rather than punctuate the play with the selfless act of the wife, who is 
willing to sacrifice herself for the sake of her husband’s honour and reputation, the play 
ends by emphasising Brutus’ self-sacrificing act in avenging her death, which serves to 
recover Collatine’s reputation, as the rape is understood as wronging him. While this might 
have been a way for Heywood to capitalise on audience interest in onstage revenge, it 
alters the way friendship is depicted.  Lucrece’s death carries great weight and significance 
in Shakespeare’s poem, but here, the addition of the parallel act of sacrifice by Brutus 
almost serves to trump Lucrece’s, as it reinforces the friend’s noble deed in laying down 
his life for duty, justice, and friendship.  This idea of the differing significance apportioned 
to each sacrifice is further borne out in the attention given to each in the text.  After 
Lucrece’s death, Brutus maintains she will be honoured: ‘Lucrece, thy death we’ll mourn 
in glittering arms / And plumèd casques.  Some bear that reverend load / Unto the forum’ 
(5.2, p. 408).  Nevertheless, there is no accompanying lament by Collatine and no 
references to the nobility of her act after this point.  In Gynaikeion, Heywood emphasises 
                                                          
111 Janet Clare, Revenge Tragedies of the Renaissance (Tavistock:  Northcote, 2006), p. 115. 
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the willingness of wives, including Lucrece, who are willing to sacrifice their lives for 
their husbands, particularly Alceste, who does so when no friend or kinsmen would.112  In 
the play, however, Lucrece’s sacrifice and the part it plays in helping to establish the 
Republic is somewhat overshadowed by the final, notable death, Brutus’, which resonates 
nobly, and with heroic significance in the moment, and for posterity.  Horatius declares: 
 
    O noble Brutus, this thy fame 
   To after ages shall survive; thy body  
   Shall have a fair and gorgeous sepulchre,  
   for whom the matrons shall in funeral black  
   Mourn twelve sad moons –thou that first governed Rome,  
   And swayed the people by a consul’s name. (5.6, p. 423).  
  
Horatius’ words reinforce the importance of Brutus’ sacrificial act and the necessity of 
strong, homosocial ties.   
     In Lucrece friendship is undeveloped on a close personal level and left to be mainly 
assumed from an understanding of the historical source. The friendship between Brutus, 
Horatius, Valerius and Collatine prior to the rape is portrayed as somewhat frivolous, in 
the ‘merry wager’ (3.4, p. 380) that takes them from the serious business of the camp.  The 
friendships that are solidified by Lucrece’s death get their fullest expression in this 
instance,  as they become almost chivalric in nature and  akin to ‘sworn brotherhood’, the 
type of friendship that Laurens Mills notes was ‘frequently’ depicted in medieval literature 
and ‘distinct from classical friendship’.113  The group friendship is somewhat reminiscent 
of Orestes and Pylades’ unity in seeking retribution and justice for Agamemnon’s murder, 
as this and the rebellion to overthrow the Tarquins unite the men in a common purpose; 
                                                          
112 Heywood, Gynaikeion, pp. 120, 126, 159-160.   
113 Laurens Mills, One Soul in Bodies Twain:  Friendship in Tudor Literature and Stuart Drama 
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however, Heywood offers no suggestion that the friendships meet any of the requisites of 
perfect friendship.  It is only Brutus’ constancy and sacrifice in the end that calls to mind 
the ideal.   
     Further, the plot itself rests on the betrayal of Collatine by the friend, Sextus, as such 
this was not true friendship, despite its contradictory characterisation by Lucrece in Act 4.  
In fact, this is the first instance where their friendship and its basis is articulated in the 
play.  Lucrece remarks to Sextus, ‘Oft, and many times, /  I have heard my husband speak 
of Sextus’ valour, /  Extol your worth, praise your perfection, / Ay, dote upon your valour, 
and your friendship’ (4.1, p. 386).  Moreover, she deems Sextus as ‘one that loves my lord’ 
(4.3, p. 391).  Of course if Sextus was loved as a friend, this may have served to heighten 
the betrayal in the audience’s eyes. But Heywood suggests, as he had previously in his 
depiction of Frankford and Wendoll, the asymmetry possible in male friendship in terms of 
one’s understanding the nature and depth of the bond.  In Lucrece, Sextus’ assessment of 
the friendship does not necessarily bear out Lucrece’s estimation, as he refers to Collatine 
only as his ‘wronged kinsmen’ (4.3, p. 390).   
     This friendship depicted by Heywood that leaves undeveloped the depth of the ties 
between Collatine and Brutus, and Collatine and Sextus, reflects the political friendship 
that Aristotle underscores in the Ethics as ‘concord’. Generally, these appear to be more 
civic and useful friendships centred around a bond of loyalty to the state and democratic 
principles rather than intimate bonds.  As Lorraine Smith Pangle explains, ‘concord relates 
primarily to matters of weighty consequence, to justice and the freedom and security of 
whole cities and nations’.114 It is a friendship borne of a joint purpose where ‘affection for 
the homeland leads men to identify their good with its good and join in its support’.115  
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Although it is an instrumental friendship, and not indicative of the unity of perfect 
friendship, Smith Pangle explains that it still is reliant on virtue to a certain extent.116  The 
overturning of injustice through the military friendships of Collatine and his men and their 
ousting of the Tarquins promotes the good, as Aristotle defines it.  According to Smith 
Pangle such political friendships were ‘another reason why Aristotle has been reluctant to 
deny that utilitarian friendship is real friendship’.117  This ‘concord’ as friendship was the 
type of friendship advanced in Elizabeth’s Royal Entry pageants, and the address to her 
Parliament discussed in Chapter 1.  It is also asserted in King James’ edict overturning 
Elizabeth’s policy against Spain, namely, the ‘surprising and taking of the said Kings [sic] 
subjects and goods’.118  James declares, ‘we stood, as still wee doe,  in good amitie and 
friendship with all the Princes of Christendome, and therefore are carefully to provide, as 
much as in us lyeth, that none of them or their Subjects should by any hostile action be 
endamaged.’119  To be sure, these instances, like the depiction in Lucrece are not 
indicative of the Ciceronean ideal of ‘one soul in two bodies’ or for that matter, Aris
and Seneca’s ideas of perfect friendship, but they are recognised as a more inclusive amit
civic friendship, focused on the good. 
totle 
y:   
                                                          
     Interestingly, Heywood uses his wives in Lucrece and The English Traveller to 
comment on their husband’s feelings for the friend.  Lucrece’s evaluation employs a 
similar word that Heywood uses to describe Wincott’s affection for Young Geraldine: 
‘dote’ (1.1.179). Collatine and Wincott are said to ‘dote’ on Sextus and Young Geraldine, 
respectively. And it is something the wives understand completely, either articulating that 
sense, as Lucrece does, or commenting on it, as does Wincott’s wife.  This use is also 
116 Smith Pangle, pp. 157-158. 
117 Smith Pangle, p. 158. 
118 James I, ‘By the King’, dated 23 June 1603 (London: Robert Barler, 1603), page 1 of 2. 
119 James I, ‘By the King’, page 1 of 2. 
278 
 
striking, in that it adds to that sense of the blurred line and shared language of friendship 
and love, as its range of connotations during this time suggests ranging from ‘infatuatedly 
fond of’ to the point that one confers ‘excessive love or fondness on or upon’, to the state 
of being ‘foolishly in love’.120  While these usages can be traced to 1477, in 1591 it is 
invoked by Shakespeare, notably, in another play that considers friendship and love, 
namely, Two Gentleman of Verona; however, it is coined in relation to the female object of 
affection:  ‘You doate on her, that cares not for your love’ (4.4.87).  In Heywood, both of 
the recipients are the male friends.  
      Nevertheless, when Wincott refers to Young Geraldine as a man ‘I love, nay almost 
dote on’ (1.1.179), he is not describing ideal friendship.  His relationship with Young 
Geraldine is based on inequality, as Young Geraldine is markedly similar to his wife, ‘not 
above two years different’ in age (1.1.87, 89), as they were actually ‘playfellows’ of youth.  
Wincott may appreciate Young Geraldine’s virtue in the end, and especially his passing 
the test of loyalty, but this is not what Heywood depicts has drawn Wincott to Young 
Geraldine.  The ideal friend must, as Heywood suggests in A Woman Killed with Kindness 
as well, not counsel, but prove entertaining:  a ‘good companion’(1.4.30).  In The English 
Traveller the ideal is something less noble, and aligns the friendship with Aristotle’s 
description of friendships of delectation.  In Lucrece the perfect friend must hold similar 
Roman democratic values and virtues, and be willing to forsake other relationships for the 
good of the state. Most importantly, Heywood’s ideal must be tested, at the expense of the 
wife, in all of his formulations of friendship: civic, chivalric, and pleasurable, and prove 
constant in a self-sacrificial way.  
     In The English Traveller  and The Rape of Lucrece Heywood figures Wincott and 
Collatine’s eudaimonia  in the same way as, according to Shepard, contemporary conduct 
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literature considered  the ‘place’ of men, ‘almost exclusively in terms of their relationships 
with other men’.121  So when Buckingham, a man whose ‘place’ was determined by 
intimate, male friendship, visited the Globe to see Lucrece in August 1628, he might have 
done so with an eye on the political resonances of the play:  namely, the ‘unfavorable [sic] 
comparisons between the Stuarts and the Tarquins’ in the 1620s (and 1630s), or the 
representation of what Kewes calls ‘the politically sensitive theme:  the King’s rejection of 
counsel’.122 Nevertheless, he could not fail to recognise from personal experience how 
prioritising male friendship would compromise the nature and viability of marriage. 
     Lisa Jardine argues that Jacobean drama ‘makes the woman bear the burden of an 
irresolvable conflict between competing social modes in early modern life’.123  And in 
both plays the conflicting ‘modes’ are friendship and marriage.  Heywood underscores this 
conflict, asserting the primacy of male friendship by positing wives bound by gender 
constraints of the early modern and Roman patriarchies that render them incapable of 
achieving the equitable, amicable relations in marriage that Aquinas, the early modern 
Church and conduct writers idealised; relations that the husband could realise in male 
friendship, which although were not perfect, were preferable.  And similar to those 
thinkers who idealised marriage along amicable lines, Heywood makes his stage wives 
unwitting challengers to male friendship, who in the end must sacrifice themselves and 
their marriages for the necessity of male business and male bonding.  
      
                                                          
121 Shepard, p. 34. 
122 Kewes, pp. 260, 262. 




In early modern England, where favour and fortune could rise and fall at whim, where 
threats were feared from the familiar and the foreign alike, and where men were reminded 
that women were inconstant, true and steadfast friendship offered a bastion of hope amidst 
any incoming storm.1  Its early modern construction seemed to have this very much in 
mind.  Its guiding principles were buttressed with appeals to ancient authority, infused 
with Christian morality, and peddled as a salve for man and commonwealth through 
translations of classical treatises and pithy precepts aimed at changing minds and 
behaviour through an attempt at codifying friendship in a way that would compel 
adherence.  This became especially important in post-Reformation society when, as 
Douglas Bush suggests, Protestantism in essence ‘made every man his own priest’.2  This 
may help to explain in part why Christian morality informed classical ideologies of 
friendship in translations:  to provide the compelling force to alter behaviour that classical 
appeals to virtue for its own sake lacked.   
     Friendship’s rewards were innumerable and were emphasised in the discourse; the 
obligations of friendship were equally prominent, daunting and demanding.  A friend 
could indeed be a companion, but also an ethical guide for one’s moral compass, and this 
idea, and the recognition of private friendship’s reverberant possibilities—both negative 
and positive—by humanists undoubtedly drove what Lorna Hutson calls the ‘reading 
                                                 
1 See for instance Leonard Culmann’s  Sententiae Pueriles  (London : Printed by H. L[ownes] for Thomas 
Man, 1612).  Its subtitle ‘translated grammatically leading the learner, as by the hand, to construe right, 
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inconvenience’ indicates its intent as a school text. On page 11 are the precepts ‘Good friends are rare’ and 
‘Nothing is more pretious then a faithfull friend’.  On page 7 is found:  ‘Inconstancy doth disdaine friendes’, 
and on page 6:  ‘women are inconstant’ .   
2 Douglas Bush, The Renaissance and English Humanism. (Toronto:  University of Toronto Press, 1939; rpt. 
1962), p. 35. 
281 
 
programme’ that ‘transformed the education of Englishmen’.3  Friendship, like religion, 
was not merely a ‘private matter’.4 With friendship’s cultural significance so impressive, 
and its performance the measure of its attainment and character, it is no surprise that 
Richard Edwards, John Ford, John Foxe, Thomas Goffe, Thomas Heywood, John Lyly and 
three anonymous playwrights saw rich potential in representing its attempt, realisation and 
failure.  They seized upon the opportunity these instances provided to invoke fear, pity, 
sympathy and even laughter in their audiences. They did so by juxtaposing true and useful 
friendship, by questioning the extent of friendship’s obligations and exploring its 
disappointments, by depicting its excesses, limitations and potential for asymmetry in 
affection and practice, and by considering its effects on society through fictive worlds and 
courts. 
     When Tullius in The Faithful Friends (1614) remarks ‘the Storie of Orestes, was a 
fable’ (fol. 26b 1976) and Laches in Timon (1602-3) acerbically deems the inconstant 
Eutrapelus ‘another Pylades’ (fo. 23a 2530) their dramatists register a similar sentiment 
seen in Walter Dorke’s earlier lament (1589) that ‘a man may as soone see a black Swan, 
as finde out a faithfull friend’:  disillusionment with the ideal.5  It was not that the 
dramatists, Dorke, or even later, Braitwaithe, who also bemoaned the inability to find a 
latter day Orestes or Pylades, truly believed that Cicero’s model for friendship could be 
reproduced over fifteen hundred years later in early modern England; they were merely 
reflecting that the theoretical ideal held up for emulation was unachievable in practice. 
Undoubtedly, the humanist and didactic writers, translators and compilers who flooded the 
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discourse of friendship with Ciceronean precepts and made De amicitia a staple of the 
grammar school curriculum recognised this themselves.  They understood that providing a 
theoretical framework for perfect friendship would not guarantee a populace made up of 
friends such as Laelius and Scipio, just as they realised that inculcating students in 
Ciceronean rhetoric would not assure that the commonwealth would have innumerable 
orators on par with Cicero. Nevertheless, they saw the merit in providing gentlemen a 
model for friendship that detailed its guiding principles. They harboured the same hope for 
better relations that Cicero had when he wrote De amicitia under similar conditions, when 
useful friendships were integral to a man’s success and stability of the state.  As such, men 
like Erasmus made key tenets of ideal friendship commonplace, and men like Thomas 
Elyot recounted stories of perfect friends in their treatises on education and politics.  
     But a friend could no more be expected to be a Pylades, than a wife could be expected 
to be an Esther, even though didactic literature asserted these possibilities. Yet, conduct 
writers saw value in teaching through parables, for historical models of ideal pairs 
provided an opportunity to bring the theory of friendship to life. The problem of course, is 
that an ideal is just that.  It may represent the ‘highest conception’ of something, but also it 
is ‘a hypothetical construct’, ‘existing only in idea’ and ‘confined to thought or 
imagination’.6  So even though Cicero’s work attempted to express the ‘idea’ of friendship 
in words, his rhetoric of unity, equality and constancy, though oft-quoted in the early 
modern period, frequently proved difficult to put into practice.   
     The eleven plays examined in this thesis engaged with this dilemma and the resultant 
differing expectations and misunderstandings that affected friendships. They explored the 
imagined classical ideal, envisaged it in action and tested its viability through negotiation 
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with ideas on friendship by Aristotle, Cicero and Seneca.  They traced the way that the 
ideal friend as ‘another self’ was vulnerable to public pressures and self-interest and 
registered an understanding of the friend’s fundamental importance to a man’s life and 
success.  He was made integral to dramatic plots, and at times advanced his friend like a 
devoted ‘deputy’, yet given no stage ‘life’ of his own, ironically mirroring the loss of self 
that the Ciceronean ideal made requisite in a world where friends were not ‘disinterested’ 
selves, but rather, self-interested men. 7    
     In drama the ideal friend also became an ‘inferior’ capable of promoting honour and 
reputation rendering friendship akin to caritas. ‘He’ could also be a wife.  Both instances 
registered a further dissolution of the Ciceronean ideal of exclusivity through recognition 
of the many formulations of philia outlined in Aristotle’s Ethics.  In this way dramatists 
reflected the cultural understanding that lords could be friends with their ‘men’, their kin, 
their wives, and also could be friends to the poor.  That is, Timon could share his wealth 
with men of equal and lesser rank, and Frankford could help the down-on-his-luck 
gentleman, Wendoll. But the friend was also sought as a companion, by country 
gentlemen, by kings, and in some cases by husbands after marriage. Friendship was 
depicted as capable of righting injustice and helping to create a republic.  
     Edwards, Ford, Foxe, Goffe, Heywood, Lyly, and the three anonymous dramatists may 
have reworked plots, and imagined friendship through artificially created situations, but 
their representations of friendship did not vacillate at either end of the extremes:  their 
friends were not always perfect, and they were not always Iago-like.  Their portrayals 
offered an alternative to the standardisation advanced by the Ciceronean model, as 
friendship was figured as unique rather than uniform, as individual characters, their 
                                                 
7 For a discussion of the ‘alienated self’ that perfect friendship creates see Tom MacFaul, Male Friendship in 
Shakespeare and his Contemporaries (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 1-2, 196-197. 
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experiences, their understanding, and their situations helped to define what was ideal.  
Even so, their work evidenced a similar insistence on the period’s abiding preoccupation 
with three aspects of amicable relations:  benefit, constancy, and gratitude.  Through 
comedy, satire and tragedy the plays engaged with Seneca’s ideas about the conventions of 
friendship and giving outlined in De beneficiis, specifically benefit and gratitude, even if 
they did not register a sense of the similar ethical underpinning of Seneca’s philosophy of 
friendship. The dramatists highlighted the benefits that men were to look for and realise in 
friendship and pointed up that constancy, gratitude, and reward were essential to maintain 
amicable bonds.   Edwards, Foxe and Goffe did so even in their consideration of 
paradigmatic friendship pairs, perhaps recognising as Arthur Golding and Thomas Lodge 
had when they thought De beneficiis useful for translation, that men could not be Stoic 
sages or disinterested friends, but giving and receiving could be the beginning and end of 
friendship.  
     The aim of this thesis was to add further dimension and scope to an understanding of 
early modern friendship by considering the contributions made to the discourse by 
dramatic representation on the academic, commercial and private stages. Through an 
examination of works in their cultural context and an exploration of early modern 
examples of private and public practices of friendship, certain resonances could be felt.  
The overall hope was to illustrate how a consideration of Aristotle’s Ethics and Seneca’s 
De beneficiis might open up meanings of friendship in early modern drama and practice, 
just as an understanding of Cicero’s De amicitia has provided insights, for their authors 
had much in common.  Aristotle, Cicero and Seneca saw the benefit of friendship, and 
viewed it as a ‘good’, even if Seneca believed that the truly wise man was self-sufficient.  
All of their works on friendship were equally grounded in a strong moral ethic.  But in De 
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amicitia Cicero does not acknowledge a friendship that is not perfect, and as such its 
inflexibility is revealed in practice.  De beneficiis and The Nicomachean Ethics outline a 
more realistic sense of how amicable relations are conducted.  We may think of it this way, 
Cicero’s De amicitia details what ideal friendship should look like, and more to the point, 
what it shouldn’t; Aristotle’s Ethics describes the many faces of amity in all its inclusive 
conceptions and formulations; and Seneca’s De beneficiis contributes in a more practical 
way, providing advice on the behaviors necessary to cultivate and maintain amicable 
bonds.  It is in this way that dramatists engaged with the ideas on friendship from all three 
philosophers.  With this in mind, the results of this study suggest that there is still more to 
be learned by exploring classical ideas beyond De amicitia when reading dramatic works 
for what they have to say about friendship.  This warrants a more inclusive and thorough 
investigation of the influence of the ideas on friendship by Aristotle, and particularly by 
Seneca, on the conception and practice of amicable relations in the period.  Despite the 
limited scope of this current study, it is clear that the contributions to the discourse made 
by Edwards, Ford, Foxe, Goffe, Heywood, Lyly, and the three anonymous dramatists were 
significant, as their representations suggested more gradations of experience than the 
extremes of ideal and disloyal friendship that translations and redactions emphasised. 
Their representations of friendship’s enactment and practice, specifically through an 
engagement with the ideas on giving and receiving in friendship from De beneficiis, 
suggests that the ideas from the work had greater resonance than has heretofore been 
considered.   
     The question raised by Lorna Hutson’s work about the extent to which we can ‘read’ 
the omnipresence of the Ciceronean model correlating to a belief by men that their 
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friendships should comply remains important.8 Contemporary writers such as Richard 
Braithwaite certainly lamented the ideal’s elusive nature, and dramatists satirised it.  The 
work in this thesis, despite its limited scope, demonstrates that there are indeed other ways 
in which to read early modern enactments and stage depictions of friendship, as they were 
variable in their conformity with the exclusive Ciceronean ideal. Whether these instances 
can be viewed as a measure of ‘belief’ may remain unresolved.  It certainly appears that 
the ideas and principles of benefiting, giving and receiving from De beneficiis were a part 
of the discourse and practice, as were the more inclusive formulations of amity posited by 
Aristotle.  Even so, early modern men and dramatists did register a familiarity with the 
Ciceronean model and the positive implications of asserting adherence to its principles 
despite practice that represented, embraced and underscored utility.   
     As a Stoic, Seneca believed that a man could live happily without friendship. Even so, 
he acknowledged its significance to a man’s life.  In a letter to his friend, Lucilus, he 
reflects: 
 
 he marrieth a wife: he is contented with himself, he bringeth up children, hee  
 is content in himselfe; and yet would he not live, if he should live    
 without mankinde. No profit but a naturall instinct inciteth him to entertain  
 friendship: for as in other things we have a certaine inbred sweetnesse, so have  
 we of friendship.9 
 
The dramatists whose work was a part of this study understood men’s inherent disposition 
for male friendship and articulated the same through depictions of men who, much like 
                                                 
8 Hutson, p.62. 
9 Lucius Annaeus Seneca, His Epistles in The Workes of Lucius Annaeus Seneca translated by Thomas 
Lodge (London:  Printed by William Stansby, 1614), Epistle IX, p. 176. 
287 
 
their early modern counterparts, may have seemingly had it all, yet still saw the benefit in 
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